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User:Almondmatcha/Armed conflict for control of the favelas in Greater Rio de Janeiro

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The armed conflict for control of the favelas in Greater Rio de Janeiro is an ongoing situation between Brazilian militias, organized criminal groups Comando Vermelho, Amigos dos Amigos, Terceiro Comando Puro and the Brazilian state. Organized criminal groups and paramilitaries largely control the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, with consistent intervention by Brazilian police and amongst rival organizations creating heightened instances of violence. To maintain dominance of drug markets and territory, criminal organizations have increasingly fostered relationships with political, social, and state actors, contributing to deepened corruption and failed remediation attempts by the Brazilian state to rid the favelas of organized criminal presence.

History of Organized Crime in Rio de Janeiro edit

Organized crime is intrinsically intertwined with Rio de Janeiro's history, growing with the development of the cities zones and their favelas. Rio de Janeiro is unique in that it has some of its wealthiest, tourist-driven communities located nearby neighborhoods that face high proportions of violence and criminal presence. This dynamic further perpetuates violence, increasing cries for police intervention from the wealthy which repress the poor,[1] and increases the reliance on groups such as miltias or organized crime, which often leverage protection and self-governance over state intervention. It is important to note that in order to accomplish drug market dominance and self-governance, though, organized crime heavily relies upon its relationships with political and state actors and institutions.[1]

Geographically and socially, Rio de Janeiro is split into three zones. The Zona Sul (South Zone) is the smallest region, but contains Rio's tourist destinations and wealthy residents,[2] as well as notable attractions Ipanema and Sugarloaf mountain. Zona Norte (North Zone) contains much of Rio's industrial areas, and is densely populated -- making it a key region for drug trafficking.[2] Zona Oeste (West Zone) is younger than the other two regions, due to its geographic setting. Largely rural, the area lacks the defining characteristics drug organizations look for, such as population or transportation opportunities.[2] Instead, organizations such as militias largely dominate control of the region.

Beginning with rackets such as Jogo do Bicho, Rio de Janeiro has had many incidents of collusion among criminal organizations and social and political institutions. Following the military dictatorship, political tools originally used by the regime, such as the prison complex Cândido Mendes, created the first prison gangs in Rio in the late 1970s.[3] With the subsequent cocaine boom in South America,[4] these gangs would go on to dominate the drug market and capitalize off it within favela communities. Heightened tensions for control of these neighborhoods contributed to turf wars and new factions of organized crime forming.

Criminal Organizations in Rio de Janeiro edit

CV drug gang edit

Comando Vermelho (Red Command) or the C.V. is Brazil's oldest criminal organization, which engages in drug trafficking, protection racketeering, and turf wars with rival drug gangs and militias in Rio de Janeiro, among other criminal activities.

The formation of the organization dates back to the late 1970s, when political prisoners and common criminals in the Cândido Mendes prison (located on the island Ilha Grande) formed a self-protective alliance.[3] Through the transfer of gang leaders by the Brazilian government, the gang was able to gain control of other prisons and establish itself on the ground in Rio de Janeiro. With the cocaine boom of the 1980s, the gang's focus shifted from petty crime to that of drug trafficking,[4] which allowed for larger profits and control of city municipalities.

Despite years of violent conflict with Brazilian police and deterrent efforts such as the Police Pacifying Unit (UPP), and among conflicts with other criminal organizations, the CV maintains significant power and governance in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. Current issues for the CV reside in outbreaks of violence with criminal organizations for control of drug routes and turf wars with militias.[3]

ADA drug gang edit

Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends) or ADA is another of Rio de Janeiro's most prominent drug gangs, historically having strongholds in Rocinha -- the largest of the favelas in greater Rio de Janeiro. The criminal organization formed in the late 1990s by ex-members of Comando Vermelho -- who were expelled due to the killing of another member -- in order to compete for territorial dominance.[5] CV is still ADA's biggest rival, along with the Terceiro Comando Puro (Pure Capital Command, TCP).

