Talk:World War II/Archive 63

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Archive 65

Ideas for new text for entry

I have some new text that I would like to propose. I will list them seperately below.

• In Soviet–Japanese border conflicts section:
  • Old text: In the mid-to-late 1930s, Japanese forces in Manchukuo had sporadic border clashes with the Soviet Union and Mongolia. The Japanese doctrine of Hokushin-ron, which emphasised Japan's expansion northward, was favoured by the Imperial Army during this time. With the Japanese defeat at Khalkin Gol in 1939, the ongoing Second Sino-Japanese War[49] and ally Nazi Germany pursuing neutrality with the Soviets, this policy would prove difficult to maintain. Japan and the Soviet Union eventually signed a Neutrality Pact in April 1941, and Japan adopted the doctrine of Nanshin-ron, promoted by the Navy, which took its focus southward, eventually leading to its war with the United States and the Western Allies.[50][51]
  • Proposed text (in italics): In the mid-to-late 1930s, Japanese forces in Manchukuo had sporadic border clashes with the Soviet Union and Mongolia. The Japanese doctrine of Hokushin-ron, which emphasised Japan's expansion northward, was favoured by the Imperial Army during this time. The battles between the Soviet Union and Japan in 1939 were much larger compared to those of the immediate prior years, and are referred to by some historians as the "Forgotten Soviet-Japanese War;" this is due to both the scale of the battles, and also, the resulting crucial impact on Japanese strategic decisions, which may have affected the ultimate outcome of World War II.

With the Japanese defeat at Khalkin Gol in 1939, the ongoing Second Sino-Japanese War and ally Nazi Germany pursuing neutrality with the Soviets, this policy would prove difficult to maintain. Japan and the Soviet Union eventually signed a Neutrality Pact in April 1941, and Japan adopted the doctrine of Nanshin-ron, promoted by the Navy, which took its focus southward, eventually leading to its war with the United States and the Western Allies.

• In World_War_II#Pacific (1942-43)
  • Proposed text: In early June, Japan put its operations into action, but the Americans, having broken Japanese naval codes in late May, were fully aware of the plans and order of battle, and used this knowledge to achieve a decisive victory at Midway over the Imperial Japanese Navy. This proved to be a major strategic turning point in the Pacific War. Prior to the Battle of Midway, Japanese forces won every battle. After the Battle of Midway, Japanese forces were continually retreating, losing strategic positions with each subsequent battle with U.S. forces.

I appreciate any feedback on this. thanks. ---Sm8900 (talk) 🌍 10:22, 20 January 2022 (UTC)

Is that true Battle of Yenangyaung] was before Midway, as was (arguably, as both sodes claimed it) was the Battle of the Coral Sea.Slatersteven (talk) 10:28, 20 January 2022 (UTC)

@Slatersteven:, those are valid points. however, clearly the Battle of Midway was the major strategic victory which enabled the US Navy to go over onto the offensive. that is self-evident from the simple events of the Battle of Midway itself, in regards to its most basic events; the sinking of multiple large carriers was a major strategic victory for the USA, by any standard!! ---Sm8900 (talk) 🌍 10:32, 20 January 2022 (UTC)

But it was not a case the Japanese had won every battle before it. And I wonder if it is even true they lost everybattle after it.Slatersteven (talk) 10:37, 20 January 2022 (UTC)

Slatersteven, ok, those are all valid questions. for answers, please see quotes below from the relevant articles for those historical events.

• from Battle of Yenangyaung#Results: For the British, according to Allen, "Deprived of a supply port at Rangoon, then of its source of fuel at Yenangyaung, the question was no longer whether to retreat, but where to?"
• from Battle of the Coral Sea#Significance: Both sides publicly claimed victory after the battle. In terms of ships lost, the Japanese won a tactical victory by sinking a U.S. fleet carrier, an oiler, and a destroyer – 41,826 long tons (42,497 t) – versus a light carrier, a destroyer, and several smaller warships – 19,000 long tons (19,000 t) – sunk by the U.S. side. Lexington represented, at that time, 25% of U.S. carrier strength in the Pacific.

I hope that helps to answer your valid questions. thanks. ---Sm8900 (talk) 🌍 11:26, 20 January 2022 (UTC)

No really as it does not change the fact your edit looks like wp:or.Slatersteven (talk) 11:30, 20 January 2022 (UTC)

section break

Ok. here are some relevant quotes. this view is actually generally accepted. I'm glad to discuss this item fully here, of course.

• "The Battle of Midway effectively destroyed Japan’s naval strength when the Americans destroyed four of its aircraft carriers. Japan’s navy never recovered from its mauling at Midway and it was on the defensive after this battle." Battle of Midway, History learning site.
• "This critical US victory stopped the growth of Japan in the Pacific and put the United States in a position to begin shrinking the Japanese empire through a years-long series of island-hopping invasions and several even larger naval battles." Article at National WW 2 musuem.
• "the IJN fleet was cursed to be led by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto—a leader of such stature and mystique that subordinates deferred to him out of habit. Never mind whether his ideas concerning operations and strategy made sense. As they sometimes didn’t. The result of Japanese seafarers’ deference prior to Midway: the needless loss of the Kidō Butai, the IJN’s aircraft-carrier fleet and main striking arm. Worse from Tokyo’s standpoint, Midway halted the Japanese Empire’s till-then unbroken string of naval victories." World War II: Why Did Japan Lose the Battle of Midway? National Interest.
• "Midway found the Imperial Japanese Navy’s offensive capabilities routed after six months of success against the Americans. As Frank Blazich, lead curator of military history at the Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History, explains, the battle leveled the playing field, giving U.S. forces “breathing room and time to go on the offensive” in campaigns such as Guadalcanal." The True Story of the Battle of Midway, Smithsonian website.

Also, take a look at the actual list of battles, from List of battles of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Remember, I said in my proposed text that the Japanese were continually on the retreat. the list below makes clear that after MIdway, even if they won an occasional tactical victory, and only now and then, they never won a strategic victory again, meaning their forces were always on the move backwards, and they never gained any new ground or any new objective ever again in the war.

list of battles

List of battles of the Imperial Japanese Navy: Attack on Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941, major Japanese tactical victory; destruction of much of the United States Navy (USN) battleship fleet, strategically inconclusive) Battle of Wake Island (8–23 December 1941, Japanese victory against US) Attack on Prince of Wales and Repulse (10 December 1941, decisive Japanese victory; destruction of the British Royal Navy (RN) Z force) Battle of Balikpapan (23–24 January 1942, Allied tactical victory, Japanese strategic victory) Battle off Endau (26–27 January 1942, Japanese victory against Allies) Battle of Makassar Strait (4 February, 1942, Japanese victory against Allies) Attack on Darwin (19 February 1942, Japanese victory against Allies) Battle of Badung Strait (18–19 February 1942, Japanese victory against Allies) First Battle of Rabaul (20 February 1942, US tactical victory, Japanese strategic victory) First Battle of the Java Sea (27 February 1942, major Japanese victory against Allies; IJN sinks five warships without loss) Battle of Sunda Strait (28 February–1 March 1942, major Japanese victory against Allies; IJN destroys Allied fleet) Second Battle of the Java Sea (1 March 1942, decisive Japanese victory; destruction of Allied naval force in Indonesia) Battle of Salamaua-Lae (8-13 March 1942, Allied tactical victory, Japanese strategic victory) Indian Ocean raid (31 March 1942, Japanese victory against Allies) Battle of the Coral Sea (4-8 May 1942, Japanese tactical victory, Allied strategic victory) Battle of Madagascar (5 May–6 November 1942, Allied victory against Vichy French and small contingent of Japanese submarines) Attack on Sydney Harbour (31 May–8 June 1942, Japanese victory against Allies) Battle of Midway' (5 June 1942, major US victory; IJN loses four carriers, while USN loses one carrier) Battle of Savo Island (9 August 1942, major Japanese tactical victory against Allies; IJN sinks four heavy cruisers without loss, strategically inconclusive) Battle of the Eastern Solomons (24 August 1942, US victory) Battle of Cape Esperance (11-12 October 1942, US tactical victory, strategically inconclusive) Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands (26 October 1942, Japanese tactical victory, US strategic victory) Battle of Guadalcanal (12 November 1942, major US victory; USN repulses major IJN troop convoy) Battle of Tassafaronga (30 November 1942, Japanese tactical victory against US, strategically inconclusive) Battle of Rennell Island (29-30 January 1943, Japanese defensive victory against US) Battle of the Bismarck Sea (2-4 March 1943, major Allied victory; Allied aircraft destroy major IJN troop convoy) Battle of Blackett Strait (6 March 1943, US victory) Battle of the Komandorski Islands (26 March 1943, tactically inconclusive, US strategic victory) Operation I-Go (1-16 April 1943, Japanese tactical victory against Allies, strategically inconclusive) Battle of Kula Gulf (6 July 1943, US tactical victory, strategically inconclusive) Battle of Kolombangara (12–13 July 1943, Japanese tactical victory against Allies, strategically inconclusive) Battle of Vella Gulf (6-7 August 1943, major US victory; USN sinks three destroyers without loss) Battle off Horaniu (17-18 August 1943, Japanese defensive victory against US) Battle of Vella Lavella (6 October 1943, Japanese defensive victory against US) Battle of Empress Augusta Bay (1 November 1943, US victory) Second Battle of Rabaul (2-11 November 1943, Allied victory) Battle of Cape St. George (25 November 1943, major US victory; USN sinks three destroyers without loss) Battle of Truk (17-18 February 1944, major US victory; IJN loses 15 warships and 32 merchant ships) Battle of the Philippine Sea (19 June 1944, decisive US victory; IJN loses three carriers and hundreds of aircraft) Battle of Formosa (12-16 October 1944, major US victory; IJN loses hundreds of aircraft) Battle of Leyte Gulf (23-26 October 1944, decisive Allied victory; IJN loses 26 warships, including four carriers and three battleships) Battle off Samar (25 October 1944, Japanese tactical victory, US strategic victory) Battle of Ormoc Bay (11 November-21 December 1944, US victory) First Battle of Kure (19 March 1945, Japanese defensive victory against US) Battle of the Malacca Strait (15-16 May 1945, RN victory) Battle of Okinawa (1 April–22 June 1945, major Allied victory; IJN loses a battleship and 15 other warships) Operation Kikusui (6 April–22 June 1945, Allied defensive victory) Operation Ten-Go (7 April 1945, major US victory; destruction of the battleship Yamato) Battle of Yokosuka (18 July 1945, Allied victory) Battle of Tokyo Bay (22–23 July 1945, US victory) Second Battle of Kure (24-28 July 1945, major Allied victory; most of remaining IJN warships are sunk)

I hope that is helpful. thanks. ---Sm8900 (talk) 🌍 11:52, 20 January 2022 (UTC)

References

I don't think that these suggested changes are improvements. They contain unreferenced claims, and we don't need to add factoids and snippets of histography to the article. The claims being made are also wrong. Nick-D (talk) 08:53, 21 January 2022 (UTC)

Why should we only post Major Axis-Allies nations?

All other war pages on Wikipedia don't do that. For arguably the most important conflict in human history, it seems problematic that this is the exception.

Allies: - United Kingdom - France - United States - Soviet Union - China - Canada - South Africa - India - Australia - New Zeeland - Poland - Czechoslovakia - Yugoslavia - Greece - Italy (1943 - 1945) - Romania (1944 - 1945) - Brazil

Axis: - Germany - Italy - Japan - Vichy France (1940 - 1944) - Hungary - Bulgaria - Romania (1940 - 1944) - Slovakia - Croatia (1941 - 1945) - Thailand Axis Co-beligerent: Finland TheLastOfTheGiants (talk) 21:30, 7 February 2022 (UTC)

Hitler and the Jews

World war II started in 1937 and started in Germany. Adolf Hitler was killing the jews. What do you call between The Jews and Hitler... The Jews didn't kill themselves. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 184.179.116.83 (talk) 16:25, 17 February 2022 (UTC)

That is genocide, not war.Slatersteven (talk) 16:30, 17 February 2022 (UTC)

Stalin threatened the Baltics before not after the start of WWII

@Paul Siebert: Thanks for your attention to my recent edits. My reading of Background of the occupation of the Baltic states#Soviet ultimatums and occupation suggests that "Stalin threatened Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with military invasion" BEFORE NOT AFTER the official beginning of WWII on 1944-09-01. That was the problem I was trying to solve. Please solve it or explain why I'm wrong. Thanks again, DavidMCEddy (talk) 06:57, 27 December 2021 (UTC)

I am not sure your interpretation is right. Soviet authorities forced the Baltic states to sign so called treaties of mutual assistance. Formally, that was not a treaty of military invasion. Retrospectively, it was interpreted as a preparation for full occupation (that happened in 1940), but it is not clear if that occupation was planned in 1939. A primary concern of Soviet authorities (which was discussed with Britain and France in 1939) was to avoid a scenario when teh Baltic states aligned with Hitler, and "treaties of mutual assistance" were aimed to prevent that scenario. Paul Siebert (talk) 15:49, 27 December 2021 (UTC)

Stalin started threatening Baltic States with military invasion on 24 September when an ultimatum was presented to Estonia, forcing it to accept treaty allowing Soviet forces on its territory. Same process was done very soon afterwards with Latvia and Lithuania. Molotov-Ribbedrop Pact secret protocol dividing spheres of influence was not a public knowledge, in fact Soviet Union denied its existence up until Perestroika.--Staberinde (talk) 16:49, 27 December 2021 (UTC)

I understand that, but the description of the events is too focused on the MRP. It is a type of a narrative that is common in a modern Central Europe, and that presents evil USSR and Nazi Germany acting in concert against other states. Furthermore, it equates Poland (which opposed to Germany from the very beginning of WWII) and the Baltic states, which were leaning to a German side, and whose position was one of the key factors that lead to the triple negotiation's failure. The Baltic states had never been on the Allied side, whereas the description of the story of their occupation by the USSR creates a false impression that they were the Allies. I agree that the current wording is not completely precise, but the new wording is more misleading. Paul Siebert (talk) 18:16, 27 December 2021 (UTC)

@Paul Siebert and Staberinde: I'm happy you two are discussing this. I trust you will find better wording and citations to back it up.

I think it's relevant to today: I think the vast majority of the people in the US think that Stalin was 100 percent evil. There's clearly a big gap between that perception and the results of opinion surveys in Russia currently. DavidMCEddy (talk) 18:26, 27 December 2021 (UTC)

The original text in this article was fine. I don't have anything more to add as the rest of the argument appears to be going offtopic.--Staberinde (talk) 19:12, 27 December 2021 (UTC)

@DavidMCEddy: We need to focus on the facts, not the sensitive opinions of people in any country. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 05:31, 25 February 2022 (UTC)

The historical consensus is that World War II started with the invasion of Poland. Anything after 1 September 1939, including the occupation of the Baltic states and the Winter War are generally considered by historians to be part of World War II. There are some fringe opinions that say otherwise, but this is the general consensus of historians. So technically speaking: Stalin threatened the Baltics after the start of World War II. Start of the Eastern Front =/= Start of World War II. TheGoldAge (talk) 14:45, 11 January 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 8 March 2022

Foxburger233 (talk) 21:30, 8 March 2022 (UTC) because I feel like people have changed it and I want to rewrite it so people can know the truth (my great grandfather was in the war)

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. Nthep (talk) 21:32, 8 March 2022 (UTC)

American casualties

What do you guys think. Which front was the most bloody for the United States. I read articles about the Italian, North African, Western fronts where references to American losses were opened and gave the figure of 185k dead soldiers. But with the Pacific Ocean, everything is not simple, the figure speaks of 161k dead soldiers fighting with Japan (185 + 161 = 346k, which is 60k short of the official 406k killed) and besides, a source indicating US losses in an article about the war in the Pacific the ocean doesn't work — Preceding unsigned comment added by 37.145.61.199 (talk) 21:47, 7 March 2022 (UTC)

I would remind you that Wikipedia is not a forum. Britmax (talk) 08:05, 15 March 2022 (UTC)

Gender roles

Gender roles before the start of the WWII 41.114.123.230 (talk) 17:27, 5 March 2022 (UTC)

I am unsure what edit you are suggesting.Slatersteven (talk) 17:36, 5 March 2022 (UTC)

Gender roles before the start of the war would probably by definition be outside the scope of this article anyway. Britmax (talk) 08:07, 15 March 2022 (UTC)

World War II Start Date Narrative very distorted?

I have a problem with this European centric narrative that WWII started in 1939 specifically 1 Sep 1939? Is Europe the World? Why is the invasion of Germany called the start of World War II when infact the war did not become global until more than a year later? Why is the invasion of Italy on Ethopia not the starting point of World War II? No the Japanese invasion of China? This is a very European centric view, are Africans and Chinese not considered part of the larger World who were already fighting for their survival? Only when the European started fighting then we call it World War?! Can we have a correction on this view? — Preceding unsigned comment added by TheElectionWatcher (talk • contribs) 03:10, 10 January 2022 (UTC)

Sure. What are the sources for the other proposed dates for the beginning of World War II? Dimadick (talk) 06:19, 10 January 2022 (UTC)

"Part of the larger world" is not "the world". The declarations of war in 1939 brought the European nations and their worldwide empires into the conflict. That is what lifted it from some regional struggles into a world war. Britmax (talk) 12:02, 11 January 2022 (UTC)

Do you consider America(USA) and Russia to be part of "the worldwide empires" of the European nations? Your explanation still falls short! and to Dimadick do we always need a source? History is written by the victors and the victors have distorted it TheElectionWatcher — Preceding undated comment added 06:45, 14 January 2022 (UTC)

do we always need a source? On Wikipedia, absolutely, yes. See: all of WP:NOR, WP:VERIFY.  — sbb (talk) 05:01, 15 January 2022 (UTC)

A site called rationalwiki says this 'The page claims "World War II is generally considered to have begun on 1 September 1939" in the lede in with no references to back up this claim. This is in spite of material made even during the war (including Prelude to War by the United States Army, which pointed to September 18, 1931 as the start date) as is the case with least five 21st-century reliable sources. It then tries to put up a fig leaf using sources that talk about when the war in Europe started and comically contradicts itself in the body text ("The dates for the beginning of war in the Pacific include the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War on 7 July 1937, or the earlier Japanese invasion of Manchuria, on 19 September 1931.") with reliable sources from what the lede in claims.' Sources: Ghuhl, Wernar (2007) Imperial Japan's World War Two Transaction Publishers pg 7

Spencer C. Tucker (23 December 2009). A Global Chronology of Conflict: From the Ancient World to the Modern Middle East. ABC-CLIO. p. 1850. ISBN 978-1-85109-672-5
Cheng, Chu-chueh (2010) The Margin Without Centre: Kazuo Ishiguro Peter Lang Page 116
Olson, James Stuart (2001) Historical Dictionary of the Great Depression, 1929-1940 Greenwood Publishing Group pg 160
Rollins, Peter (2008) Why We Fought: America's Wars in Film and History University Press of Kentucky Page 246 Dogmatic skeptic (talk) 10:03, 16 March 2022 (UTC)

The infobox, again

The Russian invasion of Ukraine seems to have sparked yet another round of edit warring to have Stalin listed below other Allied leaders in the infobox. This edit warring is plainly politically motivated given the edit summaries (e.g. [1], [2]). As a note to the editors doing this, the issue has been extensively discussed and the current shape of the infobox reflects the outcomes of those discussions. I will be reporting any further edit warring to WP:AN3. If editors are really interested in relitigating this issue, please start a good faith discussion based around reliable sources (noting that only quoting sources that supports your position is a giveaway that you are cherry picking sources). Nick-D (talk) 07:48, 18 March 2022 (UTC)

Peace treaty stalls

The WW2 peace treaty talks between Russia and Japan have stalled following sanctions on Russia over the Ukraine invasion. [3]. Might be worth including? Nford24 (PE121 Personnel Request Form) 09:22, 23 March 2022 (UTC)

Not really as its not really a hot war. Slatersteven (talk) 11:46, 23 March 2022 (UTC)

The lead does not summarize the article

The lead is meant to summarize the entire article. Yet not a single word is given on the Background and Pre-war events, both of which are substantial sections. Surely a single sentence or two could be given to state some of the factors and at least mention the existence of World War I? Aza24 (talk) 20:48, 16 March 2022 (UTC)

That's a good point. Can you suggest some text? Nick-D (talk) 09:11, 18 March 2022 (UTC)

Given the debate over what was the bigger cause, I would think a more neutral statement would be appropriate. Maybe something like "The exact causes of World War II are debated, but contributing factors include the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, the Spanish Civil War, the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Soviet–Japanese border conflicts and rising European tensions since World War I." I am by no means an expert on this period, so I propose this wording with some hesitancy. Aza24 (talk) 20:41, 18 March 2022 (UTC)

Okay, I've added this given the lack of response. I presume it is uncontroversial as merely summing up the "Pre-war events" section, but defer to others. Aza24 (talk) 23:13, 25 March 2022 (UTC)

Random blurb

49.146.154.255 (talk) 14:11, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

World War II or the Second World War, often abbreviated as WWII or WW2, was a global war that involves vitually by the hostilities, with a vast majority countries in every part of the world. It is a worldwide military conflict which including by all of the great powers and forming two opposing combatant alliances: the Allies and the Axis powers. The war was lasted from September 1, 1939 to September 2, 1945, from Europe and North Africa in the east and the Asia-Pacific in the west covering by two-thirds of land area. In a total war directly involving more than 100 million personnel from more than 30 countries across the globe, the major participants threw their entire economic, industrial, and scientific capabilities behind the war effort, blurring the distinction between civilian and military resources. Aircraft played a major role in the conflict, were used for reconnaissance, as fighters, bombers, and ground-support, and each role was advanced considerably, and of strategic bombing was enabling to targeting the enemy industrial and population centres to destroy the enemy's ability and the only two uses of nuclear weapons in the war. World War II was the deadliest, destructive and largest military conflict in human history. An estimated total of 70-85 million fatalities, including military and the majority of civilians was directly caused by the war. Tens of millions of people died due to genocides (including the Holocaust of 6.3 million Jews murdered), starvation, massacres, and disease. In the wake of the Axis defeat, Germany and Japan were occupied, and war crimes tribunals were conducted against German and Japanese leaders.

