Talk:Metaphysical naturalism/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Recent edits by 173.55.80.176

I just reverted an extended edit by 173.55.80.176 that appeared to slant much of the article toward a particular view, that of Dennis Polis. While it was obviously a good-faith edit and clearly represented a lot of work on some anonymous editor's part, it appeared to violate NPOV, so I reverted it. Any other opinions on this? Agathman (talk) 19:56, 4 January 2010 (UTC)

I thought about reverting, but overall thought it was an improvement. I did wonder if the editor was linked to Polis in some way. That said I am personally sympathetic to a Thomist position here. Overall the editor made a series of informed comments to several articles from scratch. I would be more comfortable if it was not an IP. Personally I would suggest reinstating the changes but toning them down a bit. --Snowded ^TALK 20:02, 4 January 2010 (UTC)

Okay, I went back and did some editing. I'm still a bit uncomfortable with the format in later sections, where each argument from naturalism is followed by a refutation, and I think the whole article would benefit from a lot more citations, both pro and anti - naturalism. Agathman (talk) 20:53, 4 January 2010 (UTC)

Agreed, its nice to see someone putting some effort in though! --Snowded ^TALK 21:28, 4 January 2010 (UTC)

Added Pov Tag

It is quite clear that this article was written by a believer. The "arguments" section is particulary bad in the sense that it lists very weak arguments in the "against" sub-section. The arguments "for" contain no citations whatsoever, but when I recently tried to add a strong argument "against", equally without citation, it was promptly removed. This is ludicrous. Either allow both, or none at all. If I don't see reliable sources added to that section in short order, it is only fair to wipe it out completely. As a philosopher, there is nothing more repugnant to me than a group of individuals who cannot stand to put the best argumentation forward, both for and against. It is the only way to procede in philosophy. A belief system which cannot withstand a proper debate is not worth believing in the first place. Sylvanius 16:05, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

As far as I can see you added a large body of text without a single citation so you should expect it to be reverted. That said hardly anything in this article is referenced. Its not clear to me that it is even a valid topic. Maybe its time to delete it?--Snowded ^TALK 17:33, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

Legally unscientific case

The article describes Intelligent Design as legally unscientific. This is bizarre on several levels. For one thing this article is about philosophy not science, and arguments do not have to be scientific. Further the claim is based on US law which should not be privileged above other legal systems. (I can imagine Iranian law having a different opinion.) Finally it is not clear that it matters at all whether the law views the theory as unscientific. I will delete this description. —Preceding unsigned comment added by MathHisSci (talk • contribs) 15:34, 2 April 2010 (UTC)

Primacy of happiness

At the top of this page, Wildbot points out that the "primacy" link in "(see Value of society and Primacy of happiness below)" is broken (section Metaphysical naturalism#Evolution).

That is because this edit (Dec 2008) removed the "Primacy of happiness" section (search for "primacy" on this talk page). I suppose the link should just be removed? Johnuniq (talk) 01:31, 30 April 2010 (UTC)

Wrong Information on Causal Closure

The section on "Mind as brain" claims that the "Causal Closure" paradigm has been falsified. However, the reference material points to http://xianphil.org/testing_cc.html and doesn't support this and neglects to take into consideration that parts of the brain can change the chemistry of other parts. It's taken from a book that isn't a scientific text and is isn't accepted as part of scientific literature.

Moreover, the site on which the article is hosted has this on the front page:

"Open philosophy is an approach that combines science with traditional wisdom to build a truly inclusive worldview. Dr. Dennis F. Polis is a Catholic Philosopher-Physicist and is available to speak on the challenges science poses to the religious worldview."

Hardly seems a credible source. The section that says Causal Closure has been falsified needs to go ASAP.Bhagwad (talk) 12:36, 17 May 2010 (UTC)

Multiverse part in Fine Tuning section is terrible

the sentence "However, the existences of multiverses with variant physical constants and natural laws, which is required to support the antropic principle counterargument the is completely unsupported by any scientific data, and violates the empirical principles on which naturalism is supposed to be based." is just counter-factual.

It insinuates that the multiverse violates Occam's razor, but OR is meant to clean up hypothesis. If something exists, it can not be shaved off. If this were the case, then sub-atomic particles would violate OR. Also, many physicists believe there is a ton of evidence, predictions in relation to the multiverse. Edward Witten, Andrei Linde, Michio Kaku, Leonard Susskind, Brian Greene, Stephen Hawking, Sean Carroll, Steven Weinberg are just a few of the massive amount of physicists that support it. Eightbitlegend (talk) 23:29, 11 June 2010 (UTC)

knee jerk cutting

Snowed: You deleted two paragraphs (below) because they were creationist "assertions and general material on naturalism." Come on. If you would have checked, you would have seen that both paragraphs are sourced directly from the same anti-creationist author: Steven D. Schafersman, whose anti-creationist article is posted on http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/schafersman_nat.html, which is an anti-creationist site. This material is pure Metaphysical naturalism philosophy. Creationism and creationists have nothing to do with it. Read Schafersman's article and you will see. Your cutting of these paragraphs is based solely on your knee-jerk reaction against creationism and not on rational thought. _AshforkAZ (talk) 13:13, 6 November 2010 (UTC)

"Naturalism is a philosophy that maintains:

1. Nature is all that exists, and whatever exists or happens is natural;
2. Nature (the universe or cosmos) consists only of natural elements, that is, of spatiotemporal physical substance—mass and energy. Non-physical materials such as mind, ideas, values, logical relationships, mathematics, etc., are either associated with the brain or exist independently of it, but are still somehow emergent from the physical structure of the universe;
3. Nature operates by natural processes that follow natural laws and can, in principle, be explained and understood by science and philosophy; finally
4. The supernatural does not exist, i.e., only nature is real.

Naturalism is therefore a metaphysical philosophy opposed primarily by Biblical creationism."

