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Urbain de Saint-Gelais bishop of Comminges

Urbain de Saint-Gelais was born in 1540, the illegitimate son of Louis de Saint-Gelais, the seigneur de Lanssac and Louise de La Béraudière. His father had the affair while on military campaign against the Holy Roman Emperor.

His father, Louis, enjoyed great royal favour, in particular with the queen mother Catherine. He was thus showered with royal honours. By the time of his death, Louis had amassed a fortune of around 64,000,000 livres. His favour was a benefit to his children, who found themselves close to power. Urbain's half brother, Guy de Saint-Gelais would enjoy many governorships and an important diplomatic mission.

Urbain had ties with the Vivonne family of whom the baron de Saint-Gouard would serve as the French ambassador to España from 1572 to 1582.

Urbain enjoyed an excellent command of both the Italian and Castilian languages.

During the 1560s, the bishop of Comminges was Pierre d'Albret. He resisted the prospect of conversion to Protestantism that the queen of Navarre desired for him and her supporters chased him from the diocese. After this, the queen attempted to install the illegitimate son of her husband, Charles de Bourbon in the diocese. By this means, Charles de Bourbon received the revenues of the diocese. He would not however be invested in it, and through the intervention of his father Louis de Saint-Gelais, Urbain became the bishop of Comminges in 1570. In compensation for his removal from the diocese, it was agreed that Charles de Bourbon would be paid 15,000 livres.

He served as a conseiller in the parlement of Toulouse.

The bishop of Comminges played host at his episcopal residence at Alan (Saint-Bertrand having been abandoned in favour of residences at Alan, L'Isle and Saint-Frajou at the termination of the medieval period as far as the bishops residence was concerned) to Spanish members of his diocese from the Val d'Aran in 1574. The bishop worked to court the Spanish members of his flock by intervening with Henri III to see that the Lies et passeries (local agreements made in the mountain border regions of France and España to guarantee common pastures, unified policing, the combatting of threats to the peace).

The historian Brunet believes it likely that when Jean de Coret engaged his marauding band in their first attack (against the church of Éoux in May 1575), that the bishop was in the process of raising a militia from the surrounds of Alan.

One of the most committed ligueurs among the senior clergy, the bishop of Comminges had affiliated with the ligue since 1576. Comminges' half brother, Lanssac, met with the duc de Guise and cardinal de Guise prior to the declaration of the ligue in Bourg. However, unlike his brother, any involvement Comminges had, was done discreetly.

In 1579, the bishop of Comminges undertook an extraordinary diplomatic mission to Portugal and he travelled to Lisboa to this end. Alongside him for the conduct of this mission was the royal favourite the marquis de Beauvais-Nangis. His was not the only extraordinary diplomatic posting to Portugal in 1579, and the sécretaire (secretary) to the Spanish ambassador the baron de Saint-Gouard, the sieur de Longlée also undertook a mission in this year. The purpose of the bishop's mission was to defend Catherine's rights as concerned the prospect of succession to the Portuguese throne. According to the historian Le Roux the purpose of his mission was to advocate for the rights of the prior do Crato (prior of Crato), an illegitimate grandson of the Portuguese king Manuel and thus nephew of the current childless king. Lhoumeau argues that his mission was rather to represent the claims of Catherine to succeed to the Portuguese throne descending through king Afonso III who died in 1279. Either way the bishop of Comminges' mission was not a success. Brunet speculates that the bishop of Comminges' half brother, the seigneur de Lanssac might have had a role to play in the failure of his mission.

Going forward from this time, Comminges would maintain contacts in España.

When news arrived at the French court of the death of the childless king of Portugal on 15 January 1580, the queen mother Catherine instituted a solemn funerary observance to take place at the Notre Dame. There were several pretenders seeking to succeed the old king to the throne, and prior to his death he had not chosen any one of them. The regency council declared the competing claims of those seeking the throne would be examined. One of the claimants was Felipe II, king of España. He asserted his rights on both his kinship and feudal law - Portugal having been a county that was dependant on the kingdom of Castile. To be assured of his triumph he began assembling an army on the border with Portugal. Catherine selected the bishop of Comminges to be her avocat (lawyer) for the tribunal of the claims. Felipe's army bested that of the prior do Crato in August, and the pretender would seek refuge in France in 1581.

In June 1580, a request arrived with Henri from the premier président of the Parlement of Toulouse. In this, the président requested of the king that he maintain Comminges in his see. To lose the bishop from Comminges would be to jeopardise the safety of the province.

From 10 to 12 October 1584, the queen of Navarre, Marguerite travelled to Alan to stay with the bishop of Comminges. The historian Brunet suspects the two discussed the plan for the forthcoming ligueur insurrection.

On 17 January 1585 a secret treaty was signed at Joinville between the duc de Guise, duc de Mayenne, duc d'Aumale, duc d'Elbeuf and seigneur de Maineville for the ligueur nobility, and Spanish ambassador to France and commander of the order of Malta de Moreo for the king of España. Both the bishop of Comminges and his half brother the seigneur de Lanssac were important in the establishing of this alliance.

The bishop of Comminges and his half brother had facilitated the passage of Moreo through the Val d'Aran and the comté de Comminges. They then received him in the family haunt of Bourg-sur-Gironde before he went on his way to Joinville to participate in the signing of the treaty. While he was in Bourg-sur-Gironde the men planned the coming ligueur uprising in the south-west.

By the terms of the agreement Comminges and Lanssac had helped facilitate, the Spanish king recognised the ligueur candidate to succeed Henri, the cardinal de Bourbon as the heir to the French throne, he would also support the ligueur party in France to the sum of 600,000 écus of which the duc de Lorraine would front 400,000. These two grants came at a high price. In return Felipe expected: the eradication of Protestantism in France, the adoption of the resolutions of the Council of Trento in the kingdom, the return of Cambrai to Felipe, that the cardinal de Bourbon agree to cede French Navarre and Béarn to Felipe, that France break off its alliance with the Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (Ottoman empire), that France cease to harass Spanish positions in the Caribbean, that France support España in crushing the Dutch revolt in Spanish Nederland, and that France hand over the pretender of the Portuguese throne the prior do Crato to Felipe. Felipe may not have imagined that all of these points would be realised, but he hoped that he might weaken Henri III and dissuade him from military interventions.

Comminges and his brother the seigneur de Lanssac drove the Catholic nobility to take arms with the aim of capturing Montauban, Castres and other Protestant held towns, there would indeed be ligueur operations undertaken at Castres. Lanssac would involve himself in several military efforts, though would find himself frustrated by the maréchal de Matignon. Despite the efforts of the ligueur party in the province, which also made efforts on French Navarre, Alet and L'Isle-Jourdain, the ligue failed to gain a strong foothold in Guyenne.

