Talk:United Nations Security Council Resolution 242/Archive 2

context section

Could someone explain to me how all the stuff in the context section is relevant to this article? It's about US foreign relations, not resolution 242. Some of it can go into the drafting process section I guess, but most of it is just irrelevant.
Any reason I shouldn't remove it? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 19:09, 23 August 2009 (UTC)

According to the Office of the Historian at the State Department, these documents on post-war diplomacy are about resolution 242. President Johnson publicly outlined the minimum acceptable requirements for this Security Council resolution and had the USUN Ambassador block the adoption of several draft resolutions the US found unacceptable. The US worked with the UK on the version that was finally adopted. harlan (talk) 18:49, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

I think that should probably go in the drafting process section. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 18:57, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

I don't see any reason to make the reader wade through the speculation in the "Interpretation" Section before finding out that 90% of that material is groundless. harlan (talk) 19:08, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

If it's baseless or not is your interpretation of the content. Anyway, can we agree that the Background on the disposition of Arab Palestine section is irrelevant to this article? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 19:43, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

No, because the Jewish Agency leaders were talking about the final settlement. The US and UK both considered the West Bank to be Jordanian territory and had the same policy on territorial compensation in exchange for any armistice line adjustments that Israel might request. harlan (talk) 22:36, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Be that as it may, it has no place in an article about resolution 242. Palestine is not mentioned in the resolution. Neither is Jordan. In fact, neither is the West Bank. The most this article should go back is to the war that prompted this resolution. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 22:49, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

That's your personal opinion. President Johnson mentioned the Palestinan refugees in his speech and the refugees are mentioned in the resolution. The article contains Lord Caradon's remarks about the armistice lines in connection with withdrawal from occupied territories. Israel occupied the West Bank during the war, and there were armistice lines in the West Bank. harlan (talk) 00:26, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Fully agree with NMMNG here. This bloated context section does not belong here - it is WP:SYNTH and WP:UNDUE LoverOfTheRussianQueen (talk) 04:54, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

An article discussing the a UNSC resolution requires background on the drafting. Part of that background is the views of the states who drafted and voted on the resolution. It is not synthesis to give that background. nableezy - 05:03, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Some background on the drafting is certainly appropriate. 20 year old history isn't. I also don't think that the information on the drafting should be the bulk of the article. Look at other articles about other UNSC resolutions. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 10:08, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

The US post-war negotiations and participation in drafting the terms of the resolution are not WP:Synth or WP:Undue. harlan (talk) 10:18, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

The whole first section being about this sure seems like WP:UNDUE to me. There's a large section about US foreign relations. Then there's another large section about statements by US officials. It's as if the US were the center of this resolution. It isn't. There isn't even a link to the text of the resolution.

I think we should reorganize the article as follows:

• Lead (current one is good)
• Maybe the whole text of the resolution? It's pretty short
• "land for peace" (most important feature of the resolution) + subsection on legal issues
• Drafting, including something about US relations and other background information
• Interpretations of involved parties
• What other people say

What do you guys think? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 15:49, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Looks good to me. LoverOfTheRussianQueen (talk) 19:32, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

The "Interpretations" and other subsections are not very informative, since many of the details about the negotiations and drafting process were classified when those statements were originally published. If you want to eliminate cruft, that is the logical place to start. The US had to wait until 2004 to publish its own declassified official history regarding the negotiations and drafting process.

I've added a section which explains that the principle of "Land for Peace" was introduced as the basis for a settlement by the US government, and that the government of Israel indicated it would not accept any resolution which deviated from that principle. No Security Council resolution can be adopted without US approval. Israel and Jordan didn't have a veto on the Security Council, so the US made representations and statements on their behalf during the negotiations. That information is not WP:Undue. On the contrary, it is a very significant published POV that should be represented in the article. I don't think that removing the FRUS material will improve the educational value of the article either. If you are not willing to drop the matter, I'd suggest we submit it to the Moderation Committee. harlan (talk) 05:20, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

I suggesting that at least for starters, we move the FRUS stuff down rather than it be the thing the article opens with.

I don't mind going directly to the Moderation Committee, though. Better than fighting with the band of roving reverters. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 10:29, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

The FRUS material should stay put. It contains policy discussions conducted during the summer that were preliminary to any efforts to draft the resolution. The detailed explanations provided by Rusk and Rostow regarding the terms of an acceptable settlement with Jordan tend to exclude some of the interpretations and inferences contained in the other subsections of the article, e.g. Interpretation, Legal Interpretation, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. harlan (talk) 19:31, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

The efforts to draft the resolution shouldn't come before the actual explanation of the resolution. A person has to read for 10 minutes before understanding what this resolution is about.

If you find an RS that says that Rusk and Rostow's explanations exclude someone's else's explanations, you can put that in the article. Otherwise it's OR. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 17:18, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

The lede is supposed to summarize and explain the article. The FRUS section contains explanations of the resolution with regard to the meaning of the land for peace and withdrawal provisions. Those are not necessarily limited to "efforts to draft the resolution". For example, the US commitment regarding "territorial integrity" included promises to use its good offices to obtain the return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications, and etc.

As for OR, the Georgetown symposium sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy is already cited, but there is no mention that Lord Caradon remarked that Israel was in clear defiance of resolution 242. He specifically cited the annexation of East Jerusalem and the creeping colonialism on the West Bank, in Gaza, and in the Golan as examples.

William B. Quandt cites the 67 FRUS volume XIX and says the Israeli's had officially made it clear that they did not intend to expand their borders as a result of the war. He says that the US did not endorse Israel holding the occupied territories indefinately, but rather that they be exchanged for peace. He also quotes Dean Rusk's book "As I Saw It", page 389 which said "we never contemplated any significant grant of territory to Israel as a result of the June 1967 war." The same footnote mentions Goldberg's November 3, 1967 commitment to Hussein, and the fact that in 1968 Israel authorized US Ambassador George Ball to tell King Hussein that it was willing to return the West Bank to his authority. see pages 44-50 and the footnotes on pages 442-444, Peace process: American diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967", University of California Press harlan (talk) 06:29, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

The FRUS section contains explanations of what the US thought it was doing regarding the resolution. With all due respect to the US, it is not the main thing this resolution is about, and you're giving the US and its opinions UNDUE WEIGHT. This resolution is not about the US, although someone reading this article would probably think it was. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 09:33, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

With all due respect the US told the other members of the council whether their drafts were unacceptable or not - and its veto gave its opinions more weight. Caradon said that he borrowed the wording of the withdrawal clause and the refugee clause, as well as the express reference to Article 2 of the United Nations Charter (which requires UN members to act in “good faith” and to seek peaceful means for the resolution of international disputes) from the American draft. He also said the inclusion of the inadmissibility principle was the result of the July agreement between the Americans and the Soviets. see U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981), at p. 9.

In any event there is no requirement to keep the extrinsic evidence contained in the policy statements of the Security Council representatives of the UK, US, Israeli and other governments isolated in a section by itself located after the speculative opinions of a history and literature major (Sassoon) expounding on the doubtful applicability of common law principles to international organization or to non-common law member countries. harlan (talk) 02:10, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Do you want to move the statements by UNSC members section up before the interpretation section? I wouldn't mind that. It makes sense chronologically. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 11:13, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Source Description of the FRUS

I have no strong conviction either way. It might help to avoid confusion. For example, Foreign relations of Israel does not refer to the "Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel" Series Some casual readers might not be aware of the fact that Foreign Relations of the United States is a book.

In addition, there are a few editors who are characterizing it as US-centric, despite the fact that much of the material in the chapter on resolution 242 consists of messages from foreign governments and memos that record the details of discussions with the officials of Jordan, Israel, the UK, the USSR, and etc. harlan (talk) 06:22, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

You can write an article on the FRUS series, then citations can be linked to it so that people can find out about the source. There is no cause for giving this source (which is not a book but a multi-volume continuing series) special treatment in the article. Anyway, it is US-centric. I wrote this in another place:

The series "Foreign Relations of the United States" (FRUS) is undoubtedly a great resource, and very convenient now that the text is searchable on the internet. But it is not an objective source. It is an official publication of the United States government and must be treated with the same care that government publications should always be treated. The mere fact that it describes events from a US-centered viewpoint means that it is not neutral. Besides that, lots of the documents presented there were written by US officials with the usual prejudices and self-interests that government officials have. FRUS can be treated as a reliable source of US policy and of the machinations that went on within the US government, and for the source of foreign documents that are reprinted verbatim. Other claims found in FRUS are claims by an interested party and should only be presented as such. Taking claims from internal US documents and presenting them as facts is a perfect example of original research. That's what historians are for, and that's why we should try to source things from historians who have consulted not only FRUS but lots of other sources. Zero^talk 09:11, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

Zero is correct. There is no need for a paragraph describing what the FRUS are we have an article about them, and all that's needed is to link the reference to that article. LoverOfTheRussianQueen (talk) 16:52, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

Letting the sources speak for themselves is in no way original research. One of the citations is an Editorial note written by the Office of the Historian thirty years after the fact to provide an explanation for the public. Another is a cable from the Israeli Foreign Office. There was no attempt to take claims from those documents and present them as facts, since there was a prefatory note which explained this was the official historical and documentary record of the United States, and that it contained official policy statements of the United States, Israel, and etc.

On the other hand, the common law principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius cuts both ways. For example, the specific explanations provided by Rusk and Rostow regarding the terms of an acceptable settlement with Jordan tend to exclude several of the interpretations presented elsewhere in the article. harlan (talk) 19:15, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

Jewish Refugees

I really don't recall any mention of Jewish refugees in the 1967-era Security Council deliberations about resolution 242. I am aware that the issue was subsequently raised in other forums, but that does not mean that 242 was speaking about them. harlan (talk) 10:39, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

I don't think Jewish refugees were specifically mentioned when 242 was written. It was interpreted to include them later. Considering the language is not specific as to which refugees they are discussing, that's not surprising. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 12:36, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Jewish refugees were not considered a "problem". There were no Jewish refugees in squalid camps or clamouring to be allowed back to their homes. The phrase "refugee problem" meant "Arab refugee problem". However it was Israeli policy since the 1950s to always bring up Jewish refugees whenever Arab refugees were mentioned. So the offered document could be cited something like "The Israeli government argued that Jewish refugees should be included in the negotiations as well". It can't be cited as evidence they were included already. Zero^talk 13:16, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

J. Quigley (President’s Club Professor in Law at Ohio State University), writing in Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1 (Autumn 2007), pp. 49–61 :   "In recent years, efforts have also been made on the Israeli side to equate the issue of Jewish refugees from Arab countries with that of the Palestine Arab refugees and to suggest that the issue of the Palestine Arab refugees need not be resolved until and unless resolution is also reached for the Jewish refugees from Arab countries. As far as Resolution 242 is concerned, however, it is clear from the context in which it was adopted, and from the statements recounted above by delegates, that Resolution 242 contemplates the Palestine Arab refugees only." Zero^talk 10:10, 3 September 2009 (UTC)

(outdent) I'm certain there are individuals with claims arising from the Jewish exodus from Arab countries. No government or UN system was keeping track of those individuals as refugees in 1967. They would not have come to mind by simply including the word refugees in the resolution. I don't recall them being mentioned in the FRUS, DBFP, or Security Council records. The JCPA attributes an unsourced statement to Ambassador Goldberg which appears to be a complete non-sequitur. Goldberg contended (elsewhere) that the Security Council vote did not indicate unanimous support for terms that were omitted from the text of the resolution. harlan (talk) 18:56, 5 September 2009 (UTC)

WP:OR

The {{fact}} tag has been repeatedly removed from the statements about refugees, despite the fact that the material has NOT been properly sourced. For example, Wikipedia appears to be the source of the WP:OR claim that Charles De Gaulle said UN resolution 242 refers to both Jewish and Arab refugees in his press conference on 27 November 1967 [1] and in a 9 January 1968 letter to David Ben Gurion.[2] In fact, neither the press conference nor the letter contained any mention of Jewish refugees.

