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Co-benefits of climate change mitigation;
active lifestyle, benefits to wildlife and the natural environment, economic development and employment, air quality, energy access, urban resilience and decarbonisation
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Climate change is an issue of planetary scale. Its effects are either projected to impact every facet of society and the natural environment, or they already do so now, and their impact will only increase as climate change intensifies. Societies around the world are inevitably driven to climate change adaptation to reduce the damages they experience, and in the recent years, they also embrace Climate change mitigation measures to outright prevent many of the anticipated future impacts through reducing greenhouse gas emissions, with the ultimate goal of reaching net zero. These two approaches cover a wide variety of responses, and these responses can have a range of secondary impacts, both positive (also known as co-benefits or ancillary benefits) and negative (downsides).

Co-benefits of mitigation responses edit

In general, the term co-benefits refers to "simultaneously meeting several interests or objectives resulting from a political intervention, private sector investment or a mix thereof". Opportunistic co-benefits appear as auxiliary or side effect while focusing on a central objective or interest. Strategic co-benefits result from a deliberate effort to seizing several opportunities (e.g., economic, business, social, environmental) with a single purposeful intervention."[1]

Clean air edit

Climate change mitigation policies can lead to lower emissions of co-emitted air pollutants, for instance by shifting away from fossil fuel combustion. In addition, emissions of black carbon and methane contribute both to global warming and to air pollution, such that their mitigation can bring benefits in terms of limiting global temperature increases as well as improving air quality.[2] Multiple studies describe how lower GHG emissions lead to better air quality and consequently impact human health positively.[3][4][5] The scope of co-benefits research expanded to its economic, social, ecological and political implications.

Implementation of the climate pledges made in the run-up to the Paris Agreement could therefore have significant benefits for human health by improving air quality.[6] The replacement of coal-based energy with renewables can lower the number of premature deaths caused by air pollution. A higher share of renewable energy and consequently less coal-related respiratory diseases can decrease health costs.[7]

This section is an excerpt from Health and environmental effects of battery electric cars § Air pollution and carbon emissions.[edit]

Compared to conventional internal combustion engine automobiles, electric cars reduce local air pollution, especially in cities,[8] as they do not emit harmful tailpipe pollutants such as particulates (soot), volatile organic compounds, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, ozone, lead, and various oxides of nitrogen. Some of the environmental impact may instead be shifted to the site of the generation plants, depending on the method by which the electricity used to recharge the batteries is generated. This shift of environmental impact from the vehicle itself (in the case of internal combustion engine vehicles) to the source of electricity (in the case of electric vehicles) is referred to as the long tailpipe of electric vehicles. This impact, however, is still less than that of traditional vehicles, as the large size of power plants allow them to generate less emissions per unit power than internal combustion engines, and electricity generation continues to become greener as renewables such as wind, solar and nuclear power become more widespread. By 2050, carbon emissions reduced by the use of electric cars can save over 1163 lives annually and over $12.61 billion in health benefits in many major U.S. metropolitan cities such as Los Angeles and New York City.[9]

The specific emission intensity of generating electric power varies significantly with respect to location and time, depending on current demand and availability of renewable sources (See List of renewable energy topics by country and territory). The phase-out of fossil fuels and coal and transition to renewable and low-carbon power sources will make electricity generation greener, which will reduce the impact of electric vehicles that use that electricity.

Active lifestyle edit

Main article: Active living

Biking reduces greenhouse gas emissions[10] while reducing the effects of a sedentary lifestyle at the same time[11] According to PLoS Medicine: "obesity, diabetes, heart disease, and cancer, which are in part related to physical inactivity, may be reduced by a switch to low-carbon transport—including walking and cycling."[12]

Health edit

Section 'Health co-benefits from mitigation' not found

Employment and economic development edit

Co-benefits can positively impact employment, industrial development, states' energy independence and energy self-consumption. The deployment of renewable energies can foster job opportunities. Depending on the country and deployment scenario, replacing coal power plants with renewable energy can more than double the number of jobs per average MW capacity.[13] Investments in renewable energies, especially in solar- and wind energy, can boost the value of production.[14] Countries which rely on energy imports can enhance their energy independence and ensure supply security by deploying renewables. National energy generation from renewables lowers the demand for fossil fuel imports which scales up annual economic saving.[15] Households and businesses can additionally benefit from investments in renewable energy. The deployment of rooftop solar and PV-self-consumption creates incentives for low-income households and can support annual savings for the residential sector.[16]