The queen of Navarre was won over to the ligueur cause by España and the urgings of the bishop of Comminges. To this end she met with him in Alan prior to the start of her uprising. Thus she travelled to Agen in March and purged the city of those officers that were not loyal to her before assuming command of Agen. From here she struck out in several military campaigns, though they were bested by the forces of her husband and by August she could no longer pay her soldiers, and the populations under her authority chafed under the impositions required of them. As such when Matignon was tasked with returning the city to royal obedience. He bribed several inhabitants of Agen who then effected a coup against Marguerite in September.

The ligueur party in the south-west, chief among them the queen of Navarre, hoped to receive both financial and military aid from the Spanish king. However, the latter was not provided and even the former was deficient for the queen of Navarre's cause (forcing her to take refuge in Auvergne).

The biship of Comminges fought for the cause in the comté de Comminges. With the support of the vicomte de Duras he engaged in seizures and pillage. In reaction to the offensive he undertook his see of Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges was captured and pillaged by the Protestant captain de Sus in 1586, something the bishop was unable to prevent. The Aure-Larboust brothers would rush to join in on the sacking of Saint-Bertrand, seizing the archives and the treasury of the cathedral. Catherine wrote to her son the king saying that he well knew 'what kind of people' the Larboust were.

During the June of 1585, according to the French ambassador in España the sieur de Longlée, the bishop of Comminges undertook diplomatic work between España and the Catholic ligue in the south-west of France.

The bishop endeavoured to reconquer his see. To this end he gained the military support of the Montagnards of Haut-Comminges and bandoliers from Antonio de Bardaxí. The Bardaxí, members of the Aragonese nobility had as far back as the 1560s maintained connections between the French seigneur de Monluc and the Spanish court. He was also provided a cannon by the city of Toulouse, which had a decisive effect in his return to Saint-Bertrand. Along with a force of 500 arquebusiers and summons from the countryside he laid siege to the city. After two months and three days of effort, Saint-Bertrand fell to its bishop on 13 June. Those inhabitants who had left their homes with the conquest of de Sus returned. The campaign cost the bishop around 45,863 livres, of which 9,000 was paid off by the estates of Comminges. To cover the rest of his costs, he sought reimbursement from the lieutenant-général de Guyenne maréchal Matignon. In this account, he tactically minimised the role the militia's had played in the reconquest. Henri was overflowing in praise for the bishop's recapture of Saint-Bertrand, and endorsed his request for reimbursement. Brunet finds this demonstrative that the bishop's ligueur and Spanish sympathies were unknown to the crown.

The dislodged royalists turned their attentions to the rich episcopal fiefdom of Puymaurin. For a steep price they were bought out of Puymaurin.

Brunet argues the affair of the reconquest of Saint-Bertrand evidences the precocious existence of the Campanère Ligue in Comminges. The noble seigneur de Montégut envisioned the adoption of a broad scale anti-Protestant ligue covering not only Comminges, but also the Condomois, Rieux and even Toulouse. In response to the ambitions of Montégut, the bishop of Comminges promised to bring together as many seigneurs, churchmen and towns as possible. On 11 July 1587, it was agreed at the Estates of Comminges to form a sworn association. The nobility would be employed on both an offensive and defensive basis, the clergy (chief among them the bishops of Comminges and the bishop of Rieux) would offer fiscal support, and the commons would serve as the soldiery.

Alongside the Spanish agent de Moreo and the duc de Guise, the bishop of Comminges was to be found in Antwerp in 1588.

Sometime between the Day of the Barricades in May and the meeting of the Estates General in October, the queen of Navarre addressed a long correspondence to the Spanish king. She proffered 2,000 cavalry and 12,000 arquebusiers to campaign in Guyenne and Languedoc (those provinces closest to the king and key for her husband). With Spanish help she suggested she could seize Bordeaux, Bayonne and other centres. She suggested she could count on many allies in this fight, and offered Felipe two pathways. He could either declare himself openly or operate from the shadows behind a French seigneur. The bishop of Comminges translated the letter and ensured its provision to Felipe. The king was not ignorant of the bishops involvement in Marguerite's intrigues.

Both the king and the the ligueur party endeavoured to see their candidates sent as representatives for the Estates General of 1588. Neither side was afraid to employ less than legitimate means to see their choice sent to Blois. In Toulouse the ligue ensured the election of the bishop of Comminges and the avocat Étienne Tournier were chosen, with the former representing the First Estate, and the latter the Third. They replaced the bishop of Lavaur.

Having been elected, the bishop would participate in the meeting of the Estates as a representative of the First Estate. He was a representative of the sénéchausée of Toulouse as opposed to those of Comminges as his episcopal city was in the jurisdiction of Rivière-Verdun.

After the king's sudden strike against the ligueur leadership during the Estates General, in which he had the duc de Guise and his brother the cardinal de Guise assassinated, both Lanssac and the bishop of Comminges thought it prudent to hurriedly make their departure from Blois. Indeed Comminges' arrest was of interest to the king. The bishop would flee alongside his friend, the bishop of Rodez. Le Roux argues that while the bishop of Comminges flight from Blois is certain, Lanssac's is conjectural. The bishop of Comminges took refuge in Toulouse.

Word of the assassination of the duc de Guise and his brother the cardinal de Guise arrived in Toulouse on 3 January 1589. He brought with him an undated declaration produced by the Parisian ligueurs in which the Toulousian parlement announced its withdrawal of obedience to the king. The bishop of Comminges endeavoured to spread the word of the assassination and inspire passions in response. At the same time as Comminges arrived in the city, a letter was received from the Parisian ligueurs urging the city to subordinate itself to the duc de Mayenne (who had taken over the leadership of the ligue upon the murder of his brother). Preachers expounded upon the wickedness of the tyrant king Henri and processions were organised. The bishop of Comminges had a key role to play in this ligueur coup. Defensive measures began to be explored by the municipal magistracy on 6 January then on 7 January a bureau d'État was established by the ligueur sympathetic Toulousians, composed of eighteen members (six clerics, six bourgeois - of whom two are Capitouls of Toulouse and six parlementaires) to deal with the most sensitive matters alongside the capitouls of Toulouse. The bureau was endorsed by the parlement on 8 January. Souriac argues that the formation of this bureau represented the unification of all the decision making bodies that existed in Toulouse. Also on 7 January, the sénéchal de Toulouse presented himself before the city with his compagnie (company). Alongside the bishop of Comminges he had been one of the representatives of the sénéchaussée at the recent Estates General. In addition he had demonstrated his Catholic fervour in the army of the duc de Joyeuse. However, at this time, the Joyeuse remained loyal to the crown, further the sénéchal had arrived with instructions from the king. The capitouls in agreement with the parlement refused entry to the city to their sénéchal on the grounds his presence would be disruptive to public order. He was instructed to leave his messages from the king behind, and depart from outside Toulouse.

The keys to the city were recast, and the captains if the capitoulate were re-selected by the new bureau. This latter measure was to the chagrin of the conseil de ville (town council) as responsibility for this selection had been the responsibility of the conseil de bourgeoisie.