I am unsure what you are asking. Slatersteven (talk) 14:13, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 14:21, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 27 March 2022

World War II or the Second World War, often abbreviated as WWII or WW2, was a global war that involves vitually by the hostilities, with a vast majority countries in every part of the world. It is a worldwide military conflict which including by all of the great powers and forming two opposing combatant alliances: the Allies and the Axis powers. The war was lasted from September 1, 1939 to September 2, 1945. In a total war directly involving more than 100 million personnel from more than 30 countries across the globe, the major participants threw their entire economic, industrial, and scientific capabilities behind the war effort, blurring the distinction between civilian and military resources. Aircraft played a major role in the conflict, were used for reconnaissance, as fighters, bombers, and ground-support, and each role was advanced considerably, and of strategic bombing was enabling to targeting the enemy industrial and population centres to destroy the enemy's ability and the only two uses of nuclear weapons in the war. World War II was the deadliest, destructive and largest military conflict in human history. An estimated total of 70-85 million fatalities, including military and the majority of civilians was directly caused by the war. Tens of millions of people died due to genocides (including the Holocaust of 6.3 million Jews murdered), starvation, massacres, and disease. In the wake of the Axis defeat, Germany and Japan were occupied, and war crimes tribunals were conducted against German and Japanese leaders. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Markmarkgalera1997 (talk • contribs) 14:19, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

You do not need to post this twice, and you need to actually say what you want done. Slatersteven (talk) 14:21, 27 March 2022 (UTC)

Renam to World Crisis

To align with Russian-Ukraininan War naming in many publications as a crisi let's rename article to World Crisis II 46.211.229.66 (talk) 13:29, 30 March 2022 (UTC)

Sorry but no (please read wp:commonname). Slatersteven (talk) 13:35, 30 March 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 11 April 2022

I would like to add Mackenzie King in the Main allied leaders section Jerry from Hypixel skyblock (talk) 17:43, 11 April 2022 (UTC)

I am unsure he was in the top 5. Slatersteven (talk) 17:45, 11 April 2022 (UTC)

 Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit semi-protected}} template. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 20:32, 11 April 2022 (UTC)

Photo of Polish Catholic girl at Auschwitz

@E-960: Why anonymize the photo of "Czesława Kwoka, a Polish Catholic girl deported to Auschwitz"? I think it makes the story more human and compelling, to know that a girl with a particular name -- with a Wikipedia article on her -- died as a prisoner in Auschwitz. I think it's also important to recognize that not just Jews died as prisoners in Nazi death camps.

I'm restoring the name and changing the caption to, "Czesława Kwoka, a Polish Catholic girl, who died in Auschwitz"?

Thanks, DavidMCEddy (talk) 13:19, 12 April 2022 (UTC)

This was an issue that came up a couple times in the past. The reader can click into the link to read about the famous picture and the person behind it, however in this case the image is a personification of a bigger context. Perhaps you can add a citation to include a bit more detail and a direct reference to Czesława Kwoka. --E-960 (talk) 14:03, 12 April 2022 (UTC)

Finland during World War II

@Nick-D: You mentioned that my edit provided too much detail. I see your point; there is a significant amount of detail there compared to other sections. I would be fine with removing the sentences describing battles during the conflict. I can also add sources for the ceded territory percentage and the USSR being expelled from the League of Nations (I assume this is what you were referring to). Would you agree with this? Betelgeuse X (talk) 09:47, 16 April 2022 (UTC)

I don't think that we need more material on the topic to be honest. Nick-D (talk) 09:59, 16 April 2022 (UTC)

Why not? It had an impact on the war as a whole, being the first Soviet invasion during it as well as the consequences that followed. The content Betelgeuse added was not extreme, similar conflicts could always also be expanded in a similar minor fashion. If sources can be added for all the content I don't see any problem with this edit. TylerBurden (talk) 14:57, 16 April 2022 (UTC)

Addition: Espescially considering the willingness to cut some of the content making it more in line with other similar conflicts. TylerBurden (talk) 15:02, 16 April 2022 (UTC)

The current material on the Winter War is most of a large para, which is most than what some more important campaigns get (for instance, Operation Bagration is covered in a sentence and the Battle of Leyte and the Battle of Leyte Gulf get half a sentence combined!). I don't see the rationale for expanding it given this article is meant to provide an overall summary of the war, and is already over-long. I'd actually suggest reducing the coverage of the Winter War, as it seems too detailed. Nick-D (talk) 22:44, 16 April 2022 (UTC)

Summary style

As Wikipedia:Summary style uses WWII as an example, I was experimenting with using automatic excerpting, see a workpage here: Talk:World_War_II/Summary_style. I'm not proposing to adopt summary style in the main article, but the exercise serves to illustrate some areas that would need attention. For example, section World_War_II#Axis_advance_stalls_(1942–43) doesn't seem to have a main article -- shouldn't it? Also, the Timeline of World War II could offer a short summary of the key events. Overall, the summary-style version serves to highlight potential lack of synchronization between sections here and the corresponding main articles. fgnievinski (talk) 05:35, 25 April 2022 (UTC)

Japan Waged War in Hirohito's name

I think it would be relevant to mention that Japan waged the wars in Asia in the name of Hirohito, who was absolved of war time responsibility with the help of MacArthur, which isn't mentioned in the article.

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-aug-14-me-4022-story.html — Preceding unsigned comment added by LilAhok (talk • contribs) 07:18, 29 April 2022 (UTC)

He was only a figure head. Slatersteven (talk) 09:20, 29 April 2022 (UTC)

that is not a conclusive fact; his role in the war remains controversial. there are multiple theses that challenge the "figure head" statement. Doesn't change the fact that the war was waged in his name. — Preceding unsigned comment added by LilAhok (talk • contribs) 11:15, 29 April 2022 (UTC)

(edit conflict) Try reading the LA Times article. The emperor was not a figurehead. The decision not to try the emperor was taken in Washington, not by MacArthur, and the emperor was not absolved, it was simply decided not to put him on trial. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 11:26, 29 April 2022 (UTC)

"The emperor’s intimate wartime role was understood at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Nonetheless, the decision was made in Washington, and strongly endorsed in Tokyo by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the supreme Allied commander in occupied postwar Japan, to keep the emperor on the throne and implicitly absolve him from any war guilt. The United States thus colluded in the fabrication of a myth that many, especially in Japan, believe to this day." - per LA times article. I said "with the help of MacArthur". They implicitly absolved him from war guilt.

The war was waged in his name, and the Americans had to go to great lengths not to have him put on trial. I think this information should be included in the article. I need a consensus on whether this information should be included in the article. Feel free to make the edit yourself if there is a consensus to include it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by LilAhok (talk • contribs) 21:16, 29 April 2022 (UTC)

The war was aged in Hirohito's name, and US thought keeping him around helped would help them achieve their postwar goals. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/what-happened-to-emperor-hirohito — Preceding unsigned comment added by LilAhok (talk • contribs) 08:24, 30 April 2022 (UTC)

Regardless, the question is whether or not this content absolutely needs to be in the lede, which is quite long already and has to condense a large amount of information. LilAhok states that Hirohito's role "isn't mentioned in the article". I have not checked if that is accurate or not, but if it is accurate, then the war being waged in Hirohito's name almost certainly does not belong in the lede, because the lede is merely supposed to summarize the body of the article. LilAhok's edit appears to be an example of a common error, in which good faith contributors make drive-by edits to emphasize points they consider important in high-profile articles, focusing almost exclusively on the lede because it is the most visible part of the article. Over time, this practice results in malformed, excessively long ledes that become increasingly disconnected from the text which they are intended to summarize.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 22:55, 30 April 2022 (UTC)

Agreed; it should not be in the lead. But it does seem strange that the emperor is mentioned in the infobox but nowhere the article body, either for his role in starting the war, or for that in ending it. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:03, 30 April 2022 (UTC)

So it sounds like this content could probably be added to the body of the article, rather than the lead like the original reverted edit did. TylerBurden (talk) 06:23, 2 May 2022 (UTC)

I don't think this content should be dealt with here as the article is already very long.--Jack Upland (talk) 06:58, 2 May 2022 (UTC)

Lithuania,Estonia and latvia during the war

. Coolkid5375u4 (talk) 19:21, 5 May 2022 (UTC)

@Coolkid5375u4: ...What about them? TylerBurden (talk) 06:00, 6 May 2022 (UTC)

Soviet Shift

Aside from ignoring the Soviet Union's initial co-belligerence with Germany against Poland in '39 and '40, the moderators' ban on Lithuanian historians appears to violate the policy prohibitingdiscrimination on the basis of ethnicity.CessnaMan1989 (talk) 23:56, 20 January 2023 (UTC)

Initially, the Soviet Union was a co-belligerent or even an ally of the Axis Powers, and it didn't switch until Barbarossa. The article needs to reflect that. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 03:52, 27 October 2021 (UTC)

The problem we might find is that these conflicts are not typically considered World War 2. Baltic States, Eastern Poland and to a lesser extent Finland. I have just read the text and am happy that it reflects the things I have read. But have always thought this a wrongly forgotten part of the story. Dushan Jugum (talk) 04:16, 27 October 2021 (UTC)

Personally, I think this point is raised too much. I don't think the USSR was seen an an enemy of Britain and France. As noted in the article, in 1936, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, joined by Italy. The USSR and Germany were on opposite sides of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). The USSR was at also war with Japan in 1939. It is not noted in this article, but the USSR offered to defend Czechoslovakia from German invasion (see Munich Agreement). Rather being happy about the Fall of France, Stalin was furious. The success of the Axis in the West was not part of his plan. To sum up, the USSR led the campaign against Fascism up to 1939, was neutral in the European War from 1939 to 1941, and was neutral against Japan from 1941 to 1945. By comparison, the USA was neutral up to 1941.--Jack Upland (talk) 05:03, 27 October 2021 (UTC)

Most of what you said is false. While it's true that the Soviets and Nazis were backing opposite sides in the Spanish Civil War, they were on the same side in the first part of World War 2. The Soviets and Nazis backing opposite sides of the Spanish Civil War no more reflects alliances in the first part of World War 2 than the Nazis and Mussolini's Italian Fascists backing opposite sides in Italy's Invasion of Ethiopia. History is the study of what happened, not what you wish would have happened. The Soviet Union was very much seen as an adversary of Britain and France in 1939. In fact, Britain feared a Soviet invasion of then-British India, and the Soviets had drawn up plans to invade India. In Germany, mention of the anti-Comintern Pact was censored vigorously by the Nazi-controlled media outlets, which resulted in the anti-Comintern Pact being replaced by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact temporarily. In Japan, the Anti-Comintern Pact was also censored in media due to Japanese media promoting attempts to form an alliance with the Communist Party of China. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 23:10, 30 October 2021 (UTC)

Based on my response above, I'm going to edit the page. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 23:11, 30 October 2021 (UTC)

And I've just reverted you. The infobox has been extensively discussed, and its current format reflect the outcomes of those discussions. There has been no support here for your position. Nick-D (talk) 23:26, 30 October 2021 (UTC)

@Nick-D: It appears that you're either completely lying or that your assertion that "there has been no support here" for my position is no longer tenable. In fact, TheGoldAge explicitly supports my position on this subject. It is also apparent that Paul Siebert is violating the guidelines on Point-of-View, marginalizing entire nationalities of historians to suit a political narrative. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 21:56, 9 March 2022 (UTC)

Where has it been discussed? I don't see it here on this page. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 23:38, 30 October 2021 (UTC)

Having seen extensive discussions of the topic, your statement that there has been no support for my position is completely false. Of a sample of twenty major historians who have studied the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 19 agreed there was collaboration. The only one I found who denied Nazi-Soviet collaboration was literally Joseph Stalin in his Falsifiers_of_History. I'm referring this to Dispute Resolution. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 00:55, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

Please see the archives of the talk page. The current structure of the infobox reflects the outcomes of a couple of RfCs with large numbers of participants, where the status of the USSR was one of the many issues discussed, as well as many other discussions. It has been largely stable now for years. Nick-D (talk) 01:17, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

That is now flagrantly false. There is significant support for my position including from @TheGoldAge and @3 Löwi CessnaMan1989 (talk) 01:48, 2 September 2022 (UTC)

The invasion of Poland isn't part of World War II? They totally switched sides over a year after the war started. Stidmatt (talk) 17:21, 13 April 2022 (UTC)

@Nick-D: Looking at this very talk page, there is extensive support for my position as well, but a couple of users just want to ignore mainstream scholarly sources, while taking other sources, such as Gorodetsky completely out of context. Geoffrey Roberts, in his "The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Pact with Hitler", readily describes collaboration as a kind of alliance, albeit an informal one, in many places. Roger Moorhouse in his The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941 fully supports my position and was written after the discussions you appear to be referencing even occurred. There are at least 18 other major sources that support of my position. None of the users that I have seen on the talk page such as User:Paul Siebert have even addressed Roger Moorhouse let alone any other the other sources in proper context. There is one point that Siebert made that deserves a response: the fact that the Soviet's were at war with Japan while they were at war with Poland. Siebert contends that the Soviets' war against Japan in 1939 means that they were Allies and inherently not Axis allied, and that the simultaneity of the Soviets' brief war against Japan with the Soviets' war against Poland means that they must not be considered co-belligerents of the Axis at this point. To this, I point out that the Soviets' War in Poland was much larger, roughly ten times larger in terms of army size, than their relatively minor border skirmishes with Japan in 1939. Secondly, Siebert's suggestion that the fact that Japan would join the Axis later meant that it should be deemed to have been Axis at the time of the Battles of Khalkhin Gol is simply wrong.

For other historians who support my position, I'll quickly refer you to Ennio_Di_Nolfo, Alexander Nekrich, Bernd Wegner, I. Joseph Vizulis, and James V. Wertsch. What contemporary research are you relying on? CessnaMan1989 (talk) 01:38, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

I'll put my opinion down here. I don't really consider the Soviets as ever part of the Axis. Yes, they invaded Poland, but they only had an alliance with Germany, not the other Axis powers. Annexing the Baltics and Bessarabia also did not make them part of the Axis. Yes, these events are still considered part of World War II by some, but the Baltics were not part of the Allies (when they were annexed at least), kind of like Finland's situation. So yes, the USSR had an alliance with Germany at the start of the war to invade Poland, but that is all. The Soviets were never Axis powers. - Therealscorp1an (talk) 01:50, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

Soviets were axis powers from 1939-1941. Then Stalin changed his mind after operation barbarrosa was launched. The the soviets joined the allies. 114.124.240.111 (talk) 08:37, 7 May 2022 (UTC)

No, my arguments were different. I argued that if we assume some "Allies" existed in 1939, the USSR should be considered the first Allied power who started to fight against the Axis. However, both Allies and Axis were some loose formations in 1939, and, therefore, the "Axis vs Allies" division cannot be made based on fragmentary evidences and ad hoc rules. In connection to that, many historians conclude that in 1939 the USSR was neither the Allled not the Axis side, but, instead, it was on the "Soviet" side (i.e. it pursued its own goals). Incidentally, the US position, despite Roosevelt's personal attitude, was the same (and they even provided Japan with lion's share of oil needed for her war in China). Paul Siebert (talk) 02:35, 1 November 2021 (UTC)

Hmmm...that's an extremely weak argument. First of all, by that logic, one could easily assert that Japan wasn't a member of the Axis in 1939 since it hadn't signed the Tripartite Pact yet. Secondly, given that Poland was unquestionably a member of the Allies, and that Germany was already in the process of forming its Axis, looking for members, the Soviet Union's attacking Poland made it a co-belligerent with the Axis. Finally, as time goes on, more and more historians, such as Moorhouse, agree that the Soviets were pro-Axis when they invaded Poland with Germany. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 03:31, 1 November 2021 (UTC)

How would you characterize the Soviet Union in Europe in 1939 with regards to their war against Poland? Unlike the Baltic states, Poland was explicitly part of the Allies. Would you say that the Soviet War against Poland was not part of World War 2? The Soviet Union never signed the Tripartite Pact, and the contemporary sources surrounding the Nazi diplomatic efforts to get the Soviets to join the Axis were described as being unsuccessful, so I think your position on that point, that the USSR was never part of the Axis, is at least reasonable. However, just because it wasn't ever part of the Axis doesn't mean it wasn't conditionally supporting the Axis in various circumstances or serving as a co-belligerent of the Axis.

Also, what major historians don't consider the Soviet annexations of the Baltics and Bessarabia to be part of World War 2? CessnaMan1989 (talk) 02:22, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

"the Soviet Union was a co-belligerent or even an ally of the Axis Powers" So I can go with you on the co-belligerent thing as per Co-belligerence where it is already mentioned. However, even though one definition of co-belligerent is "any of two or more nations engaged in war as allies" I struggle with them being in an alliance. That said what I think don't matter, do these historians refer to it as an Alliance? Do your references explicitly say Russia was at war with the Allies or a co-belligerent with Germany against the Allies, not just Poland? I have not read anything academic on this published since the 80s so I am relying on you. Dushan Jugum (talk) 04:58, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

@Dushan Jugum: Yes, these historians that I've mentioned, many of them, refer to it as an outright "alliance", including Moorhouse, Roberts, and Di Nolfo. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 16:13, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

A key reason that the USSR is listed only against the 'Alles' side of the infobox is the strong preference in previous discussions and RfCs to keep the infobox simple (e.g. the same reason that only one leader is listed for each country, despite some having more than one). The US was neutral for much of the war, and Italy also fought on both sides of the conflict. Oddly, only the USSR has previously been proposed to be listed on both sides as is being suggested, again, here. The USSR was only at war with Poland of the Allied countries so its status is somewhat complex and presenting it on the 'Axis' side of the infobox would be difficult to explain to readers. I think that the merits of keeping the infobox simple stand, and note that the text of the article covers the Soviet-German alignment and the Soviet war against Poland. The infobox can't cover everything relating to this huge and very complex war. Nick-D (talk) 08:49, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

At least that's a rational argument: for the part of the War that saw the most casualties and was the longest part of the War, the Soviets were on the Allies' side. Still, such oversimplification is not common on here, and I don't think it should be. For many other wars, the infoboxes aren't particularly simplified. Look at the infoboxes for the Thirty Years War and the Great Northern War, which show countries switching sides. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 03:35, 1 November 2021 (UTC)

That makes sense.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:16, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

Good for me. Dushan Jugum (talk) 09:45, 31 October 2021 (UTC)

To that, I would add that by 1939, the tern "Allies" implied Entente Cordiale (a British-French alliance), with a limited Polish participation. The Anglo-Polish and Franco-Polish alliances had a limited nature, and they were directed only against Germany. That means these two states had no obligation in a case when Poland were attacked by any other power. In a full accordance with those agreements, France and Britain declared a war on Germany, but they took no action when the USSR invaded Poland, because there were no full scale alliance between Poland and those two powers.

Furthermore, after fall of France, the Franco-British alliance ceased to exist, and we cannot speak about any "Allies" until late 1941, when the USSR, UK, and USA formed a new alliance.

Therefore, if someone wants to claim that in 1939-41 the USSR was fighting against the Allies, the first question that has to be specified is "What concrete "Allies" do you mean?" Paul Siebert (talk) 03:08, 1 November 2021 (UTC)

Yes, they consider those events as a part of WWII. However, I am not sure why you concluded that proves your point. Soviet annexation of the Baltic states can be considered as the Axis co-belligerence only if that were the attack of some Allied (or future Allied) state. Can you remind me when, how, and under which circumstances these three states became the Allies?

Similarly, Finland became the Ally only after the USSR forced her to do that. I doubt the attach of Finland, which, of course, was totally unjustifed and silly step, can be considered as the Axis co-belligerence.

With regard to Bessarabia, annexation of that territory by Romania in 1918 had never been recognized by the USSR (and, if I remember that correctly, by some other countries, including the USA), so that is a quite separate case. And, by the way, Romania was a neutral country, which latter became the Axis member: how the annexation of Romania can be considered as a hostile action against the Allies?

