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User:Amakuru/G6

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International involvement edit

Main article: Role of the international community in the Rwandan Genocide

UNAMIR edit

Main article: UNAMIR
 
A school chalkboard in Kigali. Note the names "Dallaire", UNAMIR Force Commander, and "Marchal", UNAMIR Kigali sector commander.

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) had been in Rwanda since October 1993,[1] with a mandate to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords.[2] UNAMIR commander Roméo Dallaire learned of the Hutu Power movement during the mission's deployment,[3] as well as plans for the mass extermination of Tutsi,[4] Dallaire learned of secret weapons caches, but his request to raid them was turned down by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).[3] UNAMIR's effectiveness in peacekeeping was also hampered by President Habyarimana and Hutu hardliners,[5] and by April 1994, the Security Council threatened to terminate UNAMIR's mandate if it did not make progress.[6]

 
The building in which ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers were massacred and mutilated. Today the site is preserved as a memorial

Following the death of Habyarimana, and the start of the genocide, Dallaire liaised repeatedly with both the Crisis Committee and the RPF, attempting to re-establish peace and prevent the resumption of the civil war.[7] Neither side was interested in a ceasefire, the government because it was controlled by the genocidaires, and the RPF because it considered it necessary to fight to stop the killings.[8] UNAMIR's Chapter VI mandate rendered it powerless to intervene militarily,[9] and most of its Rwandan staff were killed in the early days of the genocide, severely limiting its ability to operate.[8]

UNAMIR was therefore largely reduced to a bystander role, and Dallaire later labelled it a "failure."[10] Its most significant contribution was to provide refuge for thousands of Tutsi and moderate Hutu at its headquarters in Amahoro Stadium, as well as other secure UN sites,[11] and to assist with the evacuation of foreign nationals. On 12 April, the Belgian government, which was one of the largest troop contributors to UNAMIR,[12] and had lost ten soldiers protecting Prime Minister Uwilingiliyimana, announced that it was withdrawing, reducing the force's effectiveness even further.[13] In mid-May, the UN finally conceded that "acts of genocide may have been committed,"[14] and agreed to reinforcement, which would be known as UNAMIR 2.[15] The new soldiers did not start arriving until June,[16] and following the end of the genocide in July, the role of UNAMIR 2 was largely confined to maintaining security and stability, until its termination in 1996.[17]

France and Opération Turquoise edit

Main article: Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide
 
French marine parachutists stand guard at the airport, August 1994

During President Habyarimana's years in power, France maintained very close relations with him, as part of its Françafrique policy,[18] and assisted Rwanda militarily against the RPF during the Civil War;[19] France considered the RPF, along with Uganda, as part of an "plot" to increase Anglophone influence at the expense of French influence.[20] During the first few days of the genocide, France launched Amaryllis, a military operation assisted by the Belgian army and UNAMIR, to evacuate expatriates from Rwanda.[21] The French and Belgians refused to allow any Tutsi to accompany them, and those who boarded the evacuation trucks were forced off at Rwandan government checkpoints, where they were killed.[22] The French also separated several expatriates and children from their Tutsi spouses, rescuing the foreigners but leaving the Rwandans to likely death.[22] The French did, however, rescue several high profile members of Habyarimana's government, as well as his wife, Agathe.[22]

In late June 1994, France launched Opération Turquoise, a UN-mandated mission to create safe humanitarian areas for displaced persons, refugees, and civilians in danger; from bases in the Zairian cities of Goma and Bukavu, the French entered southwestern Rwanda and established the zone Turquoise, within the Cyangugu–Kibuye–Gikongoro triangle, an area occupying approximately a fifth of Rwanda.[23] Radio France International estimates that Turquoise saved around 15,000 lives,[24] but with the genocide coming to an end and the RPF's ascendancy, many Rwandans interpreted Turquoise as a mission to protect Hutu from the RPF, including some who had participated in the genocide.[25] The French remained hostile to the RPF, and their presence temporarily stalled the RPF's advance.[26]

A number of inquiries have been held into French involvement in Rwanda, including the 1998 French Parliamentary Commission on Rwanda,[27] which accused France of errors of judgement, including "military cooperation against a background of ethnic tensions, massacres and violence,"[28] but did not accuse France of direct responsibility for the genocide itself.[28] A 2008 report by the Rwandan government sponsored Mucyo Commission accused the French government of knowing of preparations for the genocide and helping to train Hutu militia members.[29][30][31]

Other nations edit

 
Convoy of American military vehicles bring fresh water from Goma to Rwandan refugees located at camp Kimbumba, Zaire in August 1994