After the death of the previous boss Luciano Barbosa da Silva, or Lulu, in 2004, Antônio Bonfim Lopes, better known as "Nem" or "Nem da Rocinha" became on of the major leaders of ADA. Under his control of Rocinha, corruption, rather than violence increased, leading to an era of relative calm in the favela[6] while continuously strengthening ADA's drug trafficking schemes and the consolidation of power over political networks and the social projects.[7] This included the financial and social support of political candidates,[7] provision of services and regularly held parties and celebrations.[5] Nem's eventual arrest in 2011 led to years of incessant turf wars for control of Rocinha among ADA and CV, which are still ongoing. Although unconfirmed, it is thought that Nem still leads ADA operations from within prison.[8]

TCP drug gang edit

Terceiro Comando Puro (Pure Third Command) or TCP is yet another of Rio de Janeiro's most powerful organized crime groups, participating in the drug market and extortion. Originating in 2002, the group began as an off-shoot of the Terceiro Comando (Third Command),[9] which no longer operates and was originally a faction formed off of Comando Vermelho.

Although enemies now, Terceiro Comando and Amigos dos Amigos formed an alliance in the late 1990s to overtake territory held by their mutual enemy, CV.[9] Several years later, this alliance crumbled and led to the degradation of the Terceiro Comando, until former leader Nei da Conceição Cruz, alias “Facão, reformed the group in 2002 under the new name Terceiro Comando Puro.

Since then, TCP has maintained territorial control of the northern and western zones of Rio de Janeiro, although they may be attempting to expand their territory through the help of an alleged alliance with Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Capital Command) or PCC, Brazil's largest criminal organization, headquartered in São Paulo.[9] It is important to note the breakdown of the alliance between CV and the PCC in 2016, which has allowed this possible new alliance to form. TCP also engages in continual turf wars with ADA and CV, but have recently gained allies in the form of militias.

Jogo do Bicho illegal gambling groups edit

Jogo do Bicho (Animal game) is an illegal gambling game in Brazil, which is still incredibly popular and sought out despite its federal prohibition in 1946. The game is played all around the country, with lottery-style drawings in every state occurring daily in its headquarters in Rio de Janeiro.[10] The game is controlled by bosses, called bicheiros or banqueiros ("bankers").

Jogo do Bicho is a longstanding staple in Brazilian culture, with thousands participating in the game daily. Because of its potential to circulate and raise large sums of money, control of Jogo do Bicho is lucrative and largely contributes to corruption, with politicians, judicial personnel, and members of the police force all monetarily and politically benefitting from it.[10] Bicheiros also contribute funding to social programs, such as samba schools, which play a critical role in cultural festivities such as Brazilian Carnival.[10] Because of this, Jogo do Bicho, and in turn its bicheiros, are deeply ingrained in Brazilian culture, especially in Rio de Janeiro, and contribute to the landscape of organized crime and corruption.

Militia organizations edit

Brazilian milicias (militias), or paramilitary groups, consisting of current and retired police officers, prison guards, and military members, control much of the western territory of Rio de Janeiro[11] and continue to expand their territory through turf wars with ADA and CV. Militia groups have grown in size and power rapidly, originating in the early 2000s and growing to control highly populated areas since. Founded as vigilante groups, they've amassed enough power as to dominate and extort entire territories of Rio de Janeiro. Along with extortion methods, the groups have gained political influence and have even been previously supported by high-profile politicians, such as former president Jair Bolsonaro.[12]

Unlike the other criminal organizations such as CV and ADA, who have always invested in the drug market, militias positioned themselves against drug trafficking in order to gain community approval and trust, with some favela residents seeing them as the "lesser evil" of crime as compared to drug gangs.[11] Instead of drug trafficking, the groups participate in extortion, controlling civilian access to gas, land, and cable television.[13] Recently, some groups have decided to expand to allowing drug dealing within their territories or are doing so themselves, leveraging profit and control of important territories from drug gangs.[14]

Formation of the UPP edit

The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Units) or UPP was a security program in Rio de Janeiro that aimed to reclaim favelas from criminal organizations, most of which are drug gangs such as CV, ADA, and TCP, through community policing. The strategy worked in two parts: deployment of the Military Police of Rio (PMERJ) into the favelas, and then increasing the amount of police officers who were meant to interact with the community through units,[15] in hopes of creating a healthier relationship between favela residents and law enforcement than what existed in years prior. For decades, interactions with police in Rio de Janeiro were abrasive; violent interactions between drug gangs and the police led to civilian casualties, and numerous instances of abuses of power by the police led to a general distrust by favela residents.[16] The creation of the UPP aimed to both restructure the police force and its interactions with civilians, while also deterring criminal activity leading up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics, an increased period of tourism.

