Talk:Strategic bombing during World War II/Archive 3

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Not Rorschach

I added the mention of Blackett's criticism because it's the sole example at the time, & because, without it, it appears the only view was in favor of dehousing. That's clearly not the case. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 22:29, 2 June 2011 (UTC)

False claim and not supported by source

About Warsaw: As a defended city in the direct front-line that refused calls to surrender it could legitimately be attacked under the Hague Convention Its attributed to Boog 2001, p. 361

Nevermind that it comes from dubious source(wrote for Junge Freiheit) and without attribution.It doesn't actually state that. The source claims that "by the last third of September the situation of Warsaw has changed;it was now a defended city". Something quite different from the claim that was based on this source. Warsaw was bombed from 1st September.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 20:38, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

Nice detective work. I suspect that this false claim will have been added to a few articles. Nick-D (talk) 23:59, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

At risk of synthesis, does citing Boog for defense & the Hague Con itself for making it okay fail? TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 01:22, 16 July 2011 (UTC)

This reminds me of Wikipedia:Competence is required!

It is clear from the way the text in the article was structured that that the sentence in question refers to the situation after the city became surrounded by ground troops that were trying to capture it (September 13). If you read the source, puplished by Oxford University Press, the only reason it mentions the third half of September is due to the fact that the book is discussing the heavy bombings that were started then (25th). Where is the allegedly false claim?

In addition, what is the point in the statement that Warsaw was bombed on September 1? Are you claiming the text somehow claimed there were no earlier bombings? Did you read the text? " A report made on 4 September by the French air attache in Warsaw stated clearly that so far the Germans had tried to hit only military and economic targets."

As the text stood in the article.

Preparations were made for a concentrated attack (Operation Wasserkante) by all bomber forces against targets in Warsaw.[38] However, possibly as a result of the plea from Roosevelt to avoid civilian casualties, Goering canceled the operation and prohibited the bombing of military and industrial targets within the Warsaw residential area called Praga.[39] A report made on 4 September by the French air attache in Warsaw stated clearly that so far the Germans had tried to hit only military and economic targets.[40] Warsaw was first attacked by German ground forces on 9 September and was put under siege on 13 September. As a defended city in the direct front-line that refused calls to surrender it could legitimately be attacked under the Hague Convention.

The text in the book.

The report of the French air attache in Warsaw of 4 September 1939, submitted at the Nuremberg Trial of Major War Criminals, expressedly stated that the Luftwaffe until then tried to attack only military and economic targets in the city. By the last third of September the situation of Warsaw had changed, it was now a defended city in the front line, as even the Brittish air-war historian Frankland has confirmed, as a city that, in spite of repeated calls, had refused to surrender and therefore, under the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, could legitimately be attacked. Gen. von Richthofen's earlier proposals for comprehensive bombing had been rejected from higher up. Nevertheless, the bombing of Warsaw on 25 September, carried out against military targets in preparation for the capture of the city, was marked by a great degree of inaccuracy because, with bomber formations being pulled back to protect Germany´s western frontier, the raid was largely performed by Ju-52 transport aircraft usuitabe for aimed bombing. Yet even Polish historians confirm that barely 3 percent of the total bombs were incendiaries, a mere 1/5 of the proportion of incendiaries to be later routinely carried by RAF bomber command in its raids on German cities. Finally, there was a further justification in international law for this bombing raid - the prospect of achieving an immediate military advantage, in this case the surrender of Poland.

--Stor stark7 ^Speak 14:52, 16 July 2011 (UTC)

German destruction percentages

There were no responses to the following - if no one has a source for accurate final figures, it is necessary to take the table down:

The table listing "Conventional bombing damage to large German cities in WWII" cites Arthur Harris' data from 1943-1945 as a source. 'Bomber' Harris' data, if I'm not mistaken, must have been based on photos taken from planes during and in the immedeate aftermath of air raids (i.e. in the dark and through smoke). They are preliminary results (see article 177 in Harris' book) and they don't necessariliy including all US efforts (only for Berlin there is a footnote on US participation). The estimates we have today (possibly based on the post-war Air Force surveys and/or local officials) are in some cases much higher, in fact some of these higher numbers are mentioned in the English entries or the more detailed German ones on the cities in question. Cologne city center was 95% destroyed by the end of the war, with the rest of the city not far behind. (Harris: 61%.) Conventional bombing was used on the cities to prepare for take-over long after Harris' campaigns, so that may be the main reason for the differences. I suggest we find numbers from a later source or remove the table for the time being. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Jansch (talk • contribs) 17:32, 18 April 2011 (UTC) 00:01, 10 August 2011 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.180.110.116 (talk)

