Substantive View of The Image of God edit

 
In "Creation of Adam," Michelangelo provides a great example of the substantive view of the imago of God through the mirroring of the human and the divine.

The substantive view locates the image of God within the psychological or spiritual makeup of the human being. This view holds that there are similarities between humanity and God, thus emphasizing characteristics that are of shared substance between both parties. Some proponents of the substantive view uphold that the rational soul mirrors the divine.[1] According to this mirroring, humanity is shaped like the way in which a sculpture or painting is in the image of the artist doing the sculpting or painting.[2] While the substantive view locates the image of God in a characteristic or capacity unique to humanity, such as reason or will, the image may also be found in humanity’s capacity to have a relationship with the divine.[3] Unlike the relational view, humanity’s capacity to have a relationship with the divine still locates the image of God in a characteristic or capacity that is unique to humanity and not the relationship itself. What is important is that the substantive view sees the image of God as present in humanity whether or not an individual person acknowledges the reality of the image or not.[4]

History of Christian Interpretations of the Substantive View edit

Patristic Interpretation edit

 
Issues surrounding "the fall" and "original sin" often became a crucial points of contention among Christian theologians seeking to understand the image of God.

The substantive view of the image of God has held particular historical precedence over the development of Christian Theology particularly among early Patristic Theologians (see Patristics), like Irenaeus and Augustine, and Medieval Theologians, like Aquinas. Irenaeus, unlike later Reformation Theologians, believes that the essential nature of humanity was not lost or corrupted by the fall, but the fulfillment of humanity’s creation, namely freedom and life, was to be delayed until “the filling out the time of [Adam’s] punishment.”[5] Irenaeus also draws a sharp line between image and likeness. Humankind before the fall (see Fall of Man) was in the image of God through the ability to exercise free will and reason. And we were in the likeness of God through an original spiritual endowment.


While Irenaeus represents an early assertion of the substantive view of the image of God, the specific understanding of the essence of the image of God is explained in great detail by Augustine, a fifth century theologian who describes a Trinitarian formula in the image of God. Augustine’s Trinitarian structural definition of the image of God includes memory, intellect, and will.[6] According to Augustine, “will […] unites those things which are held in the memory with those things which are thence impressed on the mind's eye in conception.”[7] Augustine believed that, since humanity reflects the nature of God, humanity must also reflect the Triune nature of God. Augustine’s descriptions of memory, intellect, and will held a dominant theological foothold for a number of centuries in the development of Christian Theology.

Medieval Interpretation edit

Aquinas, a medieval theologian writing almost 700 years after Augustine, builds on the Trinitarian structure of Augustine but takes the Trinitarian image of God to a different end. Like Irenaeus and Augustine, Aquinas locates the image of God in humanity’s intellectual nature or reason, but Aquinas believes that the image of God is in humanity in three ways. First, which all humanity possess, the image of God is present in humanity’s capacity for understanding and loving God, second, which only those who are justified possess, the image is present when humanity actually knows and loves God imperfectly, and thirdly, which only the blessed possess, the image is present when humanity knows and loves God perfectly.[8] Aquinas, unlike Augustine, sees the image of God as present in humanity, but it is only through humanity’s response to the image of God that the image is fully present and realized in humanity. Medieval scholars suggested that the holiness (or "wholeness") of humankind was lost after the fall, though free will and reason remained. [John Calvin]] and Martin Luther agreed that something of the Imago Dei was lost at the fall but that fragments of it remained in some form or another, as Luther's Large Catechism article 114 states, "Man lost the image of God when he fell into sin."

Rabbinic Interpretation of the Substantive View edit

 
Hebrew Midrashim depicts the image of God in democratic or universal terms.

Furthermore, rabbinic Midrash focuses on the function of image of God in kingship language. While a monarch is cast in the image or likeness of God to differentiate him ontologically from other mortals, Torah’s B’reishit portrays the image as democratic: every human is cast in God’s image and likeness. This leveling effectively embraces the substantive view and likens humankind to the earthly presence of God.[9] Yet it should be noted that this immanent presence enjoys the ambiguity of midrashim; it is never outrightly characterized as “Godlike,” as in ontologically equivalent to God, or merely “Godly,” as in striving towards ontological equivalency.


The rabbinic substantive view, conversely, does not operate out of the framework of original sin. In fact, the account of Adam and Eve disobeying God’s mandate is neither expressly rendered as “sin” in B’reishit, nor anywhere else in Torah for that matter. It is instead likened to a “painful but necessary graduation from the innocence of childhood to the problem-laden world of living as morally responsible adults.” [10] That God fashions garments for Adam and Eve out of skins (Gen 3:21), is cited as proof of God’s quickly fading anger. Midrashim, however, finds common ground with the Thomist view of humanity’s response to the image of God in the stories of Cain and Abel filtered through the, “Book of Genealogies” (Gen 5:1-6:8). Insofar as the image and likeness of God is transmitted through the act of procreation, Cain and Abel provide examples of what constitutes adequate and inadequate response to the image, and how that image either becomes fully actualized or utterly forsaken. The murder of Cain is cast as preempting the perpetuation of the image through Abel’s potential descendants.[11] This idea may be likened to the Christian idea of “original sin” in that one’s transgression is seen to have grave unintended, or unforeseen, repercussions. Midrashim interprets Gen 4:10 as Abel’s blood crying out not only to God, but also “against” Cain, which lays the onus squarely on Adam’s firstborn.[12]

References edit

  1. ^ Middleton, J. Richard. "The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1." Grand Rapids: BrazosPress, 2005, p.19.
  2. ^ Grenz, Stanley J. "The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei." Louisville: John Knox Press, 2001, p. 142
  3. ^ Akin, Daniel L. "A Theology for the Church." Nashville: B & H Publishing Group, 2007, p. 387.
  4. ^ Grenz, p. 142.
  5. ^ Irenaeus. "Against Heresies," 23.1
  6. ^ Middleton, p. 19
  7. ^ Augustine. "De Trinitatae." Translated by Arthur West Haddan. From "Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3." Edited by Philip Schaff. Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887, XIII.26
  8. ^ Thomas Aquinas. "Summa Theologiae," Q 93, A 4 Body
  9. ^ Lieber, p. 9
  10. ^ Lieber, p. 18
  11. ^ Lieber, p. 26
  12. ^ Lieber, ibid.

--Pneumatechie (talk) 03:44, 4 December 2014 (UTC)