- "Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, who had succeeded Nimitz as CNO on 15 December 1947" - Checks out
- "Matthews resigned on 31 July 1951, and became the United States Ambassador to Ireland" - Source just says July 1951, doesn't say the exact date.
- In the caption to NH 77355-KN Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:20, 12 January 2021 (UTC)
- The block quote from Smith - I'm checking vs. the refs and there's the words "if destroyed concurrently" missing between "and weapons factories ... would "; missing ", therefore, " between forced and to in "and we were forced to look for panacea targets". Also, the sources have "is stopped" instead of "stops" in "and his circulatory system stops"
Y Corrected. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:20, 12 January 2021 (UTC)
- "The wartime Chief of the USAAF, General of the Army Henry H. Arnold, contended that the conventional bombing had destroyed Japan's ability to wage war, and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had given the Emperor of Japan an excuse to end the war" - Checks out
- "A research group, OP-23, a naval intelligence unit formed in early 1948 by Denfeld to advise him on unification and later headed by Captain Arleigh Burke, had been gathering information to help defend the Navy's position, including material critical of the B-36's performance and capabilities" - You sure early 1948 is right? Steele p. 139 says The Organizational Research and Policy Division (OP-23) was created in December 1948 to promote the Navy within the military establishment, which doesn't really agree with early 1943.
- Y Changed to "December". Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:20, 12 January 2021 (UTC)
- " Johnson was also a member of the board of directors of Convair, the company that produced the B-36, and the head of Convair's law firm" vs. a member of the board of directors of Consolidated-Vultee (Convair), the corporation that produced the B-36, as well as the head of Convair’s key law firm,. Checks out, but is there a way you can rephrase this so it's not as close to exact wording of the source?
- Y Re-worded. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:20, 12 January 2021 (UTC)
- "and confidently predicted that "large-scale amphibious operations, such as those in Sicily and Normandy, will never occur again" - Checks out
- "The services were reduced from 95 army and marine divisions to 12, from 213 air groups to 63 (only 11 of which were operational, with many existing only on paper) and from 1,166 warships to 343" - Several issues here. Source says 91 army divisions and 6 marine division, which is 97, not 95. Source also indicates that the army and marine divisions were mostly understrength and only two were combat-ready, should this be mentioned too? Lastly, the source only states that "some probably only existed on paper", while the article pretty much states that they definitely only existed on paper.
- Y There is an error in the source, due to a misunderstanding by its author of his source (which I checked). Only 89 US Army divisions were operational during WWII. The extra two were caused by the 2nd Cavalry Division, which was formed and disbanded twice. I'll add another source. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:20, 12 January 2021 (UTC)
- "Many air force officers were skeptical of the value of the B-36" - Checks out
- "Trained crews were also in short supply; at the beginning of 1948 only six crews were qualified to fly atomic bombing missions, although enough personnel had been trained to assemble an additional fourteen in an emergency" - Checks out.
Hog Farm Bacon 03:17, 11 January 2021 (UTC)