An enlarged version of the city council and the parlement elected Comminges as the governor of both Toulouse and the wider sénéchaussée on 29 January. Having initially refused the charge, he took his oath of office on 4 February. Notably the notion of a 'governor' had been anathema to the capitouls of Toulouse as in opposition to their municipal liberties when the governor in question was the baron de Terride, the baron de Fourquevaux or the seigneur de Savignac. No such protests were made with the elevation of the bishop of Comminges. Souriac argues the nature of his elevation, by the most politically active ultra-Catholics of the city embodying a broader Toulousian consensus made it impossible to oppose. The wages of the new governor were to be seen to by the trésoriers municipaux (municipal treasures), Puget and Le Balme. He would take 500 livres a month to maintain himself.

The bishop was determined to organise the ligueur cause in Toulouse. Following in the mould of the maréchal de Monluc and the cardinal d'Armagnac, he established a religious brotherhood, known as the confrérie du Saint-Sacrament (brotherhood of the Holy Sacrament). Fairly unusually among the ligueur leadership, the bishop of Comminges enjoyed a strong influence with the common people.

He would establish the first ligueur armies of Toulouse. To support the small Toulousian ligueur army, the seigneur de La Balme was established as a tréorier extraordinaire des guerres (extraordinary treasurer of the wars) with the authorisation of the bishop of Comminges, the parlement and the capitouls. Money was raised through the seizing of Protestant property, confiscations of the tithe, and loans to support this army. By this means the military force was to defend both Toulouse and its immediate surrounds, without being dependant on the consular administration of Toulouse. Since the time of the governor Cornusson, compagnies imported into the city stayed there only for the preparation of their campaigns. However, this pattern was broken from in 1589 by the bishop of Comminges who brought in the Bérat regiment and some Gascon nobles. This represented an emergency mobilisation for the cities defence in a troubled year.

Despite the ascendency of the bishop of Comminges in Toulouse, Henri opined that he maintained his faith in the nobility of Languedoc, who he believed would remain loyal to the royalist cause as long as they had a suitable leader. Henri was also aware of what Comminges had been up to in Toulouse. He thus also wrote to the vicomte de Joyeuse (viscount of Joyeuse) on 23 February 1589 informing him that the bishop of Comminges had connections with the Spanish, including a man named Jehan de Bardachin (in Spanish Juan de Bardaxí), and that the bishop intended to bring the Spanish into the kingdom. Henri proposed that the vicomte de Larboust and his brother should seize the revenues of the bishopric of Comminges, and then take the château d'Alan where they would find evidence of Comminges' guilt in illegally minting money. Henri hoped to strike at the dîmes (tithes) which supported Comminges and had success on this front.

Passions between the ligueur and royalist party ran high in Toulouse at the start of 1589. The ligueur party unified itself around the denunciations of politiques (those willing to prioritise political concerns above religious ones) in the city who were accused of covert Protestantism. These tensions reached a climax after it was discovered the avocat-général of the Parlement of Toulouse (Jacques Daffis) had allegedly been in contact with the royalist lieutenant-général of Guyenne the maréchal de Matignon and the président of the parlement of Bordeaux, Guillaume Daffis in the hope of receiving soldiers to restore control over Toulouse. Both of these men were opponents of the bishop of Comminges.

On 10 February 1589, Daffis was lynched by a crowd, along with his brother-in-law, the prémier président of the Parlement, Jean-Étienne Duranti. Duranti had been a member of the ligueur party in 1585 alongside the bishop of Comminges and was a zealous Catholic. However he did not abandon Henri III after the assassination of the duc de Guise. The premier président's body was dragged through the streets before being hung on a pillory in the place Saint-Georges. A portrait of Henri III was affixed to his body. The violence of the 'popular tribunal' by which Duranti and Daffis were lynched, would turn the parlement against the bishop's government and towards the vicomte de Joyeuse. For Comminges, the court was too timid and politique.

Henri ordered that the parlementaires vacate Toulouse in favour of first Carcassonne and then Béziers. Only two members of the parlement heeded the royalist call.

It was only in the matter of the captaincies of the capitoulate that the new apparatus found opposition from the existing structures of power in Toulouse. The historian Souriac argues that the local decision making framework continued to function much as it had done. Further that the balance of power in the city with its new governor Comminges, was not dissimilar to that with prior governors such as Bellegarde or Cornusson.

The ligueur government in Toulouse failed to impose itself on the ligueur apparatus outside of the city, during the bishop of Comminges brief ascendency.

The heat of the political hatreds between the two parties in the city was tempered by memory of the Protestant coup in the city in 1562 and the presence of many Protestant held settlements around Toulouse.

After Henri III entered into alliance with the Protestant king of Navarre, he restored the duc de Montmorency to the governorship of Languedoc. This alienated the vicomte de Joyeuse who then defected to the ligueur camp along with his son the duc de Joyeuse. Both men swore their ligueur oaths on 20 April 1589, and the duc de Mayenne established the vicomte de Joyeuse as ligueur governor of Languedoc, and his son as the lieutenant-général in his absence.

In his new role as governor of Toulouse, the bishop of Comminges came into conflict with the ligueur leadership of the duc de Mayenne and the vicomte de Joyeuse, who had served as lieutenant-général of Languedoc. These men were suspicious that the bishop of Comminges intended to hand over Toulouse to España. The rivalry between the vicomte de Joyeuse and the bishop of Comminges was a threat to the political accord that had been reached with the establishment of the bureau d'État. The tension in the ligueur leadership of the province also came to the attention of the Spanish king Felipe. It contrasted with other provinces where a clear ligueur leader was able to emerge (Bretagne - duc de Mercœur, Normandie - comte de Brissac, Picardie - duc d'Aumale and others).

The conflict between the partisans of Joyeuse and those of Comminges meant that 1589 was a particularly rapid increase for the cities extraordinary finances.

In May, the bureau d'État of Toulouse drew up a list of suspected Protestants.

Mayenne complained that the bishop of Comminges, and Toulouse, had failed to send to him a emissary. Comminges turned to Felipe and in May informed him that the reason he had not yet done so was due to his uncertainty of the position of the Spanish king on the matter. Around this time (May to June) he made a request of Felipe in a couple of memoranda to provide 500 arquebusiers. These arquebusiers were to be integrated with militias under the command of the Catholic nobility, chiefly the seigneur de Tajan, the seigneur de Salerm and the seigneur de Bérat. Overarching command would be given to a Spanish military leader. Two thousand militiamen would be raised for this army in only three days according to Comminges.

In a joint plan with the capitouls of Toulouse on 6 June 1589, the bishop of Comminges sought to establish a bureau des finances extraordinaires de Guyenne (extraordinary bureau of finances of Guyenne). This institution already existed for Languedoc. They hoped to establish this institution (with the approval of the parlement) in Toulouse, so that their city would receive all the revenues of Guyenne. On 17 June the bureau was created, comprising conseillers of the Parlement, two men of the church, and bourgeois Toulousians. Mayenne and the Parisian ligueurs would succeed in confining Toulouse to a minor fiscal role however.