A secondary component of the UPP plan was the creation of UPP Social, which aimed to address the social welfare needs of the favelas by UPP units. This included improvements to sanitation, education, and healthcare, among other social issues.

Early Success edit

in 2009, the first UPP was set up in the Santa Marta favela, with more quickly following -- coalescing in 32 units overall, spanning all of Rio de Janeiro's zones (though most were located in Zona Norte). Despite urges for increased financial support, the UPP units amassed praise in their early years for evident decreases in both visible crime and violence within the favelas they were operating in.[17]

Because military presence was a precursor to actual UPP units, many drug traffickers fled occupied favelas to avoid persecution or capture by the Military Police of Rio's tactical unit, BOPE. Because of this, crime rates significantly dropped for a couple years. In interviews with residents, details of the freedoms they were allowed once UPP units were installed continued to highlight the successes of the project. [17]

Amarildo Souza, UPP abuses, and backsliding edit

Despite early success, some of the main hinderances of the UPP project were police abuses and disappearances that occurred. One of the most prominent cases of this was the disappearance of Amarildo Souza, a bricklayer from the Rocinha favela.[18] Souza, 42, had been fishing the morning of his disappearance and decided to go into the favela to get produce when he was confronted by UPP officers.[19] Souza was taken for questioning and subsequently never returned home.[19]

Souza was well known throughout Rocinha, leading to public outcry at his disappearance and a lack of response by the UPP unit. After more than two months of public outcry, an investigation was opened into his disappearance, where twenty-four UPP officers and the UPP commander were found accused of torture, concealing a body, procedural fraud, and conspiracy.[20] In the subsequent trial, twelve officers would be found guilty of torture, procedural fraud, and concealing a body.[21]

Despite the investigation and criminal case, the UPP suffered weakened support from favela residents, who felt both anger and fear at the actions of the local UPP unit. Coupled with insufficient training [22] and poorly strategized growth of the units, the UPP continued to fail as insignificant funding heavily derailed the project, which could not perform what it was intended to. [23] With the weakening of the UPP, criminal organizations could again attempt to reclaim their territories through shootouts and confrontations, but were this time more successful.[16]

Article Draft edit

Lead edit

The armed conflict for control of the favelas in Greater Rio de Janeiro is an ongoing conflict between Brazilian militias, organized criminal groups Comando Vermelho, Amigos dos Amigos, Terceiro Comando Puro and the Brazilian state. Organized criminal groups and paramilitaries largely control the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, with consistent intervention by Brazilian police and amongst rival organizations creating heightened instances of violence. To maintain dominance of drug markets and territory, criminal organizations have increasingly fostered relationships with political, social, and state actors, contributing to deepened corruption and failed remediation attempts by the Brazilian state to rid the favelas of organized criminal presence.

Article body edit

History of Organized Crime in Rio de Janeiro edit

Organized crime is intrinsically intertwined with Rio de Janeiro's history, growing with the development of the cities zones and their favelas. Rio de Janeiro is unique in that it has some of its wealthiest, tourist-driven communities located nearby neighborhoods that face high proportions of violence and criminal presence. This dynamic further perpetuates violence, increasing cries for police intervention from the wealthy which repress the poor,[1] and increases the reliance on groups such as miltias or organized crime, which often leverage protection and self-governance over state intervention. It is important to note that in order to accomplish drug market dominance and self-governance, though, organized crime heavily relies upon its relationships with political and state actors and institutions.[1]

 
Panorama night image of Rocinha, the largest favela in Rio de Janeiro.

Geographically and socially, Rio de Janeiro is split into three zones. The Zona Sul (South Zone) is the smallest region, but contains Rio's tourist destinations and wealthy residents,[2] as well as notable attractions Ipanema and Sugarloaf mountain. Zona Norte (North Zone) contains much of Rio's industrial areas, and is densely populated -- making it a key region for drug trafficking.[2] Zona Oeste (West Zone) is younger than the other two regions, due to its geographic setting. Largely rural, the area lacks the defining characteristics drug organizations look for, such as population or transportation opportunities.[2] Instead, organizations such as militias largely dominate control of the region.

