Talk:German declaration of war against the United States

Per copyright issue

Per MadmanBot's tag, this article in not an infringement of copyright (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/gerdec41.asp) as the statement mentioned is a US government document describing an historical event. Stating this, I am removing the fore mentioned tag. Dinkytown talk 01:42, 4 October 2013 (UTC)

Agreed. Avalon is merely posting a copy. It's not even a translation. They do not claim a copyright.

-- Randy2063 (talk) 00:04, 5 March 2014 (UTC)

Not necessarily in German self-interest

A number of historians have speculated that this declaration of war was not really in Germany's self-interest. It contributed to strengthening the British-U.S. alliance against Germany, while not doing much to strengthen Germany's own position... AnonMoos (talk) 19:14, 15 October 2013 (UTC)

Embassies quickly become spy bases. The Declaration helped Germany by removing a spy base from Berlin (and other NAZI occupied cities). Sinking US ships was no longer a war crime/crime against peace. High ranking Germans no longer had to be polite to Americans. Andrew Swallow (talk) 16:03, 16 October 2013 (UTC)

If the declaration of war against the U.S. was a decisive or significant factor in the U.S. engaging in combat in Europe / North Africa, then overall it could have harmed Germany's military position far more than helping... AnonMoos (talk) 16:31, 16 October 2013 (UTC)

STRONGLY disagree with point that declaration not in Germany's self interest.

Had Germany not declared war on the United States, thereby forcing the Americans to split their forces, the United States could have rapidly knocked out Japan with its superior industrial capacity and then proceeded to turn the full strength of its war economy against Germany. Moreover, a quick victory by the United States over Japan would free up the massive reserves the USSR had left guarding the Soviet Far East against further Japanese aggression to be used against Germany at a time when Germany was locked in a life-or-death struggle with the Soviet Union. The United States, despite the declaration of war didn't act decisively against Germany until mid way through 1944, well after Japan's navy had been crushed, and only when it appeared that the Soviets threatened to overrun all of Central Europe, including Germany. Had Germany not declared war then the logic of geo-strategy would have eventually lead to an American declaration of war against Germany, likely by 1943 or 44, when US industrial capacity would have reached its zenith and the US could have turned its full attention to Germany after having beaten Japan. Indeed, this is more or less what actually happened, declaration or not. The United States was never going accept a German (or Russian) hegemony in Europe. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.73.102.174 (talk) 18:16, 1 July 2015 (UTC)

Please note that this talk page is not a forum for the general discussion of the subject matter of the article. Also note that it is the clear consensus of professional historians and writers on the subject that Hitler's almost off-hand decision to declare war on the US was one of the many choices he made which contributed greatly to Germany losing the war. If you have a citation from a reliable source that supports your personal opinion, then please post it here on this page, so a discussion can be held on how much weight it should carry in the article. In any event, without such a citation, this viewpoint cannnot be added to the article at all. BMK (talk) 18:25, 1 July 2015 (UTC)