In August, the vicomte de Joyeuse (who had made a truce with the duc de Montmorency so that he might have a free hand) and his son the duc de Joyeuse put Toulouse to siege. By this time the bishop no longer enjoyed the confidence of the parlement which disliked both his populism and his foreign ties.(confirm translation)

On 30 September, the vicomte de Joyeuse came to the parlement of Toulouse for the registration of a truce established with the duc de Montmorency and his opposition to the confrérie de Saint-Sacrement being established in the city. This put him in opposition to the présidents of the court. Fired up by a sermon, the bishop of Comminges led the people towards the archbishops palace where the vicomte was lodging. The people voiced their discontent at Joyeuse. Rather than face off against the angry crowd, Joyeuse fled from the city.

Sometime in November Joyeuse entered disagreement with sections of the Toulousian ligue and was forced to flee from the city. He put himself at the head of an army, and returned to besiege the city, achieving its capitulation.(confirm translation)

On 27 November, an accord was reached between the besieging army and Toulouse by which the bishop of Comminges would be dismissed and the authority of the vicomte de Joyeuse recognised. That day Comminges departed from the city. Brunet argues that the defeat of Comminges and the Hispano-Ligueurs in Toulouse acted as a precursor to the destruction of the same tendency by the Mayenniste party in Paris after the murder of the président Brisson in that city.

The bishops' followers were not ready to go down so easily, and in December tried to seize the palais. This loyalist force was then pushed back to the Île de Tounis and then defeated by a force from the palais and the maison consulaire.

As 1589 drew to a close, the most militant ligueur bodies in Toulouse were suppressed by the new Joyeuse government of the city. These were the eighteen member bureau d'État which had been dominated by the bishop of Comminges and the confrérie du Saint-Sacrement that he had established. Toulouse's government maintained continuity with how it had always functioned.

The ligueur governor of Toulouse, the vicomte de Toulouse subsequently worked to maintain urban order. In February 1590, commissioners arrived, sent by the duc de Mayenne to complete the pacification of Toulouse.

No longer ascendant in Toulouse, Comminges wrote a defence of his government of the city in 1589. Going forward he would operate in the shadows, hoping to achieve his goals through means of espionage. His military participation would be limited to the defence of the ligueur cause in Comminges.

Felipe dispatched a representative named Pedro Saravia as an assurance of his commitment to the cause.

In Comminges the bishop enjoyed relations with the minor nobility of the Haut-Comminges. He also looked to the local ecclesiastical authorities. Clerics themselves would only defend their churches against attack, however they would also proffer their support to combatants. Particularly in the Haut-Comminges churches were made into fortified strong points. This climaxed in the Val d'Aran, where the churches were transformed into châteaux ecclésiaux (church castles). Meanwhile in the Bas-Comminges the ringing of bells would serve as an advanced warning system of attacks. It is from the bell-towers that the Comminges ligue acquired its name - the Ligue Campanère (Gascon - Campanau - bell tower). This Ligue Campanère would develop in 1591. The term itself would not be used before March 1594, rather in correspondence with Felipe it was referred to as the Ligue Campanelle (with the same meaning).

In the states of the union, regulations were established for villages military organisation, with a chief to preside over each one while there would also be a general chief over the wider organisation (though the name was left blank). Rules of conduct were established with those who violated them to face the justice of the ligue. The territories under the authority of this Ligue Campanère did not map exactly to the borders of Comminges, including communities in the territory of Rivière-Verdun.

The bishop of Comminges' role in the establishment of the Ligue Campanère is laid bare by the three epicentres of the movement. His see of Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges, Alan (the site of his episcopal château) and the rich lands around Puymaurin. He would only serve as its 'protector' however, and refused to be its official leader. Though it would be compared with the Croquants movement in Limousin, it claimed representation among all three orders (clergy, nobility, commons). In a further differentiation from other rebel peasant movements, those of the Campanère were anti-peace, and worked with the ligueur nobility to prosecute the war against the 'heretic king' Henri IV.

While the ligue received the approval of the parlement of Toulouse and the lieutenant-général of Guyenne, it would not be until January 1592 that the Estates of Comminges gave their approval. During a meeting of the Estates of Comminges at L'Isle-en-Dodon on 14 January 1592, the ligue was approved over the objections of the royal judge Sébastien de Cazalas. Those parishes that refused to register would be considered enemies. They declared that the organisation under the particular protection of the bishop of Comminges. He would provide his moral authority while the marquis de Villars took the command of governor.

During 1590, the bishop spent some time in Picardie alongside the ligueur prince, the duc d'Aumale.

Felipe was insistent on the need for the endorsement of the provincial Estates, refusing to send them without the taking of such a step. As a result of this, the bishop of Comminges prodded the marquis de Villars to undertaken negotiations with the Estates of Guyenne both to acquire more troops directly, and to endorse a mission to Felipe to acquire more soldiers still. As a result of this, the marquis de Villars ordered the convening of the provincial Estates of Guyenne, to convene at Gimont on 23 May 1590. While full records of the meeting are lacking, it was agreed to support the ligueur war effort, for the preservation of Protestantism. To this end the clergy would sacrifice a portion of their tithes to pay for soldiers. Such funds did not stretch sufficiently however, and thus the bishop of Comminges was tasked with meeting Felipe, and requesting 4,000 infantry and 450 cavalry with pay for four months. There was concern that the Spanish soldiers might be ill disciplined, and therefore it was requested that they be well trained.

Aware of the effort of the estates of Guyenne to receive Spanish support through Guyenne, the maréchal de Matignon visited Comminges in May 1590. He endeavoured to exploit opposition to the ligue that he picked up on in the comté, chiefly from the town of Salies. He further enjoyed the support of a member of the Estates of Comminges (a syndic named Baptiste de Lamezan). At a meeting of the Estates of Lombez back in February, Lamezan helped lead the assembly to the possibilities of considering a truce with Matignon, or submitting to his authority. The Estates of Comminges were brought closer to the ligue by the meeting of the Estates of Guyenne that transpired in May.

On route to the Spanish court, the bishop of Comminges had intended to review the defences and soldiers of the upper-Garonne valley. However this did not come to pass, due to the spread of an epidemic in the region.

During the absence of the bishop, Villars was in Comminges to protect the province from the intrusions of Matignon. He compelled the submission of Saint-Gaudens to the ligue and then placed a client of the bishop of Comminges, named the seigneur de Luscat (who had been entrusted by the bishop with the guard of Saint-Bertrand) in charge of the place.

Having received the bishop, Felipe dispatched Joaquim Claros to get a sense of the hostility in France between the party of Joyeuse and that of Comminges.

