User:PenangLion/sandbox

The Great Flood of 1926 refers to a major flood that had occurred throughout British Malaya between 27 December 1926 and early January 1927. Regarded by contemporaries as one of the most destructive floods in Malayan history, the floods of 1926 broke several rainfall records of the region, killing 24. Despite affecting Klang Valley directly, areas as far as Pahang were impacted economically. Uninflated costs of damages were estimated to be $12,000 Straits dollars in Klang. It provoked numerous changes by the British colonial government on flood managements in British Malaya.

Events

Downpours began on 26 December 1926, which was to last until 29 December. By 27 December, fears of a major flood were mentioned in local newspapers. The fear was proven true when on the same day Kuala Lumpur suffered severe flooding.

Articles under attention

Local government in Malaysia
List of cities in Malaysia
List of cities in Malaysia by population

Test

George Town

Kuala Lumpur

Ipoh

Kuching

Johor Bahru

Putrajaya

Kota Kinabalu

Shah Alam

Malacca City

Alor Setar

Miri

Petaling Jaya

Kuala Terengganu

Iskandar Puteri

Seberang Perai

Seremban

Subang Jaya

Pasir Gudang

Kuantan

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Locations of cities in Malaysia

Criteria

Kuala Lumpur

Putrajaya

Shah Alam

Petaling Jaya

Subang Jaya

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Map of Klang Valley, or Greater Kuala Lumpur, with its constituent city-governments. Greater Kuala Lumpur, a metropolitan region centerd around the city of Kuala Lumpur, with a population of 8 million inhabitants, has five city-governments; three from Selangor, and two from the Federal Territories.

George Town

Seberang Perai

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Map of Greater Penang, with its constituent city-governments. Greater Penang, a metropolitan region centerd around the city of George Town, with a population of 3 million inhabitants, has two city-governments, both from Penang.

See also: Local government in Malaysia § Status criteria

Local governments or local authorities in Malaysia (Malay: pihak berkuasa tempatan, abbreviated PBT) are placed under the jurisdiction of their respective state governments. On the other hand, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Malay: Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan, abbreviated as KPKT) handles the classification and standardisation of local governments while providing them with consultations services (i.e. technical consultancy and federal funding). For the Federal Territories, their respective local governments are monitored by the Ministry of Federal Territories and Urban Wellbeing (Malay: Kementerian Wilayah Persekutuan, abbreviated KWP). The National Council of Local Governments (Malay: Majlis Negara Kerajaan Tempatan, abbreviated as MNKT), formed in 1960 by the federal government, is tasked on handling policies and laws related to local governments.

KPKT formally classifies local governments in three different categories: city councils, municipal councils, and district councils, with exceptions equivalent to the three respective categories. These categories are separated by certain requirements related to urban population, finances, and infrastructural developments. The 60th meeting of the MNKT, held on 3 June 2008, approved updated criterion on the selection process for the granting of city status on a local government:

1. The local government must administer a region that is an administrative center of a state;
2. The region must have a population of more than 500-thousand people;
3. The local government must be financially sustainable, with an annual income of not less than 100-million ringgit, and has the ability to afford stable administrative expenditures;
4. The local government must have an efficient bureaucratic structure, while maintaining public services at the highest-level, e.g. tax collection, development approvals, legal enforcement, and other necessary functions;
5. Urban developments planned by the local government should be sustainable;
6. The local government should give further emphasis on resolving social issues, i.e. squatting, pollution, safety, affordable housing, and environmental conservation. Studies conducted by the Malaysian Urban Indicators Network (MURNInet) would also be taken account of.
7. The local government must promote an urban image that is applicable towards the national identity as a representation of the country's heritage, and preserve any local objects or places of historical, cultural, or artistic significance;
8. The region must contain adequate resources and institutions of finance and industry to easily facilitate trade and foreign investments;
9. The region must be a local hub of education, complete with universities, colleges, museums and public libraries;
10. The region must be a center of culture, sports, and recreation;
11. The local government should have the ability to host conventions of national and international level;
12. The infrastructure of the region should be complete, with sufficient public utilities (e.g. disabled-persons friendly-public parks, public transportation, traffic management systems, road networks, computer services), and;
13. The region must achieve nationwide or international recognition equivalent to those of other cities worldwide.

