User talk:Marskell/Archive 3

File:GibbonInaTree.jpg

Look at me

Slim, Tim and happy Gibbon:

Dear fellow primate

I'm really perplexed by your anger over edits to primate and ape. I avoided duplication one-page-to-the-other but absolutely no info was removed. In fact, taken together, the concept has been expanded upon, particularly given that the ape page previously made no mention of the topic. I also tried to make clear that Ape is not synonomous with Primate. It's an important point which people often miss. To address a few of things:

• "It strikes me that you're personally dismissive of the idea and therefore feel it has no place here..." Not at all! It's an absolutely fascinating topic which deserves a mention. Two things. First, again, apes are not primates in the same way dogs are not wolves and my main concern was which page does this belong on. Secondly, great pains have been taken (particularly by Uther, who deserves a lot of credit for his fastidiousness on animal articles) to cover taxonomy and biology comprehensively first and then get into other considerations. He actually moved legal considerations back down, not myself.
• "If you've inserted it wholesale into Ape, you'd better adjust the figures in it to cover only apes." I didn't insert it wholesale and mentioned no figures. I moved the expanded paragraph about what the "Great Ape Project" is to ape because it makes sense there and left the stats about research on primates on primate (and for what it's worth I never added the "there is no discomfort" line which is indeed a joke as you said).
• "And yes, people are very serious about extending the notion of personhood, a legal concept, to lemurs." I have read around this topic and I have honestly not seen any reference to lemurs and monkeys being included (as I recall I have encountered comments about dolphins in this regard!). I apologize if it came off as glib to say "Source?" as a single sentence, but I'd honestly be curious for the source. I did search around and can't find one.
• "You're now engaged in WP:POINT, deliberately inserting false material elsewhere." I'm sorry but that's just not true. I really haven't inserted false material anywhere.

As an ancillary point, do we have a "grandfather" article along the lines of Legal status of animals which we could point to in discussions of this sort? Can't find one in the animal cat. It's certainly an interesting topic and I'd help if you want to make an article. Marskell 00:44, 6 October 2005 (UTC)

Apologies from this (barely human) primate

I'm sorry, Tim. I've not had a good wiki-day (lots of annoying WP-related e-mails) and I was short-tempered with you for that reason. I also got annoyed by the "no discomfort" sentence, which I know wasn't you, and I was unfairly reading your posts as coming from the same place, which I see now they weren't. I do apologize. Regarding lemurs, I can't give you a source offhand, but there are many animal-rights groups focusing on trying to achieve rights for all the primates, and lots of people doing PhDs on the legal implications of extending personhood beyond human beings.

I like the idea of a "Legal status of animals" page. We already have Animal rights, but that doesn't quite cover details of the current legal status. I'd be happy to work with you on a page like that, though I don't have time right now, but maybe in a few days. Or feel free to start one, and I can catch up with you later. If you want to look through our animal rights articles, they're in Category:Animal liberation movement. Some of them are okay, some aren't. I've been going through them in the last few weeks trying to tidy them a little.

I'm not quite sure I understood your point about apes not being primates though. They are, as are we. Or am I wrong about that?

Once again, I do apologize, especially for my WP:POINT remark, which I take back, of course. And thank you for sending such a nice note despite my poor behavior. SlimVirgin ^(talk) 01:14, 6 October 2005 (UTC)

Long-winded follow-up point

Apes are primates but the term ape is not synonomous with primate (like again, dog is not synonomous with canine). That is, apes are one type of primate (and actually a quite limited one, if you exclude the 6 billion us). If there is a truly mis-apprehended word in this regard, it is "monkey". We are not monkeys. Apes are not monkeys. But of course, an off-the-top-head discussion of evolution inevitably includes "hey, we're monkeys!" Anyhow, there is some POV on my part and I'll admit that the previous edit summary "placing legal status at bottom and removing great ape project ref. should lemurs be considered persons under law? a) no b) i don't care. save it for the ape page" was hasty and sarcastic. But again, it goes back to apes versus primates. To go over quickly what I view as a starting point for discussion.

1. Apes (or maybe just chimps--disputed) appear to have self-recognition, passing the "mirror test."
2. Apes may have theory of mind (again disputed); that is they appear cognizant of what another is thinking and will act on that knowledge. Knowing "you" basically being the step after knowing "I".

To my mind, if you pass both tests you are a person (POV obviously, but not out of nowhwere). Trees don't pass either. Dogs don't pass either (place a mirror in front of them and they get ready to fight the "intruder"). And the vast majority of primates (as far as I know and I'm not claiming expert knowledge) may pass the first but not the second test. Only chimps come close. The Great Ape Project says this without saying it IMHO. Their declaration is clear but their reasoning is not and they don't clarify the "before this why not before that point" (ie, you include chimps so then you include gorillas and orangs—why not all primates, why not all mammals, why not insects, and on and on until hydrogen ought to have personhood...). My getting uptight about the edits has a lot to do with this reasoning; again it's POV but it's not non-thought-out or over-general. I really do think the paragraph I placed on ape makes more sense there than on primate because the project has, to this point, only sought to demand rights for apes. Anyway, I'll chew over the suggested addition of Legal status of animals. It shouldn't be added in the "just a stub everybody add an incidental point" fashion because it could wind-up badly. Well-done it could be a good addition. Finally, after much long-windedness, thanks for your gracious comments on my talk page! Marskell 02:17, 6 October 2005 (UTC)

SlimVirgin2

Okay, I'm finally getting round to responding. First, the apes versus primates point. I put the material on Primate because we're primates too, and I wanted to have a section showing the huge discrepancy in treatment between human and non-human primates. If it were up to me, that section would be a lot longer and more detailed, so I felt I was being quite restrained in what I wrote. ;-) Regarding which types of primates are used in research, it's not just monkeys or great apes, but all the non-human primates, so again, the primate page seemed appropriate.

Regarding your points about theory of mind. First, I feel this is a dodgy concept in general, and while interesting, it's important not to make too much of it. People with severe autism don't have a theory of mind, according to leading autism researchers. But so what? All that means is that they don't have the same theory of mind as the researchers. I may not have the same theory of mind as you. And in fact, we may not even have a vocabulary sufficient to understand what the differences are between us, or the similarities.

All I know is this: if I burn you, I believe you will feel severe pain, so I won't burn you. If I do it, and you scream, I would regard myself as "knowing" that you feel pain, even though in fact I would know no such thing, because only you can know whether you're in pain (and some philosophers would argue even with that). But my sense of you as being in some important way quite like me would make your scream enough information to make me back off.

I won't cause you pain because (in part) I don't want you to do it to me. This is the basis of empathy and conscience. It all works without us needing to develop theories about who does or doesn't have a theory of mind, or who does or doesn't pass the mirror test. (And the mirror test tests what we regard as self-knowledge and knowledge of others. But who are we to define this for the entire world? I also have to add here that many philosophers and psychologists would dispute that knowing "you" comes after knowing "I", as you wrote. They would argue that it's the other way round: that we extrapolate from recognition of "other" (not-me) to recognition of "self".)

So the argument about animal rights isn't based on who has a theory of mind or who passes the mirror test. It's based largely on two ideas: first, that each human and non-human animal is what Tom Regan has called the "subject of a life". For each of us, our life is all that we have and all that we are (so far as we know), and we therefore have an inherent interest in protecting it, and a right to express that interest. And secondly, it's based on Jeremy Bentham's argument: "The question is not, Can they reason?, nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being?" (Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1781)

For me, the argument is very simple: animals in laboratories are in some important way quite like me. That's why they're being used in the first place. If we concentrate on the similarities between us, rather than on what divides us (theories of mind, mirror tests, language), it seems to me entirely reasonable to award them legal "personhood," because all that means is that we recognize them as beings, as subjects-of-a-life, and not things — not our property to inflict pain on because of some perceived long-term benefit to us, and sometimes for no reason at all. SlimVirgin ^(talk) 23:30, 7 October 2005 (UTC)

More long-windedness

Thanks for your post; all of your points are well-taken.

Before proceeding I thought I’d make a general clarification about persons in law versus persons as such. An infant is and should be a person in law though I wouldn’t actually consider them a person as such—just a loveable bundle of neurons. I’d make a similar argument for the severely disabled. Sorry if this is a bad example considering other issues, but I’d suggest Terri Schiavo essentially ceased to be a person as such when she entered a PVS (though again, she was and should have been a person in law). I don’t mean that to be callous—I mean it to be intellectually consistent.

In general, it is possible to hold pain and personhood distinct. I can acknowledge an animal feels pain without granting that they’re a person as such. If you want to take pain as your starting point for personhood, OK—"the answer could be pain," as a teacher once said to me—though I won’t agree.

If not, then what is the starting point? What is a person as such? And how can the GA project present a declaration on personhood in law without taking a stab at defining the term more generally? I’m sure individuals take a stab in the book but their declaration doesn’t. Similarly, in the statement of goals from GRASP we find: "Nonhuman apes meet the generally accepted criteria for personhood." And then they fail to define those criteria [1]. Note, that I actually agree with all of the points in the declaration from GAP but my reasoning is this: apes are large-brained, intelligent mammals with a robust sentience and a relatively robust emotional sense; I don’t see we have the right to hold them and we sure as hell don’t have the right to torture them. But note I’m not asserting that they’re persons; if accepting the points as law makes apes de facto persons legally, fair enough, but in the ontological sense I'm not obliged to consider them such. And the "if this, why not that" point still holds. What about Lesser Apes, Gibbons? (Did you see my happy Gibbon picture on the ape page by the way :)?

"Theory of mind…is a dodgy concept in general." Far from it—it’s a valid point of scientific distinction and it’s discussed in philosophy. Robin Dunbar is one needs-to-be-destubified scientist who has worked on the issue recently. I haven’t pushed it on any page but I think it as valid a criterion as any. I will definitely admit the Theory of mind page needs work (as does intentionality). I’ve never, incidentally, bought the idea that an average autistic doesn’t have theory of mind (particularly after my sponsor’s autistic son took my by the hand and said "I love you Mr. Tim!" :)

"I may not have the same theory of mind as you." Yes, in the "I can’t disprove a solipsist" sense but not true in more practical ways. Here is a statement: "Marskell wants Slim to know that Tom’s brother Joe is aware that user:Mary has been lying about Tom’s edits on the Main Page." I think we can both follow that sentence and in more or less the same way; if we didn't follow it in more or less the same way we wouldn't be able to communicate. It’s five orders of intentionality, about as much as an adult human being can intake without getting confused. This IS something that’s tested and I see nothing dodgy about saying the fact that human beings can apprehend such information and no other animal can is one reason we differ in kind from other animals. OK to underscore similarities but we can’t ignore the differences.

Well now, this has become quite lengthy. Take care and of course respond as you please. Marskell 10:26, 8 October 2005 (UTC)

SlimVirgin3

Before proceeding I thought I’d make a general clarification about persons in law versus persons as such. An infant is and should be a person in law though I wouldn’t actually consider them a person as such—just a loveable bundle of neurons. I’d make a similar argument for the severely disabled.

But they're persons in law, and would be regarded as persons by some or most philosophers. SlimVirgin ^(talk) 22:38, 9 October 2005 (UTC)

What is a person as such?

One approach to the disabled-person problem, called the animal-attribute theory, proposed by David Wiggins, is that a person is any human or non-human animal that by its kind has the biological capacity to enjoy a certain list of psychological attributes. The "by its kind" means that someone of that kind who is either too young or too sick to enjoy the list of psychological attributes retains his or her personhood. As to the list of attributes, they usually include some or all of: language (of some kind), reason, moral agency, the ability to stand in relation to another (object relations), and that the person's behavior can be explained with reference to beliefs and desires.

It's anyone's guess how many of these attributes apes possess, but why would we doubt that they possess many of them to a significant degree? Occam's razor, for one thing, demands that we adopt the simplest explanation for their apparent close similarity to us — namely that they are closely similar to us. SlimVirgin ^(talk) 22:38, 9 October 2005 (UTC)

(Did you see my happy Gibbon picture on the ape page by the way :)?

Yes, it's lovely, thank you. ;-D SlimVirgin ^(talk) 22:38, 9 October 2005 (UTC)

"Theory of mind…is a dodgy concept in general." Far from it—it’s a valid point of scientific distinction and it’s discussed in philosophy.

It's a whole branch of philosophy. But I meant it's a dodgy way of judging the mental world of animals. SlimVirgin ^(talk) 22:38, 9 October 2005 (UTC)

Robin Dunbar is one needs-to-be-destubified scientist who has worked on the issue recently. I haven’t pushed it on any page but I think it as valid a criterion as any.

So what do you mean by it exactly? SlimVirgin ^(talk) 22:38, 9 October 2005 (UTC)

I’ve never, incidentally, bought the idea that an average autistic doesn’t have theory of mind (particularly after my sponsor’s autistic son took my by the hand and said "I love you Mr. Tim!" :)

;-)

What's meant by saying that severely autistic people don't have a theory of mind is that they can't see the world from the point of view of another person. See Simon Baron-Cohen (a cousin of Ali G). SlimVirgin ^(talk) 22:38, 9 October 2005 (UTC)

Here is a statement: "Marskell wants Slim to know that Tom’s brother Joe is aware that user:Mary has been lying about Tom’s edits on the Main Page." I think we can both follow that sentence and in more or less the same way; if we didn't follow it in more or less the same way we wouldn't be able to communicate. It’s five orders of intentionality, about as much as an adult human being can intake without getting confused. This IS something that’s tested and I see nothing dodgy about saying the fact that human beings can apprehend such information and no other animal can is one reason we differ in kind from other animals. OK to underscore similarities but we can’t ignore the differences.

But isn't that example just a generative-grammar thing? We shouldn't judge animals in terms of an ability for human languages, just as we shouldn't judge ourselves in terms of our inability to make meaningful whale noises. As to the differences, they have to be morally significant if you want to withhold rights and protections on the basis of those differences. So what are the morally significant differences, and why are they morally significant? What differences could be sufficiently morally significant as to allow us to say of any animal: you must live in a laboratory in great discomfort, loneliness, and pain for the entirety of your life in order (maybe) to benefit us medically, perhaps only so that we can buy Chanel No. 5, and possibly for no reason whatsoever?

Don't feel compelled to answer this, by the way. But perhaps you could watch this. SlimVirgin ^(talk) 22:38, 9 October 2005 (UTC)

Marskell 4

OK, I’m going to cherry-pick a couple of points and create an archive for it all.

First, your last point: “what differences could be sufficiently morally significant as to allow us to say of any animal: you must live in a laboratory in great discomfort, loneliness, and pain for the entirety of your life in order (maybe) to benefit us medically, perhaps only so that we can buy Chanel No. 5, and possibly for no reason whatsoever?” I stated that I actually agree, for instance, with the points in the GAP declaration. I just do not believe I have to consider an animal a person to accept they shouldn’t be tortured or kept in awful conditions.

“Occam's razor, for one thing, demands that we adopt the simplest explanation for their apparent close similarity to us — namely that they are closely similar to us.” Hmm, well, this is a tautology and it can also be inverted: “Occam's razor, for one thing, demands that we adopt the simplest explanation for their apparent differences to us — namely that they are different from us.”

“It's a whole branch of philosophy. But I meant it's a dodgy way of judging the mental world of animals.” But it’s almost always brought up in reference to the mental world of animals (or autistics) and that’s why I brought it up here. If you’re not a fan of it, OK. (Philosophy of mind, rather than theory of mind, is a branch of philosophy, incidentally).

Indeed it is assumed autistics “can't see the world from the point of view of another person” but in the simple words of a colleague who works with them “no two autistics are the same.” Obviously this is true of many cognitive disorders but I think especially so with autism which is what I meant by “I have never bought” that we can make a blanket statement that they don’t have TOM.

“But isn't that example just a generative-grammar thing?” I don’t think so: if I am capable of five-orders of intentionality I can incorporate five individual viewpoints and/or multiple viewpoints from two or three individuals at once. I believe animals can’t do this not merely can’t express it generatively. We don’t waste metabolic resources on our 1300g brains for no reason :).