Closing discussion by banned User:HarveyCarter. Binksternet (talk) 15:41, 9 July 2015 (UTC)
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.
The great majority of historians agree that war between Germany and the United States was inevitable in 1941, regardless of the German declaration of war. Hitler had no choice as the US had been violating its "neutral" position for months with Lend Lease and the Destroyers for Bases Agreement. As Britain had declared war on Japan all limits were off regarding US supplies to the UK; it would only have been a short matter of time until the Germans began sinking American ships laden with supplies, giving Roosevelt a casus belli to declare war. (CharltonChiltern (talk) 18:37, 2 July 2015 (UTC)) Again, at this point these are your opinions (and it's far from a sure thing that FDR would have been able to get Congress to declare war on Germany absent a definite causus belli; Hitler's declaration removed that necessity) and, again, you cannot add it to the article without a reliable source, and without a discussion here about how much WP:WEIGHT to give it, depending on who the source is. BMK (talk) 18:45, 3 July 2015 (UTC) Hundreds of US ships being sunk would have provided the casus belli. The US had been siding with Britain and France from the very beginning; Germany and Italy should have declared war over the Destroyers for Bases Agreement. (CharltonChiltern (talk) 18:48, 3 July 2015 (UTC)) Your opinion. BMK (talk) 21:21, 3 July 2015 (UTC) Not at all. Hitler and Mussolini had no choice as the US was not a neutral country. If the US did not want to enter WW2 then it should not have actively helped the British Empire from the beginning of the conflict. (CharltonChiltern (talk) 09:57, 4 July 2015 (UTC)) Hitler had no choice I have removed POV about the declaration being a "blunder". Hitler had no choice because the United States had openly sided with the British Empire from the very beginning of World War II, just like in World War I. (CharltonChiltern (talk) 16:14, 8 July 2015 (UTC)) And I have restored it, as it is the general opinion of most historians, with the possible exception of Ferguson -- and even he said that calling it a major strategic blunder "is not entirely fair" (hardly a ringing un-endorsement) and goes on to discuss all the ways in which Hitler underestimated the economic and demographic capabilities of the United States. Please do not remove sourced material again, or I shall have to bring your general behavior pattern (i.e. adding unsourced information and then edt-warring over its removal) to the attention of admins. BMK (talk) 16:33, 8 July 2015 (UTC) I have added neutral pointers to this discussion and the one above it, as well as to the article itself, on the talk pages of the following WikiProjects: History, Military History, Germany, United States. BMK (talk) 16:43, 8 July 2015 (UTC) It was not a blunder at all because Hitler had no choice. The US was not neutral in 1939-41 and in any case historians agree war was inevitable as U-boats would have sunk hundreds of American ships carrying munitions and supplies to the UK. (CharltonChiltern (talk) 18:03, 8 July 2015 (UTC)) Excuse me, you're just saying the same thing over and over again -- do you realize that? You say "historians agree", but you don't cite any. William L. Shirer, who was a reporter in Washington at the time, writes in The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (p.894 note): My own impression in Washington at that moment was that it might be difficult for President Roosevelt to get Congress to declare war on Germany. There seemed to be a strong feeling in both houses as well as in the Army and Navy that the country ought to concentrate its efforts on defeating Japan and not take on the additional burden of fighting Germany at the same time. Hitler's pre-emptive declaration, which no treaty or agreement Germany had signed required him to do, removed that hurdle, and allowed Roosevelt to engage in his and Churchill's preferred grand strategy, which was "Germany first". Was war with the United States inevitable for Germany? Yes, it most probably was. Had Roosevelt pushed the boundaries of "neutrality" to the breaking point, and beyond? Yes, he had, and it was clear who he preferred in the war -- but economic nad material aid, no matter of what size or amount, is a far cry from the full-scale involvement of American military forces. The US might not have been "neutral" in the sense of Switzerland or Portugal, but it was most certainly a non-combatant, which makes all the difference. Above all, it's the timing of the German declaration that was the primary blunder. War may have come later (or much later), but Hitler, in fact, was anxious to make the declaration as soon as possible. He was certain that Roosevelt was going to ask for a declaration of war against Germany at any moment, despite the assurances of the German chargé that it was unlikely, and he wanted to get in the first strike -- which he says fairly clearly in the speech to the Reichstag. So the question isn't IF but WHEN, and Hitler, underestimating the US economic and demographic advantage, in the same way he had underestimated that of the Soviet Union, brought it down on himself earlier than was necessary -- but, then, he always preferred the offensive to the defensive. BMK (talk) 18:29, 8 July 2015 (UTC) Most historians agree war would have followed by January 1942 at the latest as U-boats began sinking American ships. The US supported Britain's illegal blockade of Germany from 1914-1919, so naturally Hitler wanted to prevent mass starvation of the civilian population from happening again. The US was certainly not a non-combatant - it alone was keeping Britain in the war with the Destroyers for Bases Agreement and Lend Lease. It's not like Germany ever had any chance of victory in the two world wars in any case. Germany was fighting a defensive war in 1914 and in 1939. (CharltonChiltern (talk) 18:36, 8 July 2015 (UTC)) "Germany was fighting a defensive war in 1914 and in 1939", are you kidding? --Kgfleischmann (talk) 20:10, 8 July 2015 (UTC) In 1914 Germany was fighting a defensive war against the British Empire, the Russian Empire, Italy, the Empire of Japan and France, all of whom were being supported by the United States. In 1939 Germany was fighting a defensive war against the British Empire and France, both financially supported by the US. — Preceding unsigned comment added by CharltonChiltern (talk • contribs) 11:55, 9 July 2015 (UTC) Unfortunately, I don't think so. I think CharltonChiltern believes everything he writes, and believes it fervently, which prevents him from editing in a NPOV manner. BMK (talk) 21:40, 8 July 2015 (UTC) @CharltonChiltern: "Most historian agree" you write often, but you have been asked for citations and have provided none. I think kthis will be the final time I ask: please provide citations to specific pages in specific books by specific historians (or even respected non-historian writers about the war) that support your contention that (1) Declaring war on the US immediately after Pearl Harbor, while he was still prosecuting the invasion of the Soviet Union, was not a serious strategic mistake on Hitler's part, and that (2) "Most historians" think that the US would have declared war on Germany by January 1942 (one month after Pearl Harbor) "at the latest". Again, please do not simply repeat your statements again, please provide verifiable citations from reliable sources that support your contentions. BMK (talk) 22:02, 8 July 2015 (UTC) Declaring war on the US made no difference, as Roosevelt had already dropped his neutral stance in March 1941. (CharltonChiltern (talk) 12:04, 9 July 2015 (UTC))

No limit

Sock of banned editor HarveyCarter. BMK (talk) 03:26, 1 December 2015 (UTC)
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.
All limits on aid to Britain had been removed as soon as the UK and its empire declared war on Japan. (Sdjkl1 (talk) 08:22, 27 November 2015 (UTC)) So what? Hitler had no reason to know that would happen. BMK (talk) 10:22, 27 November 2015 (UTC) Of course he did - we had been actively supporting Britain from the very start. (Sdjkl1 (talk) 13:36, 27 November 2015 (UTC))