The truth of Naturalism presumably depends upon the existence of a supernatural realm. If there is empirical evidence or a logical reason to believe in the supernatural without that evidence, then naturalism would be false. If it were certain that the supernatural did not exist, then naturalism would be true. But even if there is no evidence and no reason to believe in it despite the lack of evidence, the supernatural may possibly still exist without our knowledge. Thus, the naturalist must be agnostic about the existence of the supernatural and the ultimate truth of naturalism. Because of the lack of empirical evidence, it seems reasonable to disbelieve the supernatural and believe that naturalism is true.

Oh. Another thing. Those two paragraphs you "restored" had not been cut or deleted from the article, but moved to a different section which they fit in better awaiting further editing. _AshforkAZ (talk) 06:46, 7 November 2010 (UTC)

I was tempted to do a mass revert to be honest. You are making the same changes on two articles, and nonsense such as seeing naturalism as opposed by creationism is likely to create a knee jerk response. Your supernatural and natural is classic creationist nonsense and can't stand as a fact in the article itself. You also need to be careful about multiple quotes from Gould. I am an admirer of his work, but he is controversial and can't be considered representative of a position per se. I strongly suggest you separate non-controversial edits from ones that you should know will be controversial. The latter should be raised on the talk page first. --Snowded ^TALK 08:58, 7 November 2010 (UTC)

Snowed says: "Your supernatural and natural is classic creationist nonsense" The following quotes show that this contrast is not the invention of creationists. Sidney Hook (1975, Southern Journal of Philosophy) argues for the natural over the supernatural:

• "Let the naturalist prove [says the challenger] ... that there can be no other kind of knowledge, that there can be none but empirical fact! And unless he can prove it, he is a question-begging a priorist....

But here, too, the naturalist need undertake to do no such thing. Is there a different kind of knowledge that makes ... [the supernatural] an accessible object of knowledge in a manner inaccessible by the only reliable method we have so far successfully employed to establish truths about other facts? Are there other than empirical facts, say spiritual or transcendent facts? Show them to us....

Is there a method discontinuous with that of rational empirical method which will give us conclusions about what exists on earth or heaven, if there be such a place, concerning which all qualified inquirers agree? Tell us about it."

• "The crucial point ... is that we are not dealing with a question of pure logic but of existential probability ... there is a reasonable habit of inference with respect to belief or disbelief about natural fact which we follow with respect to supernatural fact. And it is still a reasonable habit of belief despite the claim that the supernatural fact is of a different order. For however unique it is, ... it is reasonable to extend the logic and ethics of discourse to it."

• "whoever says that ... [the supernatural] exists must give reasons and evidence. The burden of proof rests on him in the same way that it rests on those who assert the existence of anything natural or supernatural.... It rests with the supernaturalist to present the evidence that there is more in the world than is disclosed by our common empirical experience.

I think Snowed's statement is inaccurate. _AshforkAZ (talk) 18:04, 15 November 2010 (UTC)

If you had read the source article you would find that Schafersman is the one who strongly uses the natural vs. supernatural argument, not I. The same goes for another source used in the article - Barbara Forrest. They both define naturalism in contrast with supernaturalism. And in Schafersman's article, when he uses "supernatural", he is specifically targeting Creationism not some vague notion. As I said before, it is an anti-creation article, written by an anti-creationist, which has been quoted extensively in on-line anti-creation literature. Now, if I had quoted out-of-context, I could see your argument. But these changes were accurate representations of a reliable source. It looks like you didn't even check to see what the source said, even though the link to his easy to read article was given. Rather than check to see what the source said and if he were reliable, you jumped to unwarranted conclusions. Hardly the actions of a level headed editor. If you don't read the all or most of the source materials for the article (as I have) how can you know if any of them are valid. _AshforkAZ (talk) 15:21, 7 November 2010 (UTC)

@ AshforkAZ, as I've commented here, you seem to be misrepresenting Schafersman and taking him out the context of the views of other philosophers. Not good. . . dave souza, talk 18:36, 7 November 2010 (UTC)

I'd like to see point by point where I misrepresented Schafersman. I believe that I've slavishly stuck to what he was saying. From what I've read, the philosophers are not lock step with each other, and it seems that some have been misrepresented. For instance Forrest quotes schafersman with approval and the article seems to imply otherwise. _AshforkAZ (talk) 20:31, 7 November 2010 (UTC)

Even if you hadn't misrepresented him, you can't take it as a definitive statement, at the very least it is a controversial position and WP:WEIGHT may apply. Please try and calm down, accusations that other editors are not level headed is foolish at best. --Snowded ^TALK 20:57, 7 November 2010 (UTC)

Agreed, regarding WP:UNDUE and definitely, erring to either side is just as undesirable. Especially when it seems peculiar for metaphysical naturalism to take on those polemics.

I don't know who included the references to the Multiverse theory (aka the Metaverse), but as an example: it defines 4 categories of multiplicity, any or all of which might reasonably obtain in Nature. At least one isn't even metaphysical, in that it's spacetime is both physically identical and continuous with our spacetime. The others simply dispense with the taboo of materialism and posit mathematically possible reality, to be fully real, in actuality ... basic Aristotle. In medieval natural science, the supernatural was more like a dialectic wildcard for Aristotelian Scholasticism but today, it makes for a rather trite philosophical comparison. If you'll forgive my saying w/o having read the source in its proper context—unnatural is the opposite of natural and it's the physicists who are forever experimenting with the most wickedly unnatural things.... :)

Who self-describes their creator/creation myth as unnatural? (cheeky Gnostics). All things being equal, would a theory asserting a material/physical doctrine be more amenable to metaphysical naturalism than one with no basis for scientific disagreement? Is it to be something like negative theology?

Less is more... I hope there were some interpretations... it was just kind of overwhelming. In smaller bits, it stands a better chance of being integrated with the existing material. Do leave out the quote saying most Americans will reject science unless it's creation-friendly. That's just irritating.—Machine Elf 1735 (talk) 01:30, 8 November 2010 (UTC)

One of the most important points of any topic is it's definition. Something that was poorly done in the article. I choose Schafersman because he one of the few scientists to bother to examine the foundations of the science he does. Certainly he isn't the last word, but his detailed definition, based on many other sources, was a good step in the right direction, controversial or not (and I don't see anything controversial about it given all the other sources I've read). Even though I am quoting and paraphrasing from an anti-creationism author and an anti-creationism article, I'm accused of introducing creationism into article. Go figure. Good faith must be reciprocal, or there is none.