The neutral voice of the article cannot be used to support claims that do not actually appear in any of the original sources. There is no direct evidence that President Jimmy Carter ever claimed that UN Resolution 242 referred to Jewish refugees at Camp David. In 'Keeping the Faith memoirs of a president', he does not mention Jewish refugees at all. Author Avrum Ehrlich actually said that (a) 242 mentions refugees and (b) that Carter said the term applied to both Jewish and Arab refugees at Camp David, (a+b not a=b). That is all true, but Carter was talking about a controversial new proposal in the Memorandum of Understanding that he and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan had agreed to sign on October 4, 1977, not resolution 242 (a≠b). Israeli officials wanted the Camp David Framework to mention Jewish refugees, but Egyptian officials did not. The final Camp David Middle East Framework contained no mention of Jewish refugees.[3] It was only the 1977 Memorandum of Understanding between Israel and the US that mentioned both Arab and Jewish refugees. See 'Breakthrough', by Moshe Dayan, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981, pages 356-358; 'Camp David: peacemaking and politics' By William B. Quandt, Brookings Institution, 1986, ISBN: 0815772890, page 65 and Appendix E, page 367.

I'm going to remove the challenged material and once again ask for a citation to the actual written accounts of the Security Council proceedings (Process Verbal, S/PV, etc.). harlan (talk) 22:24, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

The author is saying that the term as used in the resolution covers both types of refugees and gives Carter as an example of usage. You can say that he's wrong, if you have sources supporting that position.

I don't think you can demand specific sources. I'm going to restore the edit. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 23:20, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

You have gotten your last free pass on restoring the false De Gaulle material. You can quote what Erlich says exactly or not at all. He does not say 242 addressed Jewish refugees and he does not say that Carter mentioned 242. He juxtaposes the two things to make an inference about future settlements. Neither the Middle East or Israel Egypt Peace Treaty Framework Agreements incorporated the suggestion about the inclusion of Jewish refugees in any event. harlan (talk) 23:58, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

Fine. Added a quote. Looked better before if you ask me, but have it your way. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 14:23, 20 September 2009 (UTC)

The Inadmissibility principle

The UN system is currently enforcing non-recognition regimes with regard to annexation of the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 war. That is why this article should open with that information about the inadmissibility principle. UN Security Council resolutions do not alter international law norms and do not need to mention them. This particular resolution actually emphasized the inadmissibility principle in its preamble because several members demanded its inclusion. harlan (talk) 19:14, 5 September 2009 (UTC)

I'm not following your logic here. Even if what you say is true, putting it at the beginning of the article gives it undue weight. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 19:47, 5 September 2009 (UTC)

It is background info, which usually is at the beginning of the article. nableezy - 19:58, 5 September 2009 (UTC)

First of all, Harlan is being a little misleading about what the source actually says. There are some "regimes of non-recognition" on a regional level. I think we know what that means. The UN as a body is not enforcing any such regime.

Second, the "non-recognition" refers to annexation but not occupation. You couldn't guess that reading Harlan's edit.

This is not background on the resolution. It's a (pretty one sided, but we'll fix that later) explanation of the legal meaning of "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war", and should be in the legal section. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 22:42, 5 September 2009 (UTC)

The principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory through conquest is the basis for the parts of the resolution calling on Israel to withdraw from territories occupied. Which makes it background information. nableezy - 22:58, 5 September 2009 (UTC)

Which belongs in the legal section. The most important aspect of this resolution is "land for peace". the article should explain that first, then it can go into what the "land" part means and what the "peace" part means. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 23:17, 5 September 2009 (UTC)

No More Mr Nice Guy, Mr. Grant mentions all of the regions occupied during the war that Israel has attempted to subject to its municipal jurisdiction. He only says that no enforcement action "seems" to have been taken at the UN level with regard to East Jerusalem, but no state has ever recognized the annexation. The UN as a whole is enforcing non-recognition regimes with respect to all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status or demographics of any of the occupied territories, not just regions.

The inadmissibility principle is an enforceable norm of customary international law which was specifically incorporated and emphasized in this resolution. The UN Security Council and General Assembly are enforcing non-recognition regimes against Israel on the basis of this resolution and that principle. The ICJ concurred in those decisions. That is much more NOTABLE than some of the discredited theories of "interpretation" contained elsewhere in the article. See "International Court of Justice Firmly Walled in the Law of Power in the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process" Paul J. I. M. De Waart, Leiden Journal of International Law (2005), 18:3:467-487 Cambridge University Press.

The inadmissibility principle was one of the Charter principles alluded to in the withdrawal phrase. It was also contained in the General Assembly's restatement on friendly relations which emphasized the rule of law and said that "No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal." The International Court of Justice stated in its subsequent Judgments that the principles as to the use of force incorporated in the Charter reflect customary international law, and that the same is true of its corollary entailing the illegality of territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force (see paragraph 87 of Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory)

The ICJ also noted that the Security Council, after recalling this particular resolution and the inadmissibility principle on a number of occasions, condemned in the clearest possible terms all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the occupied territories including Jerusalem (see paragraphs 74-78, 120-122, and 169 of Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory). harlan (talk) 01:12, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

What exactly is this "regime" and how is the UN "enforcing" it?

Grant says that the UN has not had to enforce anything since nobody recognised it in the first place. You turned his "regional organizations" (meaning the Arab League) into "the UN system". That's misleading.

Currently, non-recognition applies to less than 5% of the lands Israel occupied in 1967. —Preceding unsigned comment added by No More Mr Nice Guy (talk • contribs) 10:11, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

The Arab League isn't a UN regional group. Geographically Israel belongs in the Asian Group, but it was forced to join the Western European and Others group. A non-recognition regime is any attempt to organize international non-recognition of any sort of territorial claim, claim to sovereignty, or claim to statehood. The inadmissibility principle applies to all attempts to acquire territory through coercion or the use of force, not just annexation.

Grant wrote his article in the year 2000. There are no longer any embassies in Jerusalem. His remarks were based upon Judge Dugard's work on the rules of non-recognition and cases up to 1987, including East Jerusalem and the Golan. Since that time the ICC statute drafted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries has entered into effect, the UN Security Council adopted the Road Map for a Two State solution, and the ICJ instituted its own regime of non-recognition. The ICJ Judgment mentioned the East Jerusalem and de facto annexation caused by the construction of the wall. Livni subsequently stated that the wall has implications for the future border, [4], and Israeli judges have claimed that Israel's municipal laws apply in the disputed territories. [5] Efforts to bring Israel into compliance with its international obligations include calls for a settlement freeze, tying upgraded trade relations to compliance with international law and implementation of the two state solution, plus funding NGOs to monitor and report on Israeli compliance. harlan (talk) 14:09, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Could you show me where your source says that "The UN system is currently enforcing several regimes of non-recognition under international law with regard to the territories that Israel occupied during the 1967 war."? Thanks. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 14:33, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

First of all the application of a non-recognition regime is a sanction, not a legal interpretation. If you are unfamiliar with the topic perhaps you should quit reorganizing the article.

Grant's article explained that it sought to assess how the U.N. system has enforced regimes of non-recognition under international law. He cited John Dugard's, 'Recognition and the United Nations' which said that East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights are separate cases.

I cited a commentary on 'The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility'. If that doesn't suffice, then Stefan Talmon and Enrico Milano explain that the duty not to recognize as lawful a territorial situation created by a serious breach of an obligation arising under a law norm is now laid down in article 41 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States of Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), and that a duty of non-recognition may also arise under a treaty like the UN Charter, the Fourth Geneva Convention, or a binding resolution of the United Nations Security Council.

The ILC articles weren't finalized when Grant wrote his article. Milano explains the application of the ILC articles to non-recognition with respect to the unlawful territorial situation outlined in the ICJ Judgments. The ICJ determined that the inadmissibility principle was one of the rules and principles of international law which were relevant in assessing the legality of the measures taken by Israel (para 86), and that Israel had established settlements in territory under belligerent occupation in breach of international law (para 120). Judge Higgins pointed out that an illegal situation is not to be recognized or assisted by third parties, and that an illegal act “entails a legal consequence, namely that of putting an end to an illegal situation”. I've added citations to Paul De Waart, Enrico Milano, Stefan Talmon, and etc. harlan (talk) 21:20, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

I still don't see how that amounts to "The UN system is currently enforcing several regimes of non-recognition under international law with regard to the territories that Israel occupied during the 1967 war." like you put in the article. Could you enumerate a couple of these "regimes"?

I'm not arguing there's no such thing as non-recognition. I'm saying that 1. "The UN system" isn't currently "enforcing" "regimes" of NR, and 2. Even if it was, it would be specifically about East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights which Israel annexed, and not "the territories that Israel occupied during the 1967 war". This according to the source you provided. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 22:00, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Non-recognition is a UN legal sanction. It is not a competing legal theory or interpretation. I've added a citation to [6] 'The pillars of global law', By Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo to explain that situation.

Grant cited Dugard's cases of non-recognition regimes. He specifically cited U.N. Security Council Resolution 478 of August 20, 1980 and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 39/146. December 14, 1984. Both of those resolutions recalled 242 and reaffirmed that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible. The latter applied to all territories occupied by Israel since 1967:

Reiterating all relevant United Nations resolutions which emphasize that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law and that Israel must withdraw unconditionally from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

Grant explained that the UN System of Non-Recognition and U.N.-sponsored rules of non-recognition up to 1987 were examined by John Dugard in 'Recognition and the United Nations'. He specifically cited Israel in a list of countries and territories "in which the United Nations legislated rules of non-recognition."

Grant introduced the discussion about Israel by pointing out the legislated rules of non-recognition and citing Dugard's book: "In connection with rules of non-recognition, Dugard discussed a number of further cases, up to 1987, including claims of territorial acquisition by Israel to East Jerusalem(65) and the Golan Heights(66)" He mentions that:

East Jerusalem.. .. was, in turn, taken by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and that U.N. Security Council Resolution 478 of August 20, 1980 stated that it does not "recognize ... actions by Israel that ... seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem" and called upon states to withdraw any diplomatic missions from Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the Golan Heights were legally part of Syria and controlled by Syria until occupied by Israel during the 1967 war. The General Assembly called Israel's occupation "illegal and invalid" and called on states not to recognize it.(68)

Grant said the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided that U.N. resolutions had not in fact created an international rule of recognition or non-recognition regarding the status of East Timor. However the ICJ considered the case of East Jerusalem after Grant's article had been written and came to a different conclusion. The Court itself urged that no state take measures tending to recognize or support the illegal territorial situations in the occupied Palestinian territories including East Jerusalem. You deleted the citation to De Waalt's article which explained that.