Intelligence reports indicate that United States president Bill Clinton and his cabinet were aware before the height of the massacre that a "final solution to eliminate all Tutsis" was planned.[32] However, fear of a repeat of the events in Somalia shaped US policy at the time, with many commentators identifying the graphic consequences of the Battle of Mogadishu as the key reason behind the US's failure to intervene in later conflicts such as the Rwandan Genocide. After the battle, the bodies of several US casualties of the conflict were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by crowds of local civilians and members of Aidid's Somali National Alliance. According to the US's former deputy special envoy to Somalia, Walter Clarke: "The ghosts of Somalia continue to haunt US policy. Our lack of response in Rwanda was a fear of getting involved in something like a Somalia all over again."[33] President Clinton has referred to the failure of the U.S. government to intervene in the genocide as one of his main foreign policy failings, saying "I don't think we could have ended the violence, but I think we could have cut it down. And I regret it."[34] Eighty percent of the discussion in Washington concerned the evacuation of American citizens.[35]

The Roman Catholic Church affirms that genocide took place but states that those who took part did so without the permission of the Church.[36] Though religious factors were not prominent, in its 1999 report Human Rights Watch faulted a number of religious authorities in Rwanda, including Roman Catholics, Anglicans and Protestants, for failing to condemn the genocide – though that accusation was belied over time.[37] Some in its religious hierarchy have been tried and convincted for their participation by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.[36] Bishop Misago was accused of corruption and complicity in the genocide, but was cleared of all charges in 2000.[38] Many other Catholic and other clergy, however, gave their lives to protect Tutsis from slaughter.[37] Some clergy participated in the massacres. In 2006, Father Athanase Seromba was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for his role in the massacre of 2,000 Tutsis. The court heard that Seromba lured the Tutsis to the church, where they believed they would find refuge. When they arrived, he ordered bulldozers to crush the refugees within and Hutu militias to kill any survivors.[39][40]

  1. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 98.
  2. ^ Prunier 1999, p. 194.
  3. ^ a b Dallaire 2005, p. 146.
  4. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 150.
  5. ^ Prunier 1999, p. 205.
  6. ^ Dallaire 2005, pp. 219 220.
  7. ^ Prunier 1999, pp. 236 237.
  8. ^ a b Dallaire 2005, p. 247.
  9. ^ Prunier 1999, p. 261.
  10. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 6.
  11. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 270.
  12. ^ Prunier 1999, p. 204.
  13. ^ Melvern 2004, p. 197.
  14. ^ Various PBS contributors. "100 days of Slaughter: A Chronology of U.S./U.N. Actions". Public Broadcasting Service. Retrieved July 26, 2007. {{cite journal}}: |last= has generic name (help); Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  15. ^ Melvern 2004, p. 229.
  16. ^ Melvern 2004, p. 411.
  17. ^ United Nations (I).
  18. ^ Prunier 1999, p. 89.
  19. ^ Prunier 1999, pp. 100–101.
  20. ^ Melvern 2008.
  21. ^ Prunier 1999, p. 234.
  22. ^ a b c Prunier 1999, p. 235.
  23. ^ United Nations (II).
  24. ^ RFI 2014.
  25. ^ Fassbender 2011, p. 27.
  26. ^ McGreal 2007.
  27. ^ BBC News (I) 1998.
  28. ^ a b Whitney 1998.
  29. ^ BBC News (III) 2008.
  30. ^ Associated Press 2008.
  31. ^ Asiimwe 2008.
  32. ^ Carrol, Rory (April 1, 2004). "US chose to ignore Rwandan genocide". London: theguardian.
  33. ^ "Ambush in Mogadishu: Transcript". PBS. Retrieved October 27, 2009.
  34. ^ Chozick, Amy (2012-09-04). "In Africa, Bill Clinton Toils for a Charitable Legacy". The New York Times. Retrieved 2012-10-18.
  35. ^ Lynch, Colum (5 April 2015). "Exclusive: Rwanda Revisited". foreignpolicy.com. Retrieved 8 April 2015.
  36. ^ a b Totten, Bartrop & Jacobs 2008, p. 380.
  37. ^ a b Des Forges 1999, "The Organization » The Clergy".
  38. ^ "Rwandan bishop cleared of genocide". BBC News. June 15, 2000. Retrieved May 23, 2010.
  39. ^ "Ex-priest jailed for Rwanda genocide". MSNBC. December 13, 2006. Retrieved 2012-09-30.
  40. ^ Kimani, Martin (March 29, 2010). "For Rwandans, the pope's apology must be unbearable | Comment is free". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 2012-09-30.
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