You should add sources rather than remove existing ones.Volunteer Marek (talk) 02:19, 10 August 2011 (UTC)

In other words I should simply add more correct or false information instead of removing false or misleading information that is already there? - One English-language source that mentions the 90+ percent of Cologne in passing: http://www.bbc.co.uk/languages/germany_insideout/rhineland1.shtml - As I said before, it is a well-known fact. Another expmple: The number for Leipzig would be up to 60% instead of 20%, according to the German Wikipedia Leipzig page. This is also generally reflected in the population data of the day and documented by aerial photos. While I doubt anyone will provide accurate numbers for all the cities soon, in the meantime I am finally removing the Harris estimates. Jansch (talk) 22:42, 2 October 2011 (UTC)

In fact, the text correctly contradicts the table (now gone) as well: "The devastation was nearly total." (Cologne) Jansch (talk) 22:50, 2 October 2011 (UTC)

what's true or false is determined by the RS not by the Wiki editors. Let's keep the official RAF data until better data is presented. Note that the definitions of city limits are at issue: The cite on Cologne from BBC says "90% of the city centre had been destroyed" while the RAF data refers to the much larger "built up area" of the city. The US Strategic Bombing Survey says "In some 50 cities that were primary targets of the air attack, the proportion of destroyed or heavily damaged dwelling units is about 40 percent." (see p 15 for quote) which comports well with the RAF data. Rjensen (talk) 00:30, 3 October 2011 (UTC)

Another error

report made on 4 September by the French air attache in Warsaw stated clearly that so far the Germans had tried to hit only military and economic targets. This again cited to Boog page 361.

I checked this. Boog indeed does mention 4th of September-while sourcing it to IMT chapter IX page 639.

I checked the IMT chapter IX and page 639(IMT trials are open for reading:http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-IX.pdf). No mention of Warsaw. It's a discussion with Goering. The report is though mentioned by Goering's defender Otto Stahmer on page 689, however it gives the date of 14 September 1939. Tomasz Szarota gives more on the report which can be added. But for now however it seems that Boog either gave false date or it is a typo in the book with 1 missing before 4. All other sources give 14th September as date of the report, and the source Boog uses also gives 14th September.

Since this report is mentioned already, I would remove the incorrect information regarding 4th of September if nobody opposses it.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 13:14, 16 July 2011 (UTC)

You are engaging in original research here, just so you remember. There is no reason what so ever for Boog to give a false date, and if he was trying to whitewash the Germans then that would indeed be counterproductive for him to claim the 4th instead of the 14th since Warsaw did not come under direct military siege until on the 13th. Most likely a typo, a "1" was lost. I would suggest you add an additional reference, the one to the IMT ix, page 689, and change the date to 14th.

For those who do not care to download the IMT; extracts:

... a statement by the French General Armengaud concerning the fact that the German Air Force operated in Poland in accordance with the laws of warfare and attacked military targets exclusively.

After the outbreak of war the German Air Force under its Commander-in-Chief, Goring, did not, by order of Hitler, attack any open cities in Poland; this was con- firmed by Buttler, the British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs on 6 September 1939, and by the French Air Attache in Warsaw on 14 September 1939 (Documents 41 and 46 of the White Book). The latter, General Armengaud, says Literally:

"I must emphasize that the German Air Force acted according to the Iaws of war; it attacked military targets only and, if civilians were often killed or wounded this happened because they were near the military targets. It is important that this should be known in France and in England, so that no reprisals will be taken where there is no cause for reprisals, and so that total aerial warfare will not be let loose by us."