Bullock

Sock of banned editor HarveyCarter. BMK (talk) 03:26, 1 December 2015 (UTC)
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.
Alan Bullock's theories have been debunked by modern historians. Hitler certainly foresaw the United States leading the invasion of Europe in 1941. (Sdjkl1 (talk) 08:32, 27 November 2015 (UTC)) Please put citations here for "modern historians" who have debunked Bullock (whose worke were published in 1982 and 1992) Please site only works in English, and be specific as to page numbers. BMK (talk) 10:21, 27 November 2015 (UTC) Kershaw debunked Bullock's theory, which was published in 1962. I will check for more references. Hitler actually said in 1941 that the US would lead the invasion of France. (Sdjkl1 (talk) 13:37, 27 November 2015 (UTC)) References, please. BMK (talk) 20:04, 27 November 2015 (UTC)

"Almost offhand"

I removed this from the lead but was reverted by User:Beyond My Ken "per source". Firstly, it's not stated in the body of the article, so could reasonably be omitted for that reason. More importantly, if it is kept (which I would oppose), I think it should say "apparently almost offhand", and WP:ATTRIBUTE which Nazi's (or general's, or historian's?) opinion of Hitler's state of mind (or behaviour, mannerism, etc?) this is. You may say this is superfluous detail, but to me it just looks bizarre to state what someone's state of mind is/was, without explanation. zzz (talk) 07:06, 27 February 2016 (UTC)

(1) The body of the article cites multiple sources which describe Hitler's process for making the decision. Read them all, then come back and comment when you actually know what you're talking about. (2) I've added "apparently". BMK (talk) 13:47, 27 February 2016 (UTC)

(1) No, thanks. (2) Thanks. zzz (talk) 14:25, 27 February 2016 (UTC)

User:Beyond My Ken; I agree that Hitler's process for such an important decision was not lengthy and apparently not thorough, but that does not automatically equate to the description "offhand". That word implies an action with literally only a moment of consideration, if any, like grabbing the first suit off the rack, choosing a movie to see based on whatever was showing next, or picking a magazine from the top of a stack. Declaring a war with a prepared speech cannot be "offhand". Instead, if, in the middle of a broadcast radio interview about his hobbies, Hitler mentioned "and, y'know, since we're now at war with the US...", that could qualify as "offhand". Even then, WP still couldn't use the word "offhand" for that in WP's voice; that would be SYNTH. WP could only use it if the judgment of "offhand" came quoted from RSs, and the majority of RSs with such judgments used that term or equivalent. Oh, and adding "apparently" is just a weasel word -- still unsourced. --A D Monroe III (talk) 22:22, 30 July 2017 (UTC)

The sources do indeed indicate that was the nature of Hitler's decision. Beyond My Ken (talk) 00:58, 31 July 2017 (UTC)

Stating it's the "nature" of what's in the sources isn't enough; we're still applying a judgement in WP's voice. Saying other editors must do all the research themselves before commenting is just saying the cites aren't being done properly.

Let's try this: "offhand" is currently only the lede, not the main text. If the RSs support this directly, then we should put it in the main text with its direct cites. Then we can (and should) also include this in the lede as a summary of the main. But without it in the main text, saying this in the lede looks like SYNTH (or even OR), and doesn't reflect well on WP. If "offhand" is directly cited in the main, then we don't have to add "appears" or "almost" or some other cop-out words to "offhand" in the lede. If sources agree it was offhand, let's state so clearly, not tentatively, like we aren't sure. --A D Monroe III (talk) 15:50, 31 July 2017 (UTC)

Pinging to get some attention from other editors here; this old thread may not be getting noticed since it isn't at the end of the page: @Signedzzz, J 1982, TheFreeWorld, A.S. Brown, and Binksternet:, 7&6=thirteen

Comments? --A D Monroe III (talk) 16:53, 3 August 2017 (UTC)

I didn't comment here because I thought Beyond My Ken had struck the right note in reply. If multiple sources describe the very quick decision as a huge blunder (which they do) then I don't have any problem with the word offhand. Binksternet (talk) 17:08, 3 August 2017 (UTC)

The sources I have read all point to numerous reasons why Hitler didn't have to declare war against the US, and why it was disadvantageous to Germany in that situation to do so. They all talk about his lack of consultation with others, making the decision on his own. (These sources are all cited at one point or another in the article.) A decision that wasn't required, that was harmful to your cause, and that you made without serious consultation - I'd say that "almost offhand" describes it fairly accurately, not in Wikipedia's voice, but in the collective voices of all those sources. Beyond My Ken (talk) 20:40, 3 August 2017 (UTC)

I agree with the reasoning and conclusion of Beyond My Ken. The consensus of the experts is it was a colossal blunder. It is by no means clear that the Congress would have declared war on Germany absent the German declaration. 7&6=thirteen (☎) 16:24, 4 August 2017 (UTC)

The arguments above describe it as blunder, but that's not what we're saying in the lede; if the sources say "blunder", we should say "blunder". If the sources say "offhand", great -- I'm only asking one thing: please help me find where. I'm sorry if I've missed something so very obvious, but I've looked through the sources, and I agree they tend to paint a picture that I might think was "offhand" -- but I can come to that conclusion only by my using SYNTH.

I'm worried readers will have the same problem I'm having. If it's definitive to call it "offhand" directly based on the sources without using SYNTH, it should be easy to for one of us to make a least one direct cite, not leave it to the readers to do their own SYNTH.

I know we can skip cites in the lede if it's an obvious summary from the sub-sections. But "offhand" isn't anywhere but the lede, and doesn't seem obvious without without using SYNTH after reading the sources. Is there any problem with stating "offhand" somewhere besides the lede? Then we could simply cite it -- problem solved and the article improved! Really, if the sources are so supportive of this, it should be far easier to do than spending time detailing in talk our personal opinions on what a idiot Hitler was.

(And, actually, the picture I get from the sources is that Hitler came to this decision quickly and decisively, not thoughtlessly. The US had been putting a lot pressure on Germany despite being a neutral, escorting ships supplying the UK, informing the UK of all sub sightings, and taking over bases covering the Atlantic shipping from the UK "in exchange" for giving the UK ships to use as anti-sub escorts! All this probably enraged Hitler. Wouldn't he have wondered if having the US as an open enemy might be better than a perpetual, untouchable, aggressive pretend-neutral? Maybe Pearl Harbor simply provided the excuse he'd long hoped for. Now, that would still make declaring war a mistake, but it wouldn't be thoughtless and certainly not "offhand". Of course, that's all SYNTH. Can we avoid readers coming to this "incorrect" conclusion, by simply citing correctly?)

--A D Monroe III (talk) 17:55, 4 August 2017 (UTC)

Sigh. Well, after another week without the OP's concerns being addressed, I'm tagging this CN.

"Offhand" is a subjective evaluation, implying we know what was in Hitler's mind. As such, it needs very specific citing, which we lack here. Please, can we just cite it?

I'm for replacing this with something stating it was a blunder, which is objective. Regardless of whatever guesses about what Hitler may have been thinking or not thinking, immediately unleashing the US to attack Germany directly was a demonstrable mistake, with many clear sources covering this. Isn't noting that much more informative to the reader than suggesting what we suppose about how poor Hitler's thought processes may have been? Why would anyone care about that? People already suspect Hitler was impetuous -- nothing new here. The fact that the declaration of war was a mistake is probably the most notable fact about this subject, and our intro says absolutely nothing about it. --A D Monroe III (talk) 17:30, 12 August 2017 (UTC)

The concerns have been addressed, and thoroughly so. The consensus is that "offhand" is appropriate and very well sourced in the body of the article, so doesn't require a source in the lede. Please do not CN it again, instead follow the consensus on this talk page. Remember, "consensus" doesn't mean that everyone agrees, per WP:CONSENSUS. Tagging something that's been decided by editorial consensus because you disagree with it is WP:DISRUPTIVE, so please don't do it. Beyond My Ken (talk) 22:53, 12 August 2017 (UTC)

Good job

The article is expanded and for the most part improved from where I left it in Jan 2015. (Having difficulty figuring out who was mainly responsible amidst the edit wars...) AnonMoos (talk) 01:26, 24 July 2016 (UTC)

Discussion moved from User talk:Beyond My Ken

(I moved this discussion from my talk page. It concerns these edits: [1], [2], [3], and [4] Beyond My Ken (talk) 21:08, 21 November 2016 (UTC))

I really don't think it's useful to edit a description of "two parallel and disconnected wars" so that the wars would NOT be disconnected. Under the hypothetical scenario involved, most of the British empire east of India would likely be gone (with maybe a tacit cease-fire in Burma, like that between the Russians and Japanese in Manchuria). The Australians might be fighting the Japanese, but not as part of any unified British empire... AnonMoos (talk) 01:33, 21 November 2016 (UTC)

I'm sorry -- and I'm not being disingenuous here -- but I really don't have the slightest idea what the argument you're making is. The "two disconnected wars" would have come about if Hitler hadn't declared war on the U.S. after Pearl Harbor, and Roosevelt was forced to fight only the Japanese because the isolationist forces in the U.S. would have prevented him from declaring war against the Axis without a causus belli. The wars would be "disconnected" because the Western Allies would not have been combatants in both.

As for the state of the British Empire at the time of Pearl Harbor, the major setbacks (Singapore, for instance) in the east came afterwards, and even after those failures, the British Empire, especially Canada and Australia, contributed significantly to the Pacific War, despite the U.S. being (without a doubt) the primary combatant. I stand with the edit as it is unless you can provide some explanation why it needs to be changed. Beyond My Ken (talk) 02:18, 21 November 2016 (UTC)

Please note that I didn't add "British Empire" to that sentence, another editor did, I simply changed the order so that the primary Allied combatant was listed first. Beyond My Ken (talk) 02:34, 21 November 2016 (UTC)

Note also that "the British Empire" includes the UK. Beyond My Ken (talk) 02:35, 21 November 2016 (UTC)

Exactly -- if the UK was fighting in both spheres, then that makes total and complete nonsense of the phrase "two parallel and disconnected wars", thereby introducing a glaring inconsistency into the sentence. I really don't think it's too much to demand that a sentence be internally self-consistent...
Nothing had fallen on Dec. 7th (and few would have predicted the particular form that the Singapore fiasco took), but it was easy to foresee what the likely fate of British possessions in the Pacific (Hong Kong and small islands) would be if the UK was too tied up in Europe and North Africa to be able to devote significant resources to their defense, while under the scenario the U.S. was not a British ally and/or preoccupied with its own problems. As I said, under that scenario, Australia might have been fighting against the Japanese, but not really as part of the British empire... AnonMoos (talk) 07:38, 21 November 2016 (UTC)

"Disconnected" means "not with the same set of Western Allies." Churchill was aware that the European War was probably not winnable without the participation of the U.S. -- or would be won by the Soviet Union, which would freeze out the Brits. What he needed after Pearl Harbor was America to join the war against the Axis, and not fight only the Japanese, which would make two disconnected wars, the disconnect being the lack of participation of the US in Europe.

Your points about the state of the British Empire amount to original research, as they are counterfactual and cannot be shown to be true or false, whereas the statement as it stands is demonstrably true, and sourced. Beyond My Ken (talk) 19:14, 21 November 2016 (UTC)

{End of material moved from my talk page. Beyond My Ken (talk) 21:08, 21 November 2016 (UTC))

Whatever --
1) The whole thing is about a hypothetical scenario, so of course it can't be verified by looking at any of the maps in an atlas of WW2.
2) According to your personal interpretation of the words "parallel and disconnected" (which I find strange), it seems that in the actual course of events of 1942-1945 in WW2, you would consider that the fighting in the Pacific was "parallel and disconnected" from the fighting in Europe / North Africa. However, the British authorities feared something different from this -- that the fighting in the Pacific and in Europe/NA would be between different sets of protagonists, so that whatever the outcome of the Pacific war, it would not provide any meaningful benefit for the UK.
3) I don't think one has to delve deep into alternate history scenarios to recognize that if the U.S. didn't intervene in a major way in Europe / North Africa, then it would be very naive to think that the British Empire as a whole could mount any very significant military effort in the Pacific (except Australia in sheer self-defense). AnonMoos (talk) 14:21, 22 November 2016 (UTC)

There is nothing theoretical in any of this, as you continue to want to make it. The point not about what might happen, the point is about Churchill's concerns about what might happen, not about anyone else's ideas, yours or mine or the milkmaid's. That the perfectly understandable phrase "two parallel disconnected wars" (it should probably be "but disconnected") is strange to you is stranger to me, as I comprehend very well. Beyond My Ken (talk) 23:18, 22 November 2016 (UTC)

That's nice. If what Churchill feared was not two parallel and disconnected wars, then the phrase "two parallel disconnected wars" should not be used to describe it. I don't pretend to know what you understand by "two parallel disconnected wars", but it seems to be very different from what the average person (or someone consulting a dictionary) would understand the phrase to mean. Why oh why can't the glaring inconsistency in the sentence (introduced recently by intruding "British Empire" into the sentence as it had stood since October 2013) be resolved in some way?? Wikipedia articles are not supposed to be inconsistent, much less single sentences in articles! I really don't understand what was wrong with the sentence as it stood in the article for over two years until User:FandRB3 changed it 3 or 4 days ago, and your efforts to provide clarity on that point have not been too successful so far... AnonMoos (talk) 23:44, 22 November 2016 (UTC)

I'm sorry, I see no "glaring inconsistency", so I see nothing to be resolved. I will note that there are a number of editors who monitor this article closely (because of HarveyCarter), and none of them have yet to step forward to agree with you. Unless we hear from someone else, the "glaring inconsistency" appears to be in your eyes only. Beyond My Ken (talk) 23:53, 22 November 2016 (UTC)

Please don't tag something after there's been a discussion and there's been no consensus to support the tag. Beyond My Ken (talk) 00:32, 23 November 2016 (UTC)

Regarding a recent edit

In regard to a recent edit by User:The PIPE, I have several concerns:

• 1. I don't believe there is evidence that Hitler was aware of Rainbow Five at the time of his declaration of war against the US
• 2. Roosevelt did not mention Europe at all in his Pearl Harbor speech; see http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrpearlharbor.htm
• 3 I have ordered the book cited as a source. If it confirms the edit, I will restore it, but until then, with what I believe are two fundamental errors of fact, I have removed the entire edit as unreliable. Please do not restore it until myself, or some other editor, can confirm that the book is being accurately cited, and that the book itself is a reliable source.

Beyond My Ken (talk) 03:42, 12 December 2016 (UTC)

The author of the book cited is Andreas Hillgruber. Our article on him says:

In his book Zweierlei Untergang, he wrote that Germans should "identify" with the Wehrmacht fighting on the Eastern Front and asserts that there was no moral difference between Allied polices towards Germany in 1944-45 and the genocide waged against the Jews.[1] British historian Richard J. Evans wrote that Hillgruber was a great historian whose once-sterling reputation was in ruins as a result of the Historikerstreit.[2]

Further reading of the article, and the one on the 1980's "correction" among conservative German historians (the Historikerstreit) gives the very strong indication that Hillgruber's views are not those of mainstream historians. Beyond My Ken (talk) 03:50, 12 December 2016 (UTC)

Copy of comment by The PIPE on their talk page, and my response:

Dear Beyond My Ken:

The PIPE Here....in the Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor Wikipedia article, there IS this line, which I was not the author of, at least to my knowledge...

"Earlier in 1941, the Germans learned of the U.S. military's contingency planning to get troops in Continental Europe by 1943; this was Rainbow Five, made public by sources unsympathetic to Roosevelt's New Deal, and published by the Chicago Tribune."...

...so, as to your point on "point 1" above, you could conceivably be in error...and for additional evidence, a webpage at http://ariwatch.com/Links/RainbowFive.htm might actually reinforce my view on your "point 1's" possible error. It's only the "point 1" assertion that I'd have a likely difference of opinion with...not "point 2", as just about all of FDR's speeches are on the record.

Hope this "clears things up" a small bit...of course, I COULD use the last-linked page as a citable reference as evidence of my earlier text entry that your "point 1" rebuts.

Thank you and Yours Sincerely,

The PIPE (talk) 14:40, 12 December 2016 (UTC)

So, the source says the Germans learned about Rainbow Five on the 4th, Pearl Harbor was on the 7th, and Hitler's declaration was on the 11th. Now all one would have to do is show that Hitler was actually aware of it when he made his speech. The dates set up the possibility that he could have been aware of it, but not that he actually was and took it into account. Given Hitler's propensity for relying primarily on people he trusted, and ignoring any evidence that didn't come from them - especially if it conflicted with his predetermined beliefs - I think establishing a verified link would be absolutely necessary, not simply the possibility of one. Beyond My Ken (talk) 20:53, 12 December 2016 (UTC)

End of copied comment and response

I have now received Andreas Hillgruber's Germany and the Two World Wars and it does not support your inserted text. You added

Even as he had stated in the text of his unpublished 1928 work Zweites Buch, the Führer had decided war with the United States was unavoidable, and the Pearl Harbor attack, the publication of Rainbow Five, and Roosevelt's post-Pearl Harbor address, which focused on European affairs as well as the situation with Japan, probably contributed to the declaration. It would turn out that Hitler had disastrously underestimated American military production capacity, the United States' own ability to fight on two fronts, and the time his own Operation Barbarossa would require. [5]

then, after the mention of Hitler's unpublished second book, you gave pages 50 and 51 of the Hillgruber book as a source. [6] Well, pages 50 and 51 do indeed mention Hitler's "Second Book", but says

Hitler rated American strength as extremely high, albeit assuming that it would reach its apogee only about 1980.

It then goes on to discuss Hitler's belief in unifying Europe under Germany, and having a alliance between it and the British Empire as a counterweight to the powerful United States he foresaw existing in the future. There is no mention at all of this being a factor in his declaring war against the US after Pearl Harbor, no mention of Pearl Harbor at all, in fact, no mention of Rainbow Five, or Roosevelt's post-Pearl Harbor speech. There is nothing on 50-51 about Operation Barbarossa or the US ability to fight on two fronts, or its production capacity in 1941. Those are all OR and, I think, POV as well. Please do not add this information to the article again unless each and every statement of it is properly supported by a reliable source. Beyond My Ken (talk) 02:45, 20 December 2016 (UTC)

Erich Raeder

I mean this as no attack against anyone, so please don't take this the wrong way, but at present this article is rather unbalanced. The German declaration of war against the United States is presented as solely due to Hitler. Nowhere does this article mention that Admiral Erich Raeder had first suggested to Hitler in October 1939 in his judgement as a professional military man, the best thing to do would be to declare war against the United States. On February 1941, Raeder repeated that suggestion in a memo to Hitler. In a meeting with Hitler on 20 June 1941, Raeder again advised going to war with America was the best way to win the Battle of the Atlantic, complaining that the restrictions that Hitler had placed on U-boats firing on American ships were the only thing that was stopping the Kriegsmarine from winning. From July 1941, Raeder really got obsessive on this point, bombarding Hitler with all sorts of reasons why declaring war on America was a really good idea. In this, Raeder was backed up by the entire Kriegsmarine leadership who supported on this point. The American historians Williamson Murray and Alan Millet have written that Raeder's viewpoint about the wisdom of declaring war on America was "astonishing" because neither he nor anybody else in the Seekriegsleitung saw fit during the period July–December 1941 to commission studies on what would be the strategic consequences of war with the United States. In the fall of 1941, Raader supported by Admiral Karl Dönitz had what the British historian Ian Kershaw correctly called a "trigger-happy" attitude towards the United States, telling Hitler that in their opinion as professional military men, the best thing that could be done at present was to declare war on America. Their reasoning was that the U-boats could totally annihilate American shipping if only Hitler would bring in unrestricted submarine warfare against the United States. Murray and Millet have written that the Kriegsmarine were just taking the easiest tactical path without thinking at all about the long-term strategic consequences of a war with the United States. I think this shows that whatever their gifts may have been on the tactical, operational and strategic levels, the entire Kriegsmarine leadership was grossly incompetent on the grand strategic level. There is no doubt that Raeder and Karl Dönitz played a major role in getting Germany to declare on America, but this article says nothing at all about their role. I believe omission about the Kriegsmarine's role has been made in good faith, but it perpetuates a very false view of history here, and this the claim that the Wehrmacht was the perfect military machine that would had won World War II except for the insane and incompetent leadership of Hitler. At the central of the claims by one might call Germany's "Lost Cause" myth is that the Wehrmacht as professional military men knew that had to done to win the war and the "madman" Hitler foolishly disregarded their wise advice. Personally, I think this is a very self-serving myth that allowed the Wehrmacht commanders to take all the credit for Germany's victories and none of the blame for Germany's defeats. Furthermore, this myth suggests that it a case of Germany losing the war rather the Allies winning it. Again, I assume good faith on the part of the editors, who I believe have accidentally perpetuated this myth here by portraying the German declaration of war on the United States as solely a decision made by Hitler without consulting any of his advisors. I don't want to defend Hitler, who was a very evil and monstrous man, but it is really unfair to fault him for losing the war by not listening to professional military leaders and by calling declaring war on America an act of folly on his part. In 1941, Hitler did consult Raader and Dönitz who both told him as military professionals that declaring war on America was the best thing he could do. In other words, in declaring war on America, Hitler did exactly what he was is usually faulted for not doing; taking the advice of the professionals of the Wehrmacht. If the declaration on the United States was an act of folly, it was not all Hitler's folly. By ignoring Raeder and Dönitz completely, this article does perpetuate the self-serving myth of a war that the Wehrmacht would had done except for Hitler. I'll try to bring some material to correct the misleading impression that at present this article gives.--A.S. Brown (talk) 21:56, 12 July 2017 (UTC)

I've reverted you addition to the article until it can be discussed by other editors and a consensus is reached. I have read extensively concerning Hitler's decision, and I recall nothing that even mentioned Raeder, let only giving him the primary role you've given him here. I'm not sure if this is a fringe interpretation, or if the major historians of the Third Reich and biographers of Hitler have all missed this.

In any case, please re-state your case here, in short, succinct paragraphs (no more walls-of-text like above, please, they're next to impossible to read) accompanied by specific citations for every fact you are claiming, and we'll see what the consensus about it is. Above all, do not re-add this to the article without a consensus to do so. Thanks. Beyond My Ken (talk) 02:12, 13 July 2017 (UTC)

Kershaw's biography of Hitler mentions on page 401 that Raeder urged him to declare war when the US sent forces to Iceland in June 1941. He then spent the remainder of the year urging Hitler to declare war on the US. Shirer also mentions this on page 901 of "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich". (KurtKnutssen (talk) 00:46, 17 January 2018 (UTC)) This entry represents block evasion by banned User:HarveyCarter. Binksternet (talk) 16:56, 25 March 2020 (UTC)

I find no references to Raeder on page 401 of Nemesis, so either your edition is numbered differently from mine, or you're referring to the one-volume edition. In any case, I've looked at every mention of Raeder in the index of Nemesis, and, unless I missed something, I see nothing like what you describe. In fact "Iceland" isn't even an index enttry.

But, assuming that your citation is correct, let's look at what it says: Since Raeder tried from June 1941 on to get Hitler to declare war on the US, and Hitler ignored his entreaties for six months, I think it's safe to say that in December 1941 Raeder's opinion had little to do with Hitler's decision to declare war, since he already knew what Raeder would say. I'm aware of no evidence that he consulted with Raeder at the time of the decision to declare war. Indeed, what Kershaw writes is:

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, [Hitler] decided to make a declaration of war on the USA the high point of his long-planned speech [to the Reichstag on the war-year 1941]. As soon as he heard the news of the Japanese attack, he telephoned Goebbels, expressing his delight, and ordered the summoning of the Reichstag... (Nemesis, p.444)

It hardly appears as if such an almost instantaneous decision was based in any significant part on Raeder's opinion. Beyond My Ken (talk) 01:12, 17 January 2018 (UTC)

The Shirer citation says that Raeder conferred with Hitler on December 12th, the day after the declaration of war. It says nothing about Raeder having urged Hitler to declare war on the US in June. Beyond My Ken (talk) 01:15, 17 January 2018 (UTC)

claims about US activities made in the declaration require examination

The declaration of war is quoted in full, at the end of the article and is, in a way, allowed to speak for itself. This is problematic because it obviously is a highly biased and partisan document. It makes numerous claims about American activities, that should be put in a historical context. The article currently does not really do that, it refers a lot to Japan, Hitlers point of view, and strategic considerations, but makes no attempt to assess in-depth any of the claims made by Ribbentrop. -- Seelefant (talk) 19:34, 13 November 2019 (UTC)

Where is the discussion of the Battle of Moscow?

Hitler's decision to declare war on the US was completely catastrophic for him by 1945. But at the time of the declaration, his Wehrmacht had inflicted huge defeats on the Soviet army, and the Wehrmacht was at the gates of Moscow. The Battle of Moscow was in progress. At the time, Hitler thought he was going to win that battle, and with it the whole aim of destruction of the Soviet Union. This colossally inflated his ego, maybe more than the Fall of France. I expect that some reputable historian has made this connection; and when that is found, it should be added to the present article. Oaklandguy (talk) 18:51, 15 August 2020 (UTC)

Editors of this article might be interested in this

Talk:Leland B. Morris#Possibly apocryphal story - Beyond My Ken (talk) 22:17, 16 April 2021 (UTC)

King

What about Admiral King's remarks in December 1940? (Hubcab1927 (talk) 16:43, 29 January 2022 (UTC))

What about them? Beyond My Ken (talk) 18:24, 29 January 2022 (UTC)

Brand new editor, only edit, it seems possible that Hubcap1927 might be banned editor HarveyCarter, who often attempts to skew this page in a pro-Nazi direction. Beyond My Ken (talk) 18:28, 29 January 2022 (UTC)

Clarification is needed

"the Japanese tactic of using a surprise attack without making a declaration of war appealed to him" and so therefore he declared war? That does not make any sense at all. It should be phrased more carefully if it is to convey a clear meaning.Knklstk (talk) 06:21, 1 February 2022 (UTC)

As I explained in an edit summary, it's absolutely clear. Hitler liked the tactic of surprise attack. When the Japanese attacked the US without warning, it pleased him. This emotional response contributed to his very quick decision to declare was on the US. He had treaty obligation to the Japanese to do so. Beyond My Ken (talk) 06:24, 1 February 2022 (UTC)

As I have explained here, it is not clear. It needs to be rephrased. Instead of wasting time arguing, you should just rephrase it. A minor adjustment should be all that is required here.Knklstk (talk) 06:28, 1 February 2022 (UTC)

Goering's Actual View of War With USA - Not Same as Hitler's

Under the section 'Post-declaration opinions' there is a segment which reads:

>Hitler, however, was dismissive of the military power of the United States, a view that was shared by Hermann Göring.

Few who have analyzed Goering's life, or those who knew him and survived the war, would agree with this. Gilberto Villahermosa's research into Goering's prison interviews implies that he was acutely aware of American industrial potential:

https://www.historynet.com/lost-prison-interview-with-hermann-goring-the-reichsmarschalls-revelations/

Even if we put aside Goering's statements made in prison as unreliable, post-war interviews by historians such as Willi Frischauer with Goering's close aides (such as Erich von Gritzbach) & statements by his ADC, Bernd von Brauchitsch, show that he did not wish to start a war with Russia in 1941 or declare war on the USA in Dec. 1941. After war was declared on the USA he made several bombastic statements about Americans not being able to make proper airplanes but those were 'fighting speeches' made to his troops. All of his statements made after his capture & made during the war to his friends & colleagues indicate that he viewed Hitler's declaration of war on the USA as a strategic error.

Additionally, his close friend Ernst Udet had toured across the USA and performed at air shows in Chicago. There's no logical reason to believe that Goering or the Luftwaffe high command would expect war with the USA to be desirable.

Based off of my research, the only prominent Germans other than Hitler who thought that declaring war on the USA was a good idea were some of the naval officers (whose ships had been attacked by American warships - so this is somewhat understandable & Goebbels (who knew nothing about military affairs and was obviously somewhat of a fantasist). 66.234.113.158 (talk) 22:05, 19 May 2023 (UTC)

I want to add that when I mention naval officers I am not referring to Erich Raeder. The section above which states that Raeder urged Hitler to declare war on the USA has no grounding (as far as I know).

I have heard over the years that some of the mid level Kriegsmarine officers wanted unrestricted submarine warfare although this is one of those 'heard about it but can't source it at the moment' things. Additionally, it's doubtful that Hitler took these men's desires into account as he seems to have largely charted his own course in terms of foreign policy. 66.234.113.158 (talk) 22:18, 19 May 2023 (UTC)