Speak to atheist Eugene Scott of the NCSE about Americans rejecting science unless it is creation-friendly. She is claiming that atheists must let the public have their silly beliefs so they will more easily accept naturalism and evolution. That is a rather candid remark. Are you saying it is too candid for WP? _AshforkAZ (talk) 02:22, 8 November 2010 (UTC)

This discussion and the use of Schafersman in particular are also being discussed here. I suggest that the discussion takes place in one place only and Naturalism_(philosophy) is where AshforkAZ started this particular line of edits. --Snowded ^TALK 10:59, 8 November 2010 (UTC)

Pluralism and dualism?

Are there any sources for that section? I have never heard, or understood, metaphysical naturalism defined in a way that makes it distinct enough from physicalism to be compatible with pluralism. The article's lead openly says "metaphysical naturalism is a monistic and not dualistic view of reality" - so at very lest there is some contradiction here. As far as I know, this section is incorrect and should be deleted.-Tesseract²(talk) 19:29, 14 April 2011 (UTC)

Surprised

Was redirected here for "scientific materialism". Not convinced there's a real body of thought more than 40 years old on a subject called "metaphysical naturalism". I am happy to acquiesce regarding the possibility there really is one that passes notability; however, I want to see some very clear definitions right at the beginning. And not world-view claiming definitions at that.

To be clear: I am not convinced that there is such a thing. I've studied science, humanities, philosophy of science. This is new to me. I cast doubt on its existence.

damian (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 08:29, 29 October 2011 (UTC).

Cant say things like what????

I added to the history of naturalism section (which has no references at all) information from a reliable source? What is it that cant be said? this doesn't make sense to me.

Here is what was posted. "Current naturalism derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. Naturalists John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook, and Roy Wood Sellars worked to ally philosophy more closely with science. Reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing ‘supernatural’. The scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality." It comes directly from the article called Naturalism by Papineau on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. This author is listed in the next paragraph as among "prominent contemporary defenders of naturalism."

I cant see anything that is controversial in it. Consider the first sentence. This is a historical statement. Apparently there were debates among philosophers about what is naturalism and what is not. Nothing unusual about debates going on. Then in sentence two is a list of philosophers who wanted to have philosophy and science go hand in hand. No surprises there. Then come two sentences which summarizes what these philosophers were promoting. no surprises there. So what is it that cant be said? Mthoodhood (talk) 08:21, 25 August 2011 (UTC)

Man jess: please explain your action better. Mthoodhood (talk) 03:42, 26 August 2011 (UTC)

I assume you're referring to this revert. As I explained in my edit summary, we cannot say things like that in wikipedia's voice. You wrote, "The scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality." We are not instructing the reader on what they should or should not use to "investigate reality". We can only report what reliable secondary sources say on the topic, and in such cases, we would need to attribute the statement to a particular author. Mind you, I am not making any claims about the notability (or lack thereof), or appropriate weight (or lack thereof) of the content you're attempting to add, but simply pointing out that the language you're using is inappropriate.   — Jess· Δ♥ 04:21, 26 August 2011 (UTC)

disqualify themselves

Papineau is talking about religiously inclined philosophers who are apathetic toward strict metaphysical naturalism and who hold being a naturalist in esteem and who do not want to disqualify themselves a naturalists. They, therefore, endorse methodological naturalism. see [1]

In order to accurately reflect what Papineau is saying the paragraph should read:

Philosophers view naturalism as a positive term so few dare to announce themselves as non-naturalists. The religiously inclined philosophers tend to be indifferent toward metaphysical naturalism. Such philosophers who are more apathetic toward metaphysical naturalism prefer to understand naturalism in a nonrestrictive way in order not to disqualify themselves as naturalists. Instead they endorse methodological naturalism. Those who are keen on metaphysical naturalist doctrines are happy to set the bar for naturalism higher.

And "philosophers" need not be used since it applies not just to philosophers. Mthoodhood (talk) 18:01, 27 September 2011 (UTC)

Wrong, he said some religiously inclined philosophers may not mind being viewed as critical toward ‘naturalism’ and, regardless of religious inclination, some philosophers take a more generously inclusive view.

Even so, this entry will not aim to pin down any more informative definition of ‘naturalism’. It would be fruitless to try to adjudicate some official way of understanding the term. Different contemporary philosophers interpret ‘naturalism’ differently. This disagreement about usage is no accident. For better or worse, ‘naturalism’ is widely viewed as a positive term in philosophical circles—few active philosophers nowadays are happy to announce themselves as ‘non-naturalists’.^[1] This inevitably leads to a divergence in understanding the requirements of ‘naturalism’. Those philosophers with relatively weak naturalist commitments are inclined to understand ‘naturalism’ in a unrestrictive way, in order not to disqualify themselves as ‘naturalists’, while those who uphold stronger naturalist doctrines are happy to set the bar for ‘naturalism’ higher.^[2]

[1] It should be noted that philosophers concerned with religion tend to be less enthusiastic about ‘naturalism’. See the essays in Craig and Moreland (eds) (2000) Naturalism a Critical Analysis.

[2] Philosophers who understand ‘naturalism’ in a generous sense include John McDowell (1996), David Chalmers (1996) and Jennifer Hornsby (1997).