The bishop was in España from July until the end of 1590. He endeavoured to see sent soldiers so that they might resist the royalist forces of the duc de Montmorency and maréchal de Matignon. In August 1590, 6,000 Spanish soldiers were duly provided, entering the kingdom at Port-la-Nouvelle near Narbonne and providing the support the vicomte de Joyeuse required to fend off Montmorency and the seigneur de Lesdiguières. Felipe promised also an army of intervention into Guyenne, and to this end began assembling soldiers in Aragón.

In September the bishop presented to Felipe a letter from the marquis de Villars and several of the diocese of Gascogne. Villars also dispatched his own representative Pedro Saravia to thank the king for his provision of soldiers and assure him of the loyalty of the nobility to the Catholic cause.

Moving beyond the mandate he received from the Estates of Guyenne, the bishop of Comminges presented a grandiose plan to the Spanish king on the Garonne axis through the intermediary of Saraxia. The plan was only one part of a broader memorandum which also featured contributions by others, such as father Basile who opined that Villars was inexperienced, and Comminges was devoted to the Catholic cause but suffered from an over abundance of ambition and was liable to promise more than he could fulfil. In the part of the memorandum produced by Comminges, the bishop proposed a plan by which both Bordeaux and Toulouse would be carried for the Spanish crown. The plan bore similarities to one proposed by the Breton ligueurs to Felipe. Both Lanssac and Comminges held influence in this region. For the seigneur de Lanssac his seigneurie was close to Bourg on the confluence of the Garonne and Dordogne, for Comminges he enjoyed control of the abbey of Bourg.

The bishop outlined the path of the Spanish invasion to the sovereign. They would enter the diocese of Comminges through the Val d'Aran, then head down the Garonne to first Toulouse and then Bordeaux. Comminges assured Felipe that he would have 12,000 disciplined soldiers to join with the Spanish contingent (i.e. the Campanères). Bourg-sur-Gironde was in the hands of Lanssac, and the other key citadel that controlled access to Bordeaux was Blaye, held by the seigneur de Lussan who Lanssac intended to bribe. By this means a Spanish force would be landed like had been accomplished at Le Blavet in Bretagne to see to the reduction of Bordeaux.

In Comminges opinion, the nobility of Guyenne was all driven by pecuniary concerns, and it would be necessary for Felipe to provide pensions suitable to the dignity of the nobles in question. He contrasted the situation in Guyenne, where the nobles could be dealt with in this way, with Languedoc where in his estimation there were no nobles of note to treat with, and rather it would be the urban consulates with which the Spanish had to negotiate. Comminges and the marquis de Villars envisioned the provision of supplies for the invading Spanish armies, both in terms of victuals and powder. Villars announced that Spanish soldiers would be entering Comminges to the Estates of the province on 20 September. In return for offering such resources to the Spanish, the Estates of Comminges hoped to receive the liquidation of the Protestants of Foix and L'Isle-Jourdain. Villars meanwhile fancied himself the commander of the Spanish forces in France.

The bishop of Comminges asked for the provision of 1,000 ducats so that two cannons might be forged for his bishopric of Saint-Bertrand (due to its control of the Garonne) and a further 2,000 ducats to garrison the place. In regards to broader policy, Comminges opined that the people should be appeased through the reduction of the ordinary tax burden (no more than 40,000 écus for Guyenne and Gascogne). In addition to the appeasing quality, it would allow for the easier collection of the dîme and revenues could instead be farmed on river traffic, which would bring in one million d'or in Comminges estimation. It would be this policy of light ordinary taxation that the Spanish agent Mendoza represented with the Seize when he met with them in Paris.

The mission of the bishop to the Spanish court was, in the estimation of the historian Brunet, blessed with a degree of conviviality, slickened by the bishops strong command of the Castilian language. Beyond this Felipe had promised the hoped for military interventions.

Arriving on the Val d'Aran on 8 January 1591, the bishop undertook the inspections of the region that he had intended to undergo prior to leaving for Felipe's court. He signed a concordat and liaised with the local militia captains. He was accompanied by many captains from the Haut-Comminges on route to the ligueur estates that were convened at Agen. He was to inform these deputies of the imminent arrival of Spanish aid. As he was departing from Aran back into France through the pass of Saint-Béat in February, his party was intercepted by a Béarnais force directed against him by the regent of Béarn, Catherine. Thanks to the captains that were with him the royalist ambush was forced back to the château de Cier-de-Luchon. .

One of the captains with him, Barbazan subsequently led a successful siege of Cier-de-Luchon, with the royalist captain who had led the ambush and several others being executed after its conclusion. Meanwhile Comminges passed through the comté de Comminges in safety on his way to Agen. This safety would not be replicated in Gimont or L'Isle Jourdain. A bloody engagement was fought against some royalist garrisons in which three of Comminges' party were killed and a further five wounded, while the royalists who had assaulted them lost thirteen dead and twenty one wounded. Despite this, Comminges was able to reach Agen on 23 February for the ligueur estates. The royalist estates of Guyenne were being held simultaneously in Lectoure.

The same day as Comminges arrived at the Estates, he wrote to the Spanish secretario (secretary) Idiáquez outlining the ideal route for Spanish aid to take into France. Specifically he proposed the Port de la Bonaigua which would be a longer route with bad roads, but would allow the force to draw up together without risking enemy attack. Brunet judges his proposed route to have been the most sound. The estates of Comminges are to provide the money for the logistical support in the operation.

Word of the imminent Spanish arrival was greeted with delight in Agen. Matignon was declared to be deposed, and the duc de Mayenne was urged to elevated the marquis de Villars to the post of governor. An army of 3,000 arquebusiers and 600 horsemen was to be raised for Villars. Villars with enthusiasm took on the role, even before letters patent (by which Mayenne gave him the powers of governor if not the title) in his favour had been published. Meanwhile in the royalist estates of Lectoure, subsidies were voted on and defensive preparations agreed to combat a Spanish invasion.

Back in Alan, the bishop of Comminges made the friendly offering to the Spanish king of the acquisition of fish and birds for the king's palace at Aranjuez, which was then under construction. His episcopal château d'Alan would not be subject to threats despite its ill-secure position.

It would be the family of Aure-Larboust, also nobles of the Haut-Comminges but royalist rather than ligueur, who would particularly confound the plans of the bishop of Comminges over the coming years due to their influence in the region.

In March 1591, Felipe intended to assume control of the condato de Ribagorza (county of Rbiagorza) on the Franco-Spanish border.

Villars entrusted the bishop of Comminges with the mustering of soldiers to fight the royalists in Comminges. The royalists threatened Nébouzan, Samatan, Saint-Plancard and Montaut. With active combat in the region, Mayenne came south to undertake a siege of Monségur. The Comminges militia was active under the authority of the bishop and were further enlivened by the coming arrival of the Spaniards. Villars saw to the conquest of Fleurance, Cologne, Touget and Puycasquier.