Beginning with rackets such as Jogo do Bicho, Rio de Janeiro has had many incidents of collusion among criminal organizations and social and political institutions. Following the military dictatorship, political tools originally used by the regime, such as the prison complex Cândido Mendes, created the first prison gangs in Rio in the late 1970s.[3] With the subsequent cocaine boom in South America,[4] these gangs would go on to dominate the drug market and capitalize off it within favela communities. Heightened tensions for control of these neighborhoods contributed to turf wars and new factions of organized crime forming.

Criminal Organizations in Rio de Janeiro edit

CV drug gang edit

Comando Vermelho (Red Command) or the C.V. is Brazil's oldest criminal organization, which engages in drug trafficking, protection racketeering, and turf wars with rival drug gangs and militias in Rio de Janeiro, among other criminal activities.

The formation of the organization dates back to the late 1970s, when political prisoners and common criminals in the Cândido Mendes prison (located on the island Ilha Grande) formed a self-protective alliance.[3] Through the transfer of gang leaders by the Brazilian government, the gang was able to gain control of other prisons and establish itself on the ground in Rio de Janeiro. With the cocaine boom of the 1980s, the gang's focus shifted from petty crime to that of drug trafficking,[4] which allowed for larger profits and control of city municipalities.

Despite years of violent conflict with Brazilian police and deterrent efforts such as the Police Pacifying Unit (UPP), and among conflicts with other criminal organizations, the CV maintains significant power and governance in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. Current issues for the CV reside in outbreaks of violence with criminal organizations for control of drug routes and turf wars with militias[3] over territories such as their headquarters, Complexo do Alemão.

ADA drug gang edit

Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends) or ADA is another of Rio de Janeiro's most prominent drug gangs, historically having strongholds in Rocinha -- the largest of the favelas in greater Rio de Janeiro. The criminal organization formed in the late 1990s by ex-members of Comando Vermelho -- who were expelled due to the killing of another member -- in order to compete for territorial dominance.[5] CV is still ADA's biggest rival, along with the Terceiro Comando Puro (Pure Capital Command, TCP).

in 2004, after the death of the previous boss of Rochinha, Luciano Barbosa da Silva, or Lulu, a leader of CV, Antônio Bonfim Lopes, better known as "Nem" or "Nem da Rocinha" gained control of Rocinha and became one of the major leaders of ADA. Under his control of Rocinha, corruption, rather than violence increased, leading to an era of relative calm in the favela[6] while continuously strengthening ADA's drug trafficking schemes and the consolidation of power over political networks and social projects.[7] This included the financial and social support of political candidates,[7] provision of services and regularly held parties and celebrations.[5] Nem's eventual arrest in 2011 led to years of incessant turf wars for control of Rocinha among ADA and CV, which are still ongoing. Although unconfirmed, it is thought that Nem still leads ADA operations from within prison.[8]

TCP drug gang edit

Terceiro Comando Puro (Pure Third Command) or TCP is yet another of Rio de Janeiro's most powerful organized crime groups, participating in the drug market and extortion. Originating in 2002, the group began as an off-shoot of the Terceiro Comando (Third Command),[9] which no longer operates and was originally a faction formed off of Comando Vermelho.

Although enemies now, Terceiro Comando and Amigos dos Amigos formed an alliance in the late 1990s to overtake territory held by their mutual enemy, CV.[9] Several years later, this alliance crumbled and led to the degradation of the Terceiro Comando, until former leader Nei da Conceição Cruz, alias “Facão, reformed the group in 2002 under the new name Terceiro Comando Puro.

Since then, TCP has maintained territorial control of the northern and western zones of Rio de Janeiro, although they may be attempting to expand their territory through the help of an alleged alliance with Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Capital Command) or PCC, Brazil's largest criminal organization, headquartered in São Paulo.[9] It is important to note the breakdown of the alliance between CV and the PCC in 2016, which has allowed this possible new alliance to form. TCP also engages in continual turf wars with ADA and CV, but have recently gained allies in the form of militias.

Jogo do Bicho illegal gambling groups edit

Jogo do Bicho (Animal game) is an illegal gambling game in Brazil, which is still incredibly popular and sought out despite its federal prohibition in 1946. The game is played all around the country, with lottery-style drawings in every state occurring daily in its headquarters in Rio de Janeiro.[10] The game is controlled by bosses, called bicheiros or banqueiros ("bankers").