— David Papineau, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), "Naturalism"

I'll also point out that he says it would be “fruitless” to attempt what you seem to be attempting with your edits to the definition of metaphysical naturalism as naturalism simpliciter. And of course, you've just tossed in “methodological naturalism” for good measure.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 01:23, 28 September 2011 (UTC)

keep reading:

These philosophers [of the early 20th century] aimed to ally philosophy more closely with science. They urged that that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing ‘supernatural’, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the ‘human spirit’ (Krikorian 1944, Kim 2003).
So understood, ‘naturalism’ is not a particularly informative term as applied to contemporary philosophers. The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily accept naturalism as just characterized—that is, they would both reject ‘supernatural’ entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the ‘human spirit'.
And

As indicated by the above characterization of the mid-twentieth-century American movement, naturalism can intuitively be separated into an ontological and a methodological component. The ontological component is concerned with the contents of reality, asserting that reality has no place for ‘supernatural’ or other ‘spooky’ kinds. By contrast, the methodological component is concerned with the ways of investigating reality, and claims some kind of general authority for scientific method.
And

In some philosophy of religion circles, ‘methodological naturalism’ is understood differently, as a thesis about natural scientific method itself, not about philosophical method. In this sense, ‘methodological naturalism’ asserts that religious commitments have no relevance within science: natural science itself requires no specific attitude to religion, and can be practiced just as well by adherents of religious faiths as by atheists or agnostics (cf. Draper 2005). This thesis is of interest to philosophers of religion because many of them want to deny that methodological naturalism in this sense entails ‘philosophical naturalism’, understood as atheism or agnosticism. You can practice natural science in just the same way as non-believers, so this line of thought goes, yet remain a believer when it comes to religious questions.

— David Papineau

He is saying that it is 'fruitless" to nail naturalism down to either metaphysical or methodological, naturalism entails both. Most are willing to accept the metaphysical component of naturalism, but those with religious inclination allow for methodological naturalism but reject, are indifferent toward or apathetic about metaphysical naturalism. Of course implying that most others accept the methodological component as part and parcel with the metaphysical component. So I still hold that the above paragraph is a fair assessment of Papineau's thoughts on naturalism. Mthoodhood (talk) 02:35, 28 September 2011 (UTC)

Yes, I have read it and you're still wrong. Read between the "And"s.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 06:48, 28 September 2011 (UTC)

quote

Quote from schafferson article: In my own definition, a synthesis of those above, naturalism is the philosophy that maintains that (1) nature is all there is and whatever exists or happens is natural; (2) nature (the universe or cosmos) consists only of natural elements, that is, of spatiotemporal material elements--matter and energy--and non-material elements--mind, ideas, values, logical relationships, etc.--that are either associated with the human brain or exist independently of the brain and are therefore somehow immanent in the structure of the universe; (3) nature works by natural processes that follow natural laws, and all can, in principle, be explained and understood by science and philosophy; and (4) the supernatural does not exist, i.e., only nature is real, therefore, supernature is non-real. Naturalism is therefore a metaphysical position opposed mainly by supernaturalism. It is not an ethical system, although a variety--pragmatic naturalism, a synthesis of pragmatism and naturalism--does develop ethical positions. Furthermore, naturalism is a subset of metaphysical realism. Mthoodhood (talk) 02:24, 28 December 2011 (UTC)

Oh, a different article, that you didn't mention or provide a link for… I happen to remember it's a polemic by some scientist at a conference. As you can see, he points out that those are his personal opinions. Why are you so keen to say “all can, in principle, be explained and understood by science and philosophy”? What principle do you imagine that would be, hope? You'll need better sourcing than that. Try a philosopher, scientists aren't known for their metaphysical expertise.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 09:11, 28 December 2011 (UTC)

1. The link for the entire paragraph with all four points follows the sentence--Naturalism is therefore a metaphysical position opposed mainly by supernaturalism... 2. What matters is what the source says, not what i think or want it to say. 3. His definition is a synthesis of the definitions of the several philosophers that he quotes in the previous several paragraphs (as he clearly says above). So it is representative of several philosophers not just him. He didn't just pull it out of thin air. and 4. can, in principle, be explained and understood by science and philosophy; recognizes the limits of mankind's abilities to understand using the methods of science and philosophy as good as they are. It avoids dogmatism. Mthoodhood (talk) 17:11, 28 December 2011 (UTC)

Good, then you'll have no trouble finding an additional source that “recognizes” those limits.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 17:41, 28 December 2011 (UTC)

M.Elf massacred the article by inserting a definition into the middle of a definition. Fixed by moving his definition outside the original existing definition. Also replaced sourced material which M.Elf keeps removing and inserting his own unsourced opinion in its place (over and over and over again edit war style). If you have sourced material great, use it, but keep your opinion and POV to yourself. If you don't like a source, fine, but you cannot remove it based solely on your POV or opinion no matter your education or profession. You need to prove that the existing reliable source contradicts other reliable sources by obtaining these other sources which illustrate that point. The existing source already bases his definition on half-dozen other well established reliable sources.

Also, put references at the end of each line showing that they all are from the same source (which seemed like it was already obvious). And inserted logical ANDs at the end of the propositions showing that they are all integral parts of a single definition. Mthoodhood (talk) 18:45, 30 December 2011 (UTC)

It would be nice if you could refrain from being so obnoxious. If that's too much to ask, would you please take WP:NPOV/WP:V/WP:RS/WP:UNDUE on board, and stop littering the article with polemic citations to the author on whom you're fixated? Is it edit warring to incorporate the other source you've suggested? How many times have you reverted back to the same claim, word for word? I'm not the only user who's challenged it.

In regard to you're edit summary, you say: “Danto shows that things are understood through philosophy and science in principle. If you start with this philosophical assumption then that may be expected in principle, but there could be exceptions.” First, that's clearly WP:SYN and it's not permissible. Second, if there can be exceptions, then it's not a claim that's made “in principle”, in terms of science or philosophy. Third, as I explained, it doesn't say that nature can, in principle, be understood, it says that naturalism repudiates the existence of any supernatural entity that would lie, in principle, beyond the scope of scientific explanation.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 22:09, 30 December 2011 (UTC)

Argument from precedent

The second paragraph here is rather sketchy:

There are two unanswered objections to this argument. The first is that empirical methods restrict human experience to what is external and measurable without showing that only what is external and measurable exists. The argument is thus founded on an anti-empirical, a priori rejection of entire areas of human experience. The second is that in past applications of physics, what was to be explained was empirically measurable, whereas what naturalists claim can be explained by physics (intentions, awareness as opposed or data processing, God) are not empirically measurable and physics has never claimed that it is applicable to them. It must be recalled that physics uses abstractions, and that abstractions necessarily abstract from some data in order to focus on other data. Methods are not automatically applicable until empirically proven otherwise, but have conditions of applicability which must be met in advance of applying them. For example, no amount of empirical data will ever show that 2 + 2 = 4 always and everywhere.