From an economic perspective, co-benefits can enhance increased employment through carbon tax revenues and the implementation of renewable energy.[17][18] A higher share of renewables can additionally lead to more energy security.[19] Socioeconomic co-benefits have been analysed such as energy access in rural areas and improved rural livelihoods.[20][21]

Energy access edit

Positive secondary effects from mitigation strategies can also occur for energy access. Rural areas which are not fully electrified can benefit from the deployment of renewable energies. Solar-powered mini-grids can remain economically viable, cost-competitive and reduce the number of power cuts. Energy reliability has additional social implications: stable electricity improves the quality of education.[22]

Other edit

Apart from climate protection, mitigation policies can foster additional ecological co-benefits but also risks with regards to soil conservation, fertility, biodiversity and wildlife habitat.[23][24] Further, mitigation policies bear opportunities for capacity building, participation and forest governance for local communities.[21]

Downsides of mitigation edit

This section is an excerpt from Climate change mitigation § Risks.[edit]

Mitigation measures can also have negative side effects and risks.[25]: TS-133  In agriculture and forestry, mitigation measures can affect biodiversity and ecosystem functioning.[25]: TS-87  In renewable energy, mining for metals and minerals can increase threats to conservation areas.[26] There is some research into ways to recycle solar panels and electronic waste. This would create a source for materials so there is no need to mine them.[27][28]

Scholars have found that discussions about risks and negative side-effects of mitigation measures can lead to deadlock or the feeling that there are insuperable barriers to taking action.[28] A qualitative investigation of extreme weather events in a district of Sweden 1867-8 shows that public/ state incentives can mitigate starvation risk in the future.[29]

Environmental impact of energy transition edit

Section 'Manufacturing Impact' not found
This section is an excerpt from Environmental impacts of lithium-ion batteries § Extraction.[edit]

Lithium is extracted on a commercial scale from three principal sources: salt brines, lithium-rich clay, and hard-rock deposits. Each method incurs certain unavoidable environmental disruptions. Salt brine extraction sites are by far the most popular operations for extracting lithium, they are responsible for around 66% of the world's lithium production.[30] The major environmental benefit of brine extraction compared to other extraction methods is that there is very little machinery needed to be used throughout the operation.[30] Whereas hard-rock deposits and lithium-rich clays both require relatively typical mining methods, involving heavy machinery.[30] Despite this benefit, all methods are continually used as they all achieve relatively similar recovery percentages.[30] Brine extraction achieves a 97% recovery percentage whereas hard-rock deposits achieve a 94% recovery percentage.[30]

This section is an excerpt from Environmental impacts of lithium-ion batteries § Disposal.[edit]

Lithium-ion batteries contain metals such as cobalt, nickel, and manganese, which are toxic and can contaminate water supplies and ecosystems if they leach out of landfills.[31] Additionally, fires in landfills or battery-recycling facilities have been attributed to inappropriate disposal of lithium-ion batteries.[32] As a result, some jurisdictions require lithium-ion batteries to be recycled.[33] Despite the environmental cost of improper disposal of lithium-ion batteries, the rate of recycling is still relatively low, as recycling processes remain costly and immature.[34] A study in Australia that was conducted in 2014 estimates that in 2012-2013, 98% of lithium-ion batteries were sent to the landfill.[35]

Biofuels edit

This section is an excerpt from Issues relating to biofuels § "Food vs. fuel" debate.["Food_vs._fuel"_debate edit]

Food vs fuel is the debate regarding the risk of diverting farmland or crops for biofuels production in detriment of the food supply on a global scale. Essentially the debate refers to the possibility that by farmers increasing their production of these crops, often through government subsidy incentives, their time and land is shifted away from other types of non-biofuel crops driving up the price of non-biofuel crops due to the decrease in production.[36] Therefore, it is not only that there is an increase in demand for the food staples, like corn and cassava, that sustain the majority of the world's poor but this also has the potential to increase the price of the remaining crops that these individuals would otherwise need to utilize to supplement their diets. A recent study for the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development shows that market-driven expansion of ethanol in the US increased maize prices by 21 percent in 2009, in comparison with what prices would have been had ethanol production been frozen at 2004 levels.[36] A November 2011 study states that biofuels, their production, and their subsidies are leading causes of agricultural price shocks.[37] The counter-argument includes considerations of the type of corn that is utilized in biofuels, often field corn not suitable for human consumption; the portion of the corn that is used in ethanol, the starch portion; and the negative effect higher prices for corn and grains have on government welfare for these products. The "food vs. fuel" or "food or fuel" debate is internationally controversial, with disagreement about how significant this is, what is causing it, what the effect is, and what can or should be done about it.[38][39][40][41] The world is facing three global crises, energy, food and environment. Changing the trend of recreation or population growth can impact each one of these. By increasing the world population, the ratio of energy and food demands will increase as well. So, it can put these two energy and food industries in completion of supplying. Developing the techniques and utilizing the food crops for biofuel production, especially in shortage areas, can adverse the competition between the food and biofuel industries.[42] It can be cay that harvesting and producing biofuels crop on a large scale can put local food communities at risk, such as challenges to access lands and portions of the food.[43] If the food economy cannot place safe and stable, protocols such as Kyoto can not meet their purposes and help control emissions.[42]