--Stor stark7 ^Speak 14:53, 16 July 2011 (UTC)

Terror for terrors sake

This article is meant to be about strategic bombing yet there are mentions of terror scatted through the article as if the word is going out of fashion. It seems to be done on a tit for tat basis by various editors and I think that the article suffers because of it. For example what does the phrase "terror bombing" add to the sentence "In January 1944, a beleaguered Germany tried to strike a blow to British morale with terror bombing with Operation Steinbock."Surly the sentence in the lead of the Operation Steinbock would be more descriptive and useful "Between January and May 1944, a beleaguered Germany tried an offensive called Operation Steinbock intended to destroy British military and civilian targets in southern England"? -- PBS (talk) 06:29, 19 December 2011 (UTC)

the guideline on summarising (wp:summary) will back you up if you choose to make the change. Though by "civilian", I assume industrial is meant rather than libraries and lidos.GraemeLeggett (talk) 07:05, 19 December 2011 (UTC)

It was not intended "intended to destroy British military" targets. Rjensen (talk) 07:37, 19 December 2011 (UTC)

It is just one example I think there is too much emphasis on "terror bombing" in this article at the expense of description. What is the difference in "strike a blow to British morale" with "terror bombing" and "strike a blow to British morale" with "terror bombing"? -- PBS (talk) 08:16, 19 December 2011 (UTC)

Sounds to me like somebody introducing POV, either to justify the British bombing or to counter claims the Brits alone did it. Take it out. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 19:58, 19 December 2011 (UTC)

The trouble is that terror as was intended when the Goebles started to use the phrase "terror bombing" has connotations of legality. But first no one was tried at the end of World War II for ordering strategic bombing (If the Allies had wanted to do so they could have charged and tried Goebles with "terror bombing" as they did with Donitz and unrestricted submarine warfare of linked it to a war of aggression). The second is the false linkage between sapping morale through terror and ignoring other means, the whole point made in the dehousing memo was loss a home was the most demoralising thing that happened to British civilians during the Blitz. Of course one is able to trawl up reliable sources that will use the term "terror bombing" but to be included here I suggest that a majority of reliable sources should be shown to use the term if it is to be used in the passive narrative voice of the article, and it should only be quoted if it is making a valid point and not a propaganda one. -- PBS (talk) 05:30, 21 December 2011 (UTC)

Speaking of propaganda, no sign of terrorflieger in the text as it stands.GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:43, 21 December 2011 (UTC)

Bombing of Germany

I am surprised we have nothing on this subject. (Similar sample article: Bombing of Japan). --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk to me} 22:55, 29 May 2012 (UTC)

The devastation of Cologne, 1945

We had nothing on the bombing of Japan until I wrote the article from scratch last year. I agree that the lack of an article on this topic is a major omission though. Nick-D (talk) 07:11, 14 July 2012 (UTC)

Priorities?

Additional note: The R.A.F. famously mounted a series of 1,000-bomber attacks against large German cities, beginning with Cologne in 1942, with devastating results on the ground. Meanwhile, in the war against Germany's petroleum sources, a comparatively paltry force of 177 U.S. bombers was devoted to the largest raid on the Ploesti oil fields — Hitler's largest single source of oil — in 1943. Ploesti was a strategic failure (see: Operation Tidal Wave).

What do the numbers of planes involved in these missions say about the Western Allies' strategic priorities?

Sca (talk) 21:38, 7 July 2012 (UTC)

Practicalities is the missing element. Thousand aircraft raids could not be mounted from a location in range of Rumania oilfields. And nearly a third of those 177 US bombers were lost in the attack - such losses could not be maintained by RAF Bomber Command whose aircraft were much more vulnerable by day than the US. GraemeLeggett (talk) 06:49, 14 July 2012 (UTC)

They don't actually say anything. The Millennium mission was "everything but the kitchen sink", not something BC could carry out on a regular basis, while the Ploesti strike was a fairly routine op. The high losses meant it couldn't be restaged promptly, which effectively rendered it useless; had they gone back within a couple of weeks, the impact on Germany could have been devestating. (That Pleosti didn't teach AAF they needed LR escort fighters is another issue...) TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 18:58, 14 July 2012 (UTC)