1. "The argument is thus founded..." - This sentence is ambiguous and contradictory. The previous sentence talks about restricting empirical methods, which I don't see how they can be anti-empirical. Unless it's talking about the counterargument, in which case it weakens it, which doesn't make sense.
2. "The second is that in past..." - Naturalists don't claim that empirical sciences can explain things that can't be measured; they claim something can be measured if and only if it exists, by induction that nothing has been found that appeared to both exist and be unmeasurable. For the very reasons the paragraph outlines, it would be silly to try to research God empirically, so it's not done.
3. "It must be recalled that physics..." - This sentence doesn't have any connection with the surrounding text.
4. Finally, the example at the end is perfectly irrelevant. Whether 2+2=4 has nothing to do with whether a physical model can be applied in a given context, and 2+2=4 can't and doesn't need to be proven empirically. It's a mathematical tautology. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 201.250.59.109 (talk) 02:04, 24 January 2012 (UTC)

Is some supernatural allowed?

According to this article, metaphysical naturalism excludes any supernatural. However, some sources disagree with that. I brought that topic for discussion on Talk:Naturalism_(philosophy)#Definition_-_allow_for_supernatural_or_not.3F. --Chealer (talk) 03:58, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

Science and metaphysical naturalism

I don't see anything in the "Science and metaphysical naturalism" section that's specific to metaphysical naturalism. Is there any reason not to move to Naturalism (philosophy)? --Chealer (talk) 21:03, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

Yes, I'll move the discussion here if you're going to play games.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 23:00, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

Your opinion is interesting, but what do you think they are? Which discussion are you referring to? --Chealer (talk) 20:00, 7 March 2012 (UTC)

Definition - allow for supernatural or not?

Please note

This discussion was moved here from Talk:naturalism (philosophy)

I am amazed to see how complex the term "naturalism" is. In this use, there is first a big distinction between 2 "forms of naturalism", methodological and metaphysical naturalism. The difference here is rather clear.

However, it seems that just "naturalism" means different things to different people. This article is itself contradictory. The lead says:

Naturalism commonly refers to the viewpoint that [...] nothing exists beyond the natural universe or, if it does, it does not affect the natural universe.

However, the Metaphysical naturalism section contains:

[Metaphysical naturalism] is a philosophical worldview and belief system that holds that there is nothing but natural elements, principles, and relations of the kind studied by the natural sciences, i.e., those required to understand our physical environment by mathematical modeling.

The definition offered in Metaphysical naturalism is almost identical to the latter.

Obviously, this is inconsistent about whether naturalism allows for (a certain form of) supernatural or not. Both definitions are sourced, the latter with several references. The former, which I didn't verify, is attributed to the Oxford English Dictionary. Furthermore, this ambiguity is explicitly acknowledged by several sources:

Even so, this entry will not aim to pin down any more informative definition of ‘naturalism’. It would be fruitless to try to adjudicate some official way of understanding the term. Different contemporary philosophers interpret ‘naturalism’ differently. This disagreement about usage is no accident. For better or worse, ‘naturalism’ is widely viewed as a positive term in philosophical circles—few active philosophers nowadays are happy to announce themselves as ‘non-naturalists’. This inevitably leads to a divergence in understanding the requirements of ‘naturalism’. Those philosophers with relatively weak naturalist commitments are inclined to understand ‘naturalism’ in a unrestrictive way, in order not to disqualify themselves as ‘naturalists’, while those who uphold stronger naturalist doctrines are happy to set the bar for ‘naturalism’ higher.[2]

Similarly:

One of the most common versions of naturalism is the position that everything that exists is natural. Robert Audi defines naturalism, broadly construed, as "the view that nature is all there is and all basic truths are truths of nature". Rem B. Edwards offers a similar definition: "[T]he naturalist is one who affirms that only nature exists and by implication that the supernatural does not exist... The [natural] world is all of reality; it is all there is; there is no 'other world' " Although these definitions capture some of the most fundamental features of naturalism, I think that naturalism can be--and thus should be--defined less strongly. Alan Lacey captures the heart of naturalism when he writes: "What [naturalism] insists on is that the world of nature should form a single sphere without incursions from outside by souls or spirits, divine or human".

I think that most naturalists would agree that naturalism at least entails that nature is a closed system containing only natural causes and their effects. Fundamentally, naturalism is a metaphysical position about what sorts of causal relations exist--it is the position that every caused event within the natural world has a natural cause. This definition of naturalism is weaker than "everything that exists is natural" because it leaves open the possibility that the natural world does not exhaust all of reality: There may be some aspects of reality which exist outside of nature.[3]

What should be done? I guess these 2 senses need to be explained first, but then how would we choose between them? I think the difference is unimportant for methodological naturalism, but primary for metaphysical naturalism. "Weak" metaphysical naturalism seems to allow for some moral stances that would make no sense to "strong" metaphysical naturalists.

Should we choose a sense, and if not, what else can be done? Is there any terminology to disambiguate? --Chealer (talk) 03:54, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

As you're aware, this is not the article on metaphysical naturalism. You begin with a brief rehearsal of Schafersman's “clear” black and white dichotomy of metaphysical and methodological naturalism, as seen on WP. Both terms are obscured by controversy, the latter especially. This article, “here”, is encumbered by the misguided efforts that made it a merge recipient for methodological naturalism, by far the more notable of the 2 because of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District. Perhaps I understand your earlier name suggestion better: “naturalism (science)” would be a plausible redirect to a free-standing methodological naturalism article, once it's spun back out (inevitable, IMO).

