User talk:Dominic Mayers/sandbox/problem of induction

The introductory sentence in the lead

I consider the following sentence:

The problem of induction is the philosophical question of whether inductive reasoning leads to knowledge understood in the classic philosophical sense, highlighting the apparent lack of justification for:

The problem I see with this sentence is that it refers to inductive reasoning which can refer to inductive justifications or to what is now seen as inductive methods in social science and in artificial intelligence or even simply to any relationship between a law and observations that corroborate it. These concepts are totally different and operate at completely different levels. The problem of induction is about missing justifications. For example, this is clearly explained in SEP. The first paragraph in SEP describes the well known relationship between laws and observations: if a kind of bread has nourished thus far, we are not surprised to see the (false) law that it will keep be nourishing. However, when it comes to the problem of induction, the expressions used in SEP are "on what grounds" and "arguments that do not serve". So, clearly, the problem is the missing justifications. Therefore, I suggest that we do not refer to the nowadays vague term "inductive reasoning" and focus on missing justifications. I propose

The problem of induction is the philosophical question of what are the justifications, if any, for any growth of knowledge understood in the classic philosophical sense that goes beyond a mere collection of observations, highlighting the apparent lack of justification in particular for:

Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:26, 9 December 2020 (UTC)

The sentences introducing the inductivist view and Popper's view

First, I consider the following sentence in the article:

The problem calls into question the traditional inductivist account of all empirical claims made in everyday life or through the scientific method, and, for that reason, C. D. Broad once said that "induction is the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy".

This sentence plays a useful purpose, because indeed there is notable belief, justified or not, that knowledge grows through some kind of reasoning, thus inductive reasoning, because deductive reasoning is not ampliative. The first problem is that I don't feel it's written in a neutral manner. It's not attributed in a clear way. It's not attributed to Broad (except the quote of course), because on the contrary Broad is presented as an innocent witness of the fact. It is not clearly attributed to the traditional inductivist view, because the term "account" again suggests that it is an observed fact. The second problem is that it refers to all empirical claims, but there is no problem with claims of simple observations. It's a nice sentence, but it needs some work. To address the first problem I suggest the following

The traditional inductivist view is that all empirical claims, either made in everyday life or through the scientific method, can be justified through some form of reasoning. The problem is that many philosophers tried to find such a justification but their proposals were not accepted by others. Identifying the inductivist view as the scientific view, C. D. Broad once said that "induction is the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy".

The middle sentence is not attributed, but that's ok, because it is well known. To address the second problem, "empirical claims" must be replaced by something else. I propose "claimed empirical laws". So, it becomes

The traditional inductivist view is that all claimed empirical laws, either in everyday life or through the scientific method, can be justified through some form of reasoning. The problem is that many philosophers tried to find such a justification but their proposals were not accepted by others. Identifying the inductivist view as the scientific view, C. D. Broad once said that "induction is the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy".

Second, let see how this fits with the next sentence

In contrast, Karl Popper's critical rationalism claimed that induction is never used in science and proposed instead that science is based on the procedure of conjecturing hypotheses, deductively calculating consequences, and then empirically attempting to falsify them.

It could be simply:

In contrast, Karl Popper's critical rationalism claimed that inductive justifications are never used in science and proposed instead that science is based on the procedure of conjecturing hypotheses, deductively calculating consequences, and then empirically attempting to falsify them.

I addressed a problem of terminology here by replacing "induction" with "inductive justifications". Of course, Popper never claimed that the inductive relationships usually seen between laws and observations do not exist. If asked why do you accept that the sun raises on the east every day, he would have replied that he sees it every day, just like anyone else. Note that this is no justification at all for the inference of the law. If one is asked how can you infer B from A and one replies because I have A, one has provided no justification at all for the inference. In other words, he believed in the value of corroborations, just like every one else. The only thing he rejected is the existence of a rational justification for the laws.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 17:25, 9 December 2020 (UTC)

The historical considerations

I consider the sentence:

The most famous formulation of the problem was proposed by David Hume in the mid-18th century, although versions of the problem date back to the Pyrrhonist school of Hellenistic philosophy and the Cārvāka school of ancient Indian philosophy.

There might be an anachronism here when we refer to Indian philosophy and perhaps also the Hellenistic philosophy as presenting the problem of induction. No evidence is given that it was seen as a problem at the time. Especially in the case of the ancient Indian philosophy, it is very likely that they simply knew that inductive justifications were not valid and that is it, no problem. Unless sources are provided that show that these ancient philosophies supported the inductive view, at the least during a period of time, I propose that we simply mention that they rejected inductive justifications without suggesting that it was seen as a problem. This means that to our knowledge the most ancient formulation of the problem was given by Hume. This is, for example, the position taken in SEP. I suggest the following

The original source of what is known as the problem today was proposed by David Hume in the mid-18th century, although inductive justifications were already argued against by the Pyrrhonist school of Hellenistic philosophy and the Cārvāka school of ancient Indian philosophy in a way that shed light on the problem of induction.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:01, 9 December 2020 (UTC)