| Invasion of Banu Nadir | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| Belligerents | |||||
| Muslims | Banu Nadir tribe | ||||
The invasion of Banu Nadir took place in August 625 AD (Rabi' al-awwal, 4 AH) The account is related in Surah Al-Hashr (Chapter 59 - The Gathering) which describes the banishment of the Jewish tribe Banu Nadir who were expelled from Medina after being accused of plotting to assassinate the Islamic prophet Muhammad.[2]
Background edit
Reason for attack edit
According to the author Saif ur-Rahman Mubarakpuri, Muhammad, with some of his Companions, set out to see the Banu Nadir tribe and seek their help in raising the blood-money he had to pay to the Banu Kilab for the two men that ‘Amr bin Omaiyah Ad-Damari had killed by mistake in the Expedition of Bir Maona. On hearing his story they said they would share in paying the blood-money and asked him and his Companions Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Ali and others to sit under a wall of their houses and wait. Mubrakpuri says that the angel Gabriel came down to reveal the plot by the Banu Nadir to assassinate Muhammad, so he, with his Companions, hurried off back to Medina. On their way, he told his Companions of the Divine Revelation, that the Banu Nadir Jews held a short private meeting and they conspired to kill him.[1]
According to Norman Stillman, professor of Judaic History, Muhammad found a casus belli by claiming to have received a divine revelation that the Banu Nadir were plotting to assassinate him.[3] The Encyclopaedia of Islam, states that Muhammad ibn Maslama, instructed by Muhammad, ordered them to leave Medina within ten days. The tribe at first decided to comply, but Abdullah ibn Ubayy, the chief of the Khazraj, persuaded them to resist in their fortresses, promising to send men to their aid. Huyayy ibn Akhtab decided to put up resistance, hoping also for help from Banu Qurayza, despite opposition within the tribe.[4]
William Montgomery Watt, former professor of Arabic and Islamic studies, states the underlying reason for the expulsion of the Banu Nadir was same as that of the Banu Qaynuqa.[5] Namely, that Jewish criticism of Muhammad endangered the ordinary Muslims belief in Muhammad and the Quran.[5] The clan of Nadir had an alliance with the Banu Amir, but it is not clear how this affected the seeking of blood money that Muslims were after.[5] He also doubts whether the Banu Nadir wanted to drop a stone on Muhammad, and that the "allegation was no more than an excuse to justify the attack".[5]
Invasion of Banu Nadir edit
Notes edit
- ^ a b Mubarakpuri 2005, p. 189.
- ^ Stokes 2005, p. 99.
- ^ Stillman 1979, p. 14.
- ^ Vacca 1986, p. 53.
- ^ a b c d Yar-Shater 1987, p. xxxv.
References edit
- Mubarakpuri, Saifur Rahman (2005). The Sealed Nectar. Darussalam Publications.
- Stokes, Jamie, ed. (2005), Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East, vol. 1, Infobase Publishing, p. 99, ISBN 978-0-8160-7158-6,
According to Islamic tradition, the Bani Nadir were expelled from Medina in 625 after being implicated in a plot to assassinate Muhammad
- Stillman, Norman (1979). The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book. Jewish Publication Society of America. ISBN 0-8276-0198-0.
- Vacca, V. (1986). "'Abd Allah b. Ubayy". In P.J. Bearman; Th. Bianquis; C.E. Bosworth; E. van Donzel; W.P. Heinrichs (eds.). Encyclopaedia of Islam. Vol. 1. Brill Academic Publishers. ISSN 1573-3912.
Up to this point Ibn Ubayy had done little but criticize Muhammad verbally, but for the next two years he also intrigued against him. He tried to persuade Banu al-Nadir not to evacuate their homes at Muhammad's command, even promising military support.
- Yar-Shater, Ehsan, ed. (1987). The History of al-Tabari. Vol. VII. Translated by Watt, W. Montgomery; McDonald, M.V. State University of New York Press. ISBN 978-0-88706-344-2.
The main underlying reason for the expulsion of the clan of al-Nadir was the same as in the case of Quaynuqa, namely, that Jewish criticisms endangered the ordinary Muslim's belief in Muhammad's prophethood and in the Quran as revelation from God
The Mongol Conquests: The Military Operations of Genghis Khan and Sube'etei Hardcover – May 18, 2017 by Carl Fredrik Sverdrup, page 319, "THe Mongol losses are not recorded, but they were clearly not light. According to the long Sube'etei biography, Batu disputing the bridge, was taken advantage of by the enemy and lost a third of his armoured men along with the subordinate commander Batu.
The History of the Mongol Conquests, J.J. Saunders, page 222,"See the brief but vivid description of the battle[Mohi] in the new source, probably Friar Benedict the Pole, published in "The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation", New Haven, 1965, 82-3. The Chinese life of Subedei depicts him as rallying a dispirited Batu, who had suffered heavy losses..
- Histoire de Charles V, Tome I, Roland Delachenal, page 111;"... concerning the relations which may have existed between Charles V and the mother of Jean de Montaigu, are not justified by any proof by any reference (they were undoubtedly based on the handwritten genealogy of Simon de la Votte, which he used for his work).."
- Les procès politiques, XIVe-XVIIe siècle, Yves-Marie Bercé, page 73;"..Jean de Montaigu, fils du garde des chartes du roi de France Gérard de Montaigu"
- L'enlèvement du Dauphin et le premier conflit entre Jean sans peur et Louis d'Orléans (juillet-octobre 1405), Léon Mirot, page 21;"Jean de Montaigu , fils de Gérard de Montaigu et de Biote Cassinel..."
". Early in the Italian Wars (1494–1559),
Charles VIII was forced to retreat from Naples. South of Milan the path of hisarmy of just 10,000 French and Swiss was blocked by 20,000 Venetians and Mantuans led by the condottieri captain Giovanni Gonzaga. Instead of the usual feckless and nearly bloodless affair then common in Italian condottieri warfare, the French opened with an artillery bombardment, intending to killas many of their enemy as possible. Then they charged with heavy cavalry, destroying and scattering the disordered Italian ranks in just minutes. The fight was perhaps most memorable for the ineffectiveness of artillery on either
side, other than the psychological effect achieved by the French guns: of the 100 French and 3,500 Italian dead, one eyewitness estimated that fewer than 10 men were killed by cannon fire." --Nolan,page 303-304.