Like naturalism in general, naturalism in philosophy can be ambiguous depending on context. There's nothing contradictory in the definition of a qualified term like metaphysical naturalism differing from an unqualified term like naturalism, a conceit, judging by the dab page, that should itself be qualified as “naturalism in philosophy” or “philosophical naturalism” (if not artificially by parenthetical).

What's obvious is that you've neglected to recognize any distinction between these, despite the qualifier. There is no “inconsistency” about “(a certain form of) supernatural”, whatever that means.

Clearly, the intention of metaphysical naturalism is somehow different from naturalism, simpliciter, though not necessarily a proper subset. Even assuming it is a proper subset, there's no inconsistency in those definitions. Charitably, you would not be incorrect to find that naturalism in philosophy is bewildering, so to speak…, something of an ensemble. The SEP article demures from that safari, while the master's thesis (a questionable WP:RS) is more the garden variety. In general, it goes a bit too far characterizing nature as closed, but understood as a simple assumption, that's fair enough.

À la metaphysical naturalism, science fans have a downright irrational conviction that nature is closed. Schafersman's propaganda aside, that's not the case historically, and considering we're in the dark about most of the so-called “matter” and “energy” in the universe, I supposes it's whistling a cheerie tune. Barring hung-ups about skeptical hypotheses, brain in a vat offers a plausible scenario for the supernaturally disinclined (there's no accounting for taste).

“What should be done?” Having just given the WP explanations on offer for those 2 senses and concluding “I guess these 2 senses need to be explained first”, is what? Some kind of crazy talk? “…how would we choose between them?” It's not our job to make that kind of choice for the reader.

Apparently “weak” and “strong” are terms you've invented, at first blush, having only just introduced yourself to the subject matter. That's not helpful: WP:OR is no more welcome here than it would be at the actual metaphysical naturalism article. Furthermore, those are 2 woefully naïve views of morality you're saddling naturalists with.

Of all this article lacks, of it's myriad shortcomings and inadequacies… science buffs and creationistas both love Schafersman for the facile polemics.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 13:35, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

It is of course not a priori contradictory that two different terms have different meanings. However, if metaphysical naturalism is simply an absolute adoption of naturalism, then their definitions should be compatible and agree on the possibility for some supernatural. In fact, metaphysical naturalism used to present "naturalism" as a short for "metaphysical naturalism". Regarding "philosophical naturalism", that is already used as a synonymous for "metaphysical naturalism", as explained in metaphysical naturalism.

What I meant by "I guess these 2 senses need to be explained first" is that the first thing to do would be to change our definitions to account for this ambiguity and explain the ambiguity in a single place.

As for "weak" and "strong", these are English words. See Wiktionary for their definitions. --Chealer (talk) 20:45, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

See WP:OR FWIW.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 23:35, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

From my reading on Naturalism, it seems to me that Papinau has a fairly accurate description of the range of belief of what makes up naturalism. Here is his quote: "Different contemporary philosophers interpret ‘naturalism’ differently. This disagreement about usage is no accident. For better or worse, ‘naturalism’ is widely viewed as a positive term in philosophical circles—few active philosophers nowadays are happy to announce themselves as ‘non-naturalists’. This inevitably leads to a divergence in understanding the requirements of ‘naturalism’. Those philosophers with relatively weak naturalist commitments are inclined to understand ‘naturalism’ in a unrestrictive way, in order not to disqualify themselves as ‘naturalists’, while those who uphold stronger naturalist doctrines are happy to set the bar for ‘naturalism’ higher." (see reference in article)

I feel that his use of "weak" verse "strong" is inadvisable. But he does describe well the two polar views of naturalism, on the one hand the idea that Nature is all there is, has ever been, or ever will be and so there is no god and on the other the idea that Nature is all there is, has ever been, or ever will be and there may or may not be a god (i.e., if there is a god, he is irrelevant). In either case, nature is viewed and understood as if there is no god.

From what I have read, the first is called metaphysical (or ontological) naturalism and the second is called methodological naturalism. The primary difference between them seems to be whether one allows for a impotent god or not. I read that methodological naturalism contrasts with metaphysical naturalism. Contrast usually implies a black or white difference, which I just don't see here, because in either case, a god is denied or ignored, either explicitly or implicitly. Functionally, they are essentially identical. They both hold the same view of origins, i.e., always has been. So, I don't understand why there is so much milage made about the contrast between the two?

And it seems to me that they equally form the basis for science. Why methodological naturalism (which allows for an emasculated god) is more preferable as the basis for science than metaphysical naturalism (where there is no god at all) eludes me. Unless it is for a reason given by Scott: "If it is important for Americans to learn about science and evolution, decoupling the two forms of naturalism is essential strategy. ... I suggest that scientists can defuse some of the opposition to evolution by first recognizing that the vast majority of Americans are believers, and that most Americans want to retain their faith. It is demonstrable that individuals can retain religious beliefs and still accept evolution as science. Scientists should avoid confusing the methodological naturalism of science with metaphysical naturalism."(Scott, Eugenie C., 1996, "Creationism, Ideology, and Science," in Gross, Levitt, and Lewis, The Flight From Science and Reason, The New York Academy of Sciences, p. 519-520.) Thus it seems that methodological naturalism, as the only explanation for the natural world, makes naturalism palatable to believers in God by simply offering a token acknowledgment of a god. But who cares what believers might think? Why not just say it the way it is? SmittysmithIII (talk) 05:28, 7 March 2012 (UTC)

Merge proposal

Opposed: As you no doubt anticipated from the discussion above (copied from Naturalism (philosophy)). Frankly, isn't it a bit too obvious that philosophy≠“science”, (not modern science anyway). Ideology, word games and WP:IDHT are no substitute for a cogent proposal.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 23:30, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

Non-free content

The {{close paraphrasing}} tag automatically listed this article for review at the copyright problems board. I do not see specific issues with close paraphrasing (please provide examples if retagging), but I do believe that the use of non-free content requires some work. For one example, the article says:

Metaphysical naturalism is a philosophy "wherein worship is replaced with curiosity, devotion with diligence, holiness with sincerity, ritual with study, and scripture with the whole world and the whole of human learning," and it is the naturalist’s duty "to question all things and have a well grounded faith in what is well-investigated and well-proved, rather than what is merely well-asserted or well-liked."

