User:Zee money/The debate on the situation in the Iberian Peninsula in the 17th century
Introduction edit
Many countries have gone through periods of decline or turmoil, and the Iberian peninsula of the 17th century was no different. What made this period unique was the unique political nature of Spain, a loose federation of semi-autonomous kingdoms that had been independent and separate from each other until nominally brought together by Ferdinand and Isabella. Spain was also culturally distinct from much of the rest of Europe, where Catalan, Basque and other Catholic cultures were present alongside the legacy of nearly eight centuries of Islamic rule. Even today, historians have not agreed if the decline of Hapsburg Spain in the 1600s was truly a crisis.
Part One: Castilian views on the decentralized nature of “Spain” edit
Castile, which name means “castle”, started as a march of the Kingdom of Asturias around the Spanish town of Burgos in 850, and was then elevated to the status of a kingdom in 1035. In 1085, Castile captured the Islamic cultural center of Toledo, making that city the largest to come under Christian rule. In 1230, Castile annexed the Kingdom of León and the region of Galicia, bringing Oviedo and Compostella under its control. With its conquest of the Moorish Kingdom of Granada in 1492, Castile had become three times the size of Aragon, with a population of 4.3 million to Aragon’s 1 million. Castile expelled at least 50,000 Jews who did not convert. Aragon also expelled its unconverted Jews and in 1502, Muslims who remained but did not convert. Despite its larger population and size, which grew after it acquired overseas colonies in the Americas (they belonged only to Castile, not to all of “Spain”); Castile was just as determined as Aragon to assert its autonomy. For example, after the death of Isabella, the Castilian nobility supported her son-in-law, Philip I, against her husband, Ferdinand of Aragon. Ferdinand returned to Castile only after the death of Philip I. When Charles I/V became king, the Castilians opposed the idea of having him as King of Castile because of his Flemish birth and his use of Flemish advisors. Under Philip II, the millones, a tax on food, ruined any attempts by Castilian cities to industrialize. As much of the financial burden for governing the “Spanish” Empire fell on Castile, Castilians had much to gain by forcing the responsibility onto the Valencians and Catalonians. However, as they controlled most of “Spain” and its colonies in the Americas, Castilians would still be responsible for the most of financial cost of maintaining the “Spanish” Empire.
Part Two: The possibility of a strong monarch for “Spain” in the 17th century edit
If the 16th century had strong monarchs like Ferdinand of Aragon, Charles I/V and Philip II, why couldn’t the 17th century have strong monarchs as well? For one, the “Spanish” monarchs of the 17th century were born out of marriages that were within the House of Hapsburg. Over time, inbreeding results in numerous mental and physical deformities, which the Hapsburgs (and everybody else in the 17th century) were not aware of (no one studied genetics back then). Regardless of whether “Spain” had a strong or a weak monarch, it had to deal with two major foreign threats. One of France, ruled by the anti-Spanish, formerly Protestant House of Bourbon. As Philip II assisted the Catholic House of Guise against them in the French Wars of Religion, the Bourbons would benefit with replacing the Hapsburg monarchs with one of their own on the Spanish throne. Another was England, targeted by Philip II in the Spanish Armada. With Scotland and England united under one monarch in 1603, this eliminated the possibility of the “Spanish” making an alliance with Scotland against England, which the French had been able to do during the reigns of Ferdinand of Aragon and Charles I/V. The people of England were strongly opposed to “Spain” for its attempt to bring England back into the Catholic fold and would be interested in any alliance that would weaken “Spain”.
Part Three: Would the various regions of “Spain” pledge loyalty to a ruler who was not a monarch? edit
The answer to this would be no. The Europeans who had a republican form of government (that is, no monarch on the throne) were the Dutch and England, who were strongly opposed to the “Spanish” dominance of Europe. Both made alliances with the French against “Spain” at some point during the 17th century: The Dutch during the Thirty Years' War and England during the rule of Oliver Cromwell (even though the French sided with Cromwell’s opponent in the English Civil War, Charles I). Even though autonomy was important to the various regions of “Spain”, the Inquisition was the one institution that all of them shared, and every region was united with the Catholic Church to stamp out heresy. Furthermore, the Dutch and the French, the traditional enemies of “Spain”, made alliances the Ottoman Turks. Thus, the idea of a republic was seen as “un-Spanish”, heretical and anti-Catholic, because of its association with Protestants.
Part Four: Did political issues exacerbate an already tense socio-economic crisis and reignite existing tensions between Castile and the other regions that had been dormant during the reigns of Charles I/V and Philip II? edit
The marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella brought Castile and Aragon into a personal union, not a political one. Despite having a common monarch, the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon remained distinct territories, each keeping its own traditional institutions, parliaments and laws. The expulsion of Jews and Mudejars (Muslims who remained in Spain after the conquest of Granada but did not convert to Catholicism) depleted the population of groups who could have made a significant contribution to the economy, despite their questionable loyalty to the Spanish crown. Linguistic differences between the two kingdoms lead to some tensions, with a mostly Catalan-speaking Kingdom of Aragon (the Aragonese language was only spoken in Aragon itself, not in Valencia or Catalonia) and a Castilian-speaking Kingdom of Castile. There was also issues between the crown and the nobility that dated back to the time of the Reconquista, when the Crown in both kingdoms was keen on settling new kingdoms instead of merely expanding the existing kingdoms, which was a part of a power struggle that pitted the interests of the Crown against those of the existing nobility. This process was also in under way in most of the European states that successfully effected the transition to the Early Modern state. Thus, the new territories gained from the Moors (namely Valencia and Majorca) were usually given fueros as an instrument of self-government in order to limit the power of nobility in these new acquisitions and, at the same time, increase their allegiance to the monarchy itself. Both the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile gave impetus to the Reconquista by granting self-government either to cities or territories, instead of placing the new territories under the rule of nobility.
Conclusion edit
One of the contradictions of the mindset in the Iberian Peninsula of the 1600s was attributed to two quotes by the Count-Duke of Olivares, who said both "God is Spanish and fights for our nation (i.e. Spain) these days" and "God wants us to make peace; for He is depriving us... of all the means of war". These two contradictory statements, especially by someone as high-ranking as Olivares, shows that the 17th century Spain was more experiencing a crisis of faith at a time when the Age of Reason and the beginning of the Enlightenment occurred in the rest of Europe. The end date for the crisis can be debated as well, since the Treaties of Utretcht and Rastatt, which ended the war of the Spanish Succession, achieved little more than what could have accomplished peacefully shortly after the death of Charles II.
Bibliography edit
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