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User:Sir Paul/Wild animal suffering

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A juvenile Red-tailed Hawk eating a California vole

Wild-animal suffering is the suffering experienced by nonhuman animals in nature. Wild-animal suffering has historically been discussed in the context of philosophy of religion as an instance of the problem of evil.[1][2][3] More recently, a number of academics have considered the issue from a secular standpoint as a general moral problem that we might be able to take action towards preventing.[4][5][6][7]

The moral basis for interventions aimed at reducing wild animal suffering can be rights-based or welfare-based. From a rights-based perspective, if animals have a moral right to life or bodily integrity, intervention may be required to prevent such rights from being violated by other animals.[8] From a welfare-based perspective, a requirement to intervene may arise insofar as it is possible to prevent some of the suffering experienced by wild animals without causing even more suffering.[9] Advocates of intervention in nature argue that nonintervention is inconsistent with either of these approaches. Some proposed interventions include removing predators from wild areas,[10] refraining from reintroducing predators,[5][11] providing medical care to sick or injured animals,[9][12][13] and rescuing wild animals from natural disasters.

Arguments for intervention edit

Philosopher Peter Singer has argued that intervention in nature would be justified if one could be reasonably confident that this would greatly reduce wild animal suffering and death in the long run. In practice, however, Singer cautions against interfering with ecosystems because he fears that doing so would cause more harm than good.[14] Other authors dispute Singer's empirical claim about the likely consequences of intervening in the natural world, and argue that some types of intervention can be expected to produce good consequences overall. Thus, economist Tyler Cowen cites examples of animal species whose extinction is not generally regarded as having been on balance bad for the world. Cowen also notes that, insofar as humans are already intervening in nature, the relevant practical question is not whether we should intervene at all, but what particular forms of intervention we should favor. [9] Along similar lines, moral philosopher Jeff McMahan argues that, since humans "are already causing massive, precipitate changes in the natural world," we should favor those changes that would promote the survival "of herbivorous rather than carnivorous species." [7]

Potential conflict between animal rights and environmentalism edit

It has been argued that the common environmentalist goal of preserving the natural order is not in line with the goal of looking after the welfare of sentient animals.[15] It has been further argued that they conflict in different cases. Examples include environmentalists supporting hunting invasive species for population control while animal rights advocates oppose it;[16] animal rights advocates arguing for the extinction or reengineering of carnivores or r strategist species while deep ecologists defend their right to be and flourish as they are;[17] animal rights advocates defending the reduction of wildlife areas or arguing against their expansion out of concern that most animal suffering takes place in them while environmentalists want to safeguard and expand the wild.[11][18]

The amount of suffering in nature edit

In "Bambi or Bessie: Are Wild Animals Happier?" Christie Wilcox argues that wild animals do not appear to be happier than domestic animals because wild animals have been found to have greater levels of cortisol and to have elevated stress responses relative to domestic animals; furthermore, they do not have some of their needs provided for them like domestic animals.[19]

Others have argued that because of the prevalence of the r-selected animals in the wild, for the majority of wild animals the average life would be very short and so would have more suffering than happiness in it because a painful death would outweigh short-lived moments of happiness in their lives.[4][11][20]

Ecology as intrinsically valuable edit

Holmes Rolston III argues that only unnatural animal suffering is a morally bad thing and that humans do not have a duty to intervene in natural cases.[21] He celebrates carnivores in nature because of the significant ecological role they play. Others have argued that the reason that humans have a duty to protect other humans from predation is because humans are part of the cultural world rather than the natural world and so different rules apply to them in these situations.[18][22] Others argue that prey animals are fulfilling their natural function and so they are flourishing when they are preyed upon or otherwise die to allow natural selection to work.[8]

The practicality of intervening in nature edit

Another common objection to intervening in nature is that it would be impractical either because of the amount of work involved or because we could not be sure that we were improving the lives of animals on balance due to the complexity of ecosystems.[23] A reply to this is that there are already many cases in which we intervene in nature for other reasons such as for human interest in nature and environmental preservation as something valuable in their own rights.[4][9]

Aaron Simmons argues that we should not intervene to save animals in nature because doing so would result in unintended consequences such as damaging the ecosystem, interfering with human projects, or resulting more animal deaths overall.[24]

Peter Vallentyne suggests that, while humans should not eliminate predators in nature, they can intervene to help prey in more limited ways. In the same way that we help humans in need when the cost to us is small, we might help some wild animals at least in limited circumstances.[25]

Wild animal suffering as a reductio ad absurdum edit

That people would also be obliged to intervene in nature has been used as a reductio ad absurdum against the position that animals have rights.[24] This is because, if animals such as prey animals did have rights, people would be obliged to intervene in nature to protect them, but this is claimed to be absurd.[26][27][28] An objection to this argument is that people do not see intervening in the natural world to save other people from predation as absurd and so this could be seen to involve treating non-human animals differently in this situation without justification.[29]

Justifying meat-eating edit

The fact that other animals in the natural world eat meat is a common argument that eating meat must be morally permissible. One response is that other animals are not aware of what they are doing and so are not culpable for eating meat like humans would be. Others claim that, in fact, predation and other natural events are a bad thing like meat eating is.[30] People may also cite other cases of "natural" primate behaviors like homicide, rape, and gang violence that we nonetheless regard as morally unacceptable.[31]

See also edit

References edit

  1. ^ Lewis, C S (2009). The Problem of Pain. ISBN 0060652969.
  2. ^ Murray, Michael (April 30, 2011). Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0199596324.
  3. ^ Gould, Stephen (February 1982). "Nonmoral Nature" (PDF). Natural History. 91 (2): 19–26. Retrieved 19 January 2014.
  4. ^ a b c Horta, Oscar. "Debunking the Idyllic View of Natural Processes: Population Dynamics and Suffering in the Wild".
  5. ^ a b Horta, Oscar (2010). "The Ethics of the Ecology of Fear against the Nonspeciesist Paradigm A Shift in the Aims of Intervention in Nature". Télos. 13 (10): 73–88.
  6. ^ Ng, Yew-Kwang (1995). "Towards welfare biology: Evolutionary economics of animal consciousness and suffering". Biology and Philosophy. 10 (3): 255–285. doi:10.1007/BF00852469.
  7. ^ a b McMahan, Jeff. "The Meat Eaters". The New York Times.
  8. ^ a b Aaltola, Elisa (February 2010). "Animal Ethics and the Argument from Absurdity". Environmental Values. 19 (1): 79–98. doi:10.3197/096327110X485392. Retrieved 10 January 2014.
  9. ^ a b c d Cowen, Tyler (2003). "Policing Nature". Environment Ethics. 25 (2): 169–182.
  10. ^ MacAskill, William; MacAskill, Amanda (9 September 2015). "To truly end animal suffering, the most ethical choice is to kill wild predators (especially Cecil the lion)". Quartz. Retrieved 17 April 2016.
  11. ^ a b c Sagoff, Mark (1984). "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce". Osgode Hall Law Journal: 297–307.
  12. ^ Pearce, David. "A Welfare State For Elephants?". Retrieved 12 May 2014.
  13. ^ Reese, Jacy (14 December 2015). "Wild animals endure illness, injury, and starvation. We should help". Vox. Retrieved 17 April 2016.
  14. ^ Singer, Peter. "Food for Thought". www.nybooks.com. Retrieved 23 February 2015.Singer, Peter. The Point of View of The Universe. Oxford University Press. p. 346. ISBN 978-0199603695. Retrieved 23 February 2015.
  15. ^ Belshaw, Christoher (2001). Belshaw, Christopher (2001). Environmental Philosophy. Chesham: Acumen. McGill-Queen's Press. p. xii. ISBN 1-902683-21-8.
  16. ^ Horta, Oscar (2010). "What Is Speciesism?" (PDF). The Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics: 243–266. doi:10.1007/s10806-009-9205-2. Retrieved 10 June 2014.
  17. ^ Pearce, David (2009). "Reprogramming Predators".
  18. ^ a b Hettinger, Ned (1994). Hargrove, Eugene C (ed.). "Valuing Predation in Rolston's Environmental Ethics". Environmental Ethics. 16 (1): 3. doi:10.5840/enviroethics199416138.
  19. ^ Wilcox, Christie. "Bambi or Bessie: Are Wild Animals Happier?". Retrieved 5 January 2014.
  20. ^ Ng, Yew-Kwang (1995). "Towards welfare biology: Evolutionary economics of animal consciousness and suffering". Biology and Philosophy. 10 (3): 255. doi:10.1007/BF00852469.
  21. ^ Rolston III, Holmes (1988). Environmental ethics : duties to and values in the natural world. Temple University Press. ISBN 9780877225010. Retrieved 10 June 2014.
  22. ^ Moriarty, Paul; Mark Woods (1997). "Hunting ≠ Predation". Environmental Ethics. 19 (4): 391–404. doi:10.5840/enviroethics19971945.
  23. ^ McMahan, Jeff (September 28, 2010). "Predators: A Response". The New York Times. Retrieved 27 December 2013.
  24. ^ a b Simmons, Aaron (2009). "Animals, Predators, The Right to Life and The Duty to Save Lives". Ethics & The Environment. 14 (1): 15–27. doi:10.1353/een.0.0018.
  25. ^ Verchot, Manon (30 Sep 2014). "Meet the people who want to turn predators into vegans". TreeHugger. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
  26. ^ Benatar, David (February 2001). "Why the Naïve Argument against Moral Vegetarianism Really is Naïve". Environmental Values. 10 (1): 103–112. doi:10.3197/096327101129340769.
  27. ^ Ebert, Rainer (April 2012). "Innocent Threats and the Moral Problem of Carnivorous Animals". Journal of Applied Philosophy. 29 (2): 146–159. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.2012.00561.x.
  28. ^ Smith, Wesley J. (31 Jul 2014). "Elimate Predators to Eliminate All Suffering!". National Review. Retrieved 1 August 2014.
  29. ^ Horta, Oscar (2010). "Disvalue in nature and intervention". Pensata Animal.
  30. ^ Sailer, Steve. "Q&A: Steven Pinker of 'Blank Slate'". Retrieved 9 July 2014.
  31. ^ Peterson & Wrangham (1997). Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence. Mariner Books. ISBN 978-0395877432. Retrieved 8 July 2014.

External links edit

Category:Environmental ethics Category:Animal welfare

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