I would say that in a different way: annexation of the Baltic states IS considered by ALL historians as a part of WWII, and a very important, pivotal event. First, per Roberts, the annexation was Stalin's responce to Hitler's occupation of France: Stalin realized that he is alone vis-a-vis Hitler's juggernaut, and decided to move the western border as far as possible to the West. By no means that looks like co-belligerence or an alliance.

Furthermore, per Stolfi, Hitler was very irritated when he learned about the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, and that triggered his decision to start preparations for invasion of the USSR.

Therefore, whereas occupation of the Baltic states was definitely a part of WWII, it was a demonstration of the lack of any allied relationships between the USSR and Germany.

I would say your approach is superficial, and it can be summarized as "since the USSR was a bad guy, it was definitely the Hitler's ally". History is much more complicated and nuanced than you think. Paul Siebert (talk) 02:43, 1 November 2021 (UTC)

"Ally" is a strong term that requires significant evidence, but there are at least a sizable number of historians, particularly in recent years, who claim they were allies. However, there's virtually universal consensus among mainstream historians that the Soviets and Nazis were co-belligerents against Poland, coordinating their attacks and even, on a few occasions, sharing intelligence. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 03:31, 1 November 2021 (UTC)

There's no denial that the Soviets and the Nazis both invaded Poland. That is a fact. What is also a fact is that the USSR was never part of the Axis and to say that it was is not really true. The invasion of Poland was the beginning of the war. The Soviet invasion of the Baltics and of Bessarabia was also during the war. However, the USSR were never at war with the Allies (the only Ally they were at war with was Poland). If they were at war with the Allies and on the Axis, the UK and France would have declared war on the USSR or vice versa. If anything, the USSR's position at the start can kind of be compared in a similar matter to Finland's. There is no doubt Finland was using the Nazi invasion of the USSR to their advantage, but they did not declare war on the Allies, just the Soviets. When things turned south for Finland, they specifically declared war on the Axis. A similar situation with the USSR. I think it is important to remember that being at war with one Allied nation and not the others ≠ being part of the Axis. - Therealscorp1an (talk) 07:49, 1 November 2021 (UTC)

I think the analogy with Finland is incorrect in several aspects. Finland was officially at war with the USSR, and that was recognized by other countries during the war. In contrast, Soviet co-belligerence with Germany against Poland was not recognized by UK and France. In contrast to the Polish case, these two powers did recognise Soviet Union as an aggressor against Finland, and even planned (reluctantly) a military interference in that conflict. However, Finland had never been the Ally (until 1944), and, importantly, it had never been attacked by Germany. In other words, we have several examples of aggressive behaviour of the USSR that, taken separately, do not allow us to speak about Soviet co-belligerency with the Axis. And we cannot combine those cases together because they are quite different.

In addition, recently, there was a very long discussion at the Axis talk page about the very same subject. Most arguments presented in this discussion had already been put forward (and addressed) there. To save our time, I suggest you all to read that discussion first. Paul Siebert (talk) 19:13, 1 November 2021 (UTC)

@Therealscorp1an and Paul Siebert:I'm looking at the discussion on the Axis Powers talk page at Archive 9 between Paul Siebert and Volunteer Marek, and while I admit I haven't read all of it, I still see fundamental points that are simply being ignored, and I also see weak points. First of all, the alliance between Poland and Britain specifically promised defense against attacks and invasion from ANY nation, so the fact that Britain didn't recognize Soviet co-belligerence with Germany is completely irrelevant. Poland was unconditionally Allied with Britain for defensive purposes, and the Soviet Union and Germany coordinated their respective invasions of it. Secondly, just because the Soviets weren't members of the Axis, if the term is defined by the signing of the Tripartite Pact, doesn't mean that they weren't allied with the Axis, at a time when it only consisted of Germany, for a specific and important conflict within WW2. Poland was an Ally of Britain and France, and the Soviet Union attacked it with Germany. Numerous treaties, Per the Alliance article here on Wikipedia, "A formal military alliance is not required for being perceived as an ally—co-belligerence, fighting alongside someone, is enough. According to this usage, allies become so not when concluding an alliance treaty but when struck by war." The bulk of the discussion on the Axis talk page predates important recent research as well that reveals the extent of the coordination. Historical relevance is often not established through official legal documents, whatever the law may actually be in these situations, but practical behaviors. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 02:38, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

British guaranties to Poland had a secret protocol (that can be found here). Look at the articles 1(a) and 1(b).

Keith Sword (British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland in September 1939, The Slavonic and East European Review, Jan., 1991, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp. 81-101) explained how that clause was implemented:

"On I7 September the Polish ambassador, Count Raczyn'ski, delivered a Note at the Foreign Office protesting against the Soviet aggression. On the following day he met the Foreign Secretary. Lord Halifax said that he understood from the Note that the Poles wished the British Government to make a formal protest at the Soviet move, but he was not sure what was meant by the phrase, 'the Polish Government reserves the right to invoke the obligations of its allies arising out of the treaties now in force'. ('Le Gouvernement Polonais se reserve de faire valoir les obligations decoulant pour ses allies des traites en vigeur'). Halifax pointed out that the obligation of His Majesty's Government towards Poland arising out of the Anglo-Polish Agreement of 25 August, was restricted to Germany. While the Treaty had referred to a European power committing aggression against Poland, the secret protocol attached to the Agreement had made clear that by 'European power' was meant Germany. The British Government did not therefore feel under any obligation to declare war on the Soviet Union, and the decision whether or not to do so 'should be determined by which would help most to achieve our common end of defeating Germany'. " Paul Siebert (talk) 05:29, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

And, frankly speaking, Halifax's position is quite understandable, keeping in mind that less that in a month before those events the triple Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations failed because of Polish refusal to collaborate.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:40, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

What do reliable sources say on this subject, without synthesis or interpretation? That's pretty much all that matters for what Wikipedia should include. (Hohum ^@) 03:22, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

@Hohum: One issue is that, in recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of reliable sources researching the nature of Soviet-German cooperation and collaboration in the invasion of Poland. Researchers like Moorhouse reveal that they were coordinating to a much larger extent than many previously though. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 16:07, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

I am not sure you know the full picture. I would like to see an evidence for your claim that in recent years the views of historians have changed, and there is an increased number of works on that subject. I am not seeing such an increase. With regards to Roberts, I have a strong feeling that you were mislead by the title of his book (Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Pact with Hitler). In reality, the views of his author are totally different, and he by no means consider Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany as allies during 1939-41. Paul Siebert (talk) 16:44, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

Upon reflection, I came to a conclusion that you probably meant not Geoffrey Roberts, but Andrew Roberts. Whereas the former focuses on Soviet history in a context of WWII events, the latter is not an expert in that topic. He is more focused on Germany, and, based on what I've read from his chapter in a popular "What If?" book, his views are rather superficial. In addition, his affiliation with Hoover Institution may reflect his political views, and, therefore, affect his conclusions.

Instead of picking some concrete authors, try to do a neutral search for sources on this topic. That will give you a more realistic impression of the views of a scholarly community on that subject. Paul Siebert (talk) 17:53, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

I am doing a neutral search on the topic. At various points, I believe I have referred to bother Geoffrey and Andrew Roberts. Even Geoffrey Roberts acknowledges coordination and a sharing of intelligence during "trade talks," although he tends to think there was far less coordination than Andrew. As for Andrew Roberts, he is a well-established mainstream scholar in History and a visiting professor of War Studies at King's College. Those are strong credentials. There is no reason to think that the Hoover Institute at Stanford would be particularly biased on this topic. This is not a Left-Right issue. The Hoover Institute is generally Center-Right and The Guardian is solidly on the Left as a newspaper, and there are writers at both focus on coordination.(Andrew Roth. Molotov-Ribbentrop: why is Moscow trying to justify Nazi pact?.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/23/moscow-campaign-to-justify-molotov-ribbentrop-pact-sparks-outcry) CessnaMan1989 (talk) 19:01, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

Can you please be more specific? I am familiar with G Roberts' writings, and I am not sure I understand what you mean. With regard to A. Roberts, again, he may be a good historian, but he seems not to be an expert in Soviet history. I was not able to find any his work devoted to this issue specifically: here is an example of the search (if you were using neutral search procedure, kindly drop a link, similar to what I did). Paul Siebert (talk) 19:26, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

In no way am I denying that the Soviets had a pact with Germany. I am just saying that I think it would be incorrect and false to label them as Axis. - Therealscorp1an (talk) 03:23, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

@Therealscorp1an: There's a difference between being allied with the Axis and being in the Axis. The Soviets and Germans were coordinating their attacks. Thailand and Finland were, at various points in the war, also allied with the Axis. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 15:53, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

@Paul Siebert: The secret protocol is irrelevant since attacking an outwardly unconditional ally is an attack on the alliance anyways. If someone tries to kill a person because he thinks that person is a member of a family he despises, even if he is incorrect about the family relationship, he is still attacking the entire family. Poland had an outwardly unconditional defensive pact, and the Soviets attacked them and assisted Germany in its attack. That's all that matters. This issue isn't about whether or not Britain broke its treaty with Poland, but rather about whether or not the Soviets attacked one of the Allies and assisted Germany(the Axis) in its attack on one of the Allies. Fundamentally, the secret protocol doesn't change the fact that the Soviet Union consciously aided Germany in its attack on Poland by also attacking Poland, which was openly one of the Allies, regardless of any secret protocol.

Even the text of the secret protocol was to be correctly construed as defining 'Germany' as any party aiding Germany, particularly by Kulski(The Anglo-Polish Agreement of Aug 25, 1939, The Polish Review, Vol. 21, No.1/2, 1976). The secret protocol was not excluding attacks by countries coordinating with Germany or attacking in ways that assisted a German invasion of Poland. Otherwise, Germany could have just set up a puppet state to invade Poland, and Britain would have had no obligations. Additionally, Stirling notes that "the legality and legitimacy of secret protocols, particularly without additional witnesses, was very much in doubt due to constraints under the common law and the lack of statutory authorization to negotiate such an addendum in secret."(Intelligence Co-Operation Between Poland and Great Britain During World War II: The Report Of The Anglo-Polish Historical Committee (Government Official History Series), pg. 187).

Finally, this has nothing to do with your assessment of Lord Halifax, or anyone else's assessment of Halifax for that matter. This dispute simply involves what happened, not your assessment of any people involved. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 15:53, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

CessnaMan1989, first, could you please format your posts properly? I've done that for you, but I expect in future it will be your responsibility. Your formatting violates talk page guidelines, and the page becomes difficult to read.

With regard to what you say, most of that is wrong.

"attacking an outwardly unconditional ally is an attack on the alliance anyways". Actually, the source provided by me says Poland was by no means an unconditional ally. There were a number of conditions, one of them was described in the article 1 of the secret protocol. If you believe the secret protocol is irrelevant, then the same logic should be applied to the Molotov-Ribbentrop secret protocol, which would be absolutely incorrect. Secret protocols were an important (maybe, the most important) part of diplomacy, and they should never be ignored. The secret protocol stipulated some very important conditions, which made Poland a conditional ally. The second condition was that Britain and France did not guarantee territorial integrity of Poland: the treaty guaranteed only Polish independence, whereas some German demands (Danzig, exterritorial corridor to East Prussia) would face no opposition from the Western allies. The third condition was that the Franco-Polish agreement ... was actually not working by Sept 1th, because it the military protocols they had signed in early 1939 would not assume the character of an agreement until the political protocol was signed (at it was signed just on Sept 4th). And, finally, Poland was more a troublemaker than a real ally, because her refusal to collaborate during the triple negotiations with the USSR lead to a failure to sign that military alliance.

"The secret protocol was not excluding attacks by countries coordinating with Germany or attacking in ways that assisted a German invasion of Poland." That is an interesting assertion, but I would like to see a source that says so. So far, I provided the source saying quite opposite, and the Halifax's interpretation of the treaty is quite relevant to the subject of our discussion.

With regard to coordination of German and Soviet efforts, yes, Nazi propaganda was trying to create a picture of a coordinated attack. Since most documents available to Western historians come from German archives, it is not a surprise that the German views affected their conclusions. However, after Soviet archives become available, many historians changed their position.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:30, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

I'll work on formatting my posts, but no, the source provided by you is about a limitation to an alliance, the secret protocol, not an affirmative alliance, which is very different. You're still ignoring several fundamental issues, and also not sourcing many major claims that you're making. The Soviet Union only knew about the outwardly unconditional defensive pact, not the secret addendum, which is the clearest reason why one should say the Soviets were attacking the Allies when they attacked Poland to help Germany. That is trivial. What source(s) do you have to suggest that the attacker's intent is irrelevant for categorizing an attack as being on an alliance?

For other points around diplomatic issues, you're confusing affirmative alliances like the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which can be secret, with what Francis Beer and J.D. Singer call "limitations" to defensive pacts, like the secret addendum which are extremely different and treated differently(Francis Beer, Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.) Specifically, in that book by Francis Beer, see the first part, "Alliance aggregation and the onset of war, 1815-1945, by J. D. Singer and M. Small.) At page 249, Singer states "Since the Congress of Vienna, the mere announcing of a defensive pact has been seen as forming an alliance when one or more parties to the pact has been attacked.....Unpublished agreements between two parties to limit or eliminate defensive pacts have generally been allowed only when the pacts have been secret." Singer goes on to write at 257 "The post-War negotiations surrounding the formation of NATO were hindered by an unresolved question: could classified operations result in nations joining NATO in secret? The Spanish Question[whether or not to allow Franco's Spain to join NATO] drove discussion, and it was suggested that Spain be allowed to join with a secret contingency for its expulsion if it privately behaved in a manner repulsive to the Free World. This suggestion was ultimately denied because it would have required new legislation in many member states and the controversy was anticipated." While I admit that I'm not entirely sure what Singer means by "controversy" because I'm not sure if he's talking about public controversy or controversy between the people negotiating NATO, it's pretty clear that he acknowledges that alliances can't be terminated in secret. Notice Singer omits mention of secret limitations regarding defensive pacts. Regarding What source would you cite to suggest that attacking an outwardly unconditional ally is not an attack on an alliance? This is The secret addendum that you are referring to is a secret limitation to an alliance, which made the Anglo-Polish alliance outwardly unconditional for defensive purposes, and only inwardly conditional. See Herdegen for the fundamentals of treaty interpretation(Interpretation in International Law. Oxford Public International Law. Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law. https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e723). I'd like to see a source suggesting that Halifax didn't construe 'Germany' as referring to all parties assisting Germany in an attack on Poland because Kulski certainly did.

No, many Polish sources are also used to show coordination. The sources used from the German archives are not the documents that the Nazis used for propaganda but rather the documents they hid for utilitarian purposes and couldn't destroy because they lost the War. The Nazi and Soviet attacks on Poland were coordinated, and even the Soviet sources such as Alexander Yakovlev later acknowledged a degree of coordination. Also, it's irresponsible to consider Soviet sources to be particularly reliable, as they had time to alter their archives after the War. Yakovlev even acknowledged that Soviet archives were altered. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 18:16, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

Thanks for you efforts to format your posts properly. Can you please also refrain from wedging your text into others' posts? I moved the text that you inserted into my post to the proper place, and I expect you will not do that in future. That is against our rules, and it creates a false impression that your text was written by me.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:48, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

I cannot provide sources for every claim, because that will make my posts unreadable. However, I (in contrast to you) am providing sources for the most essential claims, and I am ready to provide a source for other claims upon a request.

I have no idea why do you call Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression treaty "an affirmative alliance". All sources available to me describe it as a non-aggression/neutrality pact, and it stipulates no military obligations. In addition, as you probably know, each military alliance signed or negotiated in 1930s had two components, a political part and a military part. These were two different documents, which were signed separately and which had different purposes. The (failed) triple alliance (France-UK-USSR) was an example of a full scale alliance, and military and political agreements were discussed in parallel. In contrast, no military agreement were signed or even negotiated between Nazi Germany and the USSR, which is not a surprise, because MRP was a neutrality pact, and it never pretended to be an alliance (despite some authors use this word in a colloquial meaning). Paul Siebert (talk) 19:03, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

It seems Beer is not a good source for two reasons. First, it is rather old (1979), second, it does not discuss this issue, and by applying this source to our topic we step into a realm of original research, which is not allowed per WP:NOR.

Re "I'd like to see a source suggesting that Halifax didn't construe 'Germany'" - the source was provided, and it says that quite unequivocally.

Regarding reliability of Soviet archives, this issue has been analyzed by historians in details. If professional historians find some information useful we have no reason to trust them. Yakovlev's opinion is well known, but that is just an opinion. Yes, some documents were released selectively, but, as many historians pointed out, it is possible to forge a subset of documents, but it is not possible to forge a whole archive (especially in 90s, when the people from the former Soviet secret service were mostly focused on personal survival). In addition, to consistently forge a whole body of historical documents, one has to have a set of skills that people from FSB do not have.

With regard to Polish sources, keeping in mind recent resurrection of nationalism, especially aggressive pushing of a "double genocide theory", writings of Central European authors cannot be considered truly neutral. At least, they are not more trustworthy than the works of modern Russian authors. Paul Siebert (talk) 19:18, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

This seems to all be from the original post saying "the Soviet Union was a co-belligerent or even an ally of the Axis Powers". If that is the crux: Does a reliable source unequivocally say that? Not interpreted by an editor with paragraphs of argument/synthesis. (Hohum ^@) 21:31, 2 November 2021 (UTC)

I would re-phrase it as follows: "Does majority sources say that?" I am sure it is possible to find some sources saying so, but the question is if that view is shared by a scholarly community Paul Siebert (talk) 02:06, 3 November 2021 (UTC)

@Hohum and Paul Siebert: A majority standard is flawed for several reasons. First of all, if there were a slim majority, it would hardly be responsible to present it as a scholarly consensus. Secondly, what pool of sources should we consider? Paul Siebert doesn't seem to want to consider Andrew Roberts, Roger Moorhouse, [[Ennio_Di_Nolfo]], and others to be reliable sources for this matter. Siebert doesn't seem to even want to consider Polish sources ranging from Włodzimierz Borodziej to Anne Applebaum, as well as many others. Other important points are that some kinds of sources are usually considered to be far more reliable than others: historical volumes, diplomatic documents, legislative records, military diaries, and legal treatises(which I admit aren't as "common" for the common law in England as they are in other common law countries) are usually seen as more reliable than newspaper articles and blog posts. I would value a historical volume over a hundred newspaper articles. Lastly, scholars almost universally regard Soviet sources as often having reliability issues, as even the famous photo of the Soviet flag in Berlin is universally acknowledged as being altered/airbrushed(https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/stalin-photo-manipulation-1922-1953/). Scholars also see some value in the sources and don't necessarily dismiss them, but they're hardly seen as being particularly reliable. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 15:30, 3 November 2021 (UTC)

I don't know what exactly A. Roberts and Moorhouse say on that. Do they just call MPR "an alliance"? Or they put forward some fresh arguments that are based on newly discovered evidences? Had other authors commented on their claims? Are their new findings and arguments accepted positively or negatively by others? You provided no information, you just gave some names and propose me to trust you. That is not how Wikipedia works.

With regard to Borodziej, I see no his works where he analyzes this question specifically. And, as soon as we use Polish sources, we should include modern Russian sources too.

Similarly, whereas Appelbaum is a brilliant journalist, I am not familiar with any work where she presented any new analysis of the nature of the "Nazi-Soviet alliance". If she just calls it "an alliance", that is not sufficient, for journalists are famous for being inaccurate in usage of terminology. Paul Siebert (talk) 19:12, 3 November 2021 (UTC)

Anne Applebaum is a significant historian in addition to being a journalist. She plainly describes a "Hitler-Stalin alliance" when she writes "Academic defenses of the Hitler-Stalin alliance began appearing again in Russia in 2009, timed to the 70th anniversary of 1939; one collection of essays published at the time even included an approving introduction written by Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister."[Anne Applebaum. Putin's Big Lie. January 5, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/putin-blames-poland-world-war-ii/604426/] CessnaMan1989 (talk) 00:56, 4 November 2021 (UTC)

@Hohum and Paul Siebert: Also, the time period of the historical works for a majority standard would have to be considered. Are we talking about a majority of sources from 2014 or a majority since, say, 1970? CessnaMan1989 (talk) 16:30, 3 November 2021 (UTC)

It depends. Thus, many pre-1990 works on Soviet history may be considered outdated, because of "archival revolution" that happened after fall of the USSR. Since then, no outstanding events happened that advanced historical knowledge to the same degree. That means all works published in 1990s, 2000s and 2010s may be considered equally trustworthy (unless they had not be explicitly debunked by subsequent publications).