Depots for the Spanish troops were set up in Samatan, L'Isle-en-Dodon and Aurignac. The expenses of this could not be supported by the grants offered in the Estates of Guyenne and therefore Comminges would be expected to contribute (though Villars consented to reducing the rate). The Estates of Comminges agreed to support Villars' army in its operations throughout Guyenne through payment of the octet tax. The Estates begged Villars to support local garrisons in Comminges out of the general Guyenne treasury, however he refused, leaving the Estates to turn more towards the local rural ligueurs. He agreed to ensure the Spanish would be a disciplined force, and would not enter towns loyal to the ligue in Comminges.

In 1591, Comminges made an appeal to España for a military intervention into southern France across the central pyrénées. By this means he hoped the Protestant strongholds that menaced Toulouse would be reduced, and then the army would move on to capture first Bordeaux, then go on to Bretagne. The contact between the southern leaders of the ligue and España to receive is described as 'intense' by Souriac.

From May 1591, Comminges half-brother the seigneur de Lanssac was in España making a grandiose pitch to the king for a Spanish annexation of Guyenne and Bretagne. Having failed to get an endorsement for his project he retired back to France to join with the bishop in Alan.

Comminges and his half-brother Lanssac would receive a pension of 2,400 livres from Felipe.

On 1 June, the marquis de Villars announced to the Estates of Comminges that he was departing. Command of the province was left in the hands of a local: the capitain de Savignac. The bishop of Comminges shared in this mood of optimism, opining that the tranquility was such he did not feel the need to bother the Spanish crown with the news.

The bishop of Comminges wrote directly to Felipe on 17 July, something he did only rarely. In this letter Comminges endeavoured to hurry along the Spanish provision of aid into France. The Protestants, who he had imagined would be exterminated, were rather alleged to be preparing an attack against the harvest collection.

The province of Aragón in north-eastern España had traditionally enjoyed many liberties. When in 1591, Felipe attempted to have a former minister of his named Antonio Pérez, who was hiding from him in Aragón, charged by the inquisition, the people of Zaragoza rose up in rebellion to free Pérez. Felipe looked to send an army from Castile to crush this nascent rebellion. There is debate about whether the army that Felipe raised was initially intended to fulfil his promise to the French ligueurs and was then redirected towards dealing with the revolt, or whether it was always intended for the revolt. Brunet finds far more evidence for the former hypothesis. An army gathered under the command of Alonso de Vargas combining 800 veterans of the Invincible Armada and 15,000 militiamen for an invasion of France. From Ágreda they were instructed to march on Zaragoza, to Vargas' annoyance. This force entered Zaragoza on 12 November and began a harsh repression. The distraction of this large force from entering France at a crucial moment in the fortunes of the royalist party saved the cause of Henri IV in the eyes of the historian Cloulas.

There was a divide in the ligue between the Hispano-ligueurs typified by the radical Parisians who in 1591 wrote to Felipe asking him to take the crown of France under his protection, and the Mayenniste party that would subsequently suppress the radicals in the capital during December 1591 with great brutality. The bishop referred to what the historian Descimon has termed the Mayenniste party as politiques. Mayenne's crushing of the radicals in Paris in December would entirely discredit him in the eyes of the bishop of Comminges. He also identified in a letter in November 1591, a third party, those who saw one of Henri IV's Catholic relatives as the proper candidate for the throne. For Comminges, this group was bringing to Henri IV the neutral Catholics. The bishop of Comminges was a Hispano-ligueur. Comminges opposed the pretensions to the crown embodied by the duc de Mayenne, and advocated for the candidacy of the Spanish infanta (princess) Isabel Clara Eugenia. To this end he suggested to Felipe that he (Comminges) write in favour of her claim and the invalidity of Salic Law under a foreign pseudonym. He wrote to Felipe several times urging him to convince Mayenne to back down from his claims. He further wrote against the principal of Salic Law as having relevance for determing succession. In addition to writing to Felipe, he also wrote to the estranged wife of Henri IV, Marguerite, urging her to support the Spanish infanta's claim.

In the eyes of the bishop of Comminges, the hands of the regent of Navarre, Catherine were to be seen at work in the revolt in Aragón, and even desired to see it spread to Catalunya. Suspicious of Béarnais merchants, the bishop advised Villars and the parlement of Toulouse that only agents of the Spanish crown should be allowed to cross the border between the kingdoms.

The bishop of Comminges connected through the people of the Val d'Aran with the Spanish commander Vargas and the army of occupation in Aragón. While they hoped the occupation force would cross the Pyrénées it would never do so.

Catherine did indeed, as Comminges anticipated, intend to stoke the flames of the revolt in España through control of parts of Comminges and the Val d'Aran. She intended to resecure the château de Saint-Béat and Cier-de-Luchon by which Spanish soldiers would be prevented from entering the kingdom. From here she would seize on the Spanish side of the frontier Castèth Leon. In the assessment of the bishop, this was not a prelude to a broader scale invasion of the kingdom, but rather the royalists hoped that by securing these places they would for very little investment frustrate Felipe's cross border plans (as it was challenging to bring to bear artillery and large armies in that region).

Felipe was tied down by both revolts in the northern provinces of España and the bankruptcy of his kingdom. Souriac makes the further point, that given the state of the southern provinces, a Spanish army of more than 30,000 was logistically impractical, even with the promises of ligueur support. This view was indeed held by Vargas' second in command Francisco de Bobadilla who believed it would be challenging to maintain an army in impoverished land. He thus characterises the appeals for Spanish intervention, more as an artifice of rhetoric than a practical invasion plan.

During this period the bishop of Comminges once again assumed the role of a man of war with the authority invested in him by Villars. He approved the raising of arquebusiers which travelled to Lombez to arrest Protestants who had come from Béarn. Two compagnies under the command of ten captains approached with the intent of seizing Saint-Béat and Cier-de-Luchon. This was foiled, and subsequently the château de Cier-de-Luchon was torn down. It was agreed that 300 men of the Val d'Aran would aid in the defence of Benasque. Alongside two commanders in whom he placed confidence, the bishop of Comminges oversaw the distribution of soldiers and the fortification of key points. He advised scaling down the 35 soldiers to be found in Castèth Leon to 20 due to its central place in the valley.

When the commander Bardaxi attempted to bribe the seargant on command of Castèth Leon, the bishop of Comminges had him dismissed. He further tried to assure himself of some Spanish cavalry, even if he understood the many body of the Spanish army was occupied crushing the revolt. His main force would comprise a levy of montagnards while regular troops would simply support this force.

The Ligue Campanère showed itself hostile to the network of châteaux in the region and worked towards their destruction. The ligueurs reduced the former system of Castellanies in Comminges to a tax district, though even this was liable to be subject to challenge.

In the April of 1592, the brother of Villars, the marquis de Montpezat conducted a mission into Aragón to request military support. The royalists thus feared that come the summer an army of 12,000 would cross the border in favour of the ligue under Villars' authority.

The bishop wrote to the ligueur duc d'Aumale in 1592, who was operating in Picardie, to provide him comfort.