List of tallest buildings in Malaysia

General information			City Coordinates	Specific information			Notes
Name		Image		Height m (ft)	Floors	Year		Ref.
	Merdeka 118 Formerly Warisan Merdeka Jawi: مرديک 118 Chinese: 默迪卡118		Kuala Lumpur 3°8′30″N 101°42′2″E	678.9 m (2,227 ft)	118	2022	Construction of the skyscraper topped out in 30 November 2021. The second tallest structure and skyscraper in the world, and the tallest in Southeast Asia. Pinnacle height is 680.5 m (2,233 ft), while occupied height is 502.8 m (1,650 ft), the fifth tallest in the world.
	Petronas Tower 1 Malay: Menara Berkembar Petronas Satu Jawi: منارا بركمبر ڤيترونس1 Chinese: 国油双峰塔一座 Tamil: பெற்றோனாசு கோபுரங்கள் (கோபுரம் 1)		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′29.16″N 101°42′41.60″E	451.9 m (1,483 ft)	88	1999	Tallest skyscraper in the world between 31 August 1999 and 31 December 2004, in Southeast Asia until 27 July 2018, and in Malaysia until 30 November 2021. It remains as the tallest twin-structure in the world. The first supertall building built in Malaysia, it is the centerpiece of the Kuala Lumpur City center.
	Petronas Tower 2 Malay: Menara Berkembar Petronas Dua Jawi: منارا بركمبر ڤيترونس2 Chinese: 国油双峰塔二座 Tamil: பெட்ரோனாஸ் கோபுரங்கள் (கோபுரம் 2)			451.9 m (1,483 ft)	88
	The Exchange 106 Malay: Menara Exchange 106 Jawi: ذى إيکسچينج 106 Chinese: 106交易塔		Kuala Lumpur 3°8′30.84″N 101°43′7.50″E	445.5 m (1,462 ft)	95	2019	Construction topped out in December 2017 within 19 months of commencement. Centerpiece project of the Tun Razak Exchange financial district, it was developed by the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), with a net office space of approximately 2,600,000 sq ft (240,000 m2).
	Four Seasons Place		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′28.5415″N 101°42′49.6678″E	342.5 m (1,124 ft)	75	2018
	Telekom Tower		Kuala Lumpur 3°6′56.99″N 101°39′58.00″E	310 m (1,017 ft)	55	2001
	The Astaka (Tower A) Malay: Menara Astaka A Chinese: 御庭阁甲座		Johor Bahru 1°28′26.3″N 103°45′47.1″E	278.8 m (915 ft)	72	2018
	Ilham Tower		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′31.97″N 101°43′7.90″E	274 m (899 ft)	58	2016
	Petronas Tower 3		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′24″N 101°42′40″E	267 m (876 ft)	60	2012
	Star Residences ONE		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′42.21781″N 101°42′46.75198″E	265 m (869 ft)	58	2019
	Ascott Star		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′40.88585″N 101°42′42.77426″E	265 m (869 ft)	58	2019
	The Astaka (Tower B) Malay: Menara Astaka B Chinese: 御庭阁乙座		Johor Bahru 1°28′26.3″N 103°45′47.1″E	255.6 m (839 ft)	67	2018
	Permata Sapura Formerly KLCC Lot 91 Malay: Menara Permata Sapura		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′10.8″N 101°42′49.3″E	252.5 m (828 ft)
	Star Residences TWO		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′39.46331″N 101°42′45.64066″E	251 m (823 ft)
	Conrad Kuala Lumpur		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′7.65029″N 101°42′33.45217″E	250 m (820 ft)
	Trion @ KL		Kuala Lumpur 3°7′26.32699″N 101°42′38.05117″E	250 m (820 ft)
	KOMTAR Malay: Menara KOMTAR Chinese: 光大大厦 Tamil: கொம்தார் கோபுரம்		George Town 5°24′52.380″N 100°19′47.244″E	248.7 m (816 ft)	68	1986	Tallest building in Malaysia between 1986 and 1987 and in Penang since 1986. Construction topped out in 1985, with 65-storeys and a height of 232 m (761 ft). Renovations in 2016 added 3 more storeys, extending the height to its present length.
	Maybank Tower Malay: Menara Maybank Chinese: 马来亚银行大厦 Tamil: மலாயா வங்கிக் கோபுரம்		Kuala Lumpur 3°8′49.92″N 101°41′58.92″E	243.5 m (799 ft)	50	1987	The tallest building in Malaysia and Kuala Lumpur between 1987 and 1998. Houses the headquarters of Maybank since its completion, and the Maybank Numismatic Museum since 2004.
	Vogue Suites 1Malay: Residensi Vogue 1		Kuala Lumpur 3°7′0.13602″N 101°40′25.75106″E	243 m (797 ft)	63	2017
	Grand Hyatt Kuala Lumpur		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′13.10″N 101°42′43.56″E	243 m (797 ft)	60	2012
	Southpoint Tower		Kuala Lumpur 3°6′57.73104″N 101°40′32.20943″E	243 m (797 ft)	56	2018
	Banyan Tree Signatures		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′1.07672″N 101°42′50.11668″E	240 m (787 ft)	55	2016
	Vista Tower Formerly the Empire Tower Malay: Menara Vista Chinese: 远景大厦		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′28″N 101°43′6″E	238.1 m (781 ft)	60	1994
	Vortex Tower		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′16.9″N 101°42′26.3″E	235 m (771 ft)	58	2016
	W Hotel & Tropicana The Residence		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′30.83519″N 101°42′34.36668″E	235 m (771 ft)	55	2018
	Lucentia Residences		Kuala Lumpur 3°8′21.21295″N 101°42′30.10964″E	233.8 m (767 ft)	59	2022
	Affin Tower		Kuala Lumpur 3°8′27.25166″N 101°43′10.92788″E	233 m (764 ft)	47	2021
	The FACE Platinum Suites		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′31.08643″N 101°42′15.19780″E	231 m (759 ft)	57	2015
	Elite Pavilion		Kuala Lumpur 3°9′31.08643″N 101°42′15.19780″E	230 m (755 ft)	50	2018
	Sky Suites @ KLCC B
	Equatorial Plaza
	Altus
	Nube
	Sora
	Bay Laurel Tower 1
	Royal Strand Tower 3
	Sky Suites @ KLCC A
	Felda Tower
	Naza Tower
	The FACE Victory Suites
	Tri Tower Residences 1
	Tri Tower Residences 2
	Maxis Tower
	Sky Suites @ KLCC C
	AmBank Tower
	JKG Tower
	Muze
	The Sentral Residences A
	The Sentral Residences B
	St. Regis Hotel & Residences
	Q Sentral
	The Troika Tower 3
	Eaton Residences			203.1 m (666 ft)
	Berjaya Times Square			203.1 m (666 ft)
				203.1 m (666 ft)
	Bay Laurel Tower 2
	K Residences
	Bangkok Bank Tower
	The Ritz Carlton Residences
	Le Nouvel Tower 1
	Lot G KL Sentral
	Kings Bay Tower 1
	Menara Multi Purpose
	Capital Square Tower 2
	Maju Perdana One
	Standard Chartered Tower
	The Lovell
	Silverscape Residences Tower 1
	Silverscape Residences Tower 2
	Tri Tower Capri by Fraser
	UOB Tower 2
	Citibank Tower

List of battles

General information					Casualties		Notes
Name		Image	Conflict	Period	Low est.	High est.
	Siege of Leningrad Russian: блокада Ленинграда German: Leningrader Blockade Finnish: Leningradin piiritys		World War II	8 September 1941 – 27 January 1944	1,117,000	5,500,000
	Battle of Stalingrad Russian: Сталинградская битва German: Schlacht von Stalingrad Finnish: Stalingradin taistelu		World War II	23 August 1942 – 2 February 1943	1,250,000	2,500,620
	Siege of Baghdad		Mongol invasions and conquests	29 January 1258 – 10 February 1258	100,000	2,500,620

Reformasi

Not to be confused with the Indonesian reformation era.

Reformasi
Street protests in Kuala Lumpur after Anwar Ibrahim's sentencing, April 1999.
Date	September 1998 – present
Location	Malaysia
Caused by	Dissatisfaction with the federal government under the fifth Mahathir cabinet Factionalism within the United Malays National Organisation since the 1970s Other immediate causes
Goals	Resignation of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad Anwar Ibrahim's assumption of the Prime Ministership Ending Mahathirism Reform for social equality, social justice and meritocracy
Methods	Civil disobedience Demonstration Sit-in Rioting Occupation Online activism
Resulted in	Formation of Barisan Alternatif, Pakatan Rakyat and Pakatan Harapan Anwar detained under Internal Security Act in 1998, subsequently jailed and released from prison in 2004 Anwar becomes Leader of the Opposition twice, between 2008 and 2015, and later from 2020 onwards Resignation of Mahathir Mohamad in 2003 and Abdullah Badawi in 2009 Electoral loses of Barisan Nasional in the 2008, 2013 and 2018 Malaysian general election
Parties
1998–2004: Alternative Front (BA) National Justice Party (KEADILAN, 1998–2003) Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM, 1998–2003) People's Justice Party (PKR, 2003–2004) Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) Democratic Action Party (DAP, 1998–2001) Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) Social Justice Movement (ADIL) Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM) Malaysian Chinese Organizations' Election Appeals Committee (SUQIU) 1998–2003: National Front (BN) United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) Malaysian People's Movement Party (GERAKAN) Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) Government of Malaysia Royal Malaysian Police Fifth Mahathir cabinet Sixth Mahathir cabinet
Lead figures
Anwar Ibrahim Mahathir Mohamad
Number
Several hundred thousands

Reformasi is a political movement in Malaysia. It was initiated in September 1998 by Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, after he was sacked from his position by Malaysia's then-Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad. The movement, which began while the country hosted the Commonwealth Games, initially demanded the resignation of Malaysia's then-Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, and for the end of alleged corruption and cronyism within the Barisan Nasional-led (BN) government. It later became a reformist movement demanding social equality and social justice in Malaysia. The movement consisted of civil disobedience, demonstrations, sit-ins, rioting, occupations and online activism.