However, the same cannot be said about other events. Thus, I am not sure similar "revolutions" took place in historiography of Napoleonic wars or British history, so the threshold is different for those topics. Paul Siebert (talk) 19:18, 3 November 2021 (UTC)

@Hohum and Paul Siebert: Paul Siebert writes "With regard to Polish sources, keeping in mind recent resurrection of nationalism, especially aggressive pushing of a "double genocide theory", writings of Central European authors cannot be considered truly neutral. At least, they are not more trustworthy than the works of modern Russian authors." I think it's rather irresponsible to dismiss an entire nationality of historians because of a few politicians. Would you completely disregard American historians because of things Trump said? The idea that Anne Applebaum is somehow "right-wing" and biased in favor of the political Right is absurd. Plus, even when historians are biased, and bias is inevitable, it doesn't mean that they should be outright ignored. For an extreme example, almost all Holocaust survivors are naturally quite biased against the Nazis, but I'd still seriously value their accounts for historical purposes. While I don't see where you've mentioned specific Soviet sources, many Soviet sources directly refer to Falsifiers of History by Stalin as authentic and outright deny the existence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviets didn't even acknowledge the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact until the 1980's. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 16:30, 3 November 2021 (UTC)

@Hohum and Paul Siebert: One other point I just remembered, at least one major Soviet historian, Alexander Nekrich, repeatedly references the pact as an "alliance" in "Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations 1922-1941". He also amply describes coordination. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 17:19, 3 November 2021 (UTC)

I am not saying Polish historians are not trustworthy because Polish politicians say some specific things. I am saying something totally different. Recentky, I was approached by some American historians who expressed a serious concern about a way some WWII time events in Poland are described in English Wikipedia. A key reason for that was the fact that Polish sources are overrepresented in some WP pages, and those sources are obviously biased. In addition, it is well known that an infamous "double genocide theory" and similar concepts that are becoming popular in Central Europe include, as an important component, a recognition of the USSR as an equal or even greater evil than Nazi Germany. That narrative is not shared by most Western historians, and, therefore, we should not rely on Polish sources saying that.

Yes, I am familiar with Nekrich's writings. His point is that Stalin had always been a proponent of an alliance with Hitler, and the "Litvinov's line" and Soviet attempts to establish a collective security system in Europe before 1939 did not reflect their real intents, and were aimed just to mislead Western politicians and public opinion. This point of view is not shared by most historians, including G. Roberts. By the way, thanks to you I found an interesting recent paper by Carley, who, based on newly discovered archival documents, suggests that the USSR was more sincere and Britain was less enthusiastic in signing the anti-Hitler alliance, which additionally demonstrates that Nekrich's ideas were wrong. Although it refers to per-Sept 17, 1939 events, that demonstrates that Nekrich was probably wrong in other aspects too. And, in addition, he is desperately outdated.

By the way, that article demonstrates that not only Soviet, but other pre-WWII governments had skeletons in their closets. Paul Siebert (talk) 18:55, 3 November 2021 (UTC)

To summarise, I am familiar with many books and articles where the author use the term "Nazi-Soviet alliance" and variations thereof: many authors are not precise in terminology, so a colloquial "alliance" does not necessarily mean the author implied the parties were military allies. Thwerefore, just a usage of the term is not sufficient for claiming that the USSR was a real Nazi ally in 1939-41, or that there was a considerable military collaboration between them (for example, G.Roberts uses the term "alliance", but it is clear from his works that there were no military alliance between Soviet Russia and Nazi). In contrast, most sources available to me (including the sources that sporadically use the term "alliance/ally" to describe Nazi-Soviet relations) demonstrate that Stalin was very cautious to avoid creating an impression that the USSR and Germany are closely collaborating or that the USSR is a co-belligerent of Germany, and, importantly, the sources say that it was not seen as a German co-belligerent by contemporaries. That is what the sources say.

The sources also say that occupation of the Baltic states and annexation of Bessarabia is seen in a context of a ripening Soviet-German conflict rather than collaboration by those sources, and that during the Winter war sympathies of German public opinion were mostly on Finnish side.

Therefore, unless you present some serious and fresh arguments directly supported by quotes from reliable sources (the quotes should not be taken out of context, and the sources should be devoted to this issue specifically, and not just mention that issue in passing), I see no reason to continue this discussion. Paul Siebert (talk) 20:02, 3 November 2021 (UTC)

@Paul Siebert and Hohum: Nekrich clearly describes the Soviets as entering an alliance with Nazi Germany against Poland in 1939. When you write, "many authors are not precise in terminology, so a colloquial "alliance" does not necessarily mean the author implied the parties were military allies. Thwerefore[sic], just a usage of the term is not sufficient for claiming that the USSR was a real Nazi ally in 1939-41, or that there was a considerable military collaboration between them", you don't provide any standard for evaluating an author's usage of the term "ally", and you definitely don't provide any sources justifying your method of source construction, i.e., your interpretation of the language in the sources. Basically, you're saying that when all of these historians such as Nekrich use the term "ally" or "alliance", they don't really mean what they say. That seems rather capricious. As for your link the Michael Jabara Carley's book, that link doesn't work for me. Fortunately, this link does[4], and I see nothing in it that denies an alliance, or massive coordination, between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. The fact that Carley suggests that Stalin had previously been looking for allies against Hitler by no means refutes Nekrich's claim that he later became an ally of Hitler against Poland. Alliances change. Denying that alliances can change is simply wrong. When you write "By the way, that article demonstrates that not only Soviet, but other pre-WWII governments had skeletons in their closets.", you are going on completely irrelevant tangents and resorting to ad-hominem attacks, which is rather unpersuasive. What do moral flaws of other nations have to do with Soviet-German relations between 1939-1941? There is much more to say, but I'm busy and will have to respond later. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 23:55, 3 November 2021 (UTC)

Again, I have no obligation to trust you: in future, I am going to respond to that type argument only if you clearly write (i) what exact source do you mean (a book/article/interview), (ii) what exactly the source says, (iii) in what context does it say that.

Assuming that you meant his "Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations 1922-41", I looked through all reviews on that book. I found 12 reviews, which implies this source is by no means ignored by a scholarly community. What those reviews say?

• Finney (History, April 1999, Vol. 84, No. 274 (April 1999), pp. 389-390 ): " This interpretation of Soviet policy has gained great currency since the collapse of communism, and it is certainly not implausible to see Stalin as a rapacious revisionist rather than a sincere defender of the status quo. Yet Nekrich's relentlessly critical account is rather one-dimensional, relying on a loaded and strained reading of the relatively sparse direct evidence available as to Stalin's intentions, and thus remain unconvincing. (...) while the book will be of interest to specialists, the publisher's claim that it offers a 'definitive analysis' is frankly absurd."
• Geoffrey Roberts (Europe-Asia Studies, Dec., 1998, Vol. 50, No. 8 (Dec., 1998), pp. 1471-1475): "Nekrich propounds a variant of what I have dubbed the 'German school' of thought on Nazi-Soviet relations.1 This is the view that, despite appearances to the contrary, Soviet foreign policy remained oriented to an alliance with Germany even after Hitler came to power. Nekrich's version of this argument is that Stalin had an '"official" policy of rapprochement with France and her allies, as well as an "unofficial" policy of seeking not only cooperation but also a comprehensive agreement with Germany' (p. 70)." In this long review, Roberts, who does not share the "German school"'s ideas, criticizes Nekrich and puts forward his own ideas. One of subjects of criticism is Nekrich's "complete reliance on evidence from German documents, ignoring the Soviet diplomatic correspondence published in the early 1990s".
• Erickson (The Journal of Military History, Apr., 1998, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 418-419): "e. The evidence Nekrich presents for this debacle is weighty, the analysis penetrating, and the judgement on Stalin's "self-hypnosis" eminently convincing." The problem is that Eriksson's opinion relates not to the thesis about Nazi-Soviet allied relationships, but to a different question: why Stalin overlooked Barbarossa. Therefore, this brief review is not too helpful in our case.
• Stent (German Politics & Society, Vol. 17, No. 2 (51) (Summer 1999), pp. 123-129) " Nekrich's argument that Stalin's dream would have been a long term alliance with Germany against Britain may be disputed by some. However, he presents compelling evidence for a Soviet policy that clearly preferred alliance with Nazi Germany and territorial gain to any partnership with Britain or the United States. Ultimately, Pariahs, Partners, Predators explains why the wartime alliance disintegrated so quickly once Germany was defeated."
• Mawdsley (War in History, Vol. 8, No. 4 (November 2001), pp. 485-487): "Although Pariahs, Partners, Predators is useful in covering the full chronological span of the interwar relationship, the interpretation is not strikingly original, especially for a Western specialist audience. It has many of the features of what Geoffrey Roberts has aptly called "German" school of thought', although the book is based on Russian as well as German sources."
• Jakobson (Central European History, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1999), pp. 485-487): "The work is limited in its coverage of issues and sources. (Nekrich, who died in 1993, was unable to take full advantage of the opportunities now afforded by access to the archives in Moscow.) Specialists in the history of Germany, and of German foreign relations in particular, will find it rewarding reading nevertheless."
• Gorodetsky (Slavic Review, Summer, 1999, Vol. 58, No. 2, Special Issue: Aleksandr Pushkin 1799-1999 (Summer, 1999), pp. 489-490): " A graver fault is the tenuous thread that ties the story together. Nekrich's intuitive tendency is to present a continuous determinist course for the "special relations." He assumes that the relations were forged by a distinctive ideological symbiosis, a "brown-red" fascist-communist ideology that drew the two countries together. By so doing, he endorses the obsolete totalitarian model. Thus, for instance, he plays down Stalin's intensive efforts to achieve alliance with the west by implementing a system of collective security in 1934-1939. Instead he blows out of all proportion the sporadic and low-level contacts maintained with the Germans, contacts that are attested only by dubious and unreliable sources.(...) Unfortunately Nekrich's book only perpetuates the mist that obscures the already complex story."
• Uldrick (The American Historical Review, Feb., 1999, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 279-280): " Overall, Nekrich has made a useful contribution to our understanding of Russo-German relations, but this book does not eliminate the need to consult the valuable works of Haslam, Roberts, Fleischhauer, and Gabriel Gorodetsky."
• Haslam (The International History Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Dec., 1998), pp. 1015-1016): "Nekrich's book thus places greater weight on German documents than Soviet materials and not surprisingly fails to come up with anything new. Worse than that, Nekrich deliberately ignores all existing work on the subject by Western scholars, whether that of E. H. Carr, whose pioneering work in uncovering the Rapallo relationship does not appear even in the bibliography, historian of the Red Army John Erickson, the reviewer, and even Robert Tucker (who actually has made the same case as that made by Nekrich rather more eloquently). For what Nekrich gives us yet again is the tired old thesis, which he is unable to document, that Stalin always wanted to deal with Germany above all else and in spite of everything else. Whenever the evidence points in the other direction, he simply ignores it. Here the standards of Soviet historiography are transmuted into a Western publication, but with Stalin's foreign policy as all evil rather than all good. In these circumstances, the volume cannot be recommended as offering anything new or much that is scholarly ..."
• Kanet (The Russian Review, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 160-161) This reviewer just summarizes the book, without commenting on it, so the review is not informative.
• Peterson (German Studies Review, May, 1999, Vol. 22, No. 2 (May, 1999), pp. 319-320): this reviewer mostly re-iterates main Nekrich's theses.
• Clark : " That said, I remain an admirer of this work. Nekrich has brought to light new information, the interpretation of which is open to question. This, of course, is the nature of historical scholarship. While we should not automatically accept any historian's interpretation of his or her sources, we should also commend an historian who provides us with new insight into a period so widely studied as the decades between the two world wars of the twentieth century. Nekrich certainly deserves this commendation. Also deserving of substantial credit is Gregory Freeze who has brought up this excellent translation"

As we can see, the reviews are mixed, and majority of detailed review articles contain serious criticism. I think that is sufficient to conclude Nekrich represents a significant minority view, and the extent this view is presented in the article is quite sufficient.

I think I've done my part of the job, and I see no need in a further discussion. Paul Siebert (talk) 04:04, 4 November 2021 (UTC)

I'm not sure what you mean by "my part of the job", but I certainly don't think that book reviews, especially from a small group of people, are too relevant for assessing the reliability of a source, especially when those reviews didn't really attack the source's reliability, mainly its presentation. Even Haslam isn't attacking the reliability of the facts presented, merely Nekrich's interpretation of the facts. I think a more relevant indicator is whether or not the work is cited by respectable historians, which is definitely the case. You're even ignoring reviews that you actually found because of your interpretation of the reviewers' intentions. If you don't want to discuss this more, you don't have to, but I've got a lot more to say based on your responses, methodology, and apparent lack of objective standards for source evaluation. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 17:32, 4 November 2021 (UTC)

It seems you don't understand the most fundamental things: the reviews I presented is not a an opinion of "small group of people", that is an opinion of reputable experts. Actually, a couple of positive reviews in such journals as American Historical Review is sufficient to consider a source reliable. With regard to Nekrich, there is no universal support of his views. Haslam unequivocally says Nekrich brought worst kind of Soviet propaganda methodology, except the signs are switched. Roberts says that Nekrich represents just one ("German") school of thought (and other authors support that view). Gorodetsky clearly says Nekrich's view is one-sided. That is quite sufficient to avoid usage of Nekrich as a source for such universal claims as you made.

In addition, I don't have to prove that the Nekrich's ideas are not supported. On the contrary, the onus is on you to prove that Nekrich's ideas are shared by the scientific community. So far, you failed to do so, whereas I've done my job well: I demonstrated that many reviews on his book contain serious criticism, that the book is based on a limited data, and that it may be outdated. Paul Siebert (talk) 18:18, 4 November 2021 (UTC)

I'm pretty sure the reviews you presented were from no more than 12 people, which I certainly consider to be a small group. Within this small group, Cherry-picking statements about their overall opinions about the work considering their views on the reliability of the facts presented regarding German-Soviet collaboration is academically unsound. Flat-out dismissed reviews simply because the reviews' narratives are unpalatable is also a rather sloppy way to evaluate a source for reliability. Kanet, Peterson, and Clark all consider the work reliable, and it looks like you're simply ignoring those reviews because you don't like what they say. That is not how sources are evaluated for academic works. There are lots of reviews that you simply have not found, one of which is Barbara Keys' review in H-Russia in March of 1998. Keys, who gives a review that's negative overall, acknowledges the Nekrich's reliability, writing, "Soviet policy toward Germany in the wake of Hitler's Machtergreifung is deftly summarized in Chapter Three. Misreading the international situation in typical fashion, Stalin did not immediately see Nazi Germany as a threat to the Soviet Union (a point that, despite the evidence, is still disputed by some historians).[9] Instead, according to Nekrich, the Soviet dictator hoped that fascism would accelerate the revolutionary process in Germany. Nekrich asserts that Stalin in fact welcomed the Nazi takeover because he had a certain "affinity" for Hitler and "probably" preferred to deal with a dictator, whose thinking and behavior would likely have seemed "more comprehensible than the mentality of politicians from democratic states" (pp. 63-4). Later Nekrich refers to "the genetic bonds between the Soviet and Nazi regimes" (p. 66). The Soviet Union's public antifascist rhetoric and Litvinov's pursuit of collective security with the Western powers were, in Nekrich's view, intended as a fall-back position for Stalin's preferred alternative: a deal with Germany." And this is just one of the reviews you didn't consider. This is why reviews are a weak method for evaluating a source. Citations of the source are far more reliable.

Also, I have yet to read a single affirmative case for the reliability any of your offered sources. By comparison, when you write, "a couple of positive reviews in such journals as American Historical Review is sufficient to consider a source reliable", you fail to take into account that even you have presented more than a couple of positive reviews of Nekrich in terms of assessing the reliability of the facts, and you didn't even include Keys' review. When you write "With regard to Nekrich, there is no universal support of his views", you seem to forget that none of the authors mentioned here have universal support for their views. "Universal support" is not the standard, and you're being rather capricious when you only apply it to Nekrich. When you write "Haslam unequivocally says Nekrich brought worst kind of Soviet propaganda methodology, except the signs are switched," you seem to forget that you made a significant effort to defend Soviet sources as being more reliable than Polish sources or sources from historians of other nationalities. You're also ignoring the other reviews that suggest reliability. You're completely ignoring the negative reviews of the works of historians that you're relying on. When you write, "Gorodetsky clearly says Nekrich's view is one-sided.", you seem to be suggesting that Gorodetsky considers the issues to be multi-sides, and yet you are specifically advocating only including one side in the argument. That is grossly inconsistent. We're still going through all of the errors in your dismissal of Nekrich's work, and we haven't even begun to cover the many sources that your cavalierly disregarding. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 19:34, 4 November 2021 (UTC)

Please. Never. Ever. Use. The Words. "Cherry picking". If. You. Are. Not. Ready. To support. It. With. Compelling. Evidences.

Not only I'll stop any discussion, you may be reported for making personal attacks.

With regard to the rest, I am not going to convince you, my goal is to provide needed evidences as our policy requires.

If you still maintain that those authors are just "few individuals", then you should (re-)read what our policy says.

When I said "a couple of positive reviews", I obviously implied "in the absence of an obvious criticism". I didn't write that explicitly because I believed that was obvious to any reasonable person. In our case, we have serious criticism, and many authors clearly say Nekrich represents just one (out of four) schools of thought. From that, it is clear that his views by no means reflect scholarly consensus.

Re "you seem to forget that you made a significant effort to defend Soviet sources as being more reliable than Polish sources or sources from historians of other nationalities" I expect you to either quote my words where I say so, or to apologise.

In general, it seems you are repeating your old arguments, so I see no reason to continue this discussion. I reserve a right not to respond unless I see some really fresh arguments. Paul Siebert (talk) 20:19, 4 November 2021 (UTC)

You have every right to not respond, but there were far more than 12 reviews of Nekrich, and from the entire text of the three reviews that you considered to be merely recitation, it's pretty clear to me that they considered Nekrich to be professionally reliable. Concerning my claim of "cherry picking", consider the snippets of reviews that you posted. When you cited from April of 1998 issue of The Journal of Military History, you cited Erickson, but you completely ignored Karpat's review, which immediately preceded Erickson, and Karpat unequivocally wrote that the Nekrich's "Pariahs" is "the best available succinct study of the subject."(The Journal of Military History; Lexington, Va. Vol. 62, Iss. 2, (Apr 1, 1998): 416.) Now, he was writing some time ago, and I'm sorry if it sounds harsh, but when you ignore thorough reviews like the one from Karpat when they immediately precede terse reviews, and then pretend that the reviews were either universally or overwhelmingly negative, it looks like you're cherry-picking out of that issue of The Journal of Military History.

When you cited from Mawdsley, you neglected a significant concession that Mawdsley makes right above the passage you quoted. Mawdsley writes "As a result, the treatment of this later period has been superseded, notably by Gabriel Gorodetsky's Grand Delusion (1999) --although in some important respects Nekrich anticipated some conclusions about the triangular relationship between Britain, Germany, and Russia. " I think that concession, where a critical reviewer still acknowledges value in a source, matters. The reason I think such a concession matters is because it seems to me like you don't want to ascribe any scholarly value to Nekrich.

I'm not sure why you cited Uldrick because he ascribes significant merit to the work, and when Uldrick says "this book does not eliminate the need to consult the valuable works of Haslam, Roberts, Fleischhauer, and Gabriel Gorodetsky.", it's pretty clear, even from the snippet you cited, that he values the work's contribution to scholarship. If you wish to report for saying these things, I can't and won't stop you from doing so.

Regarding your statement, "Re "you seem to forget that you made a significant effort to defend Soviet sources as being more reliable than Polish sources or sources from historians of other nationalities" I expect you to either quote my words where I say so, or to apologise.", sure. You wrote "However, after Soviet archives become available, many historians changed their position.". Now, when I first read this, I thought you were saying that the historians I was quoting from would change their positions once more Soviet sources were to be released in the future. Reading this again, I think you were talking about historians already having changed their position from already released archives. If that is the case, then at least your position makes a little more sense since, if that is the case, you are not basing your opinions on sources that haven't actually been released yet. I thought before that you were literally anticipating what yet-to-be released archives were going to say. Still, you go on to defend the reliability of released Soviet archives, writing "Regarding reliability of Soviet archives, this issue has been analyzed by historians in details. If professional historians find some information useful we have no reason to trust them. Yakovlev's opinion is well known, but that is just an opinion. Yes, some documents were released selectively, but, as many historians pointed out, it is possible to forge a subset of documents, but it is not possible to forge a whole archive (especially in 90s, when the people from the former Soviet secret service were mostly focused on personal survival). In addition, to consistently forge a whole body of historical documents, one has to have a set of skills that people from FSB do not have." Regarding Polish sources, you write "With regard to Polish sources, keeping in mind recent resurrection of nationalism, especially aggressive pushing of a "double genocide theory", writings of Central European authors cannot be considered truly neutral. At least, they are not more trustworthy than the works of modern Russian authors." Later down, you follow-up on this point by writing, "I am not saying Polish historians are not trustworthy because Polish politicians say some specific things. I am saying something totally different. Recentky[sic], I was approached by some American historians who expressed a serious concern about a way some WWII time events in Poland are described in English Wikipedia. A key reason for that was the fact that Polish sources are overrepresented in some WP pages, and those sources are obviously biased. In addition, it is well known that an infamous "double genocide theory" and similar concepts that are becoming popular in Central Europe include, as an important component, a recognition of the USSR as an equal or even greater evil than Nazi Germany. That narrative is not shared by most Western historians, and, therefore, we should not rely on Polish sources saying that."

It sounds to me like you're valuing the works of Soviet-era historians over Polish historians by default because there may be biased sources in some articles. Keeping in mind that the Soviet Union denied that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact even existed until the late-1980's, that you're not specifically pointing out which Polish sources that you consider to be biased(effectively singling out the nationality), and that you're suggesting that there's a problem with an "overrepresentation" of Polish sources for events that literally took place in Poland, I think you are wrongly dismissing Polish historians.

And we haven't even gotten to all of the mixed reviews of Gorodetsky's work, such as the review from Truman Anderson of the London School of Economics. While Anderson writes that "On balance, Grand Delusion is a valuable work.", he also notes that his work is "hamstrung by his failure to take the pre-war history of Nazi Germany into account, especially Hitlers relationship with the armed forces and his decision for war in 1939. Gorodetsky simply does not deal with German motives for the Nazi-Soviet pact, or with Hitlers explanations of the pact at the time". Now, to be clear, that specific criticism is not directed towards Gorodetsky' explanation of actual nature of the pact between Stalin and Hitler, but rather to Gorodetsky's explanation of the both leaders' respective motives behind it. And that is just one part of one review. Here is a link to the review: [5] CessnaMan1989 (talk) 23:28, 4 November 2021 (UTC)

The reviews cited by me are copyrighted materials, so, per our policy I cannot post them in full. I quoted small part of the text, but I gave you links, so I do not understand what you are dissatisfied with.

My job is much easier than yours. You want to add some claim that is supposed to look like a universally accepted fact. In contrast, I need just to demonstrate that the claim is not universally accepted. I sustained my burden of evidence, whereas you failed to do so.

WRT, "It sounds to me like you're valuing the works of Soviet-era historians over Polish historians by default because there may be biased sources in some articles", where did you find that claim? I thought I clearly explained that all sources that were published before the "archival revolution" should be considered outdated, and all Soviet sources by definition fall into that category. Furthermore, the only time when I used the word "Soviet", I did that in a context of Haslam's opinion on Nekrich, who is bringing the worst traditions of tendentious Soviet historiography, although with an opposite sign. If you are reading sources equally attentively, I am not sure you can produce a high quality content. Please, don't put your own words in the opponent's mouth. Paul Siebert (talk) 00:33, 5 November 2021 (UTC)

@Paul Siebert: When you write "My job is much easier than yours. You want to add some claim that is supposed to look like a universally accepted fact. In contrast, I need just to demonstrate that the claim is not universally accepted. I sustained my burden of evidence, whereas you failed to do so. ", what are you basing that claim on? CessnaMan1989 (talk) 01:30, 5 November 2021 (UTC)

@Paul Siebert: I'll ask again. When you write, "My job is much easier than yours. You want to add some claim that is supposed to look like a universally accepted fact. In contrast, I need just to demonstrate that the claim is not universally accepted. I sustained my burden of evidence, whereas you failed to do so. ", what are you basing that bold statement on? You need to show that your reviews and sources are as well acknowledged as mine or anyone else's sources. You certainly appear to be cherry-picking from various sources and reviews, while also attacking entire nationalities of historians. When you write "I cannot post them[reviews of Gorodetsky] in full. I quoted small part of the text, but I gave you links, so I do not understand what you are dissatisfied with.", several of those links don't work. Also, again, you're cherry picking. As I said previously, many of the reviews of Gorodetsky are extremely positive in one of the very sources that you cite, and you completely ignore those reviews. I suggest you reread the Neutral point of view article. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 23:31, 11 November 2021 (UTC)

No. The statement: "Some fact X is universally accepted (and, therefore, should be presented as a fact, not an opinion)" is much harder to prove than the statement: "Some fact X is NOT universally accepted (and, therefore, should be presented as an opinion at most)". The statement that you advocate is the type 1 statement, whereas my point of view is better described by the type 2 statement. That means my job is much easier to do, and it is not a surprise that I've done it quite well. Paul Siebert (talk) 01:13, 12 November 2021 (UTC)

Complete non-sequitur at best. I don't know what your job is, but both of our duties as editors is to write the relevant truth and remove falsehoods and misleading statements. Editing this encyclopedia is not an inherently adversarial system like you're making it out to be. I have yet to see you provide the slightest bit of evidence for your double-standards. I suggest you reread the policies concerning NPOV again. It doesn't matter if your job is to advocate for a position, party of your duty as an editor is to have a neutral point-of-view. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 14:26, 14 November 2021 (UTC)

Correct. If you write that USSR was an Axis member or co-belligerent, that would be a false statement, because only few sources say so, and they do not do that clearly and unequivocally. Other sources say otherwise. Therefore, I am performing my duty ("to write the relevant truth and remove falsehoods and misleading statements") quite well. I am going to stop at that point, and I have no interest in continuation of this discussion. Paul Siebert (talk) 05:34, 15 November 2021 (UTC)

No, that would not be a false statement, and far more than a few sources either state that explicitly or state that in substance with different terminology. The sources that you're citing are dubious in light of recent evidence, and you're really disregarding your duty as an editor, apparently, based on your previous replies, for professional motives. I urge you to reread Wikipedia's policies on requiring NPOV. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 17:57, 27 December 2021 (UTC)

No. I've shown far more credible sources to form my position than you appear to have in forming your position. The other major fallacy in your statement above is in assuming that just because some of your sources don't establish my position that it somehow means they oppose or aim to refute it. You're ignoring the historical facts by cherry-picking and dismissing most reputable sources on the matter. The fact that you refer to this as your "job" also suggests extreme bias. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 15:44, 16 November 2021 (UTC)

Need I remind you that you have yet to show a single credible source from after 2014 when the most recent research became available. The entire premise of your argument now centers around your unsubstantiated claim that "Central European authors cannot be considered truly neutral. At least, they are not more trustworthy than the works of modern Russian authors" because you believe that Russian people should be considered inherently more reliable than historians of other ethnicities. This exceptional prejudice behind your position is a gross violation of Wikipedia's NPOV and non-discrimination policies that I suggest you re-familiarize yourself with. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 17:25, 1 September 2022 (UTC)

(Personal attack removed)

Can you briefly summarise again what are your "god sources", and what they say? And why my sources are bad and outdated? Paul Siebert (talk) 18:08, 27 December 2021 (UTC)

Here's another source that you refuse to acknowledge, although I don't know what your excuse is for this one. Robert Blobaum writes "As a co-belligerent of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union secretly assisted the German invasion of central and western Poland before launching its own invasion of eastern Poland on September 17" Blobaum, Robert (1990). "The Destruction of East-Central Europe, 1939-41". Problems of Communism. 39: 106.

Meanwhile, you continue to refuse to present a single credible source. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 00:07, 2 September 2022 (UTC)

Took me a while to read all the text, apologies if I missed something.

- Yes, the article needs to reflect that the Soviet Union was a co-belligerent and even an ally of the Axis Powers and it didn't switch until Barbarossa.

- Baltic States, Eastern Poland and to a lesser extent Finland are typically considered part of World War 2. Even the Second Sino-Japanese conflict is typically conisdered part of World War 2 despite starting in 1937.

- USSR was seen an an enemy of Britain and France, but Britain and France hoped USSR and Germany would eventually turn against each other.

- "To sum up, the USSR led the campaign against Fascism up to 1939, was neutral in the European War from 1939 to 1941, and was neutral against Japan from 1941 to 1945" -> False. USSR was supporting Germany since 1939. It even offered to join the Axis, but Germany refused. What happened between them before 1939, does not reflect what happened between 1939 - 1941. USSR was a supporter of Germany, not neutral. User CessnaMan1989 is right.

- The historical consensus is that USSR was a supporter of Germany in that period. Some call it support, others co-billegent, some even go as far as calling them allies.

- Nick-D simplicity should not come at the cost of falsehood. I agree that the infobox should be as simple as possible, but disagree that it should have wrong or misleading information because of this.

- And CessnaMan1989 makes a good point. The vast majority of infoboxes on wikipedia are not oversimplifications, why should the most complex conflict in human history be?

- User Paul Siebert: Finland and Baltics were annexed with German permission, the whole continent was split between them by the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, if that isn't a sign of Soviet co-billegence I don't know what is. Poland was part of the Allies and Romania had a French and British guarnatee. The historical consensus is that USSR clearly acted against the interests of the Allies and in cooperation with Nazi Germany, but the USSR's actions were tolerated by the Allies as they hoped for an eventual German-Soviet clash and didn't want to alienate USSR any further.

- Therealscorp1an: USSR's position is not comparable to Finland. Finland did not act outside of the Allies' interests, the Soviets did on numerous occasions. It's incorrect and false to label the Soviets as Axis. But correct and fair to label the Soviets as Axis co-billegent or Axis supporters.

After that is more of the same discussion. In the end I agree with user CessnaMan1989's position. In the meanwhile, would it satisfy you if I continue with my list for all nations that took part in World War 2 but leave the Soviets alone until this discussion is concluded?TheGoldAge (talk) 11:55, 11 January 2022 (UTC)

-Just my two cents, but I don't think a majority of sources say the USSR was an axis member. Since this is wikipedia, we need a majority of reliable sources to add something. — Preceding unsigned comment added by CheeseInTea (talk • contribs) 17:56, 22 April 2022 (UTC)

@CheeseInTea, The vast majority of respectable sources that affirmatively address the issue at all consider the Soviet Union to have been a co-belligerent of Nazi Germany prior to the commencing of Operation Barbarossa. While most of these sources do not consider the Soviets to have been a member of the Axis, it is important to remember that the Tripartite Pact had not been codified at the time the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was made. It is also true that negotiations to get the Soviets to join the Axis powers did fail. However, that doesn't change the Soviets' extremely important co-belligerent status at the start of WW2 in Europe as an ally of Nazi Germany against Poland. Paul Siebert's primary argument against these sources is that he feels that many of these scholars should be disregarded on account of their nationality. Siebert has summarized his argument by writing "Central European authors cannot be considered truly neutral. At least, they are not more trustworthy than the works of modern Russian authors." I think it is grossly irresponsible to attempt to compare historians' reliability based on their respective ethnicities, and it reflects poorly on the article. @Paul Siebert has ultimately made this about trying to elevate some nationalities of historians over others. CessnaMan1989 (talk) 21:10, 31 August 2022 (UTC)

Alternate dates for Allied victory in Europe

Many of us probably know that there are two separate dates commemorating the end of the war in Europe: Victory in Europe Day is celebrated on 8 May, and Victory Day on 9 May. As far as I can tell, the last time this issue was discussed was in 2010 (see Talk:World War II/Archive 43#9 May 1945), and almost twelve years later the article is doubtless very different.

I believe a short paragraph in the start and end dates section, noting Germany's surrender and the discrepancies between the dates, would be in order: both to contextualize the other half of the war, and in keeping with how Japan's armistice and surrender are treated in the section as-is.

I wrote the following paragraph discussing the alternate end dates. I have copied it below, for consideration:

The end of the war in Europe is considered to fall on either 8 May or 9 May, 1945. Germany declared its desire to surrender on 8 May, but the formal act of surrender occurred one day later, on 9 May. V-E Day is celebrated among the Western Allies on 8 May, while in the former Soviet Union, Victory Day takes place on 9 May. In Russian law, the end date of the Great Patriotic War is sometimes also pushed out to 11 May, coinciding with the end of the Prague Offensive.

(This was in the article for all of four minutes, after which I removed it. Because I was intially editing in the mobile client, I didn't see the warning about undiscussed major edits. Now I'm here writing this talk page thread, and the rest is history.)

It does need a rewrite and more sources. Still, I think a paragraph like this would be a valuable addition to the section. It gives context to alternate end dates that a reader might have heard about, but leaves more detailed discussion to the articles which it links to. The paragraph is also short and draws no undue attention to itself, perfect for such a minor section that occurs so early. What say you all?

— Marisauna (talk): 02:22, 2 June 2022 (UTC)

A paragraph seems too much on what is a minor issue, which largely resulted from Stalin wanting to stage manage the end of the war. Some of the largest battles of the war don't even get a full sentence! Nick-D (talk) 09:25, 2 June 2022 (UTC)

If a paragraph is too much, what do you think would be long enough? A sentence, or part of a sentence? Nothing at all? I have no preference — consensus dictates what enters the article — but for people looking into the end of fighting in Europe, I still think at least something would be beneficial. Marisauna (talk) 14:17, 2 June 2022 (UTC)

References

Heads of state vs. heads of government

Under the “Commanders and leaders” section, it lists both Hirohito and Churchill. I find the listing of Hirohito interesting, as it is debatable whether he “led” the war effort in a practical sense. I think it makes most sense to either: list George VI and Hirohito; or list Churchill and Tojo. I recognize that listing a Japanese government leader wouldn’t cover the full duration of the war, but if we are listing FDR, then Tojo’s resignation in 1944 shouldn’t be an issue. This has been previously discussed (2007) [6], and while there are strong sources on both sides back then, I believe this should be reconsidered not for arguing whether Hirohito, Tojo, King George, or anyone else had a larger impact on their country’s direction in the war, but for consistency. As a categorical, objective criteria for inclusion in this infobox, I believe it would be best to choose between heads of state (which would put Mussolini and Churchill in jeopardy) and heads of government (which would affect Hirohito). Accuse me of presenting a false dichotomy if you will, but if I had to choose between Churchill, Mussolini, Tojo or two relatively obscure heads of state and Hirohito, I would choose the former. Please share your thoughts below, and I hope the discussion can remain civil. 2601:199:C202:E070:A043:ECB9:24E0:CC0 (talk) 12:31, 2 June 2022 (UTC)

This exact issue has been discussed all too many times, and the article has a clear precedent for preferring Hirohito over Tojo. The main reason is that modern historians consider Hirohito to have been much less of a figurehead than the other two monarchs, granting him a hands-on role closer in proximity to, say, Hitler. To see for yourself, continue searching through this talk page's archives. Marisauna (talk) 14:32, 2 June 2022 (UTC)

I apologize, I rushed in with my first comment and did not read your argument the whole way through. Nevertheless, I still believe that Hirohito should remain in place of Tojo, for a couple of reasons.

During the second half of Asia-Pacific fighting, Tojo plays the dual part of Prime Minister (head of government) and Minister of War. During the first half, he is preceded as Minister of War by three people in quick succession (Hajime Sugiyama, Seishiro Itagaki, and Shunroku Hata), and as Prime Minister (head of gov't) also by many people but principally by Fumimaro Konoe. The Emperor, on grounds of his being head of state before, during, and after the war, and of his official status as dai-gensui (generalissimo), is the single major thread that sews Japan's fighting into a single garment.

To prefer the head of government on grounds of consistency also makes for a complicated state of affairs, because it openly calls the war's start date into dispute. Listing only Tojo casts the war in the Asia-Pacific region as only starting in 1941, a date which ignores all of China and Japan's fighting from 1937. Listing Japan as having two principal heads of government (Konoe, then Tojo) creates the opposite problem of pushing the start date of the entire war back to 1937. Listing Hirohito as representative of Japan sidesteps this entirely, because he was the head of state before, during, and after the war by all metrics. This allows for the Eurocentric 1939 start date, which is almost universally accepted, to be preserved in the infobox with only minimal qualification.

Preference to Japan's Minister of War would be both misleading and inconsistent — it's like listing Eisenhower instead of Roosevelt. And as you have already suggested, preferring the head of state would be nonsense. Putting George VI and Victor Immanuel III, two figureheads, in "Commanders and leaders" next to Hirohito and other more involved people would be silly.

In spite of his inconsistency, then, I really do think Hirohito is the best representative of Japan. Marisauna (talk) 19:14, 2 June 2022 (UTC)

I agree with the replies by Marisauna. In addition, I would like to add that I do not see any problem of inconsistency because in some countries the head of state is cited and in others the head of government. It depends on the circumstances of each case.

For example, if the infobox listed more countries (let's say Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria), I think we should list the head of state in the first and third (Regent Miklós Horthy of Hungary and Tsar Boris III of Bulgaria), instead the heads of government (Prime Ministers Miklós Kállay and Bogdan Filov, respectively), because Horthy and Boris III, like Hirohito in Japan, played a much more important role in their countries than George VI in Great Britain or Victor Emmanuel III in Italy. On the other hand, in the case of Romania we should mention the head of government (conducator Ion Antonescu) instead of the very young King Michael I. It is not a question of choosing between heads of state and heads of government, but of citing the most appropriate name for the circumstances of each country at that time.

I already argued in a comment I wrote on March 31, 2021, on the occasion of discussing this matter of "Hirohito or Tojo in the infobox" why I think the mention of Emperor Hirohito is absolutely necessary, and it is not necessary to repeat again everything I said then. I will only remember the description of Tojo made by the Japanese historian Takahisa Furukawa, expert on wartime history from Nihon University: "Tojo is a bureaucrat who was incapable of making own decisions, so he turned to the Emperor as his supervisor. That's why he had to report everything for the Emperor to decide. If the Emperor didn't say no, then he would proceed." We can see it in this article.

To conclude, I would like to point out that the French historian Marc Ferro dedicates his book Ils étaient sept hommes en guerre to the main leaders of World War II, including Stalin (USSR), Churchill (Great Britain), Roosevelt (USA), De Gaulle (France), Hitler (Germany), Mussolini (Italy), and Hirohito (Japan), regardless of whether the rank of each was head of state, head of government, or both. In summary, in the case at hand, we must mention Emperor Hirohito because the relevance of his role, according to more and more experts and historians, was much greater than that of monarchs such as the British George VI or the Italian Victor Emmanuel III, and it is not possible not to distinguish the cases.Ulises Laertíada (talk) 21:12, 2 June 2022 (UTC)

It is noted that Stalin, Churchill, Roosevelt, Hitler and Mussolini were all heads of government, although Roosevelt and Hitler were heads of state s well. (Eisenhower was not the Secretary of War; that was Henry Stimson.) Tojo was the prime minister from October 1941 until July 1944, so that covers most of the Pacific War. It is noted that Roosevelt was replaced by Harry Truman in April 1945, and Churchill by Clement Attlee is July (and Churhill was not prime minister until May 1940), so the argument about not being in office for the whole war also seems weak. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:29, 2 June 2022 (UTC)

I also note that Tojo is twice mentioned in the article but Hirohito never mentioned at all. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:31, 2 June 2022 (UTC)

About not being in office, I believe Japan is special. In your examples (the US and UK), the "major leaders" still occupy their positions for the majority of the time their country is at war. Regarding your counter-cases, Chamberlain and Attlee only lead the UK for a total of 9 months of the war, and Truman the US for just 4.

As I stated at length above, Japan is a special case because in its 8 years of fighting, the position of PM is neatly split in half, with Konoe (and others) occupying the position from 1937 to 1941, and Tojo from 1941 to 1945. Both of these halves also pass through multiple disputed start dates for the war, whether locally or globally: is it the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (1937), invasion of Poland (1939), or attack on Pearl Harbor (1941)?

Tojo is indeed PM for "most of the Pacific War," but that's just that, the Pacific War; it doesn't include the first half of the Second Sino-Japanese War, presided over by Konoe and the true start of major fighting in Asia. The second hald, where it is subsumed into WW2's China Burma India Theater, is only differentiated by the entrance of China's allies into the fight. Hirohito occupies a unique neutral position because no matter what start or end dates one uses, he is always the head of state. Marisauna (talk) 23:30, 2 June 2022 (UTC)

As I said in my previous comment, it is not a question of choosing between heads of state and heads of government, but of citing the most appropriate name for the circumstances of each country at that time.I have already cited the examples of Hungary and Bulgaria, in contrast to Romania, to illustrate that not all cases are the same.

Regarding Hirohito not being mentioned in the text of the article, it is certainly a lack, which is already mentioned in this discussion, in the section "Japan Waged War in Hirohito's name". Precisely, as a result of what was discussed in that section, I am right now consulting material on the matter to add some mentions of Hirohito in the coming days (I hope to have concluded before the end of next week), because it is, certainly, a deficiency to be corrected.

For the rest, I did not initially believe that it was necessary to repeat what I already wrote in March 2021, but I am seeing that it may be appropriate, so I give my reasons again to explain the need to keep the mention of the emperor in Japan's case.

• A growing number of historians consider that Hirohito was actively involved in Japanese wartime policy. On this matter, we can see some information on this article.
• Years ago, on this talk page, a consensus was reached to include Hirohito because, of all the Japanese leaders of the war, he was the only one who remained in power during the entire war period (1937-1945). Tojo was Prime Minister only for 2 years and 9 months (October, 1941-July, 1944).
• The unsettled controversy among the historians regarding Hirohito's role in the war means that ignoring the emperor to name his prime minister between 1941 and 1944 as the sole leader would deviate from neutrality to clearly side with Hirohito's apologists. It could be discussed whether the old consensus (naming only the leader who remained throughout the war, that is, Hirohito) is sufficient, or whether Tojo should be named along with Hirohito, but never replacing him.

To illustrate the need to keep the mention of Emperor Hirohito, I will cite three opinions of different historians:

• Kenneth J. Ruoff, Director of the Center for Japanese Studies at Portland State University, writes in his book The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 (2001, p.127) that "If 'war responsibility' means participating in the policymaking process that led to the commencement and prosecution of an aggressive war (for many Japanese, the key issue was the responsibility for defeat, not complicity in an aggressive war), then there is growing evidence that Emperor Hirohito played a considerable role in this area".
• Peter Wetzler writes in his recent book Imperial Japan and Defeat in the Second World War: The Collapse of an Empire (2020, p.175) that "During the Tokyo War Crimes Trials the testimony offered by Tôjô Hideki, and gladly accepted by US officials, succeeded in exonerating the Shôwa Emperor of war guilt. The debate, however, about Hirohito's participation in political and military affairs during the Second World War -whether or not (at first) and to what extent (later)- still continues. It will animate authors for years to come. Now most historians acknowledge that the Emperor was deeply involved, like all nation-state leaders at that time."
• Takahisa Furukawa, expert on wartime history from Nihon University, described Hideki Tojo with this words: "Tojo is a bureaucrat who was incapable of making own decisions, so he turned to the Emperor as his supervisor. That's why he had to report everything for the Emperor to decide. If the Emperor didn't say no, then he would proceed." We can see it in this article.

For all these reasons, my opinion is that it would not be neutral to omit the reference to Hirohito in Japan's leadership in the war. As I said before, it could be discussed whether, in addition to the emperor, Prime Minister Tojo should also be mentioned, but I must oppose a replacement of the former by the latter.Ulises Laertíada (talk) 03:18, 3 June 2022 (UTC)

These reasons make sense to me, thank you for the explanation. It is good to see that it was a conscious decision to choose the most relevant leader of each nation. 2601:199:C202:E070:2947:B88B:947D:4748 (talk) 17:02, 6 June 2022 (UTC)

Leader of Japan during World war 2

The box that mentions the leaders of WW2 should have the leader of Japan be changed from Hirohito to Hideki Tojo, because Hirohito was just a figurehead, while Tojo had the actual power. 71.179.254.108 (talk) 00:48, 7 July 2022 (UTC)

Please see the previous, including fairly recent, discussions of the issue here. Nick-D (talk) 11:01, 7 July 2022 (UTC)

Nick-D is right. This matter has already been discussed many times, the last one quite recently, in the section entitled Heads of state vs. heads of government, which has not yet been archived and is visible just a few lines above. In that section (and on other occasions already archived in which this same issue has been discussed) user 71.179.254.108 can see all the arguments why his claim is not valid. In any case, he should not make statements seriously questioned by many historians as if it were an incontrovertible truth.--Ulises Laertíada (talk) 11:21, 7 July 2022 (UTC)

Charles de Gaulle should be in the infobox

because he could be considered a main allied leader due to him leading free france TheBritishDoge (talk) 21:00, 4 July 2022 (UTC)

This topic has been discussed repeatedly, and I'm not familiar with any sources that list de Gaulle as one of the major Allied leaders. The Free French had little military or economic power until 1945, when they were able to field a large but not particularly effective army. Nick-D (talk) 11:03, 7 July 2022 (UTC)

Basically this, he should not be in the infobox. TylerBurden (talk) 07:07, 8 July 2022 (UTC)

Causes of WWII

The opening of the article summarises the causes of the war in the following way:

"The exact causes of World War II are debated, but contributing factors included the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, the Spanish Civil War, the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Soviet–Japanese border conflicts and rising European tensions since World War I"

Now, certainly these are all commonly listed as causes by historians. However, no mention is made of the deeper ideological reasons behind specifically Nazi Germany's attempt to take over other countries. A vague "rising European tensions since World War I" sounds like it could cover, say, wanting to reverse the Treaty of Versailles, but it doesn't specifically sound like antisemitic conspiracism, theories of racial supremacy and lebensraum, which were dominant in Nazi thinking. Please can someone with edit access add something about this aspect to this sentence, given this is a pretty common and basic point amongst historians, and especially given that both the rest of the article and the Causes of World War II article itself make plenty of mention of it (hence it should be in the summary). Not mentioning Nazi ideology as a major factor in WWII is a serious failing by Wikipedia. 2A00:23C4:6B13:D801:28D5:2313:43D4:F7F (talk) 01:02, 9 July 2022 (UTC)

I have added fascism to the paragraph. Remember, you can always do it yourself too and please do not say "a serious failing by Wikipedia", as there are editors who have and do work very hard on articles, especially this one. - Therealscorp1an (talk) 01:53, 9 July 2022 (UTC)

The article is semi-protected, so an IP editor can't edit it. They need to first register, then become autoconfirmed, which happens after their user account is at least 4 days old and they have made at least 10 edits to the encyclopedia, something I encourage the user to do. HiLo48 (talk) 02:18, 9 July 2022 (UTC)

Right. My bad. - Therealscorp1an (talk) 03:13, 9 July 2022 (UTC)

I think the IP editor is justified in making the complaint shown here. The main underlying cause of WW2 were the territorial ambitions of the leaders of the three Axis countries, which were faced (in Europe) by a policy of appeasement. I think the article (in the lead) misses making this point as it is too wrapped up in giving links to other articles on the "precursor" conflicts. So Wikipedia has failed in the role of an encyclopaedia to give an overall summary, or in short, cannot see the wood for the trees. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 19:19, 9 July 2022 (UTC)

Sentence clarification

The opening sentence in the Axis attack on the Soviet Union (1941) subsection needs attention. The sentence currently states; With the situation in Europe and Asia relatively stable, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union made preparations.

This, to me, is vague and begs "what preparations?". -- Otr500 (talk) 15:30, 10 July 2022 (UTC)

War, I have added ther word. Slatersteven (talk) 15:37, 10 July 2022 (UTC)

Thanks, I considered that might have been the meaning but it was not clear. -- Otr500 (talk) 20:11, 10 July 2022 (UTC)

That paragraph is a bit clunky. Any chance we could polish it up? And I'm not sure it's true that Stalin was preparing for war in 1941. He thought it would be later, didn't he?--Jack Upland (talk) 02:47, 11 July 2022 (UTC)

Soviet offensive plans controversy. Slatersteven (talk) 09:26, 11 July 2022 (UTC)

And the consensus is there were no such plans.--Jack Upland (talk) 04:28, 15 July 2022 (UTC)

Phoney war?

It is surprising that this article makes no mention whatsoever about the Phoney War. This is one of the particularly unusual features of WW2, summed up rather well at the time by the Italian ambassador in Paris saying that he had seen ‘several wars waged without being declared’ but this was the first time he had seen one ‘declared without being waged’. (Bouverie, Tim. Appeasing Hitler (p. 382). Random House). The term "phoney war" was coined by American journalists.

The phoney war occupied 10 or 11% or the duration of the entire war (depending on exactly when you think it was replaced by British and/or French military activity). It's existence demonstrated (a) the hope that peace could still be achieved in some way and (b) the lack of military preparedness of both Britain and France.

I appreciate that this is only a high level article for which there is always competition for some particular aspect to be covered herein. However, the proper historiography of war is not exclusively about the actual fighting. A lengthy period of relative inactivity by the two countries who declared war has to be worthy of at least a mention. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 19:22, 14 July 2022 (UTC)

It's a piped link called "no direct military support", which seems a poor choice. (Hohum ^@) 19:29, 14 July 2022 (UTC)

I have de-obfuscated the link (Hohum ^@) 19:33, 14 July 2022 (UTC)

OK, edit to article noted with thanks, but the Phoney war went on for a further 216 days (caveats on arithmetic as above), which is much longer than the 35 days from the British and French declaration to the cessation of serious fighting in Poland. I think the structure of the article would need a little surgery to properly address this. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 19:39, 14 July 2022 (UTC)

I really think we should at a strength tab to this article, the casualties aren’t enough Tise exists (cool) (talk) 05:07, 23 July 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 9 August 2022

To add Canada, new Zealand, Australia, Greece, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary, to main allied and axis leaders 2001:56A:7B14:9400:F0B4:679A:AEBF:3AAE (talk) 22:07, 9 August 2022 (UTC)

 Not done: Unclear what you want added. If you are referring to the infobox "Main Leaders" section, addition of Leaders of the listed nations is unlikely, as listing the leaders of all involved nations would generate an excessively long list. WelpThatWorked (talk) 17:53, 10 August 2022 (UTC)

Allied leaders of World War II

@Economist0723 and Iamjustben:

On 2022-11-15T11:05:46 User:Iamjustben changed the order of the "Main Allied leaders" to read Churchill, Stalin, FDR, and Chiang Kai-shek.

I was surprised to see this for two reasons:

1. It has been argued over extensively in the past. The conclusion in Talk:World War II/Archive 62 was to present the "Big Three in chronological order". For that they referenced the companion discussion on Talk:Allies of World War II/Archive 10 on "Big Three / Four label and weight". That would be the UK, which officially declared war in 1939, the USSR, which switched sides (after Germany invaded) in 1941, and the US after 1941-12-08.
2. Chiang Kai-shek should not be on this list at all.

Evidently multiple other changes have been made to this article without being challenged by any the people who were aware of and concurred in that earlier discussion. (The archive protocol makes researching something like this difficult, because it breaks links to discussions as they are archived. That's a problem that should be fixed, but I don't know to whom to complain.)

In any event, I believe the previous consensus was that this list should be Churchill, Stalin, and FDR, in that order, without Chiang Kai-shek. I plan to make that change. If you disagree, first please review that earlier discussion, and then state your reasons here. Thanks, DavidMCEddy (talk) 12:22, 15 November 2022 (UTC)

I'm satisfied by these arguments and endorse this change. Economist0723 (talk) 12:25, 15 November 2022 (UTC)

@Economist0723:, et al. What do you suggest we do to ask that the archive process NOT break links to old discussions? My research for the above comments took several times as much time as it should have, because the archive process used here does NOT include appropriate #REDIRECTs. Thanks, DavidMCEddy (talk) 12:35, 15 November 2022 (UTC)

@DavidMCEddy I'm not sure about this one sorry Economist0723 (talk) 12:44, 15 November 2022 (UTC)

@强汉盛唐: Please see the above discussion and enter related search terms in the box just above "Search archives" above. There have been extensive discussions on this Talk page (many of which have been Archived) of exactly whom should be listed as the "Main Allied leaders" and in what order. The consensus was that (a) Chiang Kai-shek should not be on this list (presumably, because the generally available records suggest that his impact on the war was substantially smaller than that of the other three), and (b) the order should reflect the dates on which the other three entered the war.

To change that consensus, that history would have to be reviewed again, and people "Watching" this article would have to agree that a change is warranted.

Thanks for your support of our great project to improve the availability of the sum of all human knowledge. DavidMCEddy (talk) 11:48, 23 November 2022 (UTC)

Agreed, and I've just restored the list to the longstanding order, which as David notes is the result of many and extensive previous discussions. Nick-D (talk) 09:32, 24 November 2022 (UTC)

@Nick-D: I'm confused by your interpretation of "the longstanding order" that resulted from "many and extensive previous discussions": My research cited above said the "big three" should be in chronological order, Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt. You've modified that to Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill.

Can you please do the following

1. Find what seems to be the most recent "previous discussion" and consensus on this? (NOTE: Shouldn't it be either the one I cited above or something more recent? If not, please explain why you think the one I cited should be overruled.)
2. Change the order to match the results of your research, unless it happens to justify the change you just made.

Thanks, DavidMCEddy (talk) 12:15, 24 November 2022 (UTC) the discussion that supports your change or change your latest change to be consistent with what you

settled on that and confirm that I was somehow mistaken? Thanks, DavidMCEddy (talk) 12:15, 24 November 2022 (UTC)

I myself thought that chronological order could be a solution. However, that means we must be consistent, so the Axis leader should be listed chronologically too. However, that may lead to additional disputes: whereas the starting date for Hitler seems obvious (1 Sept, 1939), what should be the date for Hirohito? Pearl Harbor? But that would be too US-centric. It would be logical to assume that for Hirohito the war started with the start of SSJW, which means he should go first. Do we agree on that? Paul Siebert (talk) 19:09, 24 November 2022 (UTC)

@Paul Siebert: Good question.

The article on "Axis leaders of World War II" lists Hitler, Hirohito, and Mussolini. The current "World War II" article indicates that Hitler started the war by invading Poland in 1939. Mussolini invaded France with Hitler in 1940. Hirohito's military was projecting force in other parts of Asia before the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, but those actions were not considered part of World War II until December 7, 1941.

Meanwhile, the Wikipedia article on "Military history of Italy during World War II" says that Mussolini himself was arrested by the King of Italy in July 1943, after which Italy descended in civil war, becoming a liability rather than a partner to the Axis.

I suggest we leave the order of the "Axis leaders of World War II" as indicated in that other article, especially since that order fits with my understanding of the war: Without Hitler, there likely would not have been a World War, so he needs to come first. Hirohito fielded a very strong military. Mussolini's military strength does not seem to have been close to that of either Germany or Japan.

However, I do not see an order of the leaders specified in the Wikipedia article on "Allied leaders of World War II". I think this leaves us free to select our own order. As previously discussed, there are strong arguments for putting any of the "big three" first. I don't see a way of resolving that argument in a reasonable way other than leaving the Allied leaders in chronological order (Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt).

CONCLUSION: Allies: Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt. Axis: Hitler, Hirohito, Mussolini.

Acceptable? DavidMCEddy (talk) 01:03, 25 November 2022 (UTC)

@Therealscorp1an: The order of the "big three" (and whether it shouldn't be the "big four", including Chiang Kai-shek) have been discussed extensively for some time. Above please find a summary of that discussion and more recent comments.

Bottom line: I think the consensus is Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, NOT because "Churchill is much more notable than Roosevelt in terms of World War II" -- we'll never get a consensus on that -- but because Churchill was at war against Germany (1939) before Stalin was (1940) and before Roosevelt was (1941). DavidMCEddy (talk) 03:58, 25 November 2022 (UTC)

@Mathglot and Therealscorp1an: See the discussion above. Am I correct that this supports the recent change by User:Therealscorp1an? Thanks, DavidMCEddy (talk) 08:08, 25 November 2022 (UTC)

I would say so. But may I ask why you have placed Roosevelt first despite the conversation above? He did not have as much to do with the war as Churchill and Stalin, and was a latecomer to the Allies. - Therealscorp1an (talk) 08:13, 25 November 2022 (UTC)

I seem to recall that the current ordering was the result of a discussion of the Allied countries that contributed the most to the outcomes of the war, per what reliable sources said (e.g. that the literature generally argues that the Eastern Front in Europe was the decisive theatre of the war, with the US playing the dominant role in the Pacific and the larger overall role in western Europe than the UK). This is in line with the guidance for determining the ordering in this field in the documentation of Template:Infobox military conflict which states "Combatants should be listed in order of importance to the conflict..." Re: some of the comments above - please don't reference whatever your views are if you'd like to propose a change, please stick to what a survey of a range of reliable sources say (noting that there are of course divergent views on the topic). The order obviously isn't reflective of how nice the leaders were - the sources generally argue that Stalin was a monster and an aggressor, yet also led the main effort that destroyed Nazi Germany and played an important role in forcing the Japanese to surrender. As Norman Davies argues in Europe at War 1939–1945: No Simple Victory the war was complex, and wasn't a clear cut contest between good and evil given the role of Stalin. Nick-D (talk) 08:31, 25 November 2022 (UTC)

That makes sense.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:53, 25 November 2022 (UTC)

So where are we? Stalin-Churchill-Roosevelt or Churchill-Stalin-Roosevelt?

I favor the latter for two reasons: (1) I can see arguments claiming that either of the two were "more important to the conflict". (2) Churchill got England into the war before Hitler turned against Stalin, and Churchill also got Roosevelt into the war: If England had been overrun by the Germans, Roosevelt might not have wanted to fight in Europe and might not have embargoed oil shipments to Japan, thereby pushing Japan to attack Pearl Harbor. That sounds to me like Churchill was more important than Stalin to how the war actually developed.

However, if the consensus is that Stalin should come first, I could support that, especially if we could find one or more references that support that position, which could then be cited to justify that ordering. DavidMCEddy (talk) 14:51, 25 November 2022 (UTC)

As it was an allied effort, and arguably no one can be said to have solely won it, it is far too subjective to pick a leader based upon "most important". I also prefer alphabetically as it avoids issues like "when did the war start", "was Russia allied with the axis at one point" and no doubt others as well. Slatersteven (talk) 15:07, 25 November 2022 (UTC)

@Slatersteven: The text of the article seems to make the chronology fairly clear: Churchill (1939), Stalin (1940), Roosevelt (1941).

But whatever we decide, I suggest we document the decision in footnotes to "Mail Allied leaders" and "Main Axis leaders".

E.g., replace:

| commander2 = '''[[Axis leaders of World War II|Main Axis leaders]]:'''{{plainlist|

with

| commander2 = '''[[Axis leaders of World War II|Main Axis leaders]]:<ref>In order of apparent importance.</ref>'''{{plainlist|

And

| commander1 = '''[[Allied leaders of World War II|Main Allied leaders]]:'''{{plainlist|

with either

| commander1 = '''[[Allied leaders of World War II|Main Allied leaders]]:<ref>Ordered by date of entry into the war</ref>'''{{plainlist|

or

| commander1 = '''[[Allied leaders of World War II|Main Allied leaders]]:<ref>in alphabetical order</ref>'''{{plainlist|

???DavidMCEddy (talk) 15:38, 25 November 2022 (UTC)

Just to demonstrate you that formal aspects may be very ambiguous, let me point out that at least two arguments can be proposed against your "fairly clear" statement "Churchill (1939), Stalin (1940), Roosevelt (1941)". Thus, for Churchill, where "1939" comes from? It is the time when Britain joined the war, but Churchill was NOT her leader by that time. He became a prime minister only in 1940. As far as I remember, he even had to hire, by himself, bodyguards, because the government could not provide them for the persons who has no official position in His Majesty's government.

Why "Stalin (1940)"? What exactly happened in 1940 that made Stalin a WWII commander? Soviet occupation of Baltic states? But the Baltic states had never have any relation to the Axis, they were neutral states (to some degree leaning towards Germany, although that was not sufficient to call them Nazi allies). What else? As soon as Stalin is being discussed, it makes sense to remember that by the moment WWII had officially started in Europe (1st of September, 1939) there was a de facto state of war between USSR and Japan. Therefore, I would say, from a formal point of view, if we decide to use a chronological order, more arguments can be proposed in favour of "Stalin-Churchill-Roosevelt". And this dispute may continue endlessly.

That is why I propose not to use such formal criteria as chronology. Paul Siebert (talk) 19:12, 25 November 2022 (UTC)

Stalin broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 28 June 1940 when he invaded Bukovina. He then broke the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement in August 1940 by withholding deliveries of war materials for Nazi Germany. — Preceding unsigned comment added by DavidNo1Fan (talk • contribs) 19:05, 26 November 2022 (UTC)

Roosevelt should clearly be listed before Stalin, as the USSR was on the Axis side for two years. (DavidNo1Fan (talk) 19:06, 27 November 2022 (UTC))

And the USA entred the war after Russia. Slatersteven (talk) 19:14, 27 November 2022 (UTC)

The United States was already at war with Germany in 1940, as Admiral King confirmed at the time: https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/undeclared-war-in-the-atlantic/ (DavidNo1Fan (talk) 19:18, 27 November 2022 (UTC))

What Admiral King thought is not relevant as neither the USA or Germany were in a mutual state of war. That is why Germany had to declare war on the USA in December 41. Slatersteven (talk) 19:23, 27 November 2022 (UTC)

US warships were already firing on sight at Axis U-Boats in the Battle of the Atlantic by April 1941. The so-called "declarations" by Germany and Italy only acknowledged the US had already been in a state of war since Roosevelt publicly confirmed shoot on sight on 11 September 1941. (DavidNo1Fan (talk) 19:45, 27 November 2022 (UTC))

More groundhog day on this issue! Just to reiterate, Churchill may not have been the British Prime Minister when war was declared, but he was an elected member of parliament at the time and was actively engaged in correspondence with Chamberlain to encourage that declaration of war, as well as someone who had accepted a position in the War Cabinet (I recollect the appointment was announced after the declaration of war). It is also worth adding that Britain was the only one of the Allies that was faced with the option of going to war. Both the USSR and USA were attacked.

Regardless of this, counting the time that Churchill was leading Britain at war (as PM), he was still doing so for longer than Roosevelt or Stalin as leaders of their respective countries at war. So the "days in leadership and at war" criteria still hold good. The measure is simple, it is factual (so no matters of opinion on who was more important) and it has been previously agreed on this talk page.ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 20:36, 27 November 2022 (UTC)

Churchill began pressing for war with Germany in May 1938 after his vast debts were settled by Strakosch. The US attacked Germany and Japan in April 1941. Stalin broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in June 1940, before breaking the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement in August 1940. (DavidNo1Fan (talk) 12:02, 28 November 2022 (UTC))

1938, the year of the Munich crisis? So did Churchill "press for war" or just realized that a man like Hitler would continue until he was stopped? Slatersteven (talk) 12:51, 28 November 2022 (UTC)

Poland and Hungary invaded Czechoslovakia in 1938, before annexing more Czech territory in 1939. Sebastian Haffner is correct regarding Hitler's role in decolonisation. The Munich Agreement never failed - it was Chamberlain's decision to form an unworkable military pact with Poland that led to World War II. (DavidNo1Fan (talk) 13:50, 28 November 2022 (UTC))

Seriously, so there would have been no WW2, if we had let Hitler got what he wanted? I think with this we can close this derail. Slatersteven (talk) 13:54, 28 November 2022 (UTC)

The UK should have pressured the anti-Semitic regime in Warsaw more heavily to allow a referendum on Danzig. Fascist Poland had been allied with Nazi Germany since January 1934, and had participated in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938-39. Stalin knew the UK and France would only declare war on Germany, hence his invasion of Poland in September 1939. Regardless of this, Roosevelt should be listed before Churchill, as the UK and its defunct empire was already a satellite of the United States by the end of 1940. (DavidNo1Fan (talk) 17:17, 28 November 2022 (UTC))

I think there are arguments for any of the big three being first based upon "importance", that is an argument that can't be won. Hence why I say either Chroloricaly (based upon official declaration of war) or alphabetically. But I have had my say. Slatersteven (talk) 17:30, 28 November 2022 (UTC)

The Soviet Union won the war, but Stalin did start out on the Axis side until he broke his pact with Nazi Germany in June 1940. By 1944 it was very evident that the UK and its defunct empire was by far the least of "The Big Three". The correct order should be Stalin, Roosevelt and then Churchill. The USSR was at war from 1939, even though it did not join the Allied side until June 1941. (DavidNo1Fan (talk) 17:33, 28 November 2022 (UTC))

Removing Chiang Kai-shek is entirely unwarranted and OP made no reasoning why he should be removed. Long standing consensus was to include him in the infobox and it would create major pro-western pov issues if he was removed.XavierGreen (talk) 20:43, 11 December 2022 (UTC)

@XavierGreen:: Please provide documentation to support your claim that a "Long standing consensus was to include" Chiang Kai-shek "in the infobox"?

My research of the history of this article, summarized above, supports the opposite conclusion: that this issue has been discussed repeatedly in the past, and the long standing consensus was to EXclude Chiang Kai-shek from the infobox.

Whether the exclusion of Chiang Kai-shek creates a "major pro-western pov" is a different question. If you want to argue that, please provide a more substantive discussion with credible references. Could you, for example, provide a table of the size of Chiang Kai-shek's army relative to that of the Soviet Union, the British empire, the US, and others? The Wikipedia article on "World War II casualties" suggests that very roughly half of the civilian deaths during World War II were Chinese. However, it's hard to say anything from that about what Chiang Kai-shek accomplished during the war.

@Economist0723, Iamjustben, 强汉盛唐, Nick-D, Paul Siebert, Therealscorp1an, Jack Upland, Slatersteven, DavidNo1Fan, ThoughtIdRetired, and Mathglot:

User:XavierGreen has today insisted on reopening this discussion.

Am I correct that the above discussion from November 15 to 28 involved 11 Wikipedians, 2 of whom thought that Chiang Kai-shek belonged on the list of allied leaders against 9 who didn't? User:XavierGreen now makes it 3 to 9.

DavidMCEddy (talk) 03:54, 12 December 2022 (UTC)

The discussion regarding the consensus was in the talk page of the WWII infobox article, which has since been merged into this page. I will have to go digging through my edit archives to find it, since that page was merged into this one apparently some months ago.XavierGreen (talk) 17:34, 12 December 2022 (UTC)

Any luck? TylerBurden (talk) 20:49, 15 December 2022 (UTC)

Excluding Chiang Kai-Shek is entirely unwarranted and betrays a long-standing Western bias which belittles the performance of Chinese troops and consequently their contributions to the Allied victory in ww2, much of which was colored by the fallout between American advisors and Chiang, and the eventual communist victory in 1949.

However, China was virtually the only country resisting Japan until Pearl Harbour(except border clashes with the Soviet Union), and the Japanese troops in China steadily increased to around 1 million later in the war. Stalin was glad that Japan launched its fateful invasion in 1937 rather than attacking the Soviet Far East. A joint Japanese-German attack on the Soviet Union might have changed the outcome of the war, and the ongoing quagmire in China was a signficant factor which ruled it out as it sucked in a large number of infantry.

Chiang Kai-Shek also voluntarily contributed to the campaign in the Burma sector, which the British initially arrogantly refused but later agreed to. Some people would argue that China was only holding the Japanese back, and did not have victories such as Midway and Stalingrad which were turning points in the war. However, one could argue for a similar role for Britain, who never had a victory against Germany that was decisive on the outcome of the war. So perhaps Churchill should also be excluded as well?

The Western allies often mocked Chiang for not launching attacks against Japan, but bear in mind despite repeated requests from the Soviet Union, the US/UK only opened a second front in 1944 after the Germans were essentially defeated on the Eastern front.

We should not perpetuate the past biases in this website. AlanHubert677 (talk) 05:39, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

Burma was a sideshow. The Second Battle of El Alamein was far more important than either Midway or Stalingrad. The second front was North Africa. (Falall1 (talk) 20:32, 16 December 2022 (UTC))

I've just reverted the removal of Chiang Kai-shek back in. His inclusion in the infobox has been stable for years, and any change needs a consensus to do so. I note with concern that the discussion above is based on editors' personal opinions, and very little reference is being made to what reliable sources say. Without meaning to be rude, your personal opinion is irrelevant as Wikipedia runs on reliable sources. Chiang Kai-shek's inclusion was the result of discussions that cited sources. Nick-D (talk) 09:01, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

@Nick-D and TylerBurden:

User:Nick-D I'm confused: The "above discussion from November 15 to 28 involved 11 Wikipedians, 2 of whom thought that Chiang Kai-shek belonged on the list of allied leaders against 9 who didn't?" User:Nick-D was included in the 9. On December 12, User:XavierGreen reopened the discussion, making it 3 to 9. If you are now changing your mind, that makes it 4 in favor of including Chiang to 8 against.

If you now think that the long-standing consensus included Chiang, and the infobox included him for years, please provide evidence of that.

Also -- and I think more importantly -- can you or someone else please provide a "Summary table of the size of military and total cost of WWII" by major country in the war, as requested in the subsection immediately below this comment? I'm willing to believe that Chiang belongs in that summary table, but I think we need better documentation than we have right now.

And until that summary table is provided -- with adequate documentation, so it can be included somewhere in Wikipedia -- can we please leave the infobox in the condition that User:TylerBurden and others (including I) think has been its stable condition reflecting the long-standing consensus? Thanks, DavidMCEddy (talk) 10:19, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

See this version from last September for example (chosen arbitrarily as it was 500 edits ago, so is easily checkable) for evidence that Chiang Kai-shek's inclusion has been longstanding. My comment above is plainly about the ordering of the leaders, which is what everyone else was focusing on. I see now that you also included a proposal to remove Chiang Kai-shek which no-one really focused on - the discussion was focused on the issue of ordering. I note you have provided no sources to support this change, which seems to be based purely on your personal views. I note that this has been repeatedly discussed - for instance Talk:World War II/Archive 62#Chiang Kai-Shek? (November 2021), Talk:World War II/Archive 55#Do we need more than one commander per country on the infobox? (July 2018) Talk:World War II/Archive 51#Remove Chiang Kai-shek form the Infobox Commanders and leaders (November 2014), etc. The consensus of these discussions has been to retain Chiang Kai-shek. As this proposal seems to have not been focused on, I've re-reverted. I'd suggest starting a new thread focused on this change, and please provide sources. Nick-D (talk) 10:51, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

If it's helpful, my view based on a survey of the literature I have easy access to (please see the first linked thread above) is that Chiang Kai-shek should be included, as recent major histories of the war more often than not state that China was one of the major Allied powers. There is plainly not a consensus in the literature on this topic though. Nick-D (talk) 11:04, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

Thanks for providing the links to past discussions on the topic of inclusion of Chiang Kai-Shek in the info box. They have been quite detailed, so I agree that a consensus is required for the removal, not the other way around. The onus is on the person challenging the status quo to provide arguments backed up by sources. AlanHubert677 (talk) 11:17, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

I accept. I'd still like to see a terse summary table, as discussed in the next section.

A perhaps impish question here is "What would Xi Jinping like to see regarding this? Would he want Chiang Kai-shek in the infobox? Note the quote from Rudd (2022), which I added to the following subsection on "Summary table ...". Thanks, DavidMCEddy (talk) 15:22, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

Who cares about Xi? Is he a reliable source? Had he authored any peer-reviewed publications? How broadly they were cited? Paul Siebert (talk) 17:33, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

Summary table of size of military and total cost of WWII in international dollars at purchasing power parity and in military and civilians killed and injured by major countries in the war

Can someone produce a table of relevant numbers indicating the magnitude of the military efforts by all major parties, including Chiang Kai-shek, and the costs? The Wikipedia article on "World War II casualties" includes a plot and a table. I'd like to see this summarized for the Allies to include the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Indonesia, the UK, the US, and "other". We can keep the categories there for the Axis: Germany, Japan, Romania, Hungary, and Italy. Then another "other" category for neither Allies nor Axis countries.

Does such a table already exist? If yes, how can we find it? If no, I suggest we argue over the details of such a table and how to interpret it.

I'm willing to consider User:XavierGreen's claim that the current article is distorted by a major pro-western pov. I think a table like this with accompanying discussion could address that question in a sensible way. In the process of creating such, we can argue over the contents, what different sources say, and how we interpret the different sources and the resulting table.

This discussion might ultimately be spun off into a new article. At some point such an article might be appropriate for publication in a refereed academic journal, as discussed in the Wikipedia article entitled, "Wikipedia:Wiki to journal publication". Target journal might be Wikiversity:WikiJournal of Humanities.

I'm not willing to take the lead in doing this, but I am willing to support it, similar to what I've done so far with this article, which was not much beyond trying to facilitate discussions like this. What do you think? DavidMCEddy (talk) 13:55, 12 December 2022 (UTC)

This "Summary table ..." section is a subsection of a very long discussion on "Allied leaders of World War II". User:Nick-D referred to several archived portions of former contents of this Talk page, including "Talk:World War II/Archive 62#Chiang Kai-Shek? (November 2021)". In that I see three references to World War II casualties. Two of them say the following:

• Four countries had military death tolls over a million: The USSR had 9-11 million. Germany had 4-5 million. China 3-4 million and Japan 2.1-2.3 million.
• during the Pacific War the Chinese inflicted about as many losses on Japan as Australia did (about 200,000 each according to World War II casualties)

MY SUMMARY: The total military deaths provides a compact summary of how greatly China suffered during the war, but the relatively small number of losses inflicted by Chaing kai-chek upon Japan suggests to me that he does NOT belong in the infobox.

Whatever we decide on this, can we document it in a summary table and put it in a section somewhere in this article and the article on "World War II casualties"?

That article currently includes a plot and several tables, but they all provide too many details for someone to readily extract an answer addressing the current question of the top leaders.

I envision a summary table (sortable) with five rows (for China, UK, USSR, US and other) and two columns containing (a) military deaths suffered by each and (b) Japanese losses to each?

I'd like to see such a table in the lede or the first section of World War II casualties plus as a new summary section at the end of the current section 4 on the "Course of the war" after "4.9 Axis collapse and Allied victory (1944–45)" and before "5 Aftermath".

It doesn't have to be exactly what I describe, but it should be a terse summary of "World War II casualties", which I cannot find currently in either that article or this one.

I think others participating in this discussion know this topic much better than I do and could produce something like that would be better than what I would produce and take them less time.

FYI, I'm currently reading Kevin Rudd (2022). The Avoidable War: The dangers of a catastrophic conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China. PublicAffairs. ISBN 978-1-5417-0129-8. Wikidata Q115728573. On pp. 77-78, he says, "Americans typically believe that their country’s approach to China has been driven by high ideals in defense of democracy, free trade, and the integrity of the global rules-based order. But the broad Chinese view is that American strategy is nothing more than the prosecution of its core national interests. To pretend otherwise, in China’s view, is political hypocrisy. ... In China’s perspective, this is reflected in 150 years of US commercial efforts to penetrate China’s vast domestic market—from the age of opium to the age of Apple. It sees it in the history of US national security strategy. First, handing over Chinese territory to appease Japan after World War I. Then, using the protracted Japanese occupation of China during World War II to keep the bulk of Japanese imperial forces bogged down for the duration of the Pacific War instead of prioritizing a liberation of the Chinese mainland."

Was the decision by Roosevelt to support Stalin over Chiang made on racism, or was it a pragmatic assessment of which leader would make better use of US aid? I think the latter, but I don't know that.

However, I suggest we ignore that and focus on producing a simple table summarizing most importantly the damage inflicted by each on the Axis.

By the way, Kevin Rudd is a former Prime Minister of Australia, fluent in Manderin, who has held diplomatic posts in Beijing, Taipei and several other Chinese cities. DavidMCEddy (talk) 15:15, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

I suggest to remember that countries and leaders are not the same. Comparison of war losses, or country's contributions into the war is not completely relevant to the discussion about leaders. Thus, immense Soviet losses (and military losses in particular) can partially be attributed to Stalin's blunders (Soviet Union sustained about a half of losses during the second half of 1941, and that happened mostly due to Stalin). And how can we argue that Stalin should be on the top because Soviet people sustained terrible losses? The same can be said about Chang. That approach is deeply flawed: We either judge each leader based on their own merits or we replace leader's names with country names.

If we discuss Stalin's and Chang's personal roles, it is necessary to keep in mind that there are several major differences between them.

• Stalin was controlling a huge and powerful state, and its influence on each theatre of war was immense (even in Far East, 500,000 Soviet troops forced Japanese to keep their best troops near Amur, far from other theatres of war). Chang had no full control even over its own country (Communists were strong in China, and they wages a separate war with Japan).
• Stalin commanded the army that broke the back of the most powerful Axis state, Nazi Germany, captured her capital and forced her leader, Hitler, to commit suicide. Chang's army appeared to be unable to defeat even a part of IJA land troops stationed in Central and Southern China, and the Japanese surrendered to Chinese as a result of their military defeat in other theatres of war (Manchuria and Pacific).
• Stalin was a key person in all major meeting of Allied leaders where global strategy was discussed. Chang was invited (by Roosevelt) only to those meetings that discussed Asia-Paciific. "The Big Three" met in person three times (Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam), "The Four Policemen" had never been sitting at the same table.

I would say, the only argument in support of Chang is that he was at de facto war with Japan even before the WWII started in Europe. However, to be honest, the same can be said about Stalin (Khalkhin Gol, lake Khasan, etc). Paul Siebert (talk) 17:25, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

Stalin refused to meet with Chiang because he didn't want to provoke a war between the USSR and Japan; hence he did not attend the Cairo Conference.--Jack Upland (talk) 18:00, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

I am not sure how that explains Chang's absence in Yalta and Potsdam: after 1943, Japan was more interested in peace with the USSR, so nobody cared about Japan's reaction. However, Chang had never been invited (and I am not sure if that had even been discussed). Paul Siebert (talk) 18:12, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

For all the evil things Stalin did, he earned the support of his people by delivering solid economic performance between the end of the Russian Civil War and the beginning of World War II. During the Russian Civil War, the Red Army fielded 5.5 million against 1 million Whites (aka supporters of the Tsar). This suggests that 85 percent (= 5.5/(5.5+1)) of Russian peasants who cared enough to fight in the Russian Civil War supported the Bolsheviks. And the USSR data from the Maddison Project show that the periods of fastest growth in average annual income (GDP per capita at purchasing power parity) in Soviet and Russian history came (a) between the Russian Revolution and World War II and (b) since Putin came to power. (Between Stalin's death and 1991, the rate of growth gradually slowed. Then during the 1990s, the Russian economy declined rapidly.)

On 1944-08-02, Churchill noted, "it is the Russian Armies who have done the main work in tearing the guts out of the German army." And Stalin did that with soldiers and the sons of soldiers whose performance during WW I contributed to the Bolshevik Revolution, with many deserting.

While the Russian Civil War ended in 1923, the Chinese Civil War started in 1927 and ended in 1949, with a fragile KMT-CCP Alliance from 1937 to 1945 during World War II. Without the Chinese Civil War, it would have been harder for Japan to conquer them in the first place. DavidMCEddy (talk) 18:42, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

Stalin wasn't even in power during the Russian Civil War. Churchill made those remarks for propaganda purposes, in private he said the complete opposite. (Falall1 (talk) 20:29, 16 December 2022 (UTC))

I keep seeing this how Australia inflicted the same number of casualties (200k) as China in the Pacific war. Could you point out the sources?

1) Australia had in total around 50k casualties, Japan suffering 4 times as much seems implausible.

2) Just looking at China's battles after 1941 is too selective, as it virtually ignored all the large battles in the first phase of the 2nd Sino-Japanese war from 1937-1939. AlanHubert677 (talk) 02:32, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

Also, learn to spell Chiang's surname correctly. AlanHubert677 (talk) 02:33, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

Looking at Wikipedia's own page on the 2nd Sino-Japanese war, Japan suffered around 2.5 million casualties in China from 1937 to 1945. That's far more than any other country has inflicted on Japan in terms of losses in personnel. AlanHubert677 (talk) 02:44, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

And that is why China is a primary belligerent in the Second Sino-Japanese War article. However, this article is not about SSJW, and not even about Pacific war, it is about the war between ALL Allies and the whole Axis. According to the WWII casualties article, Japanese losses were 2.3 million KIA, according to SSJW, Japan lost 500-700 thousands in China. Compare these numbers with losses inflicted by the USSR or US on the Axis. European Axis losses in EF only in 1941-44 amounted to 1,5-2 million (I may be wrong, because I have no literature before me right now), and losses in late 1944-early 1945 increased dramatically. Similarly, US inflicted considerable losses on the Axis manpower, on milotary infrastructure, on the navy (both in Pacific and Atlantic), and provided ALL other Allies with wast amount of materiel, armament, raw materials, food, etc. Did China do anything of that kind? Paul Siebert (talk) 03:47, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

It's arbitrary to define the start of the war in 1939 or even 1941 and then conveniently ignores all the major fighting in China before that. That war merged with ww2 and had large impacts on the eventual decision-making of the Japanese.

I fully acknowledge that USSR and USA were by far the heavyweight lifters in the war. Though if Chiang can be removed, I don't see how Churchill can be included since Britain was playing a very similar role to China, holding Germany back and buying time. The British victories were neither decisive on the eventual outcome of the war nor were the German casualties massive. The importance of strategic bombing has been in debate ever since the war finished.

In fairness if Chiang is removed for not inflicting enough damage on the Axis powers, Churchill should be removed as well. AlanHubert677 (talk) 04:39, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

The USSR only survived due to Lend-Lease, as Stalin admitted. The Second Battle of El Alamein was the most important Allied victory of World War II. (Falall1 (talk) 14:04, 17 December 2022 (UTC))

The above thread, including David's comments, appears to still be mainly Wikipedia editors' personal views. Per WP:NOR and WP:RS these carry no weight. Please provide reliable sources. As views on the role of China in the war are diverse, I would expect that any survey of sources will include works with differing views. Nick-D (talk) 21:57, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

Nick, as soon as you mentioned the policy, let me remind you that WP:NPOV says:

"Achieving what the Wikipedia community understands as neutrality means carefully and critically analyzing a variety of reliable sources and then attempting to convey to the reader the information contained in them fairly, proportionately, and as far as possible without editorial bias."

That means we are not expected to find some specific source that would allow us to decide whose name should be in the infobox, but we should analyze as many sources as we can to decide the most neutral way to present information about the Allied leaders. Your reference to NOR is not relevant, because that policy does not apply to talk pages and other pages which evaluate article content and sources.

And, yes, although no sources have been cited during this discussion, you perfectly know that usually I do not make claims that are not supported by reliable sources, and I assume each statement made by other participant of this discussion is supported by reliable sources too. However, if, in your opinion, some statement needs a reliable source, just let me know, and I provide it. Paul Siebert (talk) 02:35, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

With regard to the analysis of sources, ngram says that "The Big Three" was mentioned much, much more frequently in 1940s, and I am sure that was not GM, Ford, and Chrysler (the huge peak is clearly seen at the end of WWII). Furthermore, Roosevelt is cited in a context of "four policemen" 1,670 times, and in a context of the Big Three 5,730 times (I added a filter to remove Ford and Chrysler, i.e. the articles that discuss car industry are not included). I can continue digging when time allows, but my current impression is that "Four Policemen" is the concept advocated by Roosevelt, and not supported by Churchill and Stalin, and it represent a US-centric POV. We need to make sure if the current version provides a balanced viewpoint. Paul Siebert (talk) 02:51, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

It is true Roosevelt supported China more than Britain and USSR, but as stated in the wikipedia page on this topic. Britain was worried about its Asian colonies and USSR knew Chiang was anti-communist. This adds more perspectives to their opposition.