Jogo do Bicho is a longstanding staple in Brazilian culture, with thousands participating in the game daily. Because of its potential to circulate and raise large sums of money, control of Jogo do Bicho is lucrative and largely contributes to corruption, with politicians, judicial personnel, and members of the police force all monetarily and politically benefitting from it.[10] Bicheiros also contribute funding to social programs, such as samba schools, which play a critical role in cultural festivities such as Brazilian Carnival.[10] Because of this, Jogo do Bicho, and in turn its bicheiros, are deeply ingrained in Brazilian culture, especially in Rio de Janeiro, and contribute to the landscape of organized crime and corruption.

Militia organizations edit

Brazilian milicias (militias), or paramilitary groups, consisting of current and retired police officers, prison guards, and military members, control much of the western territory of Rio de Janeiro[11] and continue to expand their territory through turf wars with ADA and CV. Militia groups have grown in size and power rapidly, originating in the early 2000s and growing to control highly populated areas since. Founded as vigilante groups, they've amassed enough power as to dominate and extort entire territories of Rio de Janeiro. Along with extortion methods, the groups have gained political influence and have even been previously supported by high-profile politicians, such as former president Jair Bolsonaro.[12]

Unlike the other criminal organizations such as CV and ADA, who have always invested in the drug market, militias positioned themselves against drug trafficking in order to gain community approval and trust, with some favela residents seeing them as the "lesser evil" of crime as compared to drug gangs.[11] Instead of drug trafficking, the groups participate in extortion, controlling civilian access to gas, land, and cable television.[13] Recently, some groups have decided to expand to allowing drug dealing within their territories or are doing so themselves, leveraging profit and control of important territories from drug gangs.[14]

Formation of the UPP edit

The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Units) or UPP was a security program in Rio de Janeiro that aimed to reclaim favelas from criminal organizations, most of which are drug gangs such as CV, ADA, and TCP, through community policing. The strategy worked in two parts: deployment of the Military Police of Rio (PMERJ) into the favelas, and then increasing the amount of police officers who were meant to interact with the community through units,[15] in hopes of creating a healthier relationship between favela residents and law enforcement than what existed in years prior. For decades, interactions with police in Rio de Janeiro were abrasive; violent interactions between drug gangs and the police led to civilian casualties, and numerous instances of abuses of power by the police led to a general distrust by favela residents.[16] The creation of the UPP aimed to both restructure the police force and its interactions with civilians, while also deterring criminal activity leading up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics, an increased period of tourism.

A secondary component of the UPP plan was the creation of UPP Social, which aimed to address the social welfare needs of the favelas by UPP units. This included improvements to sanitation, education, and healthcare, among other social issues.

Early Success edit

in 2009, the first UPP was set up in the Santa Marta favela, with more quickly following -- coalescing in 32 units overall, spanning all of Rio de Janeiro's zones (though most were located in Zona Norte). Despite urges for increased financial support, the UPP units amassed praise in their early years for evident decreases in both visible crime and violence within the favelas they were operating in.[17]

Because military presence was a precursor to actual UPP units, many drug traffickers fled occupied favelas to avoid persecution or capture by the Military Police of Rio's tactical unit, BOPE. Because of this, crime rates significantly dropped for a couple years. In interviews with residents, details of the freedoms they were allowed once UPP units were installed continued to highlight the successes of the project. [17]

Amarildo Souza, UPP abuses, and backsliding edit

Despite early success, some of the main hinderances of the UPP project were police abuses and disappearances that occurred. One of the most prominent cases of this was the disappearance of Amarildo Souza, a bricklayer from the Rocinha favela.[18] Souza, 42, had been fishing the morning of his disappearance and decided to go into the favela to get produce when he was confronted by UPP officers.[19] Souza was taken for questioning and subsequently never returned home.[19]

Souza was well known throughout Rocinha, leading to public outcry at his disappearance and a lack of response by the UPP unit. After more than two months of public outcry, an investigation was opened into his disappearance, where twenty-four UPP officers and the UPP commander were found accused of torture, concealing a body, procedural fraud, and conspiracy.[20] In the subsequent trial, twelve officers would be found guilty of torture, procedural fraud, and concealing a body.[21]