Building on the momentum of Reformasi, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, Anwar's wife, formed and led the Social Justice Movement (Malay: Pergerakan Keadilan Sosial, known by its abbreviations, ADIL) in late-1998. However, after facing difficulties in registering ADIL as a formal political party, remnants of the movement merged with the Ikatan Masyarakat Islam Malaysia (IKATAN), a minor Islamic political party based in Terengganu, leading to the formation of Parti Keadilan Nasional (PKN) in 1999. Along with the Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) and Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), Barisan Alternatif (BA) was formed in 24 October 1999, and contested in the 1999 and 2004 Malaysian general election.

In 2003, PKN and PRM merged and became the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). PKR was instrumental in the creation of Pakatan Rakyat (PR), which scored electoral successes in the general elections of 2008 and 2013, and later as Pakatan Harapan (PH) in the 2018 Malaysian general election, which saw BN losing its parliamentary majority for the first time since 1955. Despite electoral successes in recent decades, the Reformasi movement, as recent as 2018, is still seen as an ongoing political movement in the country.

Background

Domestic political and bureaucratic Islamization

The local politicization of Islam in the Malay Peninsula was first observed in the 1920s, with the arrival of modernist ulamak (English: religious scholars) in British Malaya that called upon the rejection of traditionalist interpretations of Islam. This interpretation was later incorporated into the local bureaucracy, with the formation of several state departments and a system of Sharia courts related to such affairs. After the Second World War, the first Malayan Islamic political parties were established, e.g. the Hizbul Muslimin (HM, March–August 1948), and the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS, 1951–present). They initially pursued anti-colonialist stances, with the ultimate goal being independent from British control, and the formation of a Malayan Darul Islam (English: Islamic state) through democratic processes.

Political dissent of the Rahman-era

By the 1960s, the typical Malay youth was described as being engrossed in Western hedonism, popularized by entertainment media. Voices of Malay dissent against the pro-western Rahman governments were characterized in two distinct blocs: the socialists, and the Islamists.

Abdul Razak (left), and Harun Idris (right).

The socialists, led by Malay intellectuals such as Ishak Haji Muhammad, Syed Husin Ali, Kassim Ahmad, Ahmad Boestamam, etc., represented the Malayan Peoples' Socialist Front (SF), a coalition of left-wing political parties, including the Labour Party of Malaya (LPM), Malaysian People's Party (PRM), and National Convention Party (NCP) between 1957 and 1966, who fought against acute socio-economic disparities present during the post-independence era. The Islamists traditionally converged around Burhanuddin al-Helmy's Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), where they opposed against the liberal-capitalist and secularistic attitudes of the ruling Alliance. Both voices of dissent were unable to counter against the vast political resources expended by the Alliance, hence their influences were only retained in the rural states of Kedah, Terengganu, and Kelantan.

Malaysian women protest against Indonesian infiltration during the Konfrontasi. The formation of Malaysia had stoked racial tensions and led to threats on national security, thereby limiting Islam's influence in politics.

The brief period of Konfrontasi (1963–1966) against Indonesia after the formation of Malaysia in September 1963 allowed the Alliance to retain support among the masses on the basis of national security. As a result, several politicians and intellects suspected to be pro-Indonesian were arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA). This included Burhanuddin and Mohamed Hanifah Abdul Ghani, who were both arrested in 1965. Despite Burhanuddin's plead of innocence, the Alliance government was able to exploit his past as an advocate of Indonesia Raya, casting doubt on the Islamist movement's loyalty towards the country. Meanwhile, state propaganda portrayed PAS as a parochial party who thrived upon communal antipathy harbored by the Malay peasantry against economically advanced Chinese and Indian communities. Both aspects destroyed support for PAS as its understanding of Malay nationalism was believed to be a threat towards inter-racial harmony within the country.

Burhanuddin al-Helmy (left), and Lee Kuan Yew (right).

Focus on the Islamists further weakened when it was overshadowed by racial tensions incited between the Singaporean People's Action Party (PAP), led by Lee Kuan Yew, who advocated the anti-discriminatory Malaysian Malaysia policy, and nationalistic leaders within the Alliance's United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), who supported the Ketuanan Melayu concept, leading to cases of sectarian violence (e.g. Singapore, 1964; and Penang, 1967). These tensions limited conscience of Islam as a political issue.

Secular materialistic Malay nationalism

See also: 13 May incident and Malaysian New Economic Policy

In 13 May 1969, political demonstrations held after the 1969 Malaysian general election, amidst the heightening of racial tensions, created severe riots and cases of sectarian violence across Kuala Lumpur. After the riots, later known to be the 13 May incident, Malaysian partisan politics saw a rise of Islamic resurgence. It created surroundings similar to those of ethnic clashes during the postwar period. Islamic political slogans became rallying cries of the Malays. Mosques became the site of political gatherings, ulama acquired roles of leadership, and talismans became popular items of interest. The 13 May incident demonstrated fears of "non-Malay imperialism" against the Malay society, and led to the notion of Islam becoming the solution towards the Malay's socioeconomic and political issues. It was seen as a popular reaction from the Malays against the traditionally secular humanist administrative elites in the Malaysian government. This philosophical attitude was reflected on the introduction of the Rukun Negara in August 1970, intended as a post-1969 reconciliation strategy to promote and uphold the principles of national unity. The national concept had lacklustre references towards Islam, except from mentioning it as a state religion.

Abdul Razak Hussein's administration emphasized secular-materialistic Malay nationalist policies, culminating in the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971.

The national policies introduced by the newly-installed Razak administration (under the leadership of Abdul Razak Hussein) following the events in 1969 emphasized the Malay ethnicity over Islam. Restrictions were made on the rights to question and discuss the "special rights" obtained through the concept of Ketuanan Melayu through constitutional amendments. Leading nationalistic politicians within UMNO purged after their alleged racial incitement and critical remarks of Tunku's response towards the 1969 riots were politically rehabilitated. In the UMNO General Assembly of 1973, then-Deputy Prime Minister Ismail Abdul Rahman reaffirmed the position of the Malays as the "basis of the nation". This stance was also echoed by then-Minister of Home Affairs Ghazali Shafie, who predicted the future of Malaysian politics would be based on "kebumiputeraan". The introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, although aimed to uplift the economic situation of all Malaysians, was seen as a solution to quiet Malay discontent on socioeconomic inequalities. The NEP evolved from a plan to eradicate poverty, to a tool of wealth redistribution, marking the transition of Malaysia's bureaucracy to state capitalism.

The Razak administration had no intentions on elevating Islam's ceremonial status within the country. Abdul Razak promoted Senu Abdul Rahman's 1971 book Revolusi Mental (English: Mental Revolution), a treatise on secular materialism, praising it as "an important milestone in the thinking of our [Malay] intellectuals". It became the "Bible" of the Malay nationalists of the 1970s, as the de facto blueprint for UMNO and the government's envisions on the reconstruction of Malay society after the 13 May incident. Revolusi Mental encouraged the accumulation of unlimited wealth among the Malay social classes by emulating the methods devised by the traditionally capitalistic Chinese, Japanese, Germans, Jews and Americans, in a competition of the "survival of the fittest", overturning the common Malay social displays of collectivism and dependence on the government. Revolusi Mental uses J. Paul Getty as an "ideal hero", an example of materialistic success, even stating that "he need not be good by religious or moral standards". It sees itself without contradictions between self-interest and the moral good, even quoting the Quran and Hadith to demonstrate the compatibility of capitalistic decisions with Islamic values.

Despite such intentions, the NEP-based re-construction policies of the 1970s provoked Islam to gain much more prominence, as the Malays searched for a national identity following the events in 1969. The 1971 National Culture Congress generated the consensus that Islam would be integral in shaping the Malaysian culture.

Dakwah movement (1968–1982)

See also: Dawah

The Malay word dakwah, with its origins from its Arabic counterpart da'wah (English: to call, invitation), has been traditionally related to the enforcement and deepening of the Muslim faith, conforming their values to Islamic principles. The modern concept of da'wah was first revived by the late-Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909) as the duty of a caliph. The importance of da'wah was widely resonated among the Islamic world throughout the early-half of the 20th century. In the 1960s and 1970s, various Arabian states competed for international Islamic influence through organizations that prioritized da'wah. By the mid-1960s, the concept drew significant popularity in Indonesia. In Malaysia, the da'wah embodied in the form of the dakwah movement, initiated in Kuala Lumpur during the late-1960s and early-1970s by then-newly founded Islamic youth groups, e.g. the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), the Jamaah Tabligh, and the Al-Arqam. It was an urban Islamic religious movement, that promoted proselytistic activities in university campuses and urban neighbourhoods in the city, aiming for greater Islamization of the country by seeking extensive applications of Islamic laws and values within the social, economic and spiritual development within the Malaysian society.

International events in the Islamic world during the Arab Cold War, especially the Iranian Revolution and the wars in the Levant throughout the 1970s, radicalized Malaysian Islamists with inspirations derived from the events.

Clockwise, from top-left:

• Six-Day War, 1967;
• Iranian Revolution, 1978–1979;
• Seizure of the Grand Mosque, 1979;
• Soviet–Afghan War, 1979–1989;

The Malaysian dakwah movement, in general, was distinct; it emerged first in urban surroundings, and in Kuala Lumpur specifically, due to its population size, and the lack of kinship present among immigrated rural Muslims in the city, which was the binding factor to regulate social and religious affairs. The popular alternative available were urban religious organisations, where they could enforce Islamic teachings to its followers. It was expressed as a "challenge" towards "the state, the political elites and religious authority" for religious change. However, the main organisations behind the movement did not advocate for a Darul Islam like the Islamist political parties of the pre-independence era, instead it confined itself to civil society and shunned involvement in partisan politics.

Islamists were aware of ongoing major events across the Islamic world, e.g. Six-Day War (1967), the Libyan revolution (1969), Yom Kippur War (1973), the Iranian Revolution (1978–1979), seizure of the Grand Mosque (1979), and the Soviet invasion of Afganhistan (1979–1980). In particular, the wars in the Levant and the Iranian Revolution attracted the most serious implications; the struggle for the Palestinian cause reverberated among the Malays for their parallel struggles of non-Malay economic dominance in the country, while the Iranian Revolution inspired local Islamists that a revolutionary overthrow of secular governments would be viable. Domestically and internationally, the discovery of petroleum reserves in Malaysian waters, and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OAPEC) actions during the 1973 oil crisis brought confidence for the Islamists, both morally and financially, to continue the dakwah movement, achieving prominence in politics between 1979 and 1982.

Islamization of the government under Mahathir Mohamad

In 1969, Mahathir Mohamad, then an UMNO Member of Parliament in Kota Setar, and Anwar Ibrahim, then a student activist, first met following the 13 May incident. They were both opposed to Tunku's response towards the racial riots. Mahathir spoke at student meetings organised by Anwar, and student journals published by Anwar even published a chapter from Mahathir's The Malay Dilemma, after it had been banned immediately after the book's publication in 1970. They parted ways afterwards, with Mahathir returning to UMNO in 1973, and Anwar continuing as a political activist by joining ABIM, becoming its president in 1974. In December 1974, Anwar was detained and arrested under the ISA after participating in anti-inflation protests held by students from the University of Malaya. The arrests were presumed to have been ordered by Mahathir himself, who was the Minister of Education at the time. He was released in 1976.

Due to the huge popularity of the dakwah movement, several mainstream political parties, UMNO and PAS alike, began expanding their Islamisation programmes to gain appeal to supporters of the movement. In 1982, Mahathir, who had succeeded as Prime Minister the year before, persuaded Anwar to join UMNO, a decision made to improve the image of the party's stance on Islam. The party was also Islamized, adopting symbols, slogans, rhetorics, and concepts derived from the dakwah movement. The Malaysian government in the 1980s also underwent heavy Islamization, with the implementation of education policies on nilai-nilai murni (English: sacred values), to the foundation of Islamic banking, financial and educational institutions. PAS also became fundamentalist, while reinstating their goals of establishing a Darul Islam and the use of the hudud laws of code.

UMNO party factionalism after 1970

By 1998, Malaysia's government was largely under the influence of Barisan Nasional (BN), the ruling coalition of country since 1955. Reformasi, as a movement, took place from the overt split within the leadership of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the leading component political party of BN. However, it was not the first time such splits have occurred.

New Order, Old Order (1971–1976)

See also: 1972 United Malays National Organisation leadership election and 1975 United Malays National Organisation leadership election

Abdul Razak (left), and Harun Idris (right).

Following the 13 May incident, the premiership of Tunku Abdul Rahman came under scrutiny. He resigned as Prime Minister in 1970. The position was assumed by Abdul Razak, his deputy, in 1971. His inaugural speech, as the President of UMNO, was titled New Order, Old Order, a title that sparked heavy debate within party members regarding Abdul Razak's intentions, which was left unexplained. After the speech, Abdul Razak denied the existence of the Old Order (described as traditional party elders from the Abdul Rahman-era of leadership), and the New Older (described as party youths of nationalist sentiments, who included Mahathir Mohamad), a statement that was later disputed.

During the 1972 UMNO party elections, contentions for the position of Vice-President was prioritized due to the unlikeliness of Ismail Abdul Rahman, the Deputy Prime Minister, of becoming Prime Minister after Abdul Razak's departure. It meant that the position of joint-Vice-Presidents, equivalent to the third and fourth most important leaders in UMNO, became possible contenders as future Prime Ministers. Severe divisions were observed when an attempt made by Ghazali Shafie to get elected as one of two Vice-Presidents failed when Selangor UMNO, led by Harun Idris, opposed his nomination. This resulted in a rivalry between both politicians. The rift widened when Ismail died in 1973, an influential member within the Old Order. His death marked a shift of the balance of power towards the New Order.

Ismail Abdul Rahman, 1963.

Harun, the Menteri Besar of Selangor, and the leader of UMNO Youth, had already been perceived by pro-Abdul Razak politicians as a "threat" towards Abdul Razak's leadership. He has been labelled as the "representative of an increasingly militant communal wing in UMNO". Along with Syed Nasir Ismail and Syed Jaafar Albar, they were described as part of the first generation of UMNO's "ultra" faction, a negative connotation used for rising UMNO leaders with ultranationalistic tendencies since the 1960s. His supporters labelled the political rivalry with Abdul Razak as a "communist affair". UMNO Youth accused communist elements of infiltrating the party to approach Abdul Razak, and in several instances, during UMNO Youth meetings in December 1975 and July 1976, there were accusations of "an Aidit and Subandrio in UMNO" (both prominent Indonesian politicians of communist sympathies). In 1974, Abdul Samad Idris was nominated by Shafie to challenge Harun's position of UMNO Youth chief. Abdul Razak intervened in the matter on Abdul Samad's side, with a promise of full-ministerial roles in exchange for publicly opposing Harun. In the end, however, the nomination did not succeed.

Tunku Abdul Rahman, 1968.

After Ismail's death, discontent grew within UMNO against Abdul Razak's tenure. It was attributed to his inability of uniting the party's growing divisions, and his reliance on anti-Tunku party leaders, notably Abdul Ghafar Baba, Abdullah Ahmad, and others, who removed pro-Tunku politicians from government functions (e.g. Khir Johari). In the 1975 UMNO General Assembly, Abdul Razak made a speech openly endorsing three candidates among the eight contesting for the party's vice-presidency in the 1975 party elections. His intention of swaying the election outcome was vehemently attacked in an unprecedented manner within the assembly.

At the same time, there were interests of replacing Abdul Razak as UMNO's leader, but party members were reluctant on appointing Harun, who was accepted as the only other contender for the position, due to growing accusations against his radical actions since 1970. Thus, there were calls of bringing the retired Tunku back to replace Abdul Razak once more, a move Tunku himself was not prepared. However, by 1975, triggered by the recent communist victory in the Vietnam War, and economic stagnation within the country, Tunku began to return to politics. In spite of the decision he never returned to the field directly, believing that national politics should be ran by the younger generation. His act of participation was done through in the form of writing columns in The Star that ridiculed the political situation in Malaysia under Abdul Razak's tenure, which offended Abdul Razak's supporters. His actions were countered in an attempt to silence his opinions by controlling The Star under pro-Abdul Razak owners by forcing the newspaper to sell shares to Abdullah Ahmad, who had control of the New Straits Times and the Malay Mail. This attempt was later thwarted when upon the consultation of Mustapha Harun, Tunku's allies bought the majority stake of the newspaper.

Abdul Razak died from leukemia in January 1976. Even though he appointed Hussein Onn as his deputy after Ismail's death, he wasn't trusted upon by other top officials within UMNO, a situation Onn was fully aware. Harun was eventually expelled from the party, upon his refusal to resign from his political positions within UMNO amidst corruption indictments in 1976. His removal from UMNO was controversial and was met with demands of his restoration as an UMNO member. He was arrested in 1977, and sentenced to six months in prison (later extended to four years). Despite the sentencing he was elected within UMNO's Supreme Council in 1978, and was given a royal pardon in 1981.

Razaleigh–Mahathir split (1987–1996)

See also: 1987 United Malays National Organisation leadership election and 1988 Malaysian constitutional crisis

Mahathir Mohamad (left), and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (right).

In 1987, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah challenged Mahathir for the presidency of UMNO. It was the first time since 1978 when an incumbent president of the party was contested. His candidacy was labelled as "Team B", as opposed to Mahathir's "Team A". Tengku Razaleigh selected former Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam as his running mate, who resigned from his position in 1986 over disagreements with Mahathir.

During the party elections held in April 1987, Razaleigh lost the presidential election by only 43 votes from the 1,479 delegates present. His running mate, Musa Hitam, lost the deputy presidential election to Abdul Ghafar Baba (Mahathir's running mate) by a margin of just 40 votes. This result was heavily disputed by Tengku Razaleigh's supporters, who claimed the election was rigged. The split worsened when Mahathir subsequently purged all "Team B" supporters in his cabinet. The dispute was then intervened by the Federal Court, and by 1988 it triggered a serious constitutional crisis in the country, which resulted in the suspension of judicial independence in Malaysia. The crisis brought heavy criticisms towards Mahathir.

Tengku Razaleigh left UMNO after the crisis, and formed Parti Melayu Semangat 46 (S46) in June 1989, establishing electoral collaborations with the Islamist Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the largely-Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP) to compete in subsequent elections. In the 1990 and 1995 Malaysian general election, the parties held an informal electoral alliance with the United Sabah Party (PBB) under the Gagasan Rakyat (GR) coalition, but enjoyed little success. GR dissolved in 1996, which saw S46 members returning to UMNO, including Tengku Razeleigh.

Imprisonment of Lim Guan Eng

In 1994, a 15-year old Malay schoolgirl accused then-chief minister of Malacca, Abdul Rahim Thamby Chik of statutory rape. She also accused thirteen other men to have involved in illicit sexual acts (in seventeen different instances). Eight of the accused later confessed to their acts. Rahim was by then the UMNO Youth Chief, and a staunch ally of Mahathir's government since the 1980s. Initial controversy erupted when the alleged victim was detained by the police in August 1994 under "protective custody". When questioned, she was told to not lodge reports against the chief minister.

Amidst the allegations, the prosecutor, Attorney General Mohtar Abdullah dropped Rahim's case in October 1994, citing a lack of evidence. Furthermore, the courts decided to place the girl under custody of a rehabilitation center for "wayward girls" for three years. Abdul Hamid Othman, a minister in the Prime Minister's Department, was even reportedly proposing to persecute the girl under Islamic law. Mohtar's ruling was met with outrage: accusations of biasness arose, and protest statements were made by several women rights groups. In November 1994, Mahathir's daughter, Marina, published a newspaper article titled Whither justice?, describing the girls' treatment by the authorities as a "gross mockery of justice". Pressured by public opinion, Rahim resigned his ministerial position on 21 November 1994. The scandal was part of an emerging debate in the country during the early-1990s over gender issues.

Lim Guan Eng, 2008.

Dissatisfied with the prosecution, the grandmother of the alleged victim attempted to secure her granddaughter's release. In early-1995, she asked for the assistance of Lim Guan Eng, an opposition member of parliament (MP) of Kota Melaka on this issue. Lim published statements on behalf of the girl, criticizing the government for not acting against Rahim, and Mohtar for applying "double standards" on the final ruling. Because of his remarks, Lim was accused on 23 February 1995 for prompting "disaffection with the administration of justice in Malaysia". On 13 March, he was again accused of spreading "false information maliciously", referring to the printing of five-thousand pamphlets, titled Victim imprisoned, criminal free, that denoted the phrase "imprisoned victim" to describe the girl, which was considered false by the authorities. He was arrested and charged with sedition under the Sedition Act 1948 and Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984. His trial began on 20 June 1995.

In 1997, he was found guilty and was given a fine of 15,000 ringgit (equivalent to 25,800 ringgit by 2022 value, inflation adjusted) by the high court. However, following the dismissal of his appeal, the verdict was soon changed to two simultaneous 18-month prison terms. This meant he was disqualified from his parliamentary seat, and was imprisoned in August 1998. On 25 August 1998, Lim was declared a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International, who demanded his immediate release. In February 1999, an Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) report cited that Lim's imprisonment failed to comply with international standards. Lim's conviction ignited popular dissatisfaction against the government and the judicial system, and attracted widespread sympathy from both Chinese Malaysians and Malays, as he, a Chinese politician, had put himself in risk for defending a Malay girl and her family, seen as a rare occurrence in the racially-divided country. When he was released from prison in late-August 1999, a year after his conviction, he was given a welcome by a multiracial crowd, who greeted him as a "hero".

1997 Asian financial crisis

Main article: 1997 Asian financial crisis

Annual growth of GDP per capita in affected countries from 1995 to 2000

Between 1986 and 1996, the Malaysian economy was dubbed as one of the "miracle economies" in East Asia, with high average gross domestic product (GDP) growth, low inflation rates, and high employment rate. In this period, successive governments under Mahathir's leadership had steered the liberalization of the economy. Monetary and fiscal policies remained largely prudent. The arrival of Anwar as Minister of Finance in 1991 also contributed several financial policies.

However, from July 1997 onwards, Malaysia was affected by the financial crisis that had begun in Thailand three months prior, causing significant inflation in the Malaysian ringgit and a collapse of local stock markets. The Malaysian economy suffered its first recession since 1985. In January 1998, the ringgit registered the historic high of RM 4.88 to the US dollar, a major difference from the average of RM 2.42 to a US dollar in April 1997. Malaysian stock markets, especially the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), the third largest in Asia at the time (behind the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange) lost 76 per cent of its value by September 1998, the largest contraction among the stock markets of all economies affected in the region. Multiple vital corporate sectors (e.g. property, construction, real) suffered setbacks due to the event. There were concerns that Wawasan 2020, the national ideal in place since 1991, would fail due to the recession. The Malaysian economy would not recover until 1999.

Conflicts on economic recovery policies

Mahathir Mohamad (left), and Anwar Ibrahim (right). Conflict between both leaders began when Mahathir believed external factors caused the 1997 crisis, and rejecting all forms of foreign help. Anwar believed in receiving help from the IMF and supporting transparency within the economy.

Mahathir believed external issues was to blame on the financial turmoil. He accused currency speculators (e.g. George Soros) for causing the crisis. Mahathir opposed any intervention from the IMF, as well as favoring loose monetary and fiscal policies, a decision noted by himself in April 1998 as crony capitalism. The policy was opposed by Anwar, where he and his supporters reflected the opposition by circulating the Indonesian anti-Suharto slogan of opposing korrupsi, kroniyisma, and nepotisma (KKN), while also highlighting Anwar's stance on ketelusan (English: transparency). It was noted that after June 1998, Mahathir actually supported reforms for more transparency on the KLSE. Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, i.e. in the 1996 UMNO General Assembly, Mahathir also initiated tougher legislations to crack down on corruption within UMNO.

Contrary to Mahathir, responding to the financial downturn, Anwar sought to approach and work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to resolve the financial problems by focusing on internal issues within the Malaysian economy. This had been the case for most of the East Asian economies that had suffered during the crisis (e.g. Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia), whose economic relief policies were planned under directives from the IMF. Under Anwar's beliefs, economic reforms were promoted based on free market systems and economic transparency. In December 1998, he instituted an austerity package that cut government spending, ministerial salaries, and putting the construction of several major infrastructural projects (e.g. the Bakun Dam) on hold.

Up until mid-1998, economic policies were devised under consultations from the IMF. Due to foreign indebtedness, the Malaysian government initially did not apply for direct assistance from the IMF, but instead independently adopted several standard IMF policies at the time. These policies did not aid with the situation, however; It instead exacerbated the crisis, causing a full-blown economic crisis to occur by 1998. On 8 January 1998, the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) was set up to respond against the crisis. The council was headed by former Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin, Mahathir's long time confidant. It took control of any plans of crisis management, shifting the responsibility from the Ministry of Finance towards the Prime Minister's Department. The creation of the NEAC allowed a forum of discussion between Mahathir, Anwar, and Daim, surrounding their opinions on financial recovery, although the final decision still remained under Mahathir's control. On 23 July 1998, the results from the discussions within the NEAC were formally tabled and released publicly in a 200-page report as the National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP), a multi-billion ringgit comprehensive package aimed at infrastructure, development, and small firm lending. An unorthodox move against the IMF's measures, it was agreed by commentators as prudent, and represented a move towards looser monetary and fiscal policies. Various measures were undertaken to reverse most of the previous reforms launched in 1997. In August 1998, the KLSE suffered another crash. At the end of that month, the Malaysian economy officially slipped into a recession. On 1 September 1998, Mahathir announced capital controls on local currencies, pegging the ringgit to the US dollar, a radical move that challenged the commonly negative international perception of such measures.

Effects on political instability

During Mahathir's first tenure as Prime Minister, several major infrastructural megaprojects were initiated and completed. Anwar was reportedly not fond of Mahathir's lavish spendings for Malaysia's international prestige.

Clockwise, from top-left:

• Penang Bridge, 1982–1986;
• Petronas Towers, 1992–1996;
• KLIA, 1993–1998;
• Putrajaya, 1995–2001

There was a difference in how both leaders approached in handling the crisis. Mahathir extended his attacks on the crisis to foreign speculators and traders. He also designated unpredictable interventionist policies on stock market management. Both situations created unnerving fears and antagonized those within the markets. In contrast, Anwar, whose charisma on public media calmed the domestic and international markets, had created disdain within Mahathir, as such moves would strengthen international confidence on Anwar's leadership and pressure himself to step down as Prime Minister. The appointment of Daim as the head of the NEAC was also seen as a move to limit Anwar's power in the decision-making process.

On the other hand, the Malaysian government had fostered economic developments within the Malay society for decades with national policies, notably the NEP (1971–1991) and its successor, the National Development Policy (NDP, 1991–2001). It hoped to create a new generation of Malay industrialists to compete with non-Malay and foreign competition. Through incentives and the creation of government-controlled corporations, where investments and contract distributions favored the Malays, it bonded Malay private corporations with different political factions within UMNO. These circumstances fell through when the recession created a huge toll on the Malay corporate sector. The government was forced to decide on which corporations that will receive relief and financial support. Mahathir, as Prime Minister, had the largest control over these affairs, but Anwar held certain influence within those decisions. The acquisitions of several corporations, e.g. Perwaja Steel, Renong, and Malaysian Airlines System provided conflict between the two over certain terms within government deals. During negotiations for the buyout of Konsortium Perkapalan, a shipping line owned by Mirzan Mahathir (Mahathir's son) by Petronas, he was reportedly displeased when Anwar accepted the terms of purchase according to independent assessments through international shipping standards, which provided a lower than expected price.

Anwar was also reportedly not fond of Mahathir's lavish spendings on administration, especially with his interest on constructing megaprojects across the country (e.g. Sepang International Circuit, Petronas Towers, Kuala Lumpur Tower, etc.) to pursue prestige for Malaysia in the international stage, albeit his opinions were muted only until after he left UMNO. He did not oppose the initiation of the Putrajaya project, which involved the construction of a new administrative capital, but did complain that Mahathir had spent government funds to construct his own extravagances, e.g. personal houses and a premium corporate jet.

1998–1999 Nipah virus outbreak

Main article: 1998–1999 Malaysia Nipah virus outbreak

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Unprocessed

Accusations of corruption within Mahathir's government

During the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, UMNO party leaders accused Mahathir of mismanaging the economic crisis. A concert of attacks followed, including a claim made by a Time magazine article that Mahathir has funnelled a $250 million loan to his son through political party connections. Overt attempts by some in the ruling elite to protect ailing beneficiaries and "clients" from the full thrust of market forces in the wake of the financial crisis like the above largely contributed to the friction between Mahathir and Anwar, with the latter commonly believed to have been less willing to yield to the government's financial bail-outs of these cronies.

As more of the business conglomerates created by symbiotic relationships between government and business elites started to face financial ruin, political ramifications inevitably spread to the highest levels of the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO)/Barisan Nasional coalition. When Anwar continued to resist some of these attempts at rescuing politically-linked businesses, he was politically neutralized by first being arrested and then charged with corruption and sexual misconduct. Months before Anwar's arrest, Mahathir had been granting more responsibility for economic policy-making to Daim Zainuddin, a financial strongman, thus limiting Anwar's power. Mahathir accused Anwar for being a "puppet" of foreign powers and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), out to re-colonize Malaysia and the arrest was partly due to Anwar's economic mismanagement. Mahathir claimed that Anwar and his supporters were guilty of corruption and cronyism and that he had led the country to the brink of economic disaster by following the wishes of the IMF. Anwar was a "liar and an agitator, detained for this in 1974, and now returning to his old ways. Above all else, disregarding court warnings on the issue."

Despite Mahathir's clear enmity against the IMF, Anwar stated that the government "have an excellent rapport with the IMF officials and that they did say that Malaysia did not need IMF's rescue". Despite Mahathir's use of state's funds to bail out several prominent conglomerates, Anwar defended his opposition to government's bailouts and lack of transparency.

1998–1999 Nipah virus outbreak

Main article: 1998–1999 Malaysia Nipah virus outbreak

1998 Indonesian crises

May 1998 riots

Fall of Suharto

Political conflict between Anwar and Mahathir

History

Early relations between Anwar and Mahathir

In 1982, Mahathir, who had succeeded as Prime Minister the year before, persuaded Anwar to join UMNO. Anwar would eventually become Mahathir's protégé, maintaining the view of Mahathir as a "father figure". Rising through the ranks with ministerial appointments between 1983 and 1993, Anwar took on the role as Deputy Prime Minister after UMNO party elections in 1993, succeeding Ghafar Baba.

Initial protests

In early September 1998, Anwar Ibrahim, who was the Deputy Prime Minister, was unceremoniously removed from his positions in government and UMNO. He was fired for sexual misconduct. Even before charges were laid, Mahathir explained in graphic detail – repeated in stunningly explicit lead articles and banner headlines in the press – that his deputy was guilty of adultery, sodomy, and was trying to cover up evidences of his trysts. However, Anwar was not immediately detained. For 18 days he toured the country, giving extremely well attended public lectures on justice, the purported evils of Mahathirism, the prevalence of cronyism and corruption, the needs for social safety nets and the urgency to reform. Anwar averred that he had been pressing for change from within, and stressed on his role in developing low-cost housing and people-friendly policies while in government. He was largely supported by Islamic NGOs and a wide array of other groups and organizations. Islamist Groups in particular command an immense grassroots network. They were able to rouse tens of thousands of mostly Malay youths to espouse Anwar's cause and his calls for Reformasi. Opposition parties, such as DAP and PAS, have also proclaimed their support.

The movement borrowed their idiom from the campaign in the neighboring country of Indonesia against President Suharto earlier that year, which protested against the thirty-some years of Suharto rule in pursuit of "Reformasi", which successfully ended with his resignation on 21 May. Before his arrest on 20 September, Anwar travelled across the country, giving huge crowds public lectures on justice, the prevalence of cronyism and corruption, the urgency for social safety nets and so on. These groups controlled an expansive grassroots network and were able to garner tens of thousands of mostly Malay youths to support Anwar's cause and his calls for Reformasi.

Opposition parties such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) also extended their support. After leading a huge rally in Kuala Lumpur on 20 September 1998, amid the Commonwealth Games and the United Kingdom's Queen Elizabeth II's visit to Kuala Lumpur, Anwar was finally arrested and detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA). A number of his followers were also held under the ISA, and hundreds of demonstrators were eventually charged with illegal assembly and related offences.

After leading an enormous rally in Kuala Lumpur on 20 September 1998, Anwar was finally arrested, together with a number of his followers. In addition, hundreds of demonstrators were eventually charged with illegal assembly and related offenses. Anwar was initially held under the ISA before other charges were specified. Opposition to the ISA became a central issue to Reformasi movement. Nine days after his arrest, Anwar appeared in court with serious head and neck injuries. As the Royal Commission of Inquiry concluded in March 1999, Anwar had been beaten in the custody by Rahim Noor, the then Inspector General of Police (IGP) and was later found guilty of assault and jailed for two months in 2000. Anwar was eventually sentenced to six years' imprisonment for corruption in April 1999 and nine years' imprisonment for sodomy two months later by the Malaysia High Court. His trial and conviction were widely discredited by the international community. Amnesty International stated that the trial proceedings "exposed a pattern of political manipulation of key state institutions including the police, public prosecutor’s office and the judiciary" and declared Anwar a prisoner of conscience, stating that he had been arrested in order to silence him as a political opponent.

Once Anwar had been detained, the Reformasi movement continued to develop, with "Justice for Anwar" remaining a potent rallying call. Before his arrest, Anwar had designated his wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail as the successor of the movement. Wan Azizah developed an enormous following, attracting thousands to her emotional but rather banal speeches. For a time, these followers held massive weekend street demonstrations, mostly in Kuala Lumpur but also occasionally in Penang and other cities, for "keadilan" (justice) and against Mahathir.

Reformasi protesters demanded protection for civil liberties and repeal of the ISA. They decried constraints on the media and the judiciary and lambasted what was called KNN (korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme) (corruption, cronyism and nepotism). Others also called for Islamization as the solution to the perceived moral decay of the government and society. Shouts of Allabu Akhbar (God is great) and takbir (a call to praise God) peppered demonstrations, many of which took place around mosques and at prayer times. The demonstrations were met with increasingly harsh crackdowns by the police.

These street protests had largely tapered out by mid-November, but they resumed at key moments, such as the announcement and anniversaries of the verdicts on Anwar's cases.

Demonstrations intensified by the surrounding actions against Anwar - his arrest at gunpoint, assault by the chief of police, widely publicized sexual allegations against him, and his highly controversial court cases. Thousands took to the streets in protest when Anwar was sentenced to six years in jail for corruption (abuse of power) in April 1999. Police repression was again harsh and 118 people were arrested. Police dispersed protesters with the use of tear gas, chemically-laced water and bludgeons, and publicised photographs and lists in the mainstream press of people wanted for interrogation. Apart from direct confrontation in the streets, the government and the opposition maintained an acrimonious campaign against each other, in the mainstream and the alternative media respectively. The latter included the bilingual (English and Malay) PAS newspaper, Harakah, published twice a week, smaller weekly and monthly publications such as Eksklusif, Detik and Tamadun, and several sites on the Internet.

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Reformasi's goals

The Reformasi movement linked a wide array of protesters who had divergent aims and concerns under a commodious if amorphous umbrella. Reformasi constituted a broad-based popular movement for social, political and economic change. It was represented by the Barisan Alternatif (BA) coalition a precursor to Pakatan Rakyat (PR), itself a precursor to the current ruling Pakatan Harapan (PH) government, and in civil society by conglomerations of NGOs, trade unions, and other activists cooperating across sectors and issue areas. The groundswell of opposition to Mahathir, to BN, and specific government laws and policies conveyed in opposition oriented media (especially on the internet) was also tied to the Reformasi movement.

The movement and its leaders were forced to specify precisely what they meant by "reform" and to articulate concrete, pragmatic objectives once the political crisis matured. Particularly since elections approached, the aims of Reformasi had to be somehow encapsulated in a broadly appealing electoral platform.

Over the course of events, the Reformasi movement attracted an unprecedented range of active and passive supporters. Most Malaysians seemed to agree that at least some degree of change is warranted. For instance, 85 percent of respondents to a mid-1999 survey agreed that Malaysia needed a reassessment in politics, economy and society.

Among the more comprehend documents detailing specific reforms were two that originated with Chinese activists: the "People Are The Boss" declaration and that of the Malaysian Chinese Organizations' Election Appeals Committee (also known as Suqiu), both of them promulgated in mid-August 1999. The online "People Are The Boss" campaign was started by an informal group of ethnic-Chinese journalists as a noncommunal citizens' awareness campaign.

The list of signatories included not only Chinese Malaysians but also a number of Malays and Indians. The project's "Declaration on the People's Awareness" explains that government is appointed by and empowered by the people; the people thus have the right and responsibility to monitor their "employees" and hold them accountable.

Suqiu proved more controversial. At the forefront was the Suqiu Committee, a lobbying and monitoring group composed of 13 national-level Chinese guilds and associations. In addition, over 2,000 Chinese organizations nationwide endorsed a list of 17 core demands that was drafted as a wishlist, submitted to all political parties, and accepted at least in principle by the BN's Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), Malaysian People's Movement Party (Gerakan), Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), and also the opposition Barisan Alternatif or Alternative Front (BA) coalition.

Some of the demands, such as those for promoting democracy, human rights, justice, women's rights, and national unity, are nonethnic. Others are considered communal, such as demanding for modernizing New Villages and encouraging more egalitarian multiculturalism.

The MCA presented the demands to the cabinet, but UMNO condemned them as inappropriately communal and threatening. Fiery debate on Suqiu extended well beyond the elections. UMNO swore that it would uphold the position of Malays, and UMNO Youth staged an aggressive demonstration outside the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall in August 2000.

Others were more supportive of the initiative, particularly those from the BA and civil society, a cohort that included a multiracial array of students and youth organizations.

Suqiu's defenders urged that the debate not be rendered so racially incendiary, advising that affirmative action policies be made more need-based, pointing out that the constitution guarantees Malays a special position (kedudukan istimewa) and not special rights (hak istimewa), and asserting that Islam denies any racial group-specific privileges. Eventually, under intense pressure, Suqiu backed down in January 2001.

International response

Anwar's arrest prompted commentators as diverse as Amnesty International, Indonesian President B.J. Habibie, George Soros and former U.S. Vice-President Al Gore who showed signs of disapproval at Malaysia's political and economic failures. At the 1998 APEC Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Al Gore, gave a speech supporting Anwar and the Reformasi movement in front of the Prime Minister of Malaysia and other Asia-Pacific premiers.

"Democracy confers a stamp of legitimacy that reforms must have in order to be effective." He went on: "And so, among nations suffering economic crises, we continue to hear calls for democracy, calls for reform, in many languages - People Power, Doi Moi, Reformasi. We hear them today - right here, right now - among the brave people of Malaysia."

In September 1998, Mahathir experienced his first international snub when the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) withdrew its invitation to the Prime Minister to be a keynote speaker at one of its meetings. Mahathir's invitation by a group of pro-government students based at Cambridge University to a workshop in October also sparked a controversy when a rival group calling itself the Cambridge Coalition for a Free Malaysia reacted to the invitation by calling for a boycott of the planned event. The event was not cancelled, but Mahathir was met by protestors, mainly Malaysian students and members of the Cambridge University Amnesty International group.

Domestic response

The Reformasi movement attracted a wide range of previously disparate groups. About 25 Malay non-governmental organizations like the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) and the Malaysian Islamic Reform Society joined PAS in forming GERAK (Malaysian People's Movement for Justice).

Predominantly non-Malay non-governmental organisations such as Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM) (Malaysian People's Voice) joined the DAP and the small but venerable Malaysian People's Party in forming GAGASAN (Coalition for People's Democracy). Further, as anticipation mounted that elections would be called, some forty non-governmental organizations involved with GERAK and GAGASAN organised Pemantau (Malaysian Citizens' Election Watch).

As a political commentator, former Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam remarked that "If the reformasi movement and demonstrations could be given any significance in terms of Malaysian politics ... it is more issue-based than racial. I'm fascinated." Musa commented that prior to Reformasi, "any demonstration of any nature in Kuala Lumpur or Penang would always turn racial. Even if they were against the government, they would burn the Chinese shops."

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