One can argue that Roosevelt was more far-sighted, that an eventually unified China will become a power on the world stage. AlanHubert677 (talk) 03:03, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

The question is not if Roosevelt was more far-sighted that Churchill. The question was if Chiang was influential enough to be included into the infobox. To decide that, let's compare what concept is more popular in literature: "The Big Three" or "Four Policemen". And let's compare if Chiang is considered in WWII literature as a leader whose influence, importance and contribution to the Allied war efforts is comparable with that of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. Paul Siebert (talk) 03:33, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

Holding 1 million Japanese infantry in China throughout 1939-1945 is pretty influential. Had Chiang simply capitulated in 1938, many of these troops would have moved to either the Soviet Far East or other European colonies in Asia.

Even with the overstretched Japanese army in 1941-42, they scored a string of miraculous victories across South East Asia. I'd say if Chiang had simply given up, the war in Asia would have looked quite different for the Allies.

Soviet Union surviving was the most critical to winning the war, and China pinning down 1 million Japanese troops was one of the key contributors. Stalin kept more than a million troops in the Far East even when the Germans invaded. AlanHubert677 (talk) 04:52, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

Nobody questions the fact that China was important, the question is if it was important enough to be in the infobox. "Pinning down 1 million Japanese troops" is hardly a serious argument. Soviet union did the same: Japanese kept the whole Kwantung Army (about 1 million troops) near Amur, anticipating a possible Soviet attack. Note, the USSR was "pinning down 1 million Japanese troops" even without being at war with Japan, and that military contribution of the USSR is usually ignored. If that military contribution of Soviets is usually left beyond the scope (it is considered that the USSR did not participate in the Pacific war until August 1945), how can a similar contribution of China make it a key Ally?

I think we need stronger arguments to keep Chiang in the infobox. Paul Siebert (talk) 20:04, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

The most critical phase of the war was between 1941 and 1942, when one considers the winning chances of the Axis powers. If the Soviet Union had fallen, all the production advantages that the USA and UK had would not really matter as they would not accept Soviet/China style of casualties, until they had the nukes perhaps.

Japan was deciding between "Strike North" and "Striker South" before Pearl harbour. The Kwantung army initially decided to build up its troops in Manchuria to outmatch the Soviets, but the war in China stopped that. The Soviet Union offered to supply Chiang large amounts of hardware as it served a useful purpose even when it faced the German threat. Japan eventually chose the "Strike South" route, in which the imperial Japanese navy played the main role rather than the army.

Standard Western historiography usually ignores what a momentous decision this was and the large impacts it eventually had on the war. At the same time the importance of the role of China is reduced as well. 2407:7000:8885:9F00:4C7F:3742:8F92:61A1 (talk) 23:06, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

Soviet Union was considered a main contributor because it destroyed most of the Wehrmacht. By the time D-day happened Germany was already collapsing and Soviet Union would have got to Berlin just by themselves.

The Soviet Union's non-aggression treaty with Japan worked because it suited both, for Japan the war in China meants it couldn't spare infantry for Soviet Union and was forced to have a defensive position. For the Soviet Union it meant it could single-handedly deal with Germany.

I am not arguing that China played the same role as USA/USSR, but simply it played a similar role to Britain in terms of holding back one of the two main Axis powers. Arguably China performed better than Britain as Germany still managed to launch Barbarossa and almost destroyed the Soviet Union since Berlin initially refused to be distracted by North Africa. China's role meant that the Japanese army essentially played a minor role in the course of the Pacific war, rather than being the main thrust against the Soviet Union it initially desired. That's the decisive margin which might have tipped the balance, and changed the war's outcome, and China was a main contributor to that. 2407:7000:8885:9F00:4C7F:3742:8F92:61A1 (talk) 23:27, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

China was dependent on US and British support. The North African Campaign was the most critical episode of World War II. (Falall1 (talk) 14:06, 17 December 2022 (UTC))

Rommel knew he was about to lose this campaign and did not want to fight at first as he was not getting much supplies whereas the allies were getting a lot more. It was just a side show, and most definitely not the most critical episode of ww2. 2407:7000:8885:9F00:4C7F:3742:8F92:61A1 (talk) 22:50, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

@Falall1: I'm confused: Stalin was in the Politburo starting in 1917 and became General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1922, before the end of the Russian Civil War. I would naively assume that he became General Secretary as a result of substantial successes during the Russian Civil War.

Are you suggesting that is NOT the case?

The Wikipedia article on Stalin says he "became part of an informal foursome leading the government, alongside Lenin, Trotsky, and Sverdlov". Sverdlov died in 1919, and Stalin was selected as General Secretary over Trotsky.

Can you please provide citations for (a) Churchill saying the opposite in private, and (b) the relative importance of the Second Battle of El Alamein, Midway, Stalingrad, other major battles, North Africa, etc.? Thanks, DavidMCEddy (talk) 22:15, 16 December 2022 (UTC)

The Allies decided not to continue the Russian Civil War after World War I. Churchill said many times that the USSR only survived due to Lend-Lease; Stalin also acknowledged this in 1943. The Second Battle of El Alamein won the North African campaign, won the Battle of the Mediterranean, ended the Siege of Malta, led directly to the invasions of Sicily and Italy, and made possible D-Day and the invasion of southern France. It was far more important than either Midway or Stalingrad. (Falall1 (talk) 14:10, 17 December 2022 (UTC))

This sections deals with a bizarre question that goes against some basic principles of (a) historiography (b) how Wikipedia works and (c) measuring the effectiveness of one side in military conflict.

(a) Historiography: Every historian will acknowledge that "what ifs" (as used in some discussion above0 make bad history. Sure, they are sometimes used by historians, but very carefully and rarely. This is because it is not really possible to know if any of these suppositions are demonstrably true.
(b) Wikipedia principles: A large part of the discussion above is or verges on original research. The opinions and arguments of editors are not really relevant. The discussion should be based on what reliable sources say. Do we have some RSs that handle this point? I suggest that we need more than one source to cover the point, so that we have the opinion of more than one historian.
(c) Military effectiveness: The USSR had massive casualties in WW2 because of the way their military were happy to incur this level of losses. Stalin putting two generals in competition to capture Berlin is an example of this ethos. Comparing American and British forces in the battle of Normandy shows that Montgomery tried to avoid massive losses, whilst the US forces (having greater resources) were much more relaxed about large casualties. Editors in the subject will know that the British and Canadian forces in that battle engaged the bulk of German armoured divisions, whilst the US forces made a large encircling move that went (largely) through less formidable opponents. Measuring casualties incurred is only a measure of how a war is fought – the military effectiveness of a combatant power is demonstrated by what happens to the other side.
It should be pointed out that little regard is given in the above discussion for the Naval input of Britain, particularly in the Mediterranean. You cannot win a world war without control of the seas. It is possible to have a large effect on the result of a war that is out of proportion to the input. What is more important, input or result? The discussion (above) of the tying down of Japanese forces by the Russians seems to lack logic when coupled with an argument for removing Churchill from the info box (have I read that argument right??). Churchill had to take the decision as to whether to agree terms with Hitler after Dunkirk. The what-ifs that I have criticised above would be very much altered if this is what Churchill had done.

I feel we ought to leave the question asked in the title to this section well alone, unless it is tackled by a number of mainstream historians ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 21:16, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

"A large part of the discussion above is or verges on original research." NOR does not apply to talk pages and other pages which evaluate article content and sources. Our opinia are directly relevant, because the discussion is not on what reliable sources say. We are discussing how to represent what RS say in the most neutral manner.

"Comparing American and British forces in the battle of Normandy shows that Montgomery tried to avoid massive losses..." If I remember it correctly, Dick it his "From defeat to victory..." argues that, whereas the Red Army was flawed, strategically they were very strong, and high losses in local operations allowed them to buy precious time, thereby significantly decreasing the overall losses. Thus, some authors argued that Allied attempts to avoid high losses during invasion of Normandy did not allow them to be in Paris in few days (which, according to Germans, was quite possible had Americans used Soviet tactics). As a result, the war in the West lasted much longer, and overall losses were higher than they could be. That is just one interesting observation that I found recently. Paul Siebert (talk) 22:01, 17 December 2022 (UTC)

I didn't explain myself well on the OR point. The question heading this section is about developing a comparative table of the input of the Allies to the war, in terms of casualties and money. This is to determine which of them contributed enough to be in the info box, represented by the summary of Allied leaders. I do not believe that there is any RS that does precisely that, for reasons stated below. So, this is a discussion in order to determine article content, where the conclusion will be based on OR or synthesis by some editors. Therefore article content would be based on OR/synthesis. I agree that the strict rules on OR do not apply to talk pages, but we always have to have in mind sources when determining what goes in an article.

I suggest that it is difficult to find a historian who has done a comparison of the nature and extent suggested here is that it would be very difficult to come up with any useful numbers. Look, for instance, at civilian deaths. Does the death of a civilian actually alter the outcome of the war? Yes, if that civilian is engaged on war production in a factory in (say) Coventry or Hamburg; probably not if they are a peasant farmer in the path of the advancing Operation Barbarossa. On monetary expenditure, how can you reasonably convert to USD in any sort of accurate way? I have seen arguments (sorry, can't lay my hands on the source for that) that the economic cost of producing a T-34 was the same as that for a Sherman. Was it the same in dollars? I don't think so. To summarise: (A) how much of the development of this table would have to be done by Wikipedia editors and how much by an RS? If more than one RS is used, then the accusation of synthesis could be fair, as different historians might use different assumptions (etc.) in their analysis. (B) What value is such a table if its content is the product of a long sequence of assumptions, conversions and comparisons - even if done by historians, but especially if done by editors? ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 09:19, 18 December 2022 (UTC)

The near total lack of sources continues to render the above discussion - to be blunt - almost worthless. With respect Paul, sources do in fact need to be consulted, and frequency counts in Google products are not useful - not least as the literature on World War II is evolving. Rana Mitter's 2020 book China's War with Japan, 1937-1945 : The Struggle for Survival, which argued that China was a major player in the war, was well reviewed and has been influential, for instance. The claim that editors here are interpreting sources is plainly not convincing given that very few sources are being referred to, and the discussion is focused on editors' personal views. Nick-D (talk) 06:37, 18 December 2022 (UTC)

If it is helpful, here's an overview of what some major works on the war I posted last year say. I'd be grateful if other editors could post comparable excerpts from the works they are consulting:

• The Oxford Companion to World War II states that the Grand Alliance's main members were "the UK, USA and USSR" (p. 390) but FDR saw China rather than the UK as being the main US ally in the Pacific (p. 392)
• Gerhard L. Weinberg's A World at Arms states that the US persuaded the UK and USSR to class China as "one of the major powers", though both did so reluctantly (pp. 620, 624)
• Anthony Beevor makes a similar argument in his The Second World War, nothing though that FDR was motivated more by China's likely position in the post-war world than its war effort, though China tied down 1 million Japanese troops (pp. 510-511)
• Max Hastings states in All Hell Let Loose that China's role in the war is under-appreciated in the west as by fighting on, albeit ineffectually, it doomed Japan: "China, and Tokyo's refusal to abandon its ambitions there, were central to Japan's ultimate failure" (p. 192)
• Rana Mitter argues that China was a major player in his book China's War with Japan 1937-1945, stating that it was "one of the four principle wartime Allies, alongside the US, Russia and Britain" (p. 13), though he notes that "China had less ability to make its own decisions than the other Allies because it was so much weaker than them, both economically and politically" (p. 5) - my understanding is that this is the current standard work on China's role in the war
• Ronald H. Spector states in Eagle Against the Sun that the US sent massive amounts of aid to China "in a vain effort to make China a major contributor to the war against Japan" (p. 325)

The conclusion I drew from this last year is that historians tend to rank China as among the main Allied powers, with the most recent major work on China's role in the war (Mitter) arguing this. As such, it belongs in the infobox. Nick-D (talk) 06:44, 18 December 2022 (UTC)

Thanks for your comment, Nick-D, but strangely I conclude from your summary of the RSs listed that China doesn't quite qualify for inclusion in the "major powers" list. I particularly pick out "in a vain effort to make China a major contributor..." (bold added). ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 09:28, 18 December 2022 (UTC)

Part of my point in the above is that there are differing views on that topic, as with many other aspects of the war, so multiple works need to be weighed up. Nick-D (talk) 10:20, 18 December 2022 (UTC)

A primary source that particularly deals with the relevance of Chiang Kai-shek is Alanbrooke's diary. He is not at all impressed by Chiang's grip on military matters. For instance: "[Chiang Kai-shek] had nothing to contribute towards the defeat of the Germans, and for the matter of that uncommonly little towards the defeat of the Japanese."(pg 477); "Evidently with no grasp of war in its larger aspects but determined to get the best of the bargains. [about Chiang Kai-shek, at a meeting also attended by Chiang's wife, Soong Mei-ling who took an active role in the meeting]"(pg 477); about Chiang's generals at the same meeting: "It was evident that they understood nothing about strategy or higher tactics and were quite unfit to discuss these questions." (pg 480). Alanbrooke is quite critical of a number of people in his diary, but appreciative of others. His criticism does not seem to be based in nationality, as he says that Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma is totally unsuited to his role in SE Asia. Alanbrooke seems to imply that Chiang's wife had a better grip of military strategy than her husband. I understand all the limitations of a primary source, but this seems worth including: the comments of a senior military leader on the effectiveness/influence of the person we are discussing. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 12:07, 19 December 2022 (UTC)

I'd be interested to hear the examples that Brooke gave for Chiang's lack of understanding of "strategies and higher tactics", rather than just in general terms. How would he react if Chiang had not sent help to Burma, or had Chiang capitulated, it was Japanese troops coming down from Yunnan and then threatening India?

The total rout that Britain suffered in south east Asia such as the sinking of Prince of Wales and the surrender of Singapore, doesn't really seem to show that the British high command had much understanding of "strategies and higher tactics" either, particularly the chief of the imperial general staff.

In the end, vehement disagreements between military commanders were common. Out of the foreign advisors sent to China, Stilwell thought of Chiang as "peanut" or "little dummy", whereas Chennault, Wedemeyer and the German advisor Falkenhausen had rather more positive views. On the other hand, Brooke himself had frequent disagreements with Churchill but he was perhaps more polite with his own PM in his diary. Criticisms and controversies also applied to other Allied commanders such as MacArthur, Montgomery, Patton and so on where military decisions were questioned and challenged. This was a normal part of a complex war. AlanHubert677 (talk) 13:38, 19 December 2022 (UTC)

References

Here's an idea that will be unpopular

When considering the relative importance of the various countries fighting in WW2, should we not look at the effect they have on the other side? Using the number of military deaths as a measure (and I would hope other measures could be thought of), we see that Germany and its biggest allies (Italy and Romania) had military deaths of up to 5.9 million. Japan, in contrast, had deaths estimated at up to 2.3 million. (Numbers come from World War II casualties.) Germany and its allies were (in general terms) fighting in Europe, Russia and North Africa - "Europe et al". Japan was fighting in China and South-east Asia/Pacific - let's describe that as the Far East.

From this, we see that the Europe et al fighting was, by this measure, more than twice the size of the conflict in the Far East. The discussion on Allied leaders seems to focus on whether or not one of the combatant nations (China) that was, arguably, a junior participant in the region that is less than half of the whole war qualifies for inclusion as one of the major combatants in WW2. I don't see that being a smaller component of the smaller part of the whole war makes a convincing argument.

Just to be clear, I am not suggesting this as a sole measure. I would, for instance, give value to Churchill deciding to fight on after Dunkirk. It is easy to see how other politicians (e.g. Lord Halifax) would have sought peace with Germany at that stage. With similar thinking, FDR's decision to declare war on both Japan and Germany (not just Japan) is surely relevant. I give no detail on this clarification - I just mention it to illustrate that there is more than this to the main point I make here. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 09:59, 18 December 2022 (UTC)

Using battle deaths is just one side to the whole struggle. There were relatively fewer deaths in the battle of France, but the huge strategic significance of that battle can't be denied. By a similar logic, you can at the same time dismiss the importance of USA/UK as the casuatlies on the second front were much smaller compared to the Eastern front, therefore both of them are also junior partners to the Soviet Union? I know Russians typically regard the Eastern front as the important theatre, separate from that of the western front.

Not denying the large contributions made by USA/UK, but combining all into one European theatre when USSR dealt more than 70%-80% of the casualties of the European Axis and then turning around to downplay the Asia/Pacific theatre and therefore China's role is really shaping the facts to fit the narrative.

Churchill and Roosevelt were undoubtedly the right leaders at the right time, without whom the war would have likely been lost, but that does not mean we should exaggerate their contributions. Britain was never likely to negotiate with Germany especially after what happened at Munich, at most what would have happened would be like the Treaty of Amiens with Napoleon, which was promptly broken. If FDR's hands had not been forced by Pearl Harbour, USA might not fully join the war until 1 year later, which would have made a large difference on war situation in terms of lend-lease. AlanHubert677 (talk) 21:35, 18 December 2022 (UTC)

If Chamberlain had been succeeded by Halifax (who was offered the job), it is highly likely Britain would have sought terms after Dunkirk. Consider: "26th May [1940]....Lord Halifax raised the possibility that the government should consider approaching the Duce to find out what terms Hitler might be prepared to accept for peace." (Beevor, Antony. The Second World War (p. 162)). Pointing out Churchill's resolve is relevant when you see evidenced behaviour of the next most likely person as Prime Minister. (Beevor is also a good source for Halifax being offered the job.)

I am not a huge fan of the casualty count to measure military effectiveness. Large casualties are surely suggestive of equally matched sides, whilst low casualties (sometimes on both sides) suggest an overwhelming victory. Which is of greater value (to the winner)? If anyone can suggest a better method, let's hear it. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 09:14, 19 December 2022 (UTC)

My main argument is that even if Halifax had been given full freedom to negotiate, it was very likely that he would not find the German terms acceptable. He did state he wanted to preserve the interests of the British Empire, which clashed fundamentally with Germany's ultimate war aims.

Similarly, in Japan, throughout 1941 the Japanese PM Konoe spent months trying to reach peace terms with the USA but was eventually replaced by Hideki Tojo in Oct 1941, who then launched Pearl Harbour. Konoe knew winning against USA's navy would be nearly impossible but still failed in his attempts since he was himself unwilling and unable to convince others to sacrifice the interests of the Japanese empire.

Churchill was perhaps the only one far-sighted enough to see the fundamental clash from the very start. Soon, Chamberlain (who was still Conservative leader for quite a while), and many others in the party, came around to Churchill's view and supported him over Halifax. 2407:7000:8885:9F00:7DF4:78FB:BEA5:E32F (talk) 11:28, 19 December 2022 (UTC)

I don't see the logic in excluding civilian casualties: World War II was very frequently a war against civilians, directly and indirectly. This seems an odd way to look at the war. As various modern sources stress, the Western Allies also had relatively light military casualties as a result of deliberate military policy choices which emphasised firepower and mobility. The US Army raised a surprisingly small number of divisions, for instance, but they were superbly armed for the era and supported by extensive artillery and airpower. Nick-D (talk) 09:05, 19 December 2022 (UTC)

The problem with counting civilian casualties is that many were deliberately murdered, away from, or at least not related to, active combat. (A horrible comparison is that the 6 million murdered in the Holocaust are of the same scale as the Nazi military deaths.) Then there is the effect of famine and disease as a result of war - not an issue for US or UK civilians, but certainly relevant in China and German-occupied territories. (How many fleeing the approaching Russians died of dysentery or from severe winter conditions? I don't suppose anyone knows.) I thought that what we are trying to do is measure the military effectiveness of each participant in WW2, so as to decide which of their leaders should be selected for listing in the infobox.

Whilst civilian deaths are a major part of WW2, I don't see how they measure the military effectiveness of each side. The cause of civilian casualties are a mix of deliberate targeting for military purposes (area bombing of Germany, with the purpose of degrading their industrial production of war material), expected collateral damage (horrible phrase!) such as French civilians knowingly bombed in Caen during the battle for Normandy, murder (Holocaust, etc.) and unintended consequences, which includes everything from deaths in combat of civilians not known to be in the line of fire, through to famine and disease of displaced persons. With such a huge range, it is surely impossible to connect a simple total with the way in which the war was run by its top leaders. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 09:32, 19 December 2022 (UTC)

The mass murder of Jews and Slavs was one of Hitler's war aims, especially as the war continued. Re: military casualties, something like half of all German military fatalities were in the final 12 months of the war as a result of the German leadership continuing the war when it was clearly lost and the Allies had overwhelming firepower, so this doesn't seem a good measure of anything. More to the point, this is also a proposal where no supporting sources are being put forward to support the underlying concept. Nick-D (talk) 09:41, 19 December 2022 (UTC)

Agree on the support of sources for the concept, but similarly for including civilian casualties. We are searching around for criteria to support a Wikipedia generated problem, so perhaps the sources are not being kind to us in solving that problem. To counter your last point, you put Nazi extermination policies as being a measure of achieving their war aims. But the Allies had no such ambition, so we have a parameter that applies only to one side, but not the other. With no meaningful comparison, that does not solve the overall question we are looking at here. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 09:49, 19 December 2022 (UTC)