Allied bombing in other countries than Germany or Japan

What about allied strategic bombings in other countries than Germany and Japan. By exemple, americans bombings on targets in France before D-Day : Marseille (2000 deads), Nantes (1500 deads) and others (like the useless and devastating napalm bombing on civilian boroughs of Royan in 1945). I think there were such bombings on Rumania and Hungary too. I'd like to see that part, I'm not very fluent in english, so I let you do the job, but I know that it won't be easy because this topic has been for a long time a taboo even in France, despite the scars are still noticeable in a lot of cities. Felipeh | babla 20:33, 12 July 2012 (UTC)

The book Forgotten Blitzes: France and Italy under Allied Air Attack, 1940-1945 (ISBN 144118581X) was recently published on that topic, and has been well reviewed. Antony Beevor's book on the Normandy Campaign also covers the Allied bombing of French towns. I'm not sure if there is a taboo on mentioning this in France; I was in Caen last year and various displays around the city and in museums were pretty frank about who was to blame for its destruction in 1944. It's important to note that these attacks were tactical in nature rather than strategic bombing though. Nick-D (talk) 07:10, 14 July 2012 (UTC)

Both Denis Richards in The Hardest Victory and Max Hastings in Bomber Command discusses the pre-D-Day Transportation Plan, which involved heavy bombing of rail targets in France, to which Churchil was initially oppossed because of the likelhood of excessive civilian casualties. Raids were meant to be planned to minimise casualties, which were in the end much less than were initally feared. A different matter is the raids on U-boat bases in France, against the wishes of Harris, which devestated several French Atlantic ports while having no effect on the operations of the U-boats.Nigel Ish (talk) 10:10, 14 July 2012 (UTC)

This page gives an interesting presentation on allied bombing of France.Nigel Ish (talk) 17:15, 14 July 2012 (UTC)

The raids on French towns on and around 6 June 1944 are controversial; these deliberately sought to destroy towns located on strategic cross roads near Normandy so the rubble would impede German reinforcements. The French civilian casualties from these attacks were quite significant, though not as bad as was expected. Nick-D (talk) 23:25, 14 July 2012 (UTC)

As one GI at the time was recorded as saying when going through such a village "We sure liberated the hell out of this place"[2] -- PBS (talk) 10:04, 15 July 2012 (UTC)

On another tack see the article area bombing directive and:

On 14 January 1943 directive (S.46239/?? A.C.A.S. Ops) gave priority to attacking U-boat pens of Lorient, St Nazaire, Brest and La Pallice on the western French coast. In line with the bombing of Genoa and Turin on 23 October 1942 and a speech by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill six days later, warning the Italian government that the RAF would continue bombing Italian cities while Italy remained an Axis power, a directive was issued on 17 January 1943 (S.46368/??? D.C.A.S. Ops) added to the bombing list of targets the Industrial centres of Northern Italy — Milan, Turin, Genoa and Spezia (citation give).

--PBS (talk) 10:11, 15 July 2012 (UTC)

The suggestion that bombing raids on the U-boat bases "devestated several French Atlantic ports while having no effect on the operations of the U-boats" seems questionable. That's not the impression one gets from reading various first-person German accounts, such as The Boat and Iron Coffins. These accounts indicate the U-boat sailors lived in constant fear of air attack, especially British — although perhaps I'm thinking more of the Bay of Biscay than the ports themselves. But if memory of these accounts serves, U-boats had a very hard time even getting in and out of their pens by the last two years of the war. Sca (talk) 14:09, 1 August 2012 (UTC)

You are thinking of the maritime patrol a/c, both in Biscay & (later) the Atlantic. The bombing of the pens themselves had no direct effect: the damage to the pens was trivial. The difficulties getting in & out, AFAIK, had more to do with risk of exposure to mari pat a/c (by then with H2S & Leigh light) than anything. (The bombers wouldn't have been equipped for attack on U-boats anyhow...) TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 22:56, 1 August 2012 (UTC) (FYI, Das Boot drastically overstates the impact of a/c in the period the book is set in... That was more a 1943 setting than 1941.)