Further debate was held in the Spanish court as to the feasibility of an invasion of southern France during 1592. In July, Felipe came back around to the idea of invading southern France. Rather than Comminges this would be through an invasion of basse Navarre in the west and another operation with Joyeuse in the east. By the end of August 1592, Felipe had abandoned this plan, resolving to maintain his force in Aragón.

On 20 September 1592, the duc de Mayenne established the marquis de Villars as the ligueur lieutenant-général of Guyenne. Despite being his son-in-law Mayenne was cautious about the prospect of investing Villars with the full governorship of Guyenne. Subsequently Villars invested the bishop of Comminges with the authority to 'wage war on the enemy' with a group of hommes d'armes. Villars himself fantasised about being the leader of the Spanish army that would cross the Pyrénées, he lacked much of a military reputation however.

Much to Comminges' irritation, the marquis de Villars decided to employ the Ligue Campanère at the end of 1592 for a purpose external to local defence: the capture of Tarbes for the ligue and the invasion of Bigorre (a territory over which Henri IV was comte). The ligueurs were open to this, despite the opposition of the bishop of Comminges. The bishop desired the organisation to remain in Comminges for local defence. Villars created much of the apparatus of a campaigning army, including surgeons and bakers. The offensive mission was a success, Ibos was seized and Pontacq put to siege.

In early 1593, an Estates General met at the insistence of Felipe who was then in a position of strength. Thee deputies determined on the need to secure a Catholic king that enjoyed approval of both the Spanish and Papacy. Henri outflanked the meeting by announcing his intention to convert to Catholicism. Felipe then made a clumsy attempt to push forward the rights of his daughter, the Infanta, who the bishop of Comminges had historically championed. By insisting that she be married to the erzherzog von Österreich rather than a French prince he damaged the credibility of her candidacy. The walk back of this position to a marriage between the Infanta and the young duc de Guise could not repair the damage and on 23 July the election of a new king was indefinitely postponed by the delegates. On 25 July 1593, Henri abjured Protestantism, this represented a major blow to the ligue. Defections to the royalist party began to flow forth. For the southern Hispano-ligueurs this period between the abjuration and the declaration of war between France and España represented the most covert period of their correspondence.

During 1593, Villars maintained garrisons in many southern towns he had fortified such as Agen, Mirande and Grenade. The first objective in this was to maintain the security of the surrounding farmland which would then be taxed. The bishop of Comminges worked towards this end in the region of Rivière-Verdun.

In this year truces were agreed between Henri and Mayenne at the national level and Villars and Matignon in Guyenne. These truces permeated only slowly into Comminges. For example the governor of L'Isle-Jourdain, du Bourg and the governor of Mauvezin, the seigneur de Maravat continued to raid into Comminges so that they could support their garrisons. Just as these royalists remained mobilised, so too did the Campanère. In June 1593, the Estates of Samatam approved of the raising of bands. These soldiers were to monitor du Bourg and Maravat's bands. Villars commanded that upon sighting the enemy, the tocsin was to be raised in a town, and the people armed, on pain of being considered an enemy.

On 27 August, the commander of the Spanish army of occupation in Aragón, Vargas was recalled and disgraced. This was a blow to the ligueurs in Guyenne, as he was one of the firmest Spanish supporters for an international expedition into the kingdom.

On 1 January 1594 the five month truce between the French royalists and the ligueurs expired, as a result defections bloomed. First Cambrai and then Meaux made their peace with the royalists, the latter having been under the command of one of Mayenne's closest advisors, the marquis de Vitry. In his capitulation Vitry explained there was no legitimate reason to make war against the king now that he was Catholic. The parlement of Aix was the next to defect to the royalists. By now almost all bishops were in the royalist camp. On 22 March, Paris was betrayed to Henri by its ligueur governor the comte de Brissac.

Even in Spanish territory, communications between the bishop and the Spanish crown were not necessarily secure. In 1594, the governor of Benasque informed Comminges that a packet of his correspondence had arrived in Benasque but had not been received in Madrid. Thus they had been stolen inside Spanish territory. Even when unencrypted precautions were taken in the communications, the bishop of Saint-Gelais used the pseudonym 'Modestino Cortese' (supposedly a Florentine cleric of the Val d'Aran), something he had employed since at least February 1588. Sometimes getting carried away he would switch from the third person to the first person in describing the bishop of Comminges. In these final years of rebellion he (likely with his brothers consent) took to signing his correspondence as 'Lanssac'. Often sensitive information was communicated orally by the messenger who brought the letter.

In 1594, a royalist satire was published named 'La Satyre Ménippée'. This satire brought up both the bishop of Comminges and his half-brother for attack. They were satirised as having recruiting many 'honest' people for a crusade against 'miscreants and infidels'. The skill of the bishop in attracting both greats and the humble people was noted by the satire.

On 16 February 1594, the bishop of Comminges sent a long memoire for Felipe's attentions from Alan, titled "Expediens pour prévenir et traverser les pernicieux desseings du Vendosme et ces adhérens tant desclarés manifestement que couvertement" (Expedients to stop and overcome the pernicious designs of Vendosme [by which was meant Henri IV] and those both openly and covertly declared in loyalty to him.) This correspondence was signed to Lanssac.

The bishop of Comminges and his brother the seigneur de Lanssac endeavoured to reassure Felipe of the merits of the popular ligueur movement. They explained that the people, clergy and much of the nobility of Gascogne had formed syndics both to oppose heresy and exactions imposed on them. He then explains how after the arrest of some 'good Catholics' and 'rich bourgeois' for failure to pay these taxes led to the mobilisation of 12,000 ligueurs to see to their release. When Villars became aware of the intentions of this group, he had the offenders released. The section of correspondence to the Spanish king concludes by arguing that the Christian order would be strengthened and improved. The bishop understood this moment to be a sensitive one, in which Henri IV risked being victorious. Therefore he made a case for the invasion of the kingdom by a Spanish army again. The rights of the Infanta to the French throne would be recognised, military aid would be channelled towards Bretagne, where the duc de Mercœur held strong. To triumph in Bretagne would require 3,000 cavalry and 10,000 footsoldiers. He outlined three invasion routes into the kingdom, of which he preferred a crossing of the Pyrénées. The devotion of Comminges and his brother, Lanssac, to the Spanish crown (with their willingness to lay down their lives and property for the cause) was emphasised. They then spoke of the Spanish king maintaining the openness of the passages and gates of Saint-Girons, Saint-Béat, Benasque, Aure and Louron, and capturing the towns and châteaux of Saint-Girons, Saint-Béat, Saint-Bertrand, Saint-Gaudens, Montréjeau and Sarrencolin. It was hoped these would be maintained in Spanish service and through their control allow the passage of a Spanish army.