This section is an excerpt from Issues relating to biofuels § Soil erosion and deforestation.[edit]

Large-scale deforestation of mature trees (which help remove CO2 through photosynthesis — much better than sugar cane or most other biofuel feedstock crops do) contributes to soil erosion, un-sustainable global warming atmospheric greenhouse gas levels, loss of habitat, and a reduction of valuable biodiversity (both on land as in oceans[44]).[45] Demand for biofuel has led to clearing land for palm oil plantations.[46] In Indonesia alone, over 9,400,000 acres (38,000 km2) of forest have been converted to plantations since 1996. [47]

A portion of the biomass should be retained onsite to support the soil resource. Normally this will be in the form of raw biomass, but processed biomass is also an option. If the exported biomass is used to produce syngas, the process can be used to co-produce biochar, a low-temperature charcoal used as a soil amendment to increase soil organic matter to a degree not practical with less recalcitrant forms of organic carbon. For co-production of biochar to be widely adopted, the soil amendment and carbon sequestration value of co-produced charcoal must exceed its net value as a source of energy.[48]

Some commentators claim that removal of additional cellulosic biomass for biofuel production will further deplete soils.[49]

This section is an excerpt from Issues relating to biofuels § Effect on water resources.[edit]

Increased use of biofuels puts increasing pressure on water resources in at least two ways: water use for the irrigation of crops used as feedstocks for biodiesel production; and water use in the production of biofuels in refineries, mostly for boiling and cooling.

In many parts of the world supplemental or full irrigation is needed to grow feedstocks. For example, if in the production of corn (maize) half the water needs of crops are met through irrigation and the other half through rainfall, about 860 liters of water are needed to produce one liter of ethanol.[50] However, in the United States only 5-15% of the water required for corn comes from irrigation while the other 85-95% comes from natural rainfall.

In the United States, the number of ethanol factories has almost tripled from 50 in 2000 to about 140 in 2008. A further 60 or so are under construction, and many more are planned. Projects are being challenged by residents at courts in Missouri (where water is drawn from the Ozark Aquifer), Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas (all of which draw water from the non-renewable Ogallala Aquifer), central Illinois (where water is drawn from the Mahomet Aquifer) and Minnesota.[51]

For example, the four ethanol crops: corn, sugarcane, sweet sorghum and pine yield net energy. However, increasing production in order to meet the U.S. Energy Independence and Security Act mandates for renewable fuels by 2022 would take a heavy toll in the states of Florida and Georgia. The sweet sorghum, which performed the best of the four, would increase the amount of freshwater withdrawals from the two states by almost 25%.[52]

This section is an excerpt from Issues relating to biofuels § Pollution.[edit]

Formaldehyde, acetaldehyde and other aldehydes are produced when alcohols are oxidized. When only a 10% mixture of ethanol is added to gasoline (as is common in American E10 gasohol and elsewhere), aldehyde emissions increase 40%. [citation needed] Some study results are conflicting on this fact however, and lowering the sulfur content of biofuel mixes lowers the acetaldehyde levels.[53] Burning biodiesel also emits aldehydes and other potentially hazardous aromatic compounds which are not regulated in emissions laws.[54]

Many aldehydes are toxic to living cells. Formaldehyde irreversibly cross-links protein amino acids, which produces the hard flesh of embalmed bodies. At high concentrations in an enclosed space, formaldehyde can be a significant respiratory irritant causing nose bleeds, respiratory distress, lung disease, and persistent headaches.[55] Acetaldehyde, which is produced in the body by alcohol drinkers and found in the mouths of smokers and those with poor oral hygiene, is carcinogenic and mutagenic.[56]

The European Union has banned products that contain Formaldehyde, due to its documented carcinogenic characteristics. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has labeled Formaldehyde as a probable cause of cancer in humans.