My quote was not really meant to be about the bombing of U-boat pens (just to mention it in passing) but to highlight the bombing of Mussolini's Italy. -- PBS (talk)

First deliberate terror raid

Given the earlier paragraphs that state that the Germans bombing of Britain was within the laws of war the paragraph that starts "Operation Abigail Rache ..." with its unattributed in text quote "first deliberate terror raid" IMHO makes the whole section read like a Nazi apologists contribution. -- PBS (talk) 12:00, 10 August 2012 (UTC)

The wording could certainly be improved to make it clearer that this was (apparently) the first such raid conducted by the British, but it is referenced. Nick-D (talk) 12:19, 10 August 2012 (UTC)

Cited but not attributed in the text which such a POV comment should be (although I do not think it wise to include such quotes) as the British did not describe such raids as "terror bombing".

Take another example:

"The attack of 7 September 1940 did not entirely step over the line into a clear terror bombing effort since its primary target was the London docks, but there was clearly an assumed hope of terrorizing the London population." In the passive narrative voice of the article ws have an expert opinion. Such expert opinions should be attributed. It is followed by the next sentence "Hitler himself hoped that the bombing of London would terrorise the population into submission." "Terror" has an implication of unlawful (which is a minority view), it can be rewritten without the emotional baggage of the word terror contains: "Hitler himself hoped that the bombing of London would so demoralise the British population so that "even a small invasion might go a long way". -- PBS (talk) 01:47, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

♠I'm concerned about the continual references to "terror bombing" at all. It seems somebody is trying to make out strategic bombing, by its very nature, is equivalent with terror bombing, no matter who does it. It also appears, failing that, somebody wants to make out "Germany started it, so it's OK." Both positions disturb me.

♠As for the "terror" in question, I do agree in principle, except Hitler's express view seems to have been "terrorize", not "demoralize", so in this instance, it's accurate. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 02:06, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

The idea that strategic bombing is terror bombing, and tactical bombing is not, is advanced by quite a few, mostly German, historians. Horst Boog, who is relied on heavily in the article, is one of those historians. Regarding operation Abigail Rachel, the references are indeed an accurate reflection of what Boog has written. Unfortunately Boog himself does not reference the claim that "The British had been waiting for the opportunity to experiment with such a raid aimed at creating a maximum of destruction in a selected town since the summer 1940". There is no mention of such early plans elsewhere, but how do you prove a negative? Some of the claims that use Boog as a reference, such as "Despite the British attacks on German cities, the Luftwaffe did not begin to attack military and economic targets in the UK mainland until 6 weeks after the campaign in France had been concluded" are so obviously false it's a wonder how they got published in the first place. Tymestl (talk) 14:17, 14 August 2012 (UTC)

As always, we go by reliable sources, and they contradict each other. Some say the Bombing of Guernica was the first terror bombing by air; others say the town was a legitimate target, though the airplanes completely missed the railway and the arms factory. Barcelona was next; pure terror. Historian Donald E. Schmidt states plainly that the first terror bombing by air was the British bombing of residential Mannheim in February 1942. Professor Frederick Henry Gareau says that the Nazis "pioneered" terror bombing in Guernica. British control of rebellion in India and Mesopotamia from 1919 to the late '30s has been called terror by air, using primarily strafing raids but also bombs and gas. Sir Philip Game was said to be more brutal than his WWII peers in using air power against civilians in India, 1919. Similarly, the Italians in Libya (1923–1933) used terror by air as did the French and Spanish in Morocco in 1923–24. See To Destroy A City: Strategic Bombing And Its Human Consequences In World War 2, by Herman Knell. My point is that we have no firm agreement as to what was the first terror raid; the best we can do is describe the larger viewpoints and attribute them. Binksternet (talk) 15:51, 14 August 2012 (UTC)

Why wasn't Hitler targeted?

Hitler and his crew spent the better part of three years at a remote headquarters near Rastenburg (now Kętrzyn, Poland) in East Prussia. This HQ, the so-called Wolfsschanze, was a huge complex served by road, rail and airfields. (I've seen it.) Each Nazi bigwig had his own bunker. It was widely known among German government and military officials, who referred to it simply as “Rastenburg.” I find it hard to believe that the Western Allies were unaware of its existence through the entire war.