Gascon gentleman and foot-soldiers would be raised, numbering 3,900. The bishop of Comminges and his brother would see to the casting of cannons which would allow the army to make their way up to Bec d'Ambès on the confluence of the Garonne and Dordogne. Lanssac would lead a Spanish contingent with a position equivalent to that held by the Spanish commander Bobadilla, i.e. second in command. Once here a fort would be built within six weeks. The Spanish king would, after a year, be able to recoup the costs of the soldiers with a surplus of 400,000 écus. At this point in the campaign, they would join up with the Spanish general Águila who would come down the coast from his base of operations in Bretagne and disembark with his infantry. The army would then force the Dordogne through the expedient of the Spanish galleons. The land force would make its way up into Poitou with support from the naval arm before capturing Saint-Nazaire where Felipe would assure himself of 600,000 écus. Moving into Bretagne, Port-Navalo would be fortified and the Spanish king would be able to count upon 1,500,000 écus annually from the territory. The nobility and cities would then recognise the Infanta as their sovereign.

To further confound the royalists, a feigned attack on the Picard frontier would be launched by the army of Nederland in concord with the duc de Guise and duc d'Aumale. Meanwhile Comminges would assembly a force (the Ligue Campanère) to secure the mountainous frontiers for the Spanish sovereign. No place in this plan was accorded to the marquis de Villars, with whom Comminges held a grudge for the Bigorre expedition. The place of Villars in the expedition was occupied by the seigneur de Lanssac, however there was some embarrasment in this for Comminges who worried his brother was of insufficient pedigree for such a responsibility.

With the truce increasing the tax burden the Ligue Campanère began to take on the form of a confederacy. The bishop of Comminges was not blind to this political development in the ligue and saw in it opportunity for España. Continuing in his long address of 16 February he explained to the Spanish king that given the 'mood of the people' (i.e. their fiscal revolts) Felipe should strike while the opportunity was presenting itself, and send a leader with great authority, wise in the ways of statecraft and war. This personnage would come to Alan to rendezvous with Comminges and the seigneur de Lanssac who would play host to a diet of the leaders of the Campanère Ligue to treat with the Spanish representative. He compared this confederation with that of the Swiss which the French kings had long used. As with the Swiss, these confederates would not become subjects of Felipe, but would rather serve as his allies. For Comminges though the conferedates were a much stronger body that the Swiss Cantons as they respected the place of the nobility and the clergy in society. Through leaning on this organisation, the Spanish king could assure himself of 4,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry with the added advantage that the ligueurs, unlike the Swiss would be of the same religion, language and customs as he was. These were not a 'venal' people in Comminges estimation. He then compared the control and access they would grant to the Spanish over the frontier to the French holds on the Marchesato di Saluzzo (marquisate of Saluzzo) and other holdings in Piemonte in years gone by. He concluded by noting that timing was sensitive, and that while this project was feasible for the Spanish king now, if he tarried a few months it might cease to be possible as every effort was being expended by the royalists to subjugate them. If Felipe had any concerns about the projects Comminges and Lanssac were presenting him, he need only say the word and they would come to him.

With the capitulation of much of the ligue in Provence, its governor the duc d'Épernon continued to hold out against the king. His opposition was more personal, he likely feared Henri intended to invest the government of Provence in a Protestant relative. He was not however affiliated with the ligue, and through the duc de Joyeuse intimated to Felipe that he would affiliate himself with the ligue in return for military support. At the request of Felipe in February 1594, Comminges and his brother the seigneur de Lanssac made appeals to the duc d'Épernon in Provence and duc de Montmorency to try and rally these men to the ligueur cause. Lanssac travelled to travelled to Provence and Languedoc to meet with the men. As a condition for his joining the cause, Montmorency demanded the seizure of Toulouse and the head of the duc de Joyeuse. The bishop of Comminges had many contacts in Toulouse and thus drew up a plan. The principal parlementaires would call for him and he would assume authority in the city. Joyeuse would then be seized and the parlement purged of those sympathetic to their royalist colleagues in Carcassonne.

The bishop of Comminges and his half-brother appealed to the Spanish crown in the defence of Juan de Bardaxí whose son was now serving as a ligueur agent in the south. The father had been sentenced by the inquisition for his conduct in the uprising of Zaragoza. Meanwhile the son, Antonio de Bardaxí, ensured the security of the Spanish emissary sent to the brothers, and also conducted spying for them in Béarn. As such, Comminges and Lanssac requested of Felipe on 23 February that he would suspend the sentence against Juan.

The Estates of Comminges, which met in Samatan in March 1594, resolved to send their submission to Henri IV. To this end the royal judge Cazalas and Péguilhan were dispatched. The Ligue Campanère was to be dissolved. From his camp at Laon in August, Henri accepted the submission of the Comminges Estates and confirmed their privileges. The consequences of the dissolution of the Ligue would not take long to manifest, as the bishop of Comminges found himself directly threatened for the first time in the civil war.

Losing heart for a moment, on 30 March the bishop of Comminges proposed to abandon his bishopric and looked to an exile in Italia or España. To replace him in Comminges he proposed an Italian cardinale.

During April, the sieur d'Ysaut and Antonio de Lamothe joined forces with the 1,000 arquebusiers the brothers had raised under the command of the seigneur de Tajan. Tajan was the candidate to lead the hypothetical Spanish army that would cross the border. Brunet argues the force actually under Tajan's command was likely largely composed of me of the Ligue Campanère. It was responsible for dissuading royalist attacks and protecting Comminges. This force had to be demobilised however, and its commander Tajan took refuge in España.

A few weeks before he would capitulate to the royalists and make his submission to Henri, the bishop of Comminges was pitching a proposal for a crusade to Felipe II.

At some point in 1594, Comminges was to be found in ligueur held Lyon.(Evidence it was ligueur held)

In June 1594, the bishop of Comminges wrote up a capitulation to Henri IV. In this capitulation he stated that Henri's conversion to Catholicism was the design of god who was the first and last cause of all actions. He compared Henri to emperor Constantine. He then inserted Henri into a genealogy of providential kings (including David, Solomon and Theodosius) and noted that he would pray that Henri enjoyed victories like David and was as devoted to the glory of god as Theodosius. He continually stressed his humble obedience and stated he would serve the king more dutifully than any bishop had in prior times. Comminges' half-brother was less eloquent than he and made his plea on the grounds of the virtue of royal clemency and noting that he had failed to uphold the natural obedience that was due to a king.

Henri granted his pardon easily to the bishop of Comminges, the situation for his brother was more complicated and Lanssac's submission would not be accepted and he would continue to scheme until his death in 1622. Comminges provided financial support to his brother.

In the summer of 1594, the duc de Joyeuse made an effort to oust Comminges from Alan, however the bishop was rescued by the intervention of the marquis de Villars. The bishop related the intervention of Villars with '50 horseman' to the Spanish secretario Idiáquez in a letter of 16 August.

On 20 November 1594, the home of Comminges' bishopric, the town of Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges, was subject to a sacking.

Around the same time as the capitulations of Comminges and Lanssac many of the Lorraine-Guise princes made their peace with the royalist cause also, including the duc d'Elbeuf in June, and the young duc de Guise in October.

He died in 1613.

Sources

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