Brazil burns significant amounts of ethanol biofuel. Gas chromatograph studies were performed of ambient air in São Paulo, Brazil, and compared to Osaka, Japan, which does not burn ethanol fuel. Atmospheric Formaldehyde was 160% higher in Brazil, and Acetaldehyde was 260% higher.[57]

Issues with carbon dioxide removal edit

Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage edit

This section is an excerpt from Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage § Environmental considerations.[edit]

Some of the environmental considerations and other concerns about the widespread implementation of BECCS are similar to those of CCS. However, much of the critique towards CCS is that it may strengthen the dependency on depletable fossil fuels and environmentally invasive coal mining. This is not the case with BECCS, as it relies on renewable biomass. There are however other considerations which involve BECCS and these concerns are related to the possible increased use of biofuels. Biomass production is subject to a range of sustainability constraints, such as: scarcity of arable land and fresh water, loss of biodiversity, competition with food production, deforestation and scarcity of phosphorus.[58] It is important to make sure that biomass is used in a way that maximizes both energy and climate benefits. There has been criticism to some suggested BECCS deployment scenarios, where there would be a very heavy reliance on increased biomass input.[59]

Large areas of land would be required to operate BECCS on an industrial scale. To remove 10 billion tonnes of CO2, upwards of 300 million hectares of land area (larger than India) would be required.[60] As a result, BECCS risks using land that could be better suited to agriculture and food production, especially in developing countries.

These systems may have other negative side effects. There is however presently no need to expand the use of biofuels in energy or industry applications to allow for BECCS deployment. There is already today considerable emissions from point sources of biomass derived CO2, which could be utilized for BECCS. Though, in possible future bioenergy system upscaling scenarios, this may be an important consideration.

Upscaling BECCS would require a sustainable supply of biomass - one that does not challenge land, water, or food security. Using bioenergy crops as feedstock will not only cause sustainability concerns but also require the use of more fertilizer leading to soil contamination and water pollution.[citation needed] Moreover, crop yield is generally subjected to climate condition, i.e. the supply of this bio-feedstock can be hard to control. Bioenergy sector must also expand to meet the supply level of biomass. Expanding bioenergy would require technical and economic development accordingly.

Direct air capture edit

This section is an excerpt from Direct air capture § Environmental impact.[edit]

Proponents of DAC argue that it is an essential component of climate change mitigation.[61][62][63] Researchers posit that DAC could help contribute to the goals of the Paris Agreement (namely limiting the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels). However, others claim that relying on this technology is risky and might postpone emission reduction under the notion that it will be possible to fix the problem later,[64][65] and suggest that reducing emissions may be a better solution.[66][67]

DAC relying on amine-based absorption demands significant water input. It was estimated, that to capture 3.3 gigatonnes of CO2 a year would require 300 km3 of water, or 4% of the water used for irrigation. On the other hand, using sodium hydroxide needs far less water, but the substance itself is highly caustic and dangerous.[64]

DAC also requires much greater energy input in comparison to traditional capture from point sources, like flue gas, due to the low concentration of CO2.[66][65] The theoretical minimum energy required to extract CO2 from ambient air is about 250 kWh per tonne of CO2, while capture from natural gas and coal power plants requires, respectively, about 100 and 65 kWh per tonne of CO2.[66][61] Because of this implied demand for energy, some have proposed using "small nuclear power plants" connected to DAC installations.[64]

When DAC is combined with a carbon capture and storage (CCS) system, it can produce a negative emissions plant, but it would require a carbon-free electricity source. The use of any fossil-fuel-generated electricity would end up releasing more CO2 to the atmosphere than it would capture.[65] Moreover, using DAC for enhanced oil recovery would cancel any supposed climate mitigation benefits.[64][68]

Co-benefits of adaptation responses edit

This section is an excerpt from Climate change adaptation § Co-benefits with mitigation.[edit]

Strategies to limit climate change are complementary to efforts to adapt to it.[69]: 128  Limiting warming, by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and removing them from the atmosphere, is also known as climate change mitigation.[citation needed]