While the quotations are cited, they are not attributed as required by WP:NFC; see WP:INTEXT for more information. All direct quotations should be properly attributed.

Please also make sure that there is valid reason to make use of this non-free content rather than simply a desire to incorporate the information. Where content can be properly paraphrased, it often should be; quotations do certainly have value, but should be transformative, such as (to draw on the WP:NFC examples) "illustrat[ing] a point, establish[ing] context, or attribut[ing] a point of view or idea."

Thanks. --Moonriddengirl ^(talk) 17:53, 18 March 2012 (UTC)

Per the earlier discussion at Talk:Metaphysical naturalism#disqualify themselves, I've gone ahead rewritten the paragraph that had originally been flagged for close paraphrasing (and subsequently re-paraphrased). Unfortunately, the question of close "paraphrasing" sidelined my outstanding concerns with WP:V: that the gist of what the author's saying had been distorted.

Needless to say, it's the fixed expression, as opposed to the idea being expressed, that's relevant in terms of close paraphrasing. The fact that they don't always go hand-in-hand, highlights the need for direct quotation in contentious passages of controversial articles. Hopefully I've introduced no new concerns.

In regard to the non-free content, I think it's inappropriate for the definition section and that removing it would be best, but SmittysmithIII reverted, saying: “Carrier is talking about all philosophy, including Meta. N, not just his own personal Meta. N philosophy”. So, I'm not sure why it was reverted, that's even more WP:UNDUE. I've moved it to a Metaphysical naturalism#Worship subsection. (SmittysmithIII, per your own summary, please don't reinsert it into the definition section of Metaphysical naturalism, and please don't revert the WP:ATTRIBUTEPOV and correction to the Plantinga quote, who was, at least, referring to naturalism in general, just not metaphysical naturalism per se).—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 12:45, 20 March 2012 (UTC)

Blocked sockpuppets

Mthoodhood and SmittyhillIII blocked as socks, see Wikipedia:Sockpuppet investigations/Allenroyboy/Archive. Dougweller (talk) 16:52, 24 June 2012 (UTC)

Carl Sagan

According to the Wikipedia entry on Carl Sagan, he indicated rather clearly that he was not an atheist:

On atheism, Sagan commented in 1981: "An atheist is someone who is certain that God does not exist, someone who has compelling evidence against the existence of God. I know of no such compelling evidence. Because God can be relegated to remote times and places and to ultimate causes, we would have to know a great deal more about the universe than we do now to be sure that no such God exists. To be certain of the existence of God and to be certain of the nonexistence of God seem to me to be the confident extremes in a subject so riddled with doubt and uncertainty as to inspire very little confidence indeed".[46] In reply to a question in 1996 about his religious beliefs, Sagan answered, "I'm agnostic."[47] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.223.19.171 (talk) 09:12, 26 June 2012 (UTC)

Faulty definition

". . .only nature is real[2], i.e. Atheism." Metaphysical naturalism is not equivalent to atheism. Atheism is the lack of belief in God or gods. It is possible to lack belief in God but still believe in supernatural entities such as ghosts, demons, angels, etc. 108.200.48.254 (talk) 03:25, 25 July 2012 (UTC)

Mind as Brain

This is not necessarily true. I (the relatively high functioning "conscious" organic deterministic state machine typing this) am the result of ongoing chemically based computation occurring within my body and in reaction to the inputs I come across, and as such, am no more than a series of "memories" (currently existing sets of atoms and related interactions) and processes (sets of atoms and interactions existing since I was "born" [a state which I shall define as that when these such processes exist]). There is no reason to assume that we cannot deduce these processes and memories and replicate them in another substrate. While my mind is wholly material, if it were executing on a different substrate I would still say I exist and interacting with me you may not be able to say I am not the me that is/was my brain. Indeed my brain 30 years from now will have largely replaced its constituent atoms while the interactions occurring among the atoms today will still cause me to be me.

Perhaps these sections as a whole are largely missing something. The current scientific understanding of the mind / body problem has significantly changed since prior to 1960 (although had I the chance to discuss this with Mr. Stace I am certain I could have convinced him both that the mind is material and that it is not only the static brain). --216.37.197.178 (talk) 00:11, 21 September 2012 (UTC)

Pre-Modern Philosophy

I added this section, and I would prefer it to stay up. If there is something needing modification, or attention, please do assert it. But if metaphysical naturalism is true, it ought to be able to better other metaphysical explanations, such as realism, and other things cited in the subsection I added. 67.3.135.155 (talk) 22:02, 19 May 2015 (UTC)

Pre-Modern Philosophy Section is seriously flawed

This section reads like an advertisement for someone trying to sell Ed Feser's book. Despite the fact that Feser is arguing for a classical position in philosophy which is not held by the majority of philosophers, it reads as though he personally has concluded and won the argument . Another huge problem is that it reads as though classical philosophy offers the only variants of realism and that naturalism is tied to either nominalism or eleminative materialism. Neither one of these claims is true. There are many more variants of realism that are either naturalistic or compatible with naturalism. There are also other options for the naturalist besides eleminativism or nominalism.

If this section stays up on the article, then it needs to be completely rewritten. This rewritting needs to include the fact that (1) the naturalist position is taken by the majority of philosophers to be best explanation for these things (probably citing David Chalmer's massive survey "What Do Philosophers Believe?" that outlines this which I referenced above), (2) making it not a biased advertisement for Feser's book (don't make it about Feser and do not treat it as though his popular level book written from his side is the end of the discussion), and (3) citing a list of the schools of philosophy that are taken as better answers by professional philosophers.

Eightbitlegend (talk) 15:19, 24 September 2015 (UTC)

Those suggestions sound pretty good. Also I'm not sure if this one book is noteworthy, or whether it belongs on this page. There are countless books that could be cited as claiming to refute naturalism (they argue for a supernatural god or powers or spirits). BrianPansky (talk) 04:09, 11 December 2015 (UTC)

Evolution of definition

I didn't find Reference Desk Humanities or Science to be appropriate places for this question, although this comment does not suggest a precise change, sorry about that; but it pertains to this article.