In her memoir Until the Final Hour, published in English translation in 2003, one of Hitler's secretaries, Traudl Junge, née Humps, writes that in late 1943 or early 1944, Hitler spoke repeatedly of the possibility of a devastating bomber attack on the Wolfsschanze by the Western Allies. She quotes Hitler as saying, "They know exactly where we are, and sometime they’re going to destroy everything here with carefully aimed bombs. I expect them to attack any day."

Junge notes that when Hitler’s entourage returned to the Wolfsschanze from an extended summer stay at the Berghof (residence) in July 1944, the previous small bunkers had been replaced by the Organisation Todt with "heavy, colossal structures" of reinforced concrete as defense against the feared air attack. She describes Hitler’s bunker, the largest, as "a positive fortress" containing "a maze of passages, rooms and halls." Junge writes that, in the period after the July 20 assassination attempt until Hitler finally left the Wolfsschanze for the last time in November 1944:

"... we had air-raid warnings every day ... but there was never more than a single aircraft circling over the forest, and no bombs were dropped. All the same, Hitler took the danger very seriously, and thought all these reconnaissance flights were in preparation for the big raid he was expecting."

Presumably, the "single aircraft circling" high overhead was a British or American reconnaissance plane. But whether the Allies indeed knew of the Wolfsschanze's location and importance never has been revealed. I've never understood why they couldn't find it and bomb it to smithereens — rather than bombing cities (or dams). At least by 1944, if not considerably earlier, they had the capability of bombing such a target; witness the devasting R.A.F. attacks on nearby Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia) in August 1944.

Similar questions could be asked regarding the Berghof (residence), Hitler's Bavarian aerie, where his entourage spent long periods during the war. Junge also writes of repeated air-raid warnings there late in the war, but says the Allied planes, chiefly U.S. bombers based in Italy, flew on "to their destinations," i.e. German cities. It wasn't bombed until April 25, 1945, twelve days before the surrender of German forces on May 7. Why not?

Sca (talk) 16:19, 16 May 2012 (UTC)

Article talk pages are for discussing ways to improve the article, they are not a forum for general discussion. However, the main reason would likely be that Hitler would have well protected shelters at each location, and that during most of the war, bombing was incapable of the accuracy required to attack point targets - they were generally lucky if bombs fell within several miles of the target. (Hohum ^@) 22:10, 16 May 2012 (UTC)

Very sorry to have violated rules of Talk pages. However, I can't quite accept your suggestion that "bombing was incapable of the accuracy required" to hit a large target such as the Wolfsschanze, much less that of the Berghof (residence), a well-known and easily identifiable target at a high elevation. They certainly could have tried to bomb Hitler into oblivion, particularly at the Berghof. The immense resources expended by the Western Allies on the bombing campaign could easily have been diverted, in part, to such an attempt.

I suspect, though I have no evidence, that Churchill et al. quite deliberately decided not to attack Hitler et al. personally in order not to perpetuate another "stab in the back" myth. Had Hitler and some of his key henchmen been killed, the war undoubtedly would have ended much sooner, and many thousands, perhaps millions, of lives would have been spared. Of course, they were mainly German lives....

All of this is mere speculation on the part of an armchair historian.

Sca (talk) 01:05, 17 May 2012 (UTC)

♠"I can't quite accept your suggestion that "bombing was incapable of the accuracy required" to hit a large target such as the Wolfsschanze, much less that of the Berghof (residence)" Then you're badly ill-informed. Bomber Command, until quite late in the war, was lucky to hit the right city, let alone a target as small as the Wolf's Lair. By the time it was possible, the war was virtually over anyhow.

You seem quite sure about that. I'm not. The RAF managed to blast V-1 launch sites and, as you note below, Peenemünde pretty effectively. And I have to think that a really massed attack on the Wolfsschanze, using 1,000 Lancasters as at Cologne, Hamburg, Dresden, etc., would have been devastating. Or perhaps one should say could have been, with a little luck. Sca (talk) 13:34, 17 May 2012 (UTC)

♠As for "deliberately decided not to" over "stab in the back", maybe, but I wouldn't bet on it. More likely, IMO, they'd have avoided it for more sensible reasons. Consider: Hitler is dead. What happens? Civil war...& the Red Army gets to the border with France in record time. If you were Churchill, would you have risked that? Would you want that?

♠And with Sovs on the French border & Leslie Groves just aching to test the Bomb... How about nuking Berlin? Or Moscow?

Civil war? In Germany? Not a chance. The Reds were mostly dead or in camps, as were nearly all the other opponents of Nazism — except for those in the officer corps, some of whom (mainly aristocrats) participated in the July 20 assasination attempt. Everyone else was just trying to survive.

I'm no professional historian. But from all I've read about why the Germans kept fighting when the war obviously was lost — and I can say I've read a lot over a long period of time — I have to think that if the German military had been released from its oath to Hitler and from Nazi reprisals, its remaining leaders would have done everything they could to negotiate an end to the conflict, the Allies' "unconditional surrender" dictum notwithstanding. Read Ian Kershaw's The End: Hitler's Germany 1944-45, (Allen Lane, 2011), ISBN 0-7139-9716-8.

Again, mere speculation, but I think the question is worth asking in the context of the present article about the Allied bombing campaign, which not only took hundreds of thousands of civilian lives, but also destroyed a great deal of irreplaceable cultural infrastructure. (Thus, I submit it is a legitimate topic for this page.) Read Jörg Friedrich's The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945. Translated by Allison Brown. Columbia University Press, New York, 2006. ISBN 978-0-231-13380-7

Sca (talk) 13:34, 17 May 2012 (UTC)

♠It's always possible to make things worse.... TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 04:16, 17 May 2012 (UTC)

A few reasons: a) RAF Bomber Command was hard pressed hitting anything smaller than a large city until well into 1943, and the improvement in accuracy from this point was largely due to UK-based radio aiming systems which didn't reach all that far into Germany. They would have had to use basic aiming techniques to attach anything in East Prussia, which was at the absolute edge of the Lancaster's range (and may have been beyond this?) and so wouldn't have had much of a chance of doing serious damage. Bomber Command was unable to conduct precision raids by night into central Germany until late 1944 after the aiming radios had been moved to near the French-German border b) Air Marshal Harris didn't believe that there were any individual 'war winning' targets, and strongly resisted all attempts to divert the bombers away from German cities (even to the extent of resisting the use of his force to support the D-Day landings) c) judging from the results of the Bombing of Peenemünde a raid on East Prussia would have incurred heavy casualties (and its unlikely that the bombers would have been able to strike a target inland with anything like the accuracy they achieved at Peenemünde given that the presence of large bodies of water or cities was needed for accurate radar-aimed bombing). All up, such an operation would have been both high risk and unlikely to have succeeded. Nick-D (talk) 10:29, 17 May 2012 (UTC)

PS: Let me correct a statement I made above re the lives that could have been spared had the war ended sooner. They were mainly German and Soviet lives — along with an untold number of forced foreign laborers and concentration-camp prisoners. Thus, they were not British or American lives. This might imply a double standard in the West, at least subconsciously.

Sca (talk) 22:18, 17 May 2012 (UTC)

To successfully target Hitler (or any other individual) by air attack, you would have to know exactly where he was to be during the attack, (I doubt his movements were precisly advertised in advance), and would have to know the locations of his headquarters etc - there is no real evidence that anyone knew where precisely many of the headquarters (like the Wolfsschanze) etc were). This is a major difference from a target like Peenemunde where the Allies knew where it was. Even for locations like Berlin, how do you know where Hitler's bomb shelters are? Bomb shelters need direct hits by heavy bombs (some had 1m+ of concrete) so area bombing is unlikely to be effective - for example Berlin was hit by very large air-raids in 1945 when Hiltler was present, but none managed to kill him. I also seem to recall reading somewhere (in the context of assasination) that deliberate targeting of a head of state might be dubious under international law. Anyway, without significant discussion of targeted air-raids against Hitler or other senior Nazi politians in WP:RS's, all this discussion is irrelevant.Nigel Ish (talk) 22:55, 17 May 2012 (UTC)

"Dubious under international law." I'm sorry, but I have to laugh. Do you think the Allies fought within the constraints of "international law" in WWII? Famously, all is fair in war. War is inherