User:Mike.bodner/NATO Soldier Systems

While arguably the idea for a soldier system originated in military science fiction , the first deliberate discussion on the topic in NATO circles occurred in the early 1990s. A mission requirements document on NATO soldier modernization was circulated in 1991, which defined the soldier system and five capabilities based on the timeless needs of all soldiers[1]. Imaginations were sparked by the U.S. Army Soldier Integrated Protective Ensemble (SIPE) Demonstration program in 1992, and a NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) study was convened. NIAG Sub-Group 48 concluded that the NATO soldier’s five capability areas could be substantially improved by the integration of technologies into a soldier system[2]. The group also concluded that it was paramount that NATO managed development as a system, that a front-end analysis was needed to define the soldier system requirements, and that a standardization process for soldier systems be initiated to ensure effective and efficient system interoperability.

NATO Soldier System Concept

In 1991, the NATO Panel III on Close Combat - Infantry defined the Soldier System,

“… as those items and equipment that are worn, carried or consumed by the soldier, and those items carried for individual use.”

This was followed in 1993 by a broader description of the soldier system concept:

The future NATO Soldier System will be an integrated system composed of modular sub-systems to improve the soldier capabilities in the areas of: Survivability, Sustainability, Mobility, Lethality and C4I. For the purpose of this study, no soldier capability is considered more important than any other. The effort of the study shall be globally balanced in all areas and in the integration of various sub-systems into a Soldier System.

NATO Soldier System Capabilities

By 1997, the WG 3 on Soldier Modernization established a detailed list of the five essential soldier system capabilities and proposed a modular soldier system structure to identify components for potential standardization. These ideas have guided soldier system development across member nations.

NATO Soldier System Capabilities

Survivability This capability enables the soldier system to survive the threats he/she will encounter while on a mission. An extensive list of natural and man-made threats relevant to the soldier system is available in Appendix 1. A ground should soldier should be able to respond to the following threats by:

Man-Made Threats • avoid detection (don't be seen) • deceive the enemy (defensive positions, mobility and counter measures) • detect threats • receive and transmit information on threats identified • prepare defensive positions (hasty or deliberate) • provide protection (blast, directed energy weapons, ballistic fragments, and nuclear/biological/chemical) (don't be killed) Weather, Terrain, Animals & Insects • predict terrain and weather conditions • monitor current terrain and weather conditions • relay information on current terrain and weather conditions • preserve human capabilities in all weather conditions • provide protection (animal and insect threats) Sustainability This capability lengthens the time the soldier system can be effective on the battlefield. In order to sustain his/herself the soldier has to be able to:

• support physiological/physical functions and needs • support fighting capability • support equipment requirements (power, munitions, make repairs, decontamination) • monitor health • administer first aid (including nuclear/biological/chemical) • include embedded training • minimize effects of stress Mobility This capability extends the geographic sphere of influence of the soldier system. The main functions of the soldier system in this capability area, under all environmental conditions, by day or night, are to:

• orient • navigate • receive and provide information on the terrain • traverse on foot (across man-made and natural obstacles) • carry his load while on the move • mount/dismount vehicle Lethality This capability is the soldier system’s ability to incapacitate or destroy the enemy. An individual weapon, personal defence weapon or other weapon provides the soldier with lethality on the battlefield. To be lethal, the soldier may perform some or a number of functions:

• observe the battlefield and detect events occurring on the battlefield via visual and sensor inputs to the soldier system • recognize an event as a possible target • identify the target and classify the target as a valid target • relay and receive information on targets identified • acquire the target (aiming and ranging) • engage the target (e.g., individual soldier) • evaluate the result of the engagement

Based on the information the soldier receives, he/she may or may not engage a target. If the soldier runs out of his/her basic load of ammunition, the cycle is suspended until resources are resupplied. C4I This capability provides the capability to increase the tempo of operations, may expand the battle-space and improve situational awareness of the soldier system. Intra-squad communication will enhance the effectiveness of the individual squad members and increase the squad’s effectiveness. Inter-squad communication will enhance the effectiveness of higher level units and enhance the squad leader’s command and control of the soldier system. The main functions in this capability area are to:

• receive information visually, verbally and through sensors • process information • store information • present information • distribute information

Improved situational awareness may improve overall lethality, survivability, mobility and sustainability of the soldier system.


The Evolution to Land Capability Group 1 on Dismounted Soldiers

WG 3 gained in prominence post-2000, becoming Topical Group 1 on Soldier System Interoperability, as the NATO structure became convinced of the need to pursue standardization opportunities, coordinate national programs and explore the potential for adopting identical sub-systems or modules. World events after 9/11 further compelled nations to pursue areas of common interest in the largest venue for such topics—now called Land Capability Group 1 on Dismounted Soldiers (LCG/1). This group has a number of subordinate groups that address Small Arms Interchangeability, C4I/Architecture, Power, Weapons and Sensors, as well as Combat Clothing Integrated Equipment and Protection at the soldier system level. Over the last 10 years, the team has shared considerable information, published many key soldier system documents and developed or updated the 38 NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) for which they are responsible.

In 2010, NATO LCG/1 published a key interoperability document, which further refined the NATO soldier system capabilities, based on current operations, and identified the high priority interoperability issues for NATO dismounted forces. Drawing on the expertise in dismounted soldier systems provided by the Soldier Capability Assessment Group (SCAG), the report provides important guidance to LCG/1 and its sub-groups on identifying and prioritizing interoperability capabilities at the lowest tactical levels.

NATO Long-Term Capability Requirements

The NATO Long Term Capability Requirements (LTCRs) were published as a separate undertaking by the NATO Headquarters called Allied Command Transformation, and have influenced soldier system efforts across NATO. This program identifies 38 LTCRs and highlights two specific soldier-level capabilities, which remain challenges today: the need for Integrated Personal Protection and the need for Soldier Situational Awareness. Both of these LTCRs are lead by LCG 1.

Integrated Personal Protection (IPP)

Integrated Personal Protection is the capability of providing integrated personal protection from the wide range of threats faced in current and future operational theatres. These threats to the dismounted soldier are generally divided into 11 areas:

• Ballistics • Fragmentation • Flame, flash and heat • Primary blast • Laser • Noise • Non-ballistic threats • Concealment • Fratricide • Environmental • CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear)

Efforts to address all these threats on the battlefield are complicated by several major technological barriers—many of which are interrelated. Capability improvements in the short and medium term are, therefore, likely to be incremental.

Among these barriers, human factors and integration, and soldier burden (overload/weight), are two important considerations requiring significant attention:

• Human Factors and Integration—It is increasingly evident that human factors and equipment integration should be taken into account at every stage of personal protection equipment capability development. No single personal protection component can be assessed in isolation from other equipment or from the soldier responsible for its use. This should include “soft” factors such as user perception. Some human factors and integration issues are enduring in nature, while others are more nation- or theatre-specific and require separate assessment.

• Overload/Weight—The soldier as a system is already overloaded to a degree not acceptable in a vehicle or air platform. The solution to any capability gap for the dismounted soldier must be assessed against its impact on system burden, especially weight. The overarching focus for all LCG/1 work must be to reduce the burden.

Soldier Situational Awareness (SA)

Soldier Situational Awareness (SA) is the capability of enhancing the SA of individual soldiers and increasing shared knowledge. This is accomplished through the seamless transfer of tactical information at the lowest tactical level. Through enhanced data interoperability, soldiers in a coalition environment will have improved command execution, target acquisition and situational awareness, which can also help to reduce fratricide.

Soldier SA Operational Requirements

Dismounted soldiers operate their equipment in dynamic and austere environments. As a result, the major operational requirements identified by LCG/1 for SA are:

• Equipment must be lightweight, compact and optimized to consume the absolute minimum of battery power.

• The system must be robust and situational awareness display must be clear and easy to understand. The device(s) must be interoperable with other SA tools available, using NATO standard interfaces and protocols. The system must be able to operate for extended periods of time and automatically filter “need to know” information.

• The system should provide information on opposition forces, friendly forces and neutral/noncombatant elements with a high enough level of accuracy and timeliness to enable targeting. The SA devices need enough communications bandwidth to transmit and receive various formats of information such as maps, schematics, imagery, data, messages, and position/navigation/time (PNT) updates as well as sufficient power to transmit in all terrains over selected distances.

Standards

Significant progress has occurred in the development of a standard technological solution to share SA data among dismounted NATO soldiers across a force boundary. Standardized use of specific message sets, converted into a soldier variant of the common NATO data model, has been demonstrated through the exchange of command and control and SA information between the national battle management systems of Canada, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and Slovakia. This effort continues to advance significantly due to recent operations in Afghanistan, where low tactical level forces interact frequently to deal with an all-pervasive threat.

Battlefield Combat ID

On current operations, all NATO nations have noted the excessive weight and power burden for dismounted soldiers, so a key remaining challenge is seamless soldier level battlefield combat identification (BCID). This is not recognized as a separate LCTR but is embedded in various LCTRs. Combat identification at the individual soldier level is a required capability for soldiers in NATO on coalition operations in order to avoid fratricide. Current documentation refers to the need for integrated solutions that do not add parasitic weight or system burden for the dismounted soldier.

Fratricide incidents at the soldier-to-soldier level remain a small percentage of the overall fratricide incidents in NATO/coalition operations. By contrast, air-to-ground and vehicle-to-vehicle incidents comprise the majority of fratricide incidents and are generally much more catastrophic than incidents involving small arms weapons utilized at the dismounted level. Systems and technologies developed for use on aircraft and vehicles are not suitable to the dismounted soldier system due to weight and power constraints. Thus soldier-level BCID systems need to be integrated into the whole soldier system suite and could consist of simple passive and active elements.

One potential solution is Blue Force Tracking (BFT), through which combat identification is provided through situational awareness of adjacent units when accessed by leaders at the company, platoon and squad/section levels. BFT has been implemented by some nations. Ultimately, this information could be provided to the individual soldier through the implementation of national soldier system programs enabled by NATO coordination.

2.3 Soldier System Related S&T in NATO

A separate organization within the NATO structure is the NATO Research and Technology Organization (RTO). Its primary focus is to promote and conduct co-operative scientific research and exchange of technical information amongst 28 NATO nations and 38 NATO partners. The RTO encompasses over 3,000 scientists and engineers addressing the complete scope of defence technologies and operational domains. Six subordinate panels of the RTO are responsible for coalition S&T efforts in a wide variety of domains from Human Factors and Medicine (HUM) to Applied Vehicle Technology (AVT), as well as the leadership of selected LTCRs. For example, the Information Systems Technology (IST) Panel—currently led by Canada—has the responsibility for the LTCR on language translator capabilities, and is closely linked with NATO soldier systems efforts. The Sensors & Electronics Technology (SET) and Systems Analysis and Studies (SAS) panels also conduct a number of soldier-related R&D task groups covering key aspects such as camouflage, power and electro-textiles.

Weapons Systems Integration and Interoperability

A notable recent effort, sponsored by LCG 1, was the S&T work conducted under the Systems Concepts and Integration (SCI) Panel: SCI-178 Integration and Interoperability Issues for the Dismounted Soldier System Weapon Systems. This task group’s objectives were to resolve three major soldier-level issues for assault weapons. Their work focused on:

• Determining an optimal methodology for attaching devices to infantry weapons and to draft a STANAG as a NATO interoperability standard. • Evaluating human factors considerations associated with modern infantry weapon systems and dismounted soldier systems composed of body armour, command and control capabilities, and head-borne systems. • Investigating power management of weapon system accessories through centralized and decentralized power, and exploring methods to provide the power to the attached accessories.

Human Factors Standards for Weapons

The products of the SCI-178 Task Group include a draft STANAG proposed for ratification, reports and technical data from experiments and trials that provide informative human factors decision-making guidance for small arms within soldier modernization programs, and technical reports to provide trade studies and analysis in weapon subsystem power and data methodologies. The suggested end-state would fill a gap in NATO infantry weapon system interoperability. It provides human factors design criteria for the integration of modern assault rifles with current body armour, and identifies opportunities for optimization of power and data on future infantry weapon system components. This highly successful five-year effort was recently recognized with the 2010 RTO Scientific Achievement Award.

Foreign Soldier Systems Modernization Efforts

International Soldier Systems Programs

The world stage now has a large number of nations providing systems for dismounted soldiers (see Table 2.2). This includes a growing number of countries outside of NATO and Partner for Peace (PfP) countries (e.g., Australia and Singapore). Most, if not all, of these nations use elements of the NATO defined soldier system capability areas of Survivability, Sustainability, Mobility, Lethality and C4I. They also regularly attend LCG /1 meetings. Training and human factors are key components of all the capabilities and are included as elements or considerations of most national programs.

The seminal event in the development of NATO soldier systems occurred in 2000 when the Netherlands hosted a key conference, exhibition and field demonstration at their training area in Bergen Op Zoom. Nations such as the U.S. and France were spurred to further develop their programs, and Germany embarked on a deliberate path towards a soldier system program from almost a blank page. In fact, Germany was the first to field a soldier system in May 2004, and has had its Infantryman of the Future (IDZ) on operations in Afghanistan for over five years.

Table 2-2: World Stage—Soldier Systems (US$13 to 15 B Market)


Other militaries have followed suit, most notably the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the French Army. A key litmus test for the maturity of a soldier system is the soldier-to-soldier C4I components at the soldier level: the USMC has had all 27 regular infantry battalions equipped with Type 2 encrypted radios since 2006. The French Army is now fielding the FELIN Future Infantry Soldier System to a regiment every 10 weeks, as well as teaching the use of the FELIN system in its military school houses and addressing the key soldier-vehicle interfaces in a deliberate way. Other nations currently on operations in places like Afghanistan have fielded soldier C4I systems as urgent operational requirements, but still lack fully integrated solutions into their national C4I backbones. Table 2-1 identifies the rough hierarchy of progress assessed by the Chairman of LCG/1.


Figure 2-1: Global soldier systems modernization efforts and markets

Soldier Systems Market Opportunities

The soldier systems world-wide market is quite robust. Major international prime contractors are bidding on programs in countries such as Australia and Singapore. NATO nations are also opening up soldier systems markets, led by Germany, Switzerland, France and Spain. Steady growth in this area is forecasted in a study commissioned by Industry Canada, with a total global market exceeding $13 to 15 billion USD by 2019 (see Figure 2-1). A broad number of emerging nations are expected to seek to enable their soldiers and/or junior commanders with various system devices in the coming years.

Market analysis (see Figure 2-2) of technologies to meet the NATO soldier system capabilities, shows that the C4I capability has the largest potential market, both in Canada and abroad. The remaining four NATO capability areas are about equal in terms of sub-market breakdown.


Figure 2-2: Soldier systems sub-market opportunities

Balancing the Five Soldier System Capabilities—“The Hard Problem”

World-wide soldier system modernization efforts have revealed what has become known as “the hard problem”—the need for continual vigilance in balancing the dismounted soldier’s capabilities. This challenge has been described broadly in various early NATO documents and now, within Canada, as part of DND’s Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) S&T’s Functional Planning Guidance and Programme Convening Letter (February 2010).

In reality, there are a series of “hard problems.” But the one that specifically impacts soldier systems relates to enhancing soldier survivability and effectiveness. The key to enhancement is the balancing of the five NATO capability areas while understanding that they are all interconnected and, thus, they all impact on each other. No single capability is more important than another, and the balance depends on what is being measured (weight, burden, cost, capability, etc.).

For example, as current technologies are applied to improve soldier survivability, the overall system weight increases: reducing mobility. The inclusion of additional C4I devices can have a similar impact on mobility, as can increases in ammunition load or responses to the need to carry more water on operations.

The soldier system can be viewed as a complex, interconnected web (see Figure 2-3). Thus—keeping “the hard problem” in mind—the international soldier system programs, including Canada’s, are continually seeking solutions that enhance soldier survivability and performance by incorporating effective and efficient procedures as well as protection and communications/information systems that are more user friendly, cost effective, lighter, smaller and highly energy efficient. At the same time, efforts are being made to balance these considerations with the needs of the other well-recognized soldier system capabilities.









Figure 2.3: The Hard Problem—balancing soldier effectiveness


A small working group (WG 3 on Soldier Modernization) within the NATO Armies Armaments Group (NAAG) spearheaded the work on soldier systems throughout the 1990s, establishing detailed NATO soldier system parameters and an operational concept, as well as a holistic understanding of dismounted threats.






NATO Soldier Systems

While arguably the idea for a Soldier System originated in military science fiction (Starship Troopers, Robert Heinlein, 1959), the first deliberate discussion on the topic in NATO circles occurred in the early 1990s. Imaginations were sparked by the US Army Soldier Integrated Protective Ensemble (SIPE) Demonstration program in 1992, and a NATO Team of Experts (TOE) was struck to examine the topic. It convened a NATO Industrial Advisory Group study (NIAG Sub Group 48) which concluded in 1994 that further effort on Soldier Systems was required and showed both an immense promise for soldier capability improvement and the potential for interoperability challenges at the soldier level. Key NATO definitions and documents were developed throughout the 1990s by a small working group from within the [NATO Armies Armaments Group] (NAAG) structure. This included establishing a NATO Soldier System definition and operational concept, a holistic understanding of dismounted threats and the identification and acceptance of the 5 NATO Soldier System capability areas (Survivability, Sustainability, Lethality, Mobility and C4I). By the late 1990s this effort was loosely described as the Future Soldier in many circles. The small NATO working group gained in prominence after the year 2000 as the NATO structure was convinced of the need to pursue interoperability opportunities at the Soldier System level by observing a large multinational demonstration at a Dutch Military training area near Bergen op Zoom. World events post 911 further compelled NATO members to pursue areas of common interest in the largest venue for such topics – the Land Capability Group 1 on Dismounted Soldiers.

Recently a report by the NATO Land Capability Group 1 on Dismounted Soldier has defined interoperability requirements and provided prioritization for interoperability capabilities identified in the process. The report represents the views of the military membership of the Soldier Capability Assessment Group (SCAG), a sub group within LCG/1, as subject matter experts on dismounted soldier systems and potential operational interoperability developers of these systems. The importance of this report was to provide guidance to LCG/1 and the supporting sub groups to prioritize work projects when developing interoperability solutions for NATO forces.

As a separate NATO initiative, the identification of 38 NATO Long Term Capability Requirements was identified by the Allied Command for Transformation <http://www.act.nato.int/> (ACT) which has two specific goals for Soldier Systems which remain challenges today. They follow:

Integrated Personal Protection (IPP)

IPP is the capability of providing integrated personal protection from the range of threats faced in current and future operational theatres. Addressing all the threats on the battlefield has several major technological barriers; therefore improvements in the short and medium term are likely to be incremental. The threats to the Dismounted Soldier are divided into 11 areas of Ballistics;

a. Fragmentation; b. Flame, c. Flash & Heat; d. Primary Blast; e. Laser; f. Noise; g. Non-Ballistic Threats; h. Concealment; i. Fratricide; j. Environmental and k. CBRN

No single protective component would be assessed in isolation from other equipment or the soldier responsible for its use. Human Factors and equipment integration should be taken into account at every stage. This should include ‘soft’ factors such as user perception. Whilst some HFI issues will endure others will be nation specific and require separate assessment. The soldier as system is already overloaded to a degree not acceptable in a vehicle or air platform. The solution to any capability gap must be assessed against its impact on system burden, especially weight. The overarching focus for all CCIEP work must be to reduce the burden.

Soldier Situational Awareness (SSA)

Soldier Situational Awareness (SSA) is the capability of enhancing the situational awareness (SA) of individual soldiers and increasing shared knowledge. This is accomplished through seamless transfer of tactical information at the lowest tactical level. Through data interoperability, soldiers in a coalition environment will have improved Command Execution, Target Acquisition and Situational Awareness which will also help to reduce fratricide.

The major Operational Requirements for C4I in LCG/1 are:

a. Dismounted Soldiers operate their equipment in dynamic and austere environments which must be lightweight, compact, and optimized to consume the absolute minimum of battery power.

b. The system must be robust and the display clear and easy to understand. The device(s) must be interoperable with other SA tools available using NATO standard interfaces and protocols. The system must operate for extended periods of time and automatically filter ‘need to know’ information.

c. The system needs to provide information on opposition forces, friendly forces and neutral/noncombatant elements with a high enough level of accuracy and timeliness to enable targeting. The SA device(s) need enough communications bandwidth to transmit and receive various formats of information (maps, schematics, imagery, data, messages, PNT updates) and sufficient power to transmit in all terrains over selected distances.

Significant progress has occurred in the development of a standard technological solution to share SA data amongst dismounted NATO soldiers. Standardized use of specific ADatP-3 message sets, converted into a soldier variant of the MIP’s JC3IEDM, has demonstrated the exchange of Command and Control and SA information between the National Battle Management systems of Canada, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Slovakia.

Battlefield Combat Identification for Dismounted Soldiers

A key challenge that remains is soldier level BCID. Combat Identification at the individual soldier level is a required capability for soldiers in NATO and coalition operations. On the dismounted soldier, this requirement is a concern for Land Capability Group 1 (LCG/1) on Dismounted Soldiers and there documents refer to integrated solutions that do not add parasitic weight or system burden. Currently weight, power, space on the individual, and any independent communication requirements to support active combat identification equipment are critical increases to overall soldier system burden. All Nations have noted that on current operations the weight and power burden on dismounted soldiers is excessive.

Situational awareness of adjacent units provides combat identification when accessed by leaders at company, platoon, and squad/section levels usually described as Blue Force Tracking (BFT). BFT is implemented by some Nations. Ultimately the information can be provided to the individual soldier by the implementation of National Soldier System Programs. Fratricide incidents at the soldier to soldier level remain a small percentage of the overall fratricide incidents in a NATO/coalition operations based on historical evidence. In contrast, air to ground and vehicle to vehicle incidents comprise the majority of the fratricide incidents and are generally much more catastrophic than incidents involving small arm weapons utilized at the dismounted level. Systems and technologies developed for use on aircraft and vehicles are likely not suitable to the dismounted soldier system due to weight and power constraints.

NATO Accessory Rail

One recent success story by LCG 1 was the sponsorship of a NATO RTO Study on future Small Arms. This resulted in a detailed study report on weapon Interfaces, Human Factors and power on small arms. A key deliverable which was a draft STANAG on called the NATO Accessory Rail. The task group was chaired by a retired Major from the USMC Marine Corps Systems Command and the whole team was recognized with the RTO 2010 Scientific Excellence Award.

Foreign Soldier System Modernization Efforts

The world stage now has a large number of Nations providing systems for dismounted Soldiers. There are a growing number of Nations, outside of NATO and PfP Nations that are starting to field Soldier Systems (ie Australia (Land 125), Singapore (ACMS) and Israel ). Most if not all use elements of the NATO defined Soldier Capability areas of Survivability, Sustainability, Lethality, Mobility and C4I. Training and Human Factors are key components of the all the capabilities and are includes as elements or considerations of most National programs.

The seminal event for NATO Soldier Systems occurred in 2000 with the NLD hosting a key conference, exhibition and field demonstration at their training area in Bergen Op Zoom. From this event, Nations such as the USA and FRA further developed their programs and DEU embarked on deliberate path almost from a blank page. DEU was the first to field a Soldier System on May 2004 and has had IdZ on operations in Afghanistan for over 5 years.

Other militaries have followed suit, most notably the USMC and the French Army FELIN. A key litmus test is the Soldier to Soldier C4I components at soldier level and the USMC has had all 27 regular Infantry battalions with Sdr to Sdr Type 2 encrypted radios since 2006. The FRA Army is now fielding FELIN to a Regiment every 10 weeks, teaching the FELIN system use in its military school houses and addressing the key man-vehicle interfaces in a deliberate way. Other Nations currently involved in the War on Terror have fielded Soldier C4I systems as urgent operational requirements, but lack fully integrated solutions into their National C4I backbones ie GBR (Future Integrated Soldier Technology) and CAN (ISSP).

The soldier system world-wide market is quite robust. Major international prime contractors are bidding on programs in countries such as Australia and Singapore. NATO nations are following suit led by Germany, France and Spain. Non-NATO nations such as Switzerland (IMESS) as well as Norway and Sweden have programs as well. Steady growth in this area has been forecasted in a study commissioned by Industry Canada with a total global market in excess of $14 B USD. A broad number of emerging Nations will seek to enable their soldiers and/or junior commanders with various system devices. Further analysis identifies that the C4I capability shows the largest are for potential markets both in Canada and aboard. The remaining 4 capability areas are about equal in terms of submarket breakdown.

Canadian Soldier Systems Modernization Efforts has not take place in isolation from our allies. Interoperability is a key concept in NATO doctrine and a NATO Soldier System definition and operational concept has provided a holistic framework and the five capability areas (Survivability, Sustainability, Lethality, Mobillity, and C4I) that has guided the subject areas.

References

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  1. ^ AC/225 (Panel III) D/316, Mission Need Document On NATO Soldier Modernization (27 May 91
  2. ^ NIAG Sub-Group 48, NIAG Prefeasibility Report on a Soldier Modernization Program (AC/225 (P.III)WGE.3)D/3: Sep 94
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