There are some synergies or co-benefits between adaptation and mitigation. Synergies include the benefits of public transport for both mitigation and adaptation. Public transport has lower greenhouse gas emissions per kilometer travelled than cars. A good public transport network also increases resilience in case of disasters. This is because evacuation and emergency access becomes easier. Reduced air pollution from public transport improves health. This in turn may lead to improved economic resilience, as healthy workers perform better.[70]

Downsides of adaptation edit

Poor planning horizons edit

This section is an excerpt from Climate change adaptation § Differing time scales.[edit]

Adaptation can occur in anticipation of change or be a response to those changes.[71] For example, artificial snow-making in the European Alps responds to current climate trends. The construction of the Confederation Bridge in Canada at a higher elevation takes into account the effect of future sea-level rise on ship clearance under the bridge.[72]

Effective adaptive policy can be difficult to implement because policymakers are rewarded more for enacting short-term change, rather than long-term planning.[73] Since the impacts of climate change are generally not seen in the short term, policymakers have less incentive to act. Furthermore, climate change is occurring on a global scale. This requires a global framework for adapting to and combating climate change.[74] The vast majority of climate change adaptation and mitigation policies are being implemented on a more local scale. This is because different regions must adapt differently. National and global policies are often more challenging to enact.[75]

Maladaptation edit

This section is an excerpt from Climate change adaptation § Maladaptation.[edit]

Much adaptation takes place in relation to short-term climate variability. But this may cause maladaptation to longer-term climate trends. The expansion of irrigation in Egypt into the Western Sinai desert after a period of higher river flows is maladaptation given the longer-term projections of drying in the region.[76] Adaptations at one scale can have impacts at another by reducing the adaptive capacity of other people or organizations. This is often the case when broad assessments of the costs and benefits of adaptation are examined at smaller scales. An adaptation may benefit some people, but have a negative effect on others.[71] Development interventions to increase adaptive capacity have tended not to result in increased power or agency for local people.[77] Agency is a central factor in all other aspects of adaptive capacity and so planners need to pay more attention to this factor.

Limitations edit

This section is an excerpt from Climate change adaptation § Limits to adaptation.[edit]

People have always adapted to climate change. Some community coping strategies already exist. Examples include changing sowing times or adopting new water-saving techniques.[76] Traditional knowledge and coping strategies must be maintained and strengthened. If not there is a risk of weakening adaptive capacity as local knowledge of the environment is lost. Strengthening these local techniques and building upon them also makes the adoption of adaptation strategies more likely. This is because it creates more community ownership and involvement in the process.[72] In many cases this will not be enough to adapt to new conditions. These may be outside the range of those previously experienced, and new techniques will be necessary.[78]

The incremental adaptations become insufficient as the vulnerabilities and risks of climate change increase. This creates a need for transformational adaptations which are much larger and costlier.[79] Current development efforts increasingly focus on community-based climate change adaptation. They seek to enhance local knowledge, participation and ownership of adaptation strategies.[80]

The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report in 2022 put considerable emphasis on adaptation limits.[81]: 26  It makes a distinction between soft and hard adaptation limits. The report stated that some human and natural systems already reached "soft adaptation limits" including human systems in Australia, Small Islands, America, Africa and Europe and some natural systems reach even the "hard adaptation limits" like part of corals, wetland, rainforests, ecosystems in polar and mountain regions. If the temperature rise will reach 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) additional ecosystems and human systems will reach hard adaptation limits, including regions depending on glaciers and snow water and small islands. At 2 °C (3.6 °F) temperature rise, soft limits will be reached by many staple crops in many areas while at 3 °C (5.4 °F) hard limits will be reached by parts of Europe.[81]: 26 

Risk of delaying mitigation edit

This section is an excerpt from Climate change adaptation § Trade-offs with mitigation.[edit]

Trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation may occur when climate-relevant actions point in different directions. For instance, compact urban development may lead to reduced greenhouse gas emissions from transport and building. On the other hand, it may increase the urban heat island effect, leading to higher temperatures and increasing exposure, making adaptation more challenging.[82]

Solar geoengineering edit

This section is an excerpt from Solar radiation modification § Unwanted or premature use.[edit]

There is a risk that countries may start using SRM without proper precaution or research. SRM, at least by stratospheric aerosol injection, appears to have low direct implementation costs relative to its potential impact. This creates a different problem structure.[83][84] Whereas the provision of emissions reduction and carbon dioxide removal present collective action problems (because ensuring a lower atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration is a public good), a single country or a handful of countries could implement SRM. Many countries have the financial and technical resources to undertake SRM.[85]