As for UN System efforts to bring Israel into compliance, the UN is a member of the Quartet. The Security Council recalled 242, adopted the Quartet Road Map for a two state solution, and called on the parties to fulfill their obligations under the plan in resolution 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003. There have also been calls for the Security Council to impose a border settlement if the parties don't come to an agreement in a reasonable timeframe. [7] harlan (talk) 08:25, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

You did not address the fact that your own source says the UN hasn't been "enforcing" anything and that even if it was, it wouldn't be regarding "the territories that Israel occupied during the 1967 war". The rest of the stuff you posted above is mainly WP:SYNTH. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 10:52, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

Actually I did address that fact. Dugard was talking about two particular on-going regimes that are discussed by multiple sources beside Grant, i.e. the ICJ dvisory opinion, Paul De Waart, and Capaldo. The notion that a declaration of non-recognition based upon a determination of illegality by the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the International Court is WP:UNDUE or a legal interpretation is nonsense. There is guidance from ArbCom that removal of statements that are pertinent, sourced reliably, and written in a neutral style constitutes disruption. harlan (talk) 11:04, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

Grant specifically says that "no attempt to enforce the rule of nonrecognition as regards East Jerusalem seems to have been made at U.N. level. No occasion for enforcement has been afforded in regard to the Golan Heights".

Also, Grant is the only guy I could find who calls UN General Assembly resolutions "regimes of non-recognition" and I believe that using this term is misleading and not neutral. So not "sourced reliably" and not "written in a neutral style".

I would also suggest that reverting after a specific BRD request, even if only doing it once or twice per day is edit warring and disruptive. I'm sure ArbCom frowns on that sort of thing as well. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 11:15, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

I've already pointed out that Grant was writing in 2000 before the ILC articles on non-recognition were finalized. I really don't need to cite him, since Milano, De Waart,and Talmon explain about the application of the ILC rules to non-recognition with respect to the unlawful territorial situation outlined in the ICJ Judgments in the wall case. Every lawful means used by the UN member states to bring Israel into compliance is covered by article 41 including the Reconvened Conference of the Geneva Convention and the obligations under the Road Map. The Talmon article that I cited also explained that "The duty not to recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of an obligation arising under a norm of jus cogens is now laid down in article 41(2) of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). That is a codification of customary international law [8] The principle of inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force happens to be a peremptory rule of international law (jus cogens).[9]

In case you haven't figured it out, there is nothing WP:UNDUE, misleading, or biased about saying that the UN General Assembly, Security Council, and International Court acting within their areas of competence have each declared that Israel has created unlawful situations in the territories it has occupied since 1967. Other states now have a binding legal obligation not to recognize, render aid, or assistance in maintaining that situation under the ILC articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. The commentary on the ILC Draft Articles (that is already cited in the article) explains that recognition in such situations would itself be a breach of international law. I will progressively cite more of this information inline instead of in references. harlan (talk) 12:49, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

What you seem not to be understanding is that I'm not arguing that there is no such thing as "non-recognition" or that there aren't certain bodies do not recognize Israel's annexation of the Golan or East Jerusalem.

What I'm saying is

• Opening the article with this is UNDUE. You can't call it "background" when resolutions and advisory opinions refer back to 242.
• It doesn't refer to all the territory Israel occupied in 1967 (over 90% of which it has returned) like you mistakenly claimed.
• You were wording it in a way that would be misleading to a layman. There is no "enforcement" of a "regime". There are resolutions. Lets call them that.

I understand it bothers you that this is under "legal interpretations". How about if we changed that to "international law and legal interpretations"? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 13:08, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

We've had an adequate discussion about the deletion of sourced material regarding peremptory norms of international law. Those aren't rhetorical exercises. Your claim that explaining the application of jus cogens principles of international law in the lede is WP:UNDUE doesn't pass the laugh test. Non-recognition is an on-going legal sanction that is going to be mentioned very prominently in connection with this resolution. harlan (talk) 09:59, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

Is the inadmissibility principle compatible with secure and recognised boundaries?

Hi all. Since I played a small part at the beginning of the editing process above I’d like to say that I think that the wording you have achieved (Sept 9th) in introducing the inadmissibility principle into the main summary is pretty balanced, except that I would like to introduce OP1 on a new line to distinguish it further from the preamble.

However, now that the principle is highlighted I am not sure that the section currently entitled ‘Legal interpretation - The inadmissibility principle’ sheds much light on the principle’s role in 242 which is clearly controversial. With a view to editing that section by consensus, I’d like to make some comments on the views expressed so far, especially the idea that the inadmissibility principle overrides other aspects of the resolution. I take the view that the inadmissibility principle and the idea of secure and recognised boundaries complement each other.

First however I'd like to comment on Harlan's position below which seems to be where all this starts:

‘The UN system is currently enforcing non-recognition regimes with regard to annexation of the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 war. That is why this article should open with that information about the inadmissibility principle. UN Security Council resolutions do not alter international law norms and do not need to mention them. This particular resolution actually emphasized the inadmissibility principle in its preamble because several members demanded its inclusion. harlan (talk) 19:14, 5 September 2009 (UTC)’

Regarding your point on the annexation of territory. By the time 242 had been passed the General Assembly had already passed two resolutions relating to the conduct of the occupation starting with A/Res/2252 dealing with humanitarian issues then A/Res/2253 on preserving the status of Jerusalem. Neither of them found the need to recite the inadmissibility principle, basing their position in general terms on the Geneva conventions. The Security Council later reaffirmed those GA resolutions and invoked this principle (but not 242) in UNSCR 252 of 1968. It has subsequently passed numerous other resolutions relating to the conduct of the occupation including UNSCR’s 267, 271, 298, 465, 476 and 478, none of which reference 242! Resolution 672 (1990) does reference 242 but only in relation to a peaceful settlement.

The point is that Resolution 242 doesn’t deal with conduct of the occupation but rather with how to end it and achieve a just and lasting peace. So 242 seems to me the wrong place for your original edit (21:59, 31st August) on the conduct of the occupation. Also by mixing preambular references that apply generally together with operative paragraphs that apply in this resolution only, such an edit distorts the meaning of both.

As for the notion that the emphasis given to some phrases makes them more important than others, this completely contradicts what Caradon said moments before the resolution was passed:

‘59. Thirdly, I would say that the draft resolution is a balanced whole. To add to it or to detract from it would destroy the balance and also destroy the wide measure of agreement we have achieved together. It must be considered as a whole and as it stands.' S/PV1382 22 Nov.1967

Nableezy you stated your reasons for putting the inadmissibility principle in the lead as follows:

‘See here and here. The phrase "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" is one of the most important aspects of the resolution. "As Lord Caradon, the principal author of resolution 242 (1967) has stated, "the overriding principle" of resolution 242 is the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and this means Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian and other Arab lands must take place to the pre-June 1967 borders, subject to minor variations to be determined, preferably, by an impartial boundary commission." This is not some random set of words thrown together, this is one of the most important aspects of the resolution and should be included in the lead. nableezy - 20:03, 1 September 2009 (UTC) ‘

Please correct me if I am looking at the wrong quotation because I haven’t been able to access the original source, but it appears Caradon didn’t say ‘overriding’ as you stated, rather ‘overwhelming’, my emphasis:

‘Knowing as I did the unsatisfactory nature of the 1967 line, I wasn’t prepared to use wording in the Resolution that would have made that line permanent. Nonetheless, it is necessary to say again that the overwhelming principle was the ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’ and that meant that there could be no justification for the annexation of territory on the Arab side of the 1967 line merely because it had been conquered in the 1967 war. The sensible way to decide permanent ‘secure and recognized’ boundaries would be to set up a Boundary Commission and hear both sides and then to make impartial recommendations for a new frontier line, bearing in mind, of course, the "inadmissibility" principle.'
-- 'UN Security Council Resolution 242 - A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity’, Caradon et al, 1981

If that is the relevant quote, the inadmissibility principle doesn’t seem to be the ‘overriding’ principle at all. Even the use of the word ‘overwhelming’ to preclude the annexation of territory by right of conquest seems strange given that the whole point of the principle is to preclude this absolutely. The only sense in which the principle might be considered overwhelming is that once the need for secure and recognised boundaries is accepted, it could reflect the need for Israel to return the overwhelming majority of the territory it had occupied.

One of the problems with highlighting the inadmissibility phrase is that it is often an attempt to elevate the principles upon which the Security Council based its position, detailed in the preamble, over the actual position itself, detailed in the operative paragraphs of the resolution. Indeed the recent “edit war” reminds me of a similar process undergone by BBC News Online. Up until late 2005 one of BBC News Online’s main descriptions of 242 was as follows[10]:

‘The UN issued Security Council Resolution 242, stressing “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and calling for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”.’

Note how the summary mixes half of a preambular reference with half of the two operative principles, both of which are to be applied, to give the impression that the principle required Israel to withdraw unilaterally. After BBC Governors ruled that this version gave a biased impression [11], it was modified to this:

‘The UN issued Security Council Resolution 242, stressing “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security” and calling for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”.’

This version completes the preamblular reference but still only references one of the two required operative principles. So it was altered yet again to become the current version[12]:

'The UN Security Council issued resolution 242, stressing "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security". The resolution called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict". It also called for an end to "all claims or states of belligerency and respect for... the sovereignty... of every state in the area and their right to live in peace... free from threats or acts of force".'

This version mentions both operative principles but omits any mention of ‘secure and recognised boundaries’. Following the revised publication of the BBC Governors’ ruling, BBC News invoked 242 on the basis of the preamble alone, ‘New Israeli leader’s balancing act’, 29 March 2006[13]:

‘There are more than 50 years of international decisions, treaties, resolutions and peace plans about the conflict. One of the most important is UN Security Council resolution 242, which was passed after Israel captured the West Bank in the 1967 Middle East war. It emphasises the "inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and last[ing] peace in which every state in the area can live in security". Interpretations of 242 vary, but the UN believes that unilaterally setting a border with the Palestinians would violate it, because Israel would be annexing land captured by war in 1967.’

How a resolution can be invoked purely on its preamble isn’t clear imho, but perhaps it helps that in the BBC’s reference copy of Resolution 242, the two are indistinguishable. [14]

Either way there is clearly something illogical about the article’s last sentence because it would obviously be possible for Israel to set a border unilaterally that didn’t annex any land captured by war in 1967, for instance the June 4th boundaries themselves.

So is the purported violation due to unilaterally setting borders in which case the green line would still be a violation of 242, or one of annexing land captured by war in 1967 in which case it wouldn’t?

If the problem is one of unilaterally setting borders the inadmissibility principle seems to be irrelevant because it has nothing to say about how borders should be set, unilaterally, multilaterally or by throwing darts at a map on the Security Council wall. It only says how they shouldn’t be set, i.e. purely by force of arms.

Similarly, if the problem is one of annexing land captured by war in 1967, then the inadmissibility principle isn’t relevant there either imho. Strange as it may seem, the principle doesn’t actually rule out the annexation of land captured by war, not least because it may have been legally yours already. It only rules out using the capture land by war as a justification for annexing it. Such a justification would be ‘inadmissible’. As long as there is some other acceptable legal claim, how the land was occupied should be irrelevant. Otherwise for example, Israel could claim that occupying land in ‘self-defence’ in 1967, gave them some or better legal claim to it.

So it becomes clear that not only does invoking a resolution on the basis of its preamble make no sense, but the way the inadmissibility principle is being applied doesn’t make sense either. Quite obviously it isn’t the inadmissibility principle that precludes unilaterally setting borders but rather the need for them to be secure and recognised, the very phrase that BBC News consistently omitted. In 242 recognised boundaries can only be defined by agreement so they cannot be imposed unilaterally and that includes the green line.

What this example from BBC News shows is a tendency to apply the inadmissibility principle as if it overrides rather than complements the operative sections of the resolution, which seems illogical.

However, interpreted in my view correctly it does no such thing. Far from demanding an immediate end to an inherently ‘illegal’ occupation, it actually endorses Israel’s right to remain in occupation until secure and recognised boundaries can be agreed as part of peace agreements between the parties. The proviso being that there can be no permanent right of conquest so that once those boundaries are agreed Israel must withdraw from the territories outside them. There is also in my view a more subtle application of the principle as hinted at by Caradon, namely to emphasise that in agreeing those boundaries Israel will have to surrender the overwhelming bulk of the territories it captured, lest from a position of strength it might benefit by negotiating the retention of extra territory in effect by right of conquest.

I’d like to edit the inadmissibility section to reflect the view that the inadmissibility principle and secure and recognised boundaries are consistent. But I will wait for any comments and objections first.Steve157 (talk)

The attempts to delete references to peremptory norms of international law are not acceptable for obvious reasons. There are a number of problems with the inclusion of your unpublished WP:OR interpretations. UN resolutions cannot violate the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Peremptory norms on the use of force render any treaty of cession or agreement void if its conclusion is procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. I've added a citation to Yoram Dinstein regarding article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

The ICJ and the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention have stated that the convention applies to the territory that Israel has occupied since 1967. Article 47 precludes the annexation of any territory or the conclusion of any agreement regarding cession of territory during an occupation. In 1993 the UN Security Council "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter on the United Nations" approved a report made by the Secretary General which concluded beyond doubt that the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Hague Convention (IV) of 18 October 1907 had become part of international customary law.

Neither the 1949 Armistice agreements nor the terms of this resolution say that Israel can unilaterally impose a border settlement based upon the 4 June 1967 lines. harlan (talk) 09:23, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

I suggest once again that we start an international law section where all this information can live. Properly sourced, of course. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 18:58, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

One of the points I was making Harlan is that most of your comments relate to the conduct of the occupation which is not covered under resolution 242. This was first considered by the Security Council under UNSCR252. Why don't you discuss all this there? 242 deals with achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East by ending the occupation. I am not disputing the application of the fourth Geneva convention to occupied territories. My point is that its application is unrelated to resolution 242 which doesn't even mention that convention.

Nor did I suggest that Israel had the right to unilaterally impose a border settlement upon the June 4 lines. On the contrary my position is that none of the parties has that right under 242, because secure and recognised boundaries can only be defined by agreement. --Steve157 (talk) 11:56, 16 September 2009 (UTC)

The information about the preamble subsection isn't limited to a discussion about international law. A number of published sources have noted that this resolution (not 252) called upon Israel to withdraw its armed forces from occupied territories without regard to the legality of its occupation. In any event the Security Council cannot propose a settlement that contravenes a jus cogens principle of international law or the principles and purposes of the Charter. Both of those are specifically cited in this resolution. I've added a citation to one of those published sources. In any event No More Mister Nice Guy hasn't been creating a section on international law. He has just been deleting very well sourced material about the official determinations and judgments of the competent UN organs regarding this particular resolution.

Wikipedia policy requires that the lede summarize the contents of the article. No matter how you propose to organize the article, the fact still remains that the preamble of the resolution invokes a legally binding non-derogable (jus cogens) norm of customary international law. That is going to be mentioned in the article and in the lede.

The primary organs of the UN have each concluded that Israel has contravened the terms of this resolution regarding the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war. That fact is beyond dispute, and it is much more notable than idle speculation about the supposed differences between the official English and French texts of the resolution. Opening the article with the views of the "Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America" might be WP:UNDUE, but opening the article with the published views of the primary organs of the UN organization is certainly not.

No More Mister Nice Guy claimed that I deleted sourced content, but the diff shows that I did no such thing. [15] The comments made by Jimmy Carter and Charles De Gaulle have nothing whatever to do with the "Land for Peace" subsection. I relocated them, but they were not removed. I've repeatedly {{fact}} tagged the comments attributed to De Gaulle, because no verifiable published source for that information has been cited. His reverts have repeatedly removed the tag, and placed those comments about refugees back into the "Land for Peace" section.

The notion that a settlement can only be reached through negotiations is incorrect. The Security Council has imposed border settlements in cases involving similar disputes, e.g. Iraq/Kuwait. The EU Foreign Minister recently suggested the Security Council do that in this case too. harlan (talk) 02:25, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

I think you're inserting way too many legal terms and making this article much less readable and understandable by lay people. I'd like to hear from others what they think about this, though.

You again deleted sourced material, specifically about the term "refugees" not being specific to Palestinian refugees.

I'm not sure why you think changing the name of the section will change the WP:UNDUE nature of the material you put in there. If it's "preamble" or "non-recognition" or "the inadmissability principle" it's the same material getting undue weight at the beginning of the article. You are starting the article with legal analysis that happened almost 40 years after the resolution was adopted. It makes no sense.

I'm going to move it down AGAIN and I will remind you AGAIN that this article is under WP:General sanctions and if you continue to edit war rather than discuss (and "discuss" doesn't mean "write your thoughts on the talk page and immediately reinstall the version we're trying to discuss") I shall take this issue to arbitration enforcement. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 11:12, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

Let's stick to published viewpoints

Harlan you make some pretty strong assertions above. Would you like to explain and justify this one:

'The primary organs of the UN have each concluded that Israel has contravened the terms of this resolution regarding the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war. That fact is beyond dispute'

Because as far as I am aware the Security Council hasn't formally ruled on any state's compliance with UNSCR 242, which is in any case generally regarded as a non binding recommendation. I my experience one of the features of this conflict is that very few facts are beyond dispute! --Steve157 (talk) 15:46, 21 September 2009 (UTC)

I am not responsible for making any assertions. I provided citations above and in the article to John Dugard's case studies and the ICJ Judgment. Both stated that the Security Council had condemned Israel's attempts to change the legal status of East Jerusalem, and mentioned that the Security Council had specifically cited "the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible". The question set forth by the General Assembly in resolution ES-10/14 of 12 December 2003 mentioned the established principle of international law on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion about the legal consequences of the actions taken by Israel in light of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, and specifically cited resolution 242. The ICJ confirmed that "the principles as to the use of force incorporated in the Charter reflect customary international law (see I. C. J. Reports 1986, pp. 98-1 01, paras. 187- 190);" and said "the same is true of its corollary entailing the illegality of territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force." (see paragraph 87)

Here is what the ICJ Judgment had to say:

73. In the 1967 armed conflict, Israeli forces occupied all the territories which had constituted Palestine under British Mandate (including those known as the West Bank, lying to the east of the Green Line).

74. On 22 November 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967), which emphasized the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and called for the "Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict", and "Termination of all claims or states of belligerency".

75. From 1967 onwards, Israel took a number of measures in these territories aimed at changing the status of the City of Jerusalem. The Security Council, after recalling on a number of occasions "the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible", condemned those measures and, by resolution 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, confirmed in the clearest possible terms that:

"all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section, are totally invalid and cannot change that status".

Dugard wrote about the collective non-recognition regime initiated by the Security Council under another resolution in response to Israel's forceable annexation of East Jerusalem, and noted that the action was taken in accordance with the inadmissibility principle enunciated in this and other relevant Security Council resolutions. The cases were outlined in Dugard's 'Recognition and the United Nations', see also the discussion in pages 99-101 of Dugard's International law: a South African perspective. [16] The notion that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter or a jus cogens rule of customary international law are non-binding is completely untenable. You should recall the maxim "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" says that the express mention of one thing excludes all others. harlan (talk) 04:28, 25 September 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for your response, but you haven't shown me any evidence that these primary organs of the UN have ruled on Israel's compliance with the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 242, or even that it is within the ICJ or GA’s powers to do so. Nor have you demonstrated that the preambular references you cite in fact constitute legally binding terms of this resolution. My understanding and that of the UN is that preambular references are generally non binding. [17] (See page 30)

These are not minor technicalities. Resolution 242 makes preambular references to both the inadmissibility principle and Article 2 of the UN Charter. You interpret these principles as if they apply only to Israel in 242, but also assert that the principles themselves are generally applicable and indeed binding and non-derogable.

The point you seem to be missing is that it is up to the Security Council to apply these principles in order to maintain international peace and security. If it applies these principles to a situation such as the aftermath of the 1967 war and makes a non-binding recommendation then it is the non-binding nature of the Security Council’s verdict that applies not the ‘binding’ nature of the underlying principles of international law.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait it is likely that Iraq was in violation of both these principles, but if it was, that doesn’t mean that Iraq had contravened the terms of Resolution 242 to which it was a party. Like the 1967 war the Security Council considered the case of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on its merits. Unlike Resolution 242, in Resolution 660 the Security Council determined that there had been a breach of the peace and invoked its Chapter VII powers to effectively condemn Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as an act of aggression and make withdrawal binding and enforceable.

In the case of 242 the Security Council didn't determine that there had been a breach of the peace, invoke Chapter VII powers, or condemn any State. The failure reach a consensus to do so means that Israel was construed to have acted in legitimate self-defense. A view reinforced by the failure to demand a unilateral withdrawal separate from negotiations on a peaceful settlement.

This verdict of not guilty of an act of aggression does not in any way alter Israel’s obligations as an occupying power. But nor does the conduct of that occupation in any way alter the verdict of the Security Council back in 1967. So whilst admitting that developments subsequent to 1967 are both important and relevant, I see no reason why issues surrounding the legality of the conduct of Israel’s occupation, dealt with in a multitude of other resolutions, should predominate in this article on 242. Steve157 (talk) 12:45, 6 October 2009 (UTC)

Harlan, I have moved the discussion about you removing my citation regarding the preamble here. I think it would help if you responded to my comments above in relation to that citation which I gave you time to do before I placed it in the article.

If you still want to remove my citation after responding, could you tell me whether you think the citation is flawed or in any way not what it purports to be. You have criticised me for not couiting sources, yet when I do you delete them?--Steve157 (talk) 09:23, 13 October 2009 (UTC)

Steve, you cited a Powerpoint-type presentation that was developed as a training aid for in-house use by a regional Economic and Social Commission in its own workshops: [18] Both the General Assembly [19] and the Security Council [20] publish formal 'Rules of Procedure' for drafting resolutions, but the ESCWA workshop presentation didn't cite either of those UN Documents, or any other official governing directive. The ESCWA theory that statements made in the preamble of a resolution have no life once the resolution has been adopted, or that they do not make substantive statements on the topic at hand is not supported by published Security Council guidance or actual Security Council practice.

The Security Council publishes its own interpretation of its rules of procedure in 'The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council' [21]. It contradicts the statement that you cited from the ESCWA presentation. For example, the analytical table of Security Council decisions (Chapter 8) for 1966-1968 explicitly stated that the preamble of resolution 242 contained several substantial measures that govern the settlement. See for example "IV Measures for Settlement, A. Call for Compliance with purposes and principles of Charter", and "E. Provisions bearing on issues of substance including terms of settlement" on page 5: [22] Both of those contain one or more citations to the preamble of 242.

I didn't respond to the post above because the references to published WP:RS sources that I already provided explicitly stated that the UN Security Council had based its decision regarding non-recognition of Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights on UN Security Council resolution 242. See for example John Dugard's 'Recogition and the United Nations', page 113. The Declaration made on 1 October 1996 by the Council of Ministers of the European Union provides a typical example of non-recognition based upon 242:

The European Union reaffirms its policy on the status of Jerusalem. East Jerusalem is subject to the principles set out in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, notably the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and is therefore not under Israeli sovereignty. The Union asserts that the Fourth Geneva Convention is fully applicable to East Jerusalem, as it is to other territories under occupation. -- A/51/447, S/1996/825, 3 October 1996 [23]

I didn't think your unsourced editorial regarding the imaginary "not guilty verdict" really needed much of a reply. The discussion in S/PV.2242(OR) just prior to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 476 says that resolution selectively quotes Resolution 242. Resolution 476 reaffirmed that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible; stated the overriding necessity of ending the occupation; strongly deplored Israel's refusal to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly; and declared Israel's actions a "flagrant violation of international law". harlan (talk) 13:36, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

Harlan the citation you deleted relates to the role of the preamble in UN resolutions. The presentation it references is a workshop covering all aspects of drafting resolutions, produced by a UN agency. Not surprisingly it describes the roles of the preamble and the operative paragraphs in some detail. I have searched high and low for this sort of information and this is the only UN based reference I have found. If you think it is faulty or have a better one, fine. But you cannot just delete a citation because it refutes your position. Its not like the UN-ESCWA presentation is absurd or harmful, has been misquoted or taken out of context. So to my mind you haven't demonstrated that the citation is in any way invalid and needed to be deleted. I have no problem with you challenging the citation by producing some citations of your own that present the role of the preamble in a different light. But in your response you haven't done that either. The first two documents you cite don't even contain the word 'preamble' or even comment on these issues. In the next citation the relevant part of the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council is merely an index of the types of statements made by the Security Council in its activities. In its introduction is the following statement concerning this index:

'This table should be regarded as of the nature of an index to chapter VIII; and no constitutional significance should be attached to the headings adopted in the compilation of this table or to the inclusion of particular measures under the individual headings.'

So that reference, which you claim: 'contradicts the statement that you cited from the ESCWA presentation' simply doesn't do what you assert it does. Nor does it explicitly state what you assert it does. You use the term 'explicity stated' far too lightly imho especially in relation to what is after all only an index!

Your quote from the European Union basing its policy on Jerusalem on the principles laid out in 242 takes the argument back to where you failed to respond (twice now) to my original citation of the ESCWA document before you deleted it from the article. Perhaps you would like to do so now. Here is what I said:

Thanks for your response, but you haven't shown me any evidence that these primary organs of the UN have ruled on Israel's compliance with the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 242, or even that it is within the ICJ or GA’s powers to do so. Nor have you demonstrated that the preambular references you cite in fact constitute legally binding terms of this resolution. My understanding and that of the UN is that preambular references are generally non binding. [24] (See page 30)

These are not minor technicalities. Resolution 242 makes preambular references to both the inadmissibility principle and Article 2 of the UN Charter. You interpret these principles as if they apply only to Israel in 242, but also assert that the principles themselves are generally applicable and indeed binding and non-derogable.

The point you seem to be missing is that it is up to the Security Council to apply these principles in order to maintain international peace and security. If it applies these principles to a situation such as the aftermath of the 1967 war and makes a non-binding recommendation then it is the non-binding nature of the Security Council’s verdict that applies not the ‘binding’ nature of the underlying principles of international law.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait it is likely that Iraq was in violation of both these principles, but if it was, that doesn’t mean that Iraq had contravened the terms of Resolution 242 to which it was a party. Like the 1967 war the Security Council considered the case of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on its merits. Unlike Resolution 242, in Resolution 660 the Security Council determined that there had been a breach of the peace and invoked its Chapter VII powers to effectively condemn Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as an act of aggression and make withdrawal binding and enforceable.

In the case of 242 the Security Council didn't determine that there had been a breach of the peace, invoke Chapter VII powers, or condemn any State. The failure reach a consensus to do so means that Israel was construed to have acted in legitimate self-defense. A view reinforced by the failure to demand a unilateral withdrawal separate from negotiations on a peaceful settlement.

You might also care to tell me why you think the UN-ESCWA workshop has got it wrong and how you would define the respective roles of the preamble and operative paragraphs. This is what they say:

Page 30 Preamble

What it does:
1. Shows that there is a problem to be resolved
2. Includes references to:
a) References to the U.N. Charter
b) Citations of past U.N. resolutions
c) Citations of treaties
d) Statements made by the Secretary-General or a relevant U.N. body or agency

3. Includes recognition of the work or efforts of regional organizations in dealing with the issue
4. Includes general statements on the topic, its significance, and its effects
5. Includes historical background that explains need for further action
6. Includes any supporting logic and arguments
7. Has clauses arranged in such an order to help lead the reader towards a conclusion
8. Keep in mind that these statements have no life once resolution has been adopted

What it does NOT do:
1. Does not make substantive statement on topic at hand
2. Does not propose action

Page 32 Operative Clauses

What they do:

1. Operative clauses are set out to achieve the country's main policy goals on the topic
2. Each clause should contain a single idea or policy proposal
3. Each clause should stand on its own
4. Organized in a logical progression
5. When choosing operative phrases and working of operative clauses, keep in mind that all resolutions except the Security Council are non-binding

What they do NOT do:
1. Do not refer to facts or items presented in the preambulatory clauses, although follow logically from the facts presented
2. Do not call for a very specific action (most clauses calling for a very specific action are often defeated)

Thanks.--Steve157 (talk) 13:56, 15 October 2009 (UTC)

I'd be happy to submit this for moderation. The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council is mandated by General Assembly resolution 686 (VII). It reports the official interpretation of the Council’s application of the UN Charter and its own Provisional Rules of Procedure. [25]

There is no evidence that the material you cited from the UN-ESCWA training workshop presentation has ever been submitted to the Security Council or any other primary organ for its consideration, approval, or entry into the UN document system. It does contain many statements that are contradicted by the applicable Rules of Procedure of the other organs. For example, in the Namibia and Wall cases the ICJ included references in the preamble of Security Council resolutions to the purposes and principles of the Charter in the analysis of the legal consequences of those resolutions. The Repertoire says that Resolution 242 contains a reference in the preamble to the purposes and principles of the Charter that governs the final settlement of the Mideast question. The verbal records of the Security Council sessions also indicate that is the case.

Regarding enforcement of the rules of international law. The Charter principle of non-recognition was discussed during the 1377th and 1382nd session of the Security Council deliberations on resolution 242. All states are obliged to follow jus cogens rules of law at all times. While Security Council Resolution 681 (1990), 20 December 1990 did call on the high contracting parties to the Geneva Convention to ensure respect by Israel for its obligations under the Convention, the other state parties did not require the Security Council's permission to do that. All states have the sovereign authority to grant their courts universal jurisdiction over offenses, no matter where they are committed. See for example Analysis: Even if Goldstone Report shelved, threat of ICC prosecutions still looms. The advisory role of the ICJ is to determine what the applicable law says on the questions referred from the designated UN organs. It did not need any additional power to advise the General Assembly that member states had an independent duty not to recognize the illegal territorial situations created by Israel. Those obligations were the result of the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions; the pre-existing norms of customary law; and the international conventions that were enumerated in the request from the General Assembly. See GA resolution ES 10/14. The obligations were not the result of the courts opinion. The Paul DeWaart journal article that I cited explains that. The General Assembly can make decisions on any important question regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. See article 18 of the UN Charter and the ICJ Judgment in the 'Certain Expenses' case. The Court said the Security Council had primary, but not exclusive authority and that the Assembly had acted within its authority in establishing the UNEF in 1956.

EU Foreign Minister Solana suggested that the Security Council impose a settlement in line with the 1949 Armistice lines. Those permanent lines of demarcation were originally established under the auspices of a Chapter VII resolution. US Secretary of State Rogers said that resolution 242 neither endorsed nor precluded the armistice lines as the definitive permanent boundaries. In any event, the introductory note to Chapter VIII of the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council explains that once questions have been submitted to the Security Council, they frequently undergo development and transformation. [26] That same section says that statements in the Council and the texts of its decisions are indicative of the view that the Council has sought to discharge its responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security by basing its actions on the general powers conferred upon it by the Charter. The ICJ has advised that in those instances, Chapter VI resolutions are binding on the member states according to article 25 of the Charter. Please provide a citation to the article in the Charter or official UN Security Council record which says that those particular resolutions are non-binding.

The fact that the Security Council invoked Chapter VII during the Iraq-Kuwait war did not prevent objections on constitutional grounds. See for example the section on "The Legitimacy of Security Council Authorization" in The UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st century, By David Malone, starting on page 156.

The UN-ESCWA is under the supervision of the UN Economic and Social Council. Its page on resolutions doesn't say that preambles are non-binding. It says they generally state the considerations on the basis of which action is taken, an opinion expressed, or a directive given. [27] Its Rules of Procedure pertaining to resolutions do not mention any of the items listed above that were extracted from the UN-ESCWA training workshop presentation. [28]

Annex II to the General Assembly Rules of Procedure [29] states that their Special Committee on drafting resolutions did not recommend the adoption of any of the proposals which recommended rules governing style, form, or the use of technical terms. It is not surprising that the General Assembly Rules of Procedure do not mention preambles. They don't mention any of the items listed above that were taken from the UN-ESCWA training workshop presentation.

The introduction on the general character of the Security Council Repertoire [30] says that the Security Council has the freedom to determine its own rules in each case as the need arises and that the Security Council is at all times within the framework of the Charter "master of its own procedure". It says the Council still operates under Provisional Rules of Procedure because the Council has refused to commit itself to procedures that in practice might prove to be excessively rigid, and due to the danger that formalization would impede its progress. The Repertoire says that the arrangement of categories does not suggest the existence of policies and procedures that have not been clearly and demonstrably established by the Council itself. Although the Security Council can adopt whatever rules it wants, its Provisional rules do not mention any of the items listed above from the UN-ESCWA training workshop presentation.

During the 1381st session of the Security Council Caradon explained that the inadmissibility principle was one of the "provisions" of this resolution: 'In our resolution we stated the principle of "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territory occupied in the recent conflict" and in the preamble we emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". In our view the wording of those provisions is clear.'

During the 1382nd session several delegates took note of the fact that the text of the resolution required a "settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of the resolution." The Repertoire does explicitly state that the Preamble is one of the clauses in 242 that governs the settlement. see S/PV.1381(OR) paragraph 31 [31]; S/PV.1382(OR) [32] paragraphs 12 and 142; and chapter VIII of the Repertoire [33] That contradicts the guidance from the workshop that you are trying to introduce.

The Repertoire directs you to the introductory note for an explanation about the contents and arrangement of Chapter VIII. [34] The introduction explains that in exercising its powers the Security Council seldom bothers to cite the particular articles of the UN Charter that its decisions are based upon. In cases where none are mentioned, a constitutional interpretation is required to determine where in the Analytical table those decisions should appear. An element of interpretation may also be required to determine if a resolution is grounded in Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter (indexed and covered in Chapter X and XI of the Repertoire respectively). For example, it is suggested that Security Council Resolution 338 contains implied references to Chapter VI and Chapter VII powers, so it is discussed in both Chapter X and XI of the applicable repertoire.

Your objection to the constitutional disclaimer in Chapter VIII is misconceived. It only applies to Chapter or Article specific headings like "Measures under Article 41" or "Measures under Chapter VII General". It does not apply to the examples that I cited: "IV Measures for Settlement, A. Call for Compliance with purposes and principles of Charter", and "E. Provisions bearing on issues of substance including terms of settlement" None of those examples cited an implied reference to the Charter or a specific article. harlan (talk) 20:05, 17 October 2009 (UTC)

Harlan, You haven’t yet commented on the issue of the non-binding nature, or otherwise, of 242. Please either do, or concede the point. Surely at the very least we could agree that it is a matter of debate rather than a fact beyond dispute.

I note above you expressed the view that all Chapter VI resolutions relating to international peace and security are binding on member states:

“The ICJ has advised that in those instances [international peace and security], Chapter VI resolutions are binding on the member states according to article 25 of the Charter.”

AFAIK what the ICJ actually concluded is that there is no evidence that Article 25 only applies to enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. That doesn’t make all Chapter VI resolutions automatically binding because as the ICJ stated in the Nambia advisory ruling para. 114 at 53:

‘the language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect.’

According to David Schweigman in his book ‘The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter...’, p32:

‘The conclusion, therefore, is that one must look at the wording and context of a resolution to determine whether the Council intended to issue a decision or a recommendation.’ Schweigman also noted that there are very limited opportunities for binding decisions under Chapter VI.

You asked for a citation suggesting that 242 wasn’t binding. How about the ICJ’s concluding statement at para. 162 of its advisory opinion on the legality of the Wall where it calls on the General Assembly to encourage a negotiated solution on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (67), 338 (73) and 1515 (2003) the roadmap:

'162. The Court has reached the conclusion that the construction of the wall by Israel

in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is contrary to international law and has stated the legal consequences that are to be drawn from that illegality. The Court considers itself bound to add that this construction must be placed in a more general context. Since 1947, the year when General Assembly resolution 181 (II) was adopted and the Mandate for Palestine was terminated, there has been a succession of armed conflicts, acts of indiscriminate violence and repressive measures on the former mandated territory. The Court would emphasize that both Israel and Palestine are under an obligation scrupulously to observe the rules of international humanitarian law, one of the paramount purposes of which is to protect civilian life. Illegal actions and unilateral decisions have been taken on all sides, whereas, in the Court’s view, this tragic situation can be brought to an end only through implementation in good faith of all relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The “Roadmap” approved by Security Council resolution 1515 (2003) represents the most recent of efforts to initiate negotiations to this end. The Court considers that it has a duty to draw the attention of the General Assembly, to which the present Opinion is addressed, to the need for these efforts to be encouraged with a view to achieving as soon as possible, on the basis of international law, a negotiated solution to the outstanding problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, existing side by side with Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all in the region.'

My point being that if 242 is legally binding why didn’t the ICJ just tell Israel and others to comply with the binding terms of the resolution?

Here’s the thing. If as you suggest the overriding principles of 242 really were the legally binding non-derogable (jus cogens) norms of customary international law you reference in its preamble, the resolution itself would be irrelevant by now and no one, including you, would be wasting their time editing this page. The reason we are, is because the resolution presents the Security Council’s prescription for a negotiated settlement leading to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The Security Council’s prescription is important because it has the primary obligation for safeguarding international peace and security and not the General Assembly. The ICJ at least, in my view, recognises this. In the passage above the ICJ, in a ruling that you continually reference in the context of the primacy of international law interpretations of 242, suggests the need for the General Assembly to encourage a negotiated 2 state solution based in particular on 242, 338 and 1515 (the roadmap), as well as international law. It also seems to suggest that the General Assembly’s request for a decision on the wall was partisan and failed to place the issue in a general context that recognised there had been illegal actions and unilateral decisions on all sides.

On the other two related issues. Your statement claiming that it was a fact beyond dispute that the primary organs of the UN had found Israel was in breach of one of the terms of 242, fails if the resolution is not legally binding and doesn’t therefore have any terms capable of being breached. Second, if the resolution itself is not binding, then it becomes impossible to suggest that the preamble is! So Harlan, is 242 legally binding or not? If it is binding, when and how did this come about, who is it binding on, and what are they bound to do?

I think we are getting too far away from exploring the Security Council's formula for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Can we at least agree that the resolution is about that? --Steve157 (talk) 14:30, 28 October 2009 (UTC)

Steve the Security Council cannot adopt resolutions that permit or condone anything that a jus cogens preremptory norm of international forbids. There are no two ways about that. The existing sources for the preamble subsection already explain that. Here is another source that I'll be using: 'The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions', by Alexander Orakhelashvili, The European Journal of International Law Vol. 16 no.1.

The ICJ did tell Israel that its settlements had been established in breach of international law (paragraph 120) and cited the customary rule regarding the inadmissibility principle and resolution 242 in the legal analysis for that finding (paragraphs 87 and 117). The Namibia judgment mentioned the members responsibilities to accept and carry out Security Council decisions under the terms of both article 24, and 25. Their responsibilities under the terms of Articles 104 and 2(5), the implied powers, were also incorporated by inclusion of a reference to the 'Reparations' case. The binding obligation of members to act in accordance with Article 2 was specifically mentioned in the preamble of 242. I already supplied a citation in an earlier post to the rules that the Court applied in the Namibia decision. In any event, see paragraph 111-116 of that Judgment. It contains details on the legal consequences of preambular declarations made by the Security Council acting on behalf of the members under Article 24 of the Charter: [35]

The UN Charter is a treaty. The first stage in interpreting a particular clause is to examine its ordinary meaning in isolation from the whole document. This is, in itself, not conclusive, but, as stated by the International Court of Justice, "If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is the end of the matter." see Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970) vol. 14, p. 371. The text of Article 25 says The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. The term "non-binding" does not appear there or anywhere else in the text of the treaty.

The next step is to review the negotiating history. The 'Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs' says that "during the United Nations Conference on International Organization which met in San Francisco in 1945, attempts to limit obligations of Members under Article 25 of the Charter to those decisions taken by the Council in the exercise of its specific powers under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter had failed. It was stated at the time that those obligations flowed from the authority conferred on the Council under Article 24 (1) to act on the behalf of the members, as well."

The next step is to look for evidence of actual UN practice regarding the nature and scope of the members responsibilities under Article 25 in regard to Chapter VI resolutions. The General Assembly mandated (GA resolution 686 (VII) the system of repertory so that evidence of customary international law could be made more accessible. Chapter VIII of The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council is titled Consideration of Questions Under the Council's Responsibility For The Maintenance of International Peace and Security. It catalogs any resolution, like 242, that contains a Security Council decision dealing with international peace and security.

The 'Decision of 13 January 1955 in connection with the Palestine question' is cited as evidence in the Practice of United Nations Organs:

49. Mr. EBAN (Israel): Israel's viewpoint on the problem now under discussion has been expounded on many occasions and is amply recorded in the proceedings of the Security Council and the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. I would therefore propose to submit Israel's case by way of brief summary rather than exhaustive review.

50. On 1 September 1951, the Security Council recorded its decision calling for the termination by Egypt of all interference with the passage of international commercial shipping through the Suez Canal, with special reference to shipping bound to and from Israel [S/2322]. At the same time, the Security Council categorically denied the Egyptian claim to discriminate against Israel ships or cargoes on the grounds of belligerency, and asserted that the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement far from sanctioning belligerent practices, as Egypt contended, actually required the total cessation of those practices. The importance of this resolution should be envisaged in the light of Article 25 of the Charter, under which the Security Council's decisions on matters affecting international peace and security have a special and unique force, being, indeed, obligatory on all Member States by virtue of the latter's signature of the Charter. S/PV.688 [36]

The General Assembly cited 242 as a relevant resolution in its request for the Advisory Opinion, and pointed out that Israel had failed to comply with the relevant General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions. 'The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council' says that the preamble of 242, including the inadmissibility principle, will govern the settlement. The Court also included resolution 242 and the inadmissibility principle in its analysis of the applicable international law. It is axiomatic that the Court would hold that the only solution is implementation in good faith of all the relevant Security Council resolutions, including 242. That is obligatory under the conventional law of the Charter. harlan (talk) 13:16, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Harlan, Thanks for your response.

Please could you answer a simple question. Do you regard 242 to be binding or not? The reason I ask is because it seems clear to me that your position in editing this article presumes that 242 is binding, on Israel at least, but you seem unwilling to actually acknowledge and defend your position despite repeated requests.

Instead of addressing those requests or my comments, for example disputing your claim that the ICJ says all SC resolutions are binding, you introduce new diversions.

You cite Eban arguing that S/RES 95 (S/2322) 1951 be regarded as binding on Egypt under Article 25. First it is pretty clear that Egypt was not bound by this Security Council Resolution, and that the resolution was not enforced by the Security Council. Further you must know from your own reference to the 688th Meeting of the Security Council in 1955, that Eban's view was not supported by Security Council members who regarded or allowed that S/RES 95 be taken as either a recommendation, see para 28 by the Peruvian delegation, or non binding, see para's. 7 through 9 by the Belgian delegation. (Perhaps Eban took this on board some years later when interpreting 242!)

I notice that once again your citation taken in the proper context actually negates the point you were trying to make. Perhaps that is because your reference was via the 'Decision of 13 January 1955' from the Article 25 Repertory for 1954-55. That summary fails to reflect properly the full scope of the actual Security Council debate. Perhaps because it is only indexing references to one issue. This seems a perfect example of how dangerous it is to treat the repertory as anything more than the index of references it in fact claims to be.

But since you raise the question of S/RES 95 (1951) it calls for Egypt to terminate restrictions on international shipping, a requirement which at least has the innate potential to be binding:

“Calls upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force.”

while S/RES 242 only Affirms that the establishment of a just and lasting peace is required to fulfil Charter principles. Even under Chapter VII it would be hard to see how any one party could be bound to establish a just and lasting peace unilaterally!:

“1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: ...”

As regards your opening statement:

'Steve the Security Council cannot adopt resolutions that permit or condone anything that a jus cogens preremptory norm of international [law] forbids. There are no two ways about that.'

Strange, because on p439 of Orakhelashvili's book, 'Peremptory Norms in International Law', he states just the opposite:

'Thus, a decision of the Security Council can conflict with jus cogens explicitly or implicitly.'

If you want to debate the authority of the Security Council relative to the norms of international law today (2009), surely the place to do that is not under S/RES 242 (1967). If you want to pretend that there is no debate, then don't cite Orakhelashvili's article above because even its abstract suggests just the opposite, that this is in fact one of the central issues of international law today:

“In today`s international law, there can be little doubt that the international community as a whole attaches special importance and effects to peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) and endows them with high status. The interaction between those high-ranking norms and the powers of the Security Council is therefore among the most central issues of international law.”

If you want to apply the peremptory norms of international law to S/RES 242 it might help if you don't cite anything after November 22nd 1967 without demonstrating how it applies retrospectively to this resolution.

Which brings me full circle to the opening question on the binding nature of 242. If you are not going to defend the position that 242 is binding then I am going to resume editing this article on the assumption that 242 is not binding, the pre-existing position. Steve157 (talk) 16:16, 5 November 2009 (UTC)

Steve the talk page is not the place for you to discuss your unpublished opinions or to solicit unpublished opinions from the other editors. Article 30 of the Charter says that the Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, and the repertory says that preamble of 242 does contain matters of substance that will govern any settlement of the Middle East question. The Court provided an analysis of the applicable international law, including the inadmissibility principle. It said that it was based upon an international law norm that prohibits territorial acquisitions that result from the use of force. I've supplied a dozen published books and articles which explain all of that. The ICJ has advised that preambular declarations made by the Security Council acting on behalf of the members under Article 24 of the Charter have legal consequences and Judge Higgins repeated that in her opinion in the Wall case. You've gone full circle for the last time with me on that issue.

Orakhelashvili's book and his article both say that the Security Council is bound by jus cogens norms and that any resolution that violates a peremptory norm is void ab intio and subject to judicial review by the ICJ and other tribunals. Here is an example of a discussion on 242 from the article:

The terms of a resolution, if vague, must be construed as requiring an outcome that is consistent with jus cogens. According to Gasser, ‘doubtful’ wording of the Council’s resolutions must always be construed in such a way as to avoid conflict with fundamental international obligations. Resolution 242 called for ‘a just settlement of the refugee problem’ in Palestine. ‘Just settlement’ can only refer to a settlement guaranteeing the return of displaced Palestinians, and other interpretations of this notion may be hazardous. The Council must be presumed not to have adopted decisions validating mass deportation or displacement. More so, as such expulsion or deportation is a crime against humanity or an exceptionally serious war crime (Articles 7.1(d) and 8.2(e) ICC Statute).

He also discussed resolution 242 in the book, cited Dugard's Recognition and the UN, the majority opinion in the Wall case, and Judge Higgins opinion. See for example pages 218-222, 447, and the footnotes. He cites East Jerusalem and the Golan as examples of the application of the peremptory norm of non-recognition by the General Assembly, Security Council, and ICJ and traces it to the preexisting Stimson and League of Nations doctrines. Orakhelashvili does NOT say that jus cogens norms are a controversial issue. He says they are a central and unrebuttable issue. He explains that jus cogens is itself a consensual mechanism, its relevance having been approved by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that applies to the UN Charter. He says derogation from peremptory norms can be attempted in a wide variety of situations, but that peremptory norms operate as norms and not merely as aspirations. They generate consequences that are also peremptory. Security Council resolutions cannot aim at a result outlawed by a peremptory norm or authorize states to do what a peremptory norm prohibits. The Security Council cannot permit a state to abstain from whatever peremptory norms require them to do. You need to supply an opposing viewpoint on jus cogens from a published source.

In 'Review of the Security Council by member states', pages 19-20 Erika De Wet says that the Security Council is bound by jus cogens and that there is no dispute among legal scholars about that fact. She says that states are under no obligation to give effect to Security Council resolutions that would require them to violate a peremptory norm. In 'The authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN', page 199 David Schweigman agreed. He cited the erga omnes interests of other states and explained that the Security Council may not commit or support acts of aggression. In 'United Nations sanctions and the rule of law', page 71-72, Jeremy Matam Farrall cited the Kadi case in which the Court of First Instance of the European Communities ruled that it was empowered to consider the lawfulness of Security Council resolutions with regard to jus cogens norms.

The repertory of UN organs is published to make evidence of international law more accessible. Mr. Eban's remarks and the decision of the Security Council in favor of the position he advanced are cited as evidence. His position is in line with the judgment of the ICJ on the applicability of article 25 to resolutions regarding the maintenance of international peace and security in the Namibia case. Judge Higgins cited the rules that were adopted in the Namibia case in her opinion on non-recognition in the Wall case.

In the Namibia case the ICJ said that Security Council declarations regarding the law and obligations under the Charter are binding on members under the terms of article 24. The UN repertory commentary on article 25 said the same thing, i.e. the Security Council's authority isn'tlimited to article 25. The members have agreed that the Security Council can act on their behalf in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter. There are lots of opportunities to do that under Chapter VI. The repertory says that Article 24(3), in conjunction with Article 15(1), places upon the Security Council the obligation to submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly, to render an account of the Council's discharge of the responsibility conferred upon it by Members for the maintenance of international peace and security. Resolution 242 and its preamble are cited repeatedly in the "Article 24 report" on decisions taken on questions considered under the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. [37]

I don't care how you edit the article, so long as you have reliable published sources that speak for themselves. So far you've supplemented your discussion on the talk page with a generous amount of WP:OR and WP:Synth argumentation. I'm not going to debate that sort of nonsense. I suggest that you try to convince the Moderation Committee that the published viewpoints of Paul De Waart, John Dugard, Enrico Milano, Stefan Talmon, Giuliana Capaldo, Alexander Orakhelashvili, David Schweigman, Erika De Wet, and Jeremy Farrall regarding the impact of jus cogens norms on Security Council resolutions, and about resolution 242 itself, shouldn't be included in this article. I'm finished discussing it. harlan (talk) 13:01, 6 November 2009 (UTC)

"Land for peace" ref

I added a ref to the "land for peace" section. Can I remove the tag or is something still missing? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 17:44, 17 September 2009 (UTC)

No. The reference does not say that the general principle of 'land for peace' was the resolution's "most important feature".

By the way, the ref introduces the views regarding the English and French versions as corollaries to the assertion that the acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible. There is no particular reason why that material should appear first or outside the Legal Interpretations subsection. harlan (talk) 13:58, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

Indeed there is no reason why this should be called the "most important feature" when a prominent drafter of the resolution called the invocation of the inadmissibility principle the "overriding principle" of the resolution and there is no reason why that should be the first section. I rearranged based on the order of the actual resolution. nableezy - 14:41, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

If you have a look at the source I added, Lord Caradon said that the inadmissibility principle was deliberately put in the preamble with the operative sections linking withdraw to political negotiations.

That said, I agree that "most important" is probably at best a bit of SYNTH. "Most famous" would probably be correct.

Which prominent drafter of the resolution are you referring to? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 15:07, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

"Land for Peace" is described as a general principle. Your ref did not say "most famously". The Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service published a case study on resolution 242. It contains Lord Caradon's analysis of the resolution which said "it is necessary to say again that the overriding principle was the 'inadmissibility of territory by war' and that meant that there could be no justification for annexation of territory on the Arab side of the 1967 line merely because it had been conquered in the 1967 war." see U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981), at p. 9. harlan (talk) 18:21, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

You know, you keep arguing as if someone here said that there's no such thing as the inadmissibility principle. That is not the case.

What Caradon basically said is that Israel can't annex land just because it won it in a war but that it was expected that the borders would be finalized through negotiations. The operative part of this resolution is "land for peace". Israel withdraws from some/all the territory it acquired in the war and everyone lives happily ever after.

Anyway, here's what I suggest. Lets organize the first few sections of the article like the issues are ordered in the resolution, starting with the preamble. Lets try to keep it to 2-3 paragraphs explaining in general terms what each piece means and then have an international law section where we can go into as much detail as necessary to explain every issue. This way I think a casual reader could get an idea of what the resolution is about without having to know what "communis opinio" or "jus cogens" means.

Thoughts? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 19:35, 18 September 2009 (UTC)

Harlan, can we nail one thing. I don't think the 'overriding principle' quote you refer to above is accurate! What it appears to say is overwhelming, my emphasis:

'Knowing as I did the unsatisfactory nature of the 1967 line, I wasn’t prepared to use wording in the Resolution that would have made that line permanent. Nonetheless, it is necessary to say again that the overwhelming principle was the ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’ and that meant that there could be no justification for the annexation of territory on the Arab side of the 1967 line merely because it had been conquered in the 1967 war. The sensible way to decide permanent ‘secure and recognized’ boundaries would be to set up a Boundary Commission and hear both sides and then to make impartial recommendations for a new frontier line, bearing in mind, of course, the "inadmissibility" principle.'

I have made this point before. Can you confirm your quote is correct? Do you have the book to hand?

The source of my quote is the wiki 242 article itself under 'The drafting process'. --Steve157 (talk) 15:11, 21 September 2009 (UTC)

The contractions and the term "overwhelming" do not appear in the original pamphlet. Caradon's quote is available online in Palestine and the law, by Musa E. Mazzawi and a number of other published sources including one that is cited in the inadmissibility section: Conceived in Law: The Legal Foundations of Resolution 242, page 11. harlan (talk) 07:39, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

Harlan your reference to the 'overriding principle' was correct. However the context of your quote is quite particular. The event was a symposium on resolution 242 held in 1981. Your quote is from a section where Caradon is responding to criticisms that 242 'did not exactly specify the boundaries to which the Israeli forces must withdraw.' But the broader context is one in which Caradon eventually proposes a second resolution based on the same principles, designed to bring 242 up to date and provide for its implementation. I would argue that your quote speaks more to the needs of that second resolution (with its boundary commission) than it does to the correct interpretation of 242. --Steve157 (talk) 00:11, 26 September 2009 (UTC)

It is pretty obvious that Caradon was talking in the past tense about resolution 242 and (as promised in the previous paragraph) reviewing the principles it contained in preparation for the discussion in "Section 4. Action" about present or future steps needed to implement those principles.

Your interpretation is a bit strained, i.e. that Caradon was talking in the past tense about a second, future, resolution. You are free to argue whatever you'd like, but without a published analysis from a reliable source which shares your opinion, the theory is just a WP:Synth conclusion. There are dozens of published sources, including Dr. Lynk and Dr. Mazzawi, who explain that the passage is about Resolution 242. In the "Introduction" Lord Caradon said what the content of each subsection would be. Here is his outline with the actual Section Headings inserted: "I shall first tell the story of the origin of Resolution 242 in 1967 [1. Origin]. Then I shall look at the substance and the importance of the Resolution [2. Substance], and comment on the criticism and shortcomings of the Resolution [3. Shortcomings], and then I shall turn to the present and the future [4. Action]."

The final remark about Border Commissions wasn't tied to the discussion of a second resolution. Border Commissions had always been a suggested solution. The original Palestine partition plan included a boundary commission, and a commission was an anticipated part of the Ambassador Jarring's mission (which was also discussed in section 3 Shortcomings). For example, de Gaulle's January 9th, 1968 letter to Ben Gurion said that provided Israel withdrew her armed forces, it would be possible to establish a solution through the UN framework that included permanent frontiers established through international arbitration. The Israeli-Egyptian dispute over the 1906 frontier markers in the Taba area was settled through international arbitration according to the principles established in the Camp David Accords.

In "3 Shortcomings" Caradon stressed that 242 had always been a two phase process that relied on Ambassador Jarring to work out the detailed settlements like the Camp David Accords:

"But we did not imagine that a statement of principles, however sound and fair, would suddenly result in a final peace. We relied on the appointment of a Special Representative to deal with the parties directly concerned and to promote a settlement on the basis of the principles we declared. I maintain that this procedure was right, and that we could not have found a better Special Representative than Ambassador Jarring of Sweden. We looked to him after intensive negotiations with all concerned to find a way forward-to work for agreement on secure boundaries between Israel and her Arab neighbours, to settle the detailed arrangements for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, to plan for United Nations supervision and, where necessary, demilitarized zones, and to work out a system of international guarantees."

I'd be happy to give you the context of the whole section if necessary, and do intend to add information from the sections on Palestinian rights and Jerusalem as time permits. harlan (talk) 17:02, 27 September 2009 (UTC)

Harlan, three points.

First 242 makes no mention of any boundary commission imposing a territorial solution, but this is proposed in his new resolution. You are on record as challenging the notion that the land for peace formula is associated with 242 on the grounds that the phrase 'land for peace' doesn't appear in the text of the resolution. Well the phrase 'boundary commission' certainly doesn't appear in resolution 242's text! As for 'land for peace', I would have thought the formula in operative paragraph 1 was pretty hard to miss:

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

What is withdrawal of Israel armed forces if not giving up land?

What is termination of all claims or states of belligerency if not making peace.

And since both principles are to be applied, the land for peace formula is there in the heart of the resolution for anyone to see.

Second, I don't have any problem with Caradon citing the ‘inadmissibility principle' and saying that 'that meant that there could be no justification for the annexation of territory on the Arab side of the 1967 line merely because it had been conquered in the 1967 war.' That was my view of the inadmissibility principle already. But that is not how Caradon's statement is being used. My objection therefore is the idea that this necessitates one principle overriding all others. That completely contradicts Caradon's previous positions, particularly his statement just before the resolution was passed that the resolution was a balanced whole and must be considered as a whole and as it stands. It also falls foul of the distinction in roles between the preamble and the operative part of the resolution and doesn't explain why Jordan's annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem should be restored in breach of the same overriding principle being enforced against Israel.

Third, you claim my interpretation is a bit strained, yet the section containing your quote is prefaced with a paragraph which shows clearly that Caradon is now looking to the future rather than the past:

Nevertheless it is now essential that we should go further than turn back to review the principles on which we were agreed in 1967. We must apply the tests of subsequent developments and future needs. we must urgently consider how the agreed principles can now be given effect; building on past agreement and also recognising past shortcomings and inadequacies we must find means to stop the drift and to go forward to plan effective action for the future.

I'd say the misuse of this quote is in fact quite pronounced, for example this one sourced from a UN seminar on the question of Palestine, my emphasis:

"As Lord Caradon, the principal author of resolution 242 (1967) has stated, "the overriding principle" of resolution 242 is the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and this means Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian and other Arab lands must take place to the pre-June 1967 borders, subject to minor variations to be determined, preferably, by an impartial boundary commission." This is not some random set of words thrown together, this is one of the most important aspects of the resolution and should be included in the lead. nableezy - 20:03, 1 September 2009 (UTC) ‘

Caradon said no such thing.--Steve157 (talk) 02:09, 29 September 2009 (UTC)

Steve, in the preceding paragraph Caradon had said, among other things, that he was going to discuss the agreed upon principles contained in 242. CAMERA quotes from the disputed passage, and says that it is a statement made by one of the main drafters of resolution 242 in which the meaning and history of Resolution 242 are explained: [38] Regarding the reference to boundary commissions: The resolution does mention demilitarized zones. The boundaries of the 1949 DMZs were established by a UN truce commission, and they were supervised by international commissions. You have neglected to cite any published source which supports your personal interpretation. Unless you can do that, it remains WP:Synth and WP:OR. Dr. Mallison (quoted by Nableezy) was discussing the applicable rules of law, and explaining why the withdrawal phrase was based upon the 1949 armistice lines, and not the resolution 181(II) lines. He cited the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, a passage on the powers of the Security Council from James Crawford's 'The Creation of States in International Law', and the applicable portion of Caradon's remarks regarding the legal principles contained in SC resolution 242 from the Georgetown Symposium.

Caradon didn't mention any new proposals or principles for the second resolution. The General Assembly had created a UN organ, The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, in the mid-1970s. It had already proposed the amendments to SC resolution 242 that Caradon mentioned during the Symposium. For example, General Assembly Resolution 35/169, December 15, 1980 criticized the shortcomings of SC resolution 242, recalled, and reaffirmed UN Resolution 181(II), 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, and etc. Resolution 181(II) contained provisions for the use of a boundary commission to delineate and demarcate the frontiers. In 1949, the Lausanne Protocol had established the partition map from resolution 181(II) as the starting point for discussions regarding the permanent settlement: [39] The Secretary General's report on the Jarring mission said that each country had been asked to provide its conception of "secure and recognized boundaries". Initially, Jordan and the UAR (Syria and Egypt) said that General Assembly resolution 181(II) defined Israel's recognized boundaries: [40]

I'm not on record as challenging the association of the general principle of land for peace with this resolution. In fact, I'm on record as saying that the US introduced the idea: [41] That doesn't mean it is tantamount to a peremptory norm of international law or to the binding provisions of a multilateral treaty, i.e. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. harlan (talk) 16:25, 12 October 2009 (UTC)

Hi Harlan I am beginning to see why we have trouble agreeing on anything.

When you say: ‘CAMERA quotes from the disputed passage, and says that it is a statement made by one of the main drafters of resolution 242 in which the meaning and history of Resolution 242 are explained’[42]

What you actually mean is that CAMERA references 19 statements by 5 different people which it collectively describes as statements ‘in which the meaning and history of Resolution 242 are explained.’ Five of those 19 statements are by Caradon, who is introduced as ‘chief drafter of Resolution 242’. One of those 5 statements cites a book which in turn cites a different passage from page 13 of the Georgetown symposium pamphlet. None of those 19 statements actually refer to the quote we were discussing!

When you say ‘ I'm not on record as challenging the association of the general principle of land for peace with this resolution.’ What you actually said previously was: ‘The resolution does not use the phrase [land for peace] or link the withdrawal to any precondition.' [43]

Anyhow, I would have thought you calling it the ‘general’ principle of land for peace pretty much makes my case.

When I say that 242 doesn’t make any reference to a boundary commission imposing a territorial solution, you say that 242 does mention demilitarised zones and that in 1949 (not post 67) demilitarised zones (not boundaries) were established by a UN truce commission (not recognised boundaries imposed by a boundary commission).

When you say ‘You have neglected to cite any published source which supports your personal interpretation.’ You seem to overlook that I have just cited verbatum the whole paragraph at the bottom of page 12 of the pamphlet preceeding the section in question which is entitled ‘(a) The boundaries’. Under your headings that is in section 3 although you cite the quote as being from page 9 which would be section 2 about substance. As far as I am concerned the paragraph I cite does support the idea that he is now looking forward and going beyond what was agreed in 1967. Here is the paragraph:

Nevertheless it is now essential that we should go further than turn back to review the principles on which we were agreed in 1967. We must apply the tests of subsequent developments and future needs. we must urgently consider how the agreed principles can now be given effect; building on past agreement and also recognising past shortcomings and inadequacies we must find means to stop the drift and to go forward to plan effective action for the future.

Here is your paraphrasing of it:

‘Steve, in the preceding paragraph Caradon had said, among other things, that he was going to discuss the agreed upon principles contained in 242.’

As I have already said, I am happy with what Caradon says the disputed 'overriding principle' phrase means, my problem is with how it is used, see below.

When I point out the differences (highlighted) between Dr Mallison’s paraphrasing of Cardon’s original statement:

‘As Lord Caradon, the principal author of resolution 242 (1967) has stated, "the overriding principle" of resolution 242 is the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and this means Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian and other Arab lands must take place to the pre-June 1967 borders, subject to minor variations to be determined, preferably, by an impartial boundary commission.’

and Caradon’s original statement itself:

‘Nevertheless it is necessary to say again that the overriding principle was the ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’ and that meant that there could be no justification for the annexation of territory on the Arab side of the 1967 line merely because it had been conquered in the 1967 war. The sensible way to decide permanent ‘secure and recognized’ boundaries would be to set up a Boundary Commission and hear both sides

You don’t even comment on the notable discrepancy, limiting your response to validating Dr Mallinson’s attempt to define Israel’s borders under international law to be the pre 1967 lines based on the withdrawal phrase:

‘Dr. Mallison (quoted by Nableezy) was discussing the applicable rules of law, and explaining why the withdrawal phrase was based upon the 1949 armistice lines, and not the resolution 181(II) lines. He cited the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, a passage on the powers of the Security Council from James Crawford's 'The Creation of States in International Law', and the applicable portion of Caradon's remarks regarding the legal principles contained in SC resolution 242 from the Georgetown Symposium.’

Might I point out that Dr Mallison is making a pretty breathtaking assertion which you seem to regard as legal fact, but which you must have a fair idea is highly contentious. The assumptions underlying that assertion, namely that 242 is unquestionably a legally binding document whose interpretation is governed by the retrospective application of evolving peremptory norms of international law established by the General Assembly with guidance from the Division for Palestinian rights has not been sustained in previous debates on this page about the non-binding nature of 242.

See the section on the nature of the resolution at the top of this discussion page where there are some 11 citations relating to the question of article 25 which counter your position. There have also been debates on the Resolution 338 page and on the UN Security Council page.

I note that while your whole position is predicated on 242 being considered legally binding, you have already twice avoided engaging in that debate in the published viewpoints section immediately above, and now do so again by requiring me to prove that it is non-binding in order that the article can freely examine the interpretation of this Chapter VI Security Council resolution as expressed in its operative paragraphs without you making these sort of comments:

‘We've had an adequate discussion about the deletion of sourced material regarding peremptory norms of international law… Your claim that explaining the application of jus cogens principles of international law in the lede is WP:UNDUE doesn't pass the laugh test.’

‘The attempts to delete references to peremptory norms of international law are not acceptable for obvious reasons.’

How about making it obvious to me that 242 is even a legally binding document, starting with when you think it became binding, how it became binding, who are all the parties to the resolution and what it is each one of them is bound to do?

Thanks. Steve157 (talk) 14:14, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

use of primary sources that do not mention 242

You cannot use primary sources that do not even mention 242 as relevant to 242. See WP:OR. nableezy - 16:20, 25 September 2009 (UTC)