Despite the investigation and criminal case, the UPP suffered weakened support from favela residents, who felt both anger and fear at the actions of the local UPP unit. Coupled with insufficient training [22] and poorly strategized growth of the units, the UPP continued to fail as insignificant funding heavily derailed the project, which could not perform what it was intended to. [23] With the weakening of the UPP, criminal organizations could again attempt to reclaim their territories through shootouts and confrontations, but were this time more successful.[16]

References edit

  1. ^ a b c d Arias, Enrique Desmond (2006). "The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social Order in Rio de Janeiro". Journal of Latin American Studies. 38 (2): 293–325. ISSN 0022-216X.
  2. ^ a b c d e f Arias, Enrique Desmond (2013-09-01). "The Impacts of Differential Armed Dominance of Politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil". Studies in Comparative International Development. 48 (3): 263–284. doi:10.1007/s12116-013-9137-8. ISSN 0039-3606.
  3. ^ a b c d e f Crime, InSight (2022-07-17). "Red Command". InSight Crime. Retrieved 2023-12-14.
  4. ^ a b c d Lessing, Benjamin (2017-12-07). Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America (1 ed.). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108185837. ISBN 978-1-107-19963-7.
  5. ^ a b c d Crime, InSight (2018-03-30). "Amigos dos Amigos". InSight Crime. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  6. ^ a b Robertson, Cerianne (2018-04-02). "'I Don't Regret Being a Drug Trafficker. What Would You Do In My Place?' - Rocinha's Nem". RioOnWatch. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  7. ^ a b c d Arias, Enrique Desmond (2013-09-01). "The Impacts of Differential Armed Dominance of Politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil". Studies in Comparative International Development. 48 (3): 263–284. doi:10.1007/s12116-013-9137-8. ISSN 0039-3606.
  8. ^ a b Asmann, Parker (2017-09-26). "'Classic Rio Gangster Battle' Leaves Brazil Favela in State of Siege". InSight Crime. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  9. ^ a b c d e f Crime, InSight (2018-04-26). "Pure Third Command". InSight Crime. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  10. ^ a b c d e f Rohter, Larry (2007-06-07). "Brazilian Numbers Game Ties Officials to Mobsters". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  11. ^ a b c d Phillips, Dom (2018-07-12). "'Lesser evil': how Brazil's militias wield terror to seize power from gangs". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  12. ^ a b "Brazil's fearsome militias: mafia boom increases threat to democracy | Brazil | The Guardian". amp.theguardian.com. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  13. ^ a b "Brazil's dangerous militias – DW – 09/04/2019". dw.com. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  14. ^ a b Magaloni, Beatriz; Franco-Vivanco, Edgar; Melo, Vanessa (2020-05-01). "Killing in the Slums: Social Order, Criminal Governance, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro". American Political Science Review. 114 (2): 552–572. doi:10.1017/S0003055419000856. ISSN 0003-0554.
  15. ^ a b Clavel, Tristan (2017-08-01). "What LatAm Cities Can Learn From the Failures of Brazil's UPP Policing Model". InSight Crime. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  16. ^ a b c d "The Dilemmas of Pacification: News of War and Peace in the 'Marvelous City'". Stability: International Journal of Security & Development. 3 (1): 22. 2014-05-22. doi:10.5334/sta.dt. ISSN 2165-2627.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (link)
  17. ^ a b c d Michaels, Julia (2012-08-08). "New Rio de Janeiro Police Force Reduces Favela Violence: Study". InSight Crime. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  18. ^ a b "Missing in Rio on the rise; Brazil police accused". AP News. 2013-10-08. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  19. ^ a b c d "Amarildo: The disappearance that has rocked Rio". BBC News. 2013-09-18. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  20. ^ a b Reporter, Contributing (2014-02-22). "Rio Court Hears from Police Accused in Amarildo Case: Daily". The Rio Times. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  21. ^ a b "Good News! - Brazil: 12 Military Police Officers Held Accountable in the Enforced Disappearance of Amarildo de Souza (UA: 202/13)". Amnesty International USA. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  22. ^ a b Clavel, Tristan (2017-08-01). "What LatAm Cities Can Learn From the Failures of Brazil's UPP Policing Model". InSight Crime. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  23. ^ a b Froio, Nicole (2015-03-30). "The Death of UPP Social: Failing to Make Participation Work". RioOnWatch. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
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