In 2000s, some have suggested that SRM could be within reach of a lone "Greenfinger", a wealthy individual who takes it upon him or herself to be the "self-appointed protector of the planet".[86][87] Others disagree and argue that states will insist on maintaining control of SRM.[88] Subsequent research had dimmed this notion, as the annual costs of around $18 billion per 1 °C (1.8 °F) of cooling are likely to be prohibitive for even the wealthiest individuals.[89]

This section is an excerpt from Solar radiation modification § Disagreement and control.[edit]

Although climate models of SRM rely on some optimal or consistent implementation, leaders of countries and other actors may disagree as to whether, how, and to what degree SRM be used. This could result in suboptimal deployments and exacerbate international tensions.[90]

Some observers claim that SRM is likely to be militarized or weaponized. However, weaponization is disputed because SRM would be imprecise.[91] Regardless, the U.N. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, which prohibits weaponizing SRM, came into force in 1978.[92]

This section is an excerpt from Solar radiation modification § Distribution of effects.[edit]

Both climate change and SRM would affect various groups of people differently. Some observers describe SRM as necessarily creating "winners and losers". However, models indicate that SRM at a moderate intensity would return important climatic values of almost all regions of the planet closer to preindustrial conditions.[citation needed] That is, if all people prefer preindustrial conditions, such a moderate use could be a Pareto improvement.

Developing countries are particularly important, as they are more vulnerable to climate change. All else equal, they therefore have the most to gain from a judicious use of SRM. Observers sometimes claim that SRM poses greater risks to developing countries. There is no evidence that the unwanted environmental impacts of SRM would be significantly greater in developing countries, although potential disruptions to tropical monsoons are a concern. But in one sense, this claim of greater risk is true for the same reason that they are more vulnerable to greenhouse gas-induced climate change: developing countries have weaker infrastructure and institutions, and their economies rely to a greater degree on agriculture. They are thus more vulnerable to all climate changes, whether from greenhouse gases or SRM.

This section is an excerpt from Solar radiation modification § Maintenance and termination shock.[edit]

Climate models project that SRM interventions would take effect rapidly, but would also quickly fade out if not sustained. This means that their direct effects are effectively reversible, but also risks a rapid rebound after a prolonged interruption, sometimes known as termination shock. SRM effects would be temporary, and thus long-term climate restoration would rely on long-term deployment until sufficient carbon dioxide is removed.[93][94] If SRM masked significant warming, stopped abruptly, and was not resumed within a year or so, the climate would rapidly warm.[95] Global temperatures would rapidly rise towards levels which would have existed without the use of SRM. The rapid rise in temperature might lead to more severe consequences than a gradual rise of the same magnitude. However, some scholars have argued that this termination shock appears reasonably easy to prevent because it would be in states' interest to resume any terminated deployment regime; and because infrastructure and knowledge could be made redundant and resilient, allowing states to act on this interest and gradually phase out unwanted SRM.[96][97]

Some claim that SRM "would basically be impossible to stop."[98][99] This is true only of a long-term deployment strategy. A short-term, temporary strategy would limit implementation to decades.[100]

History edit

Positive secondary effects that occur from climate mitigation and adaptation measures have been mentioned in research since the 1990s.[101][102]

The IPCC pointed out in 2007: "Co-benefits of GHG mitigation can be an important decision criteria in analyses carried out by policy-makers, but they are often neglected."[103] And often the co-benefits are "not quantified, monetised or even identified by businesses and decision-makers".[103] Appropriate consideration of co-benefits can greatly "influence policy decisions concerning the timing and level of mitigation action", and there can be "significant advantages to the national economy and technical innovation".[103]

The IPCC first mentioned the role of co-benefits in 2001, followed by its fourth and fifth assessment cycle stressing improved working environment, reduced waste, health benefits and reduced capital expenditures.[104] In the early 2000s the OECD was further fostering its efforts in promoting ancillary benefits.[105] During the past decade, co-benefits have been discussed by several other international organisations: The International Energy Agency (IEA) spelled out the "multiple benefits approach" of energy efficiency while the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) operationalised the list of co-benefits of the renewable energy sector.[106][107]

Relevance for international agreements edit

The UNFCCC's Paris Agreement acknowledges mitigation co-benefits from Parties' action plans.[108] Co-benefits have been integrated in official national policy documents such as India's National Action Plan on Climate Change or the updated Vietnamese National Determined Contributions.[109][110]

References edit

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