When verifying various definitions (including Webster 1913 and this article's), I see the use of belief, doctrine and denial, to describe the naturalist point of view. Which made me question if there has ever been evolution of the definition over time in certain sources.

I may be mistaken, but describing naturalism as a doctrine or belief, reminds me the common fallacy presented to athiests: "how can you prove that a diety doesn't exist?", when of course, athiests respond that it's simply non-belief in a diety, because of the lack of evidence; we cannot produce non-evidence, but acknowledge the observable.

Similarily, as someone who considers to hold a naturalist view, I don't find that faith is required to hold this view, which would only be altered if evidence of non-physical, non-naturalistic processes at work were demonstrated. Therefore, I'm not convinced that belief or doctrine are technically adequate terms to define naturalism.

If the definition indeed evolved in this direction in the work of some authors (a point of view, acknowlegement, or assertion, versus a belief or doctrine), we probably should have mention of this in the article, and possibly even alter the definition in the lead? But do such works even exist making the distinction? Thanks, 76.10.128.192 (talk) 15:12, 1 April 2014 (UTC)

This article is about metaphysical naturalism, not just 'naturalism'. Metaphysical Naturalism is indeed a positive belief about the way reality actually is. That's part of the whole point of the term 'Metaphysical Naturalism'. There are positive arguments to be made in favor of the non-existence of a god and the claim that metaphysical naturalism is probably true. If the article currently doesn't include reference to these arguments, I suggest it should. Though I don't think 'doctrine' is the right word. BrianPansky (talk) 04:24, 11 December 2015 (UTC)

External links modified

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just added archive links to one external link on Metaphysical naturalism. Please take a moment to review my edit. If necessary, add {{cbignore}} after the link to keep me from modifying it. Alternatively, you can add {{nobots|deny=InternetArchiveBot}} to keep me off the page altogether. I made the following changes:

• Added archive https://web.archive.org/20120226150034/http://onthehuman.org:80/2009/11/the-disenchanted-naturalists-guide-to-reality/ to http://onthehuman.org/2009/11/the-disenchanted-naturalists-guide-to-reality/

When you have finished reviewing my changes, please set the checked parameter below to true to let others know.

This message was posted before February 2018. After February 2018, "External links modified" talk page sections are no longer generated or monitored by InternetArchiveBot. No special action is required regarding these talk page notices, other than regular verification using the archive tool instructions below. Editors have permission to delete these "External links modified" talk page sections if they want to de-clutter talk pages, but see the RfC before doing mass systematic removals. This message is updated dynamically through the template {{source check}} (last update: 18 January 2022).

• If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
• If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—^{cyberbot II}_{Talk to my owner:Online} 03:52, 15 January 2016 (UTC)

External links modified (January 2018)

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified one external link on Metaphysical naturalism. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:

• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20120104024641/http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPWAPF&Cover=TRUE to http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPWAPF&Cover=TRUE

When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

This message was posted before February 2018. After February 2018, "External links modified" talk page sections are no longer generated or monitored by InternetArchiveBot. No special action is required regarding these talk page notices, other than regular verification using the archive tool instructions below. Editors have permission to delete these "External links modified" talk page sections if they want to de-clutter talk pages, but see the RfC before doing mass systematic removals. This message is updated dynamically through the template {{source check}} (last update: 18 January 2022).

• If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
• If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—InternetArchiveBot (Report bug) 08:56, 25 January 2018 (UTC)

External links modified (January 2018)

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified one external link on Metaphysical naturalism. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:

• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20081204204600/http://library.thinkquest.org/c004367/ph1.shtml to http://library.thinkquest.org/C004367/ph1.shtml

When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

This message was posted before February 2018. After February 2018, "External links modified" talk page sections are no longer generated or monitored by InternetArchiveBot. No special action is required regarding these talk page notices, other than regular verification using the archive tool instructions below. Editors have permission to delete these "External links modified" talk page sections if they want to de-clutter talk pages, but see the RfC before doing mass systematic removals. This message is updated dynamically through the template {{source check}} (last update: 18 January 2022).

• If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
• If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—InternetArchiveBot (Report bug) 17:29, 26 January 2018 (UTC)

Article focus

This article's scope should be more clearly defined: that it's about 19th century philosophical metaphysical naturalism (not naturalism or methodological naturalism or the scientific method, or physical constants, etc). There is a tendency (and it has been a long-time target of a prolific sockpuppeteer WP:LTA in this sense) to accumulate subtle (mostly YEC Christian) apologetics, including via extensive quote mining of notable people, to promote a relativist view (a stepping stone to deny evolution, etc). The introduction of the article also begins with a description from Schafersman that seems to confirm that objections are primarily from Biblical creationism. Creationist apologetics should not be given undue weight in a mainstream encyclopedia. The article also has strange "for/against" sections that are not only imbalanced but are in the spirit of WP:FALSEBALANCE. The "for" one doesn't even mention the general success of science and technology, however obvious. The "against" goes to the nonsensical, but can be comprehensible on a philosophical basis only (and are against materialism more than metaphysical naturalism, with "Evolutionary argument against naturalism" clearly apologetic and within a philosophy of religion scope; also see Ruse's response about conflating methodological and metaphysical naturalism). But it's also possible that this is all out of the ideal scope of the article... —PaleoNeonate – 20:15, 8 February 2020 (UTC)

Sources for further reference:

• Mumford, Stephen (2013). "4 Metaphysics". In Psilos, Stathis; Curd, Martin (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science (2nd ed.). Routledge. pp. 38–47. ISBN 9781135011093.
• Giere, Ronald N. (2013). "23 Naturalism". In Psilos, Stathis; Curd, Martin (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science (2nd ed.). Routledge. pp. 245–255. ISBN 9781135011093.

—PaleoNeonate – 03:56, 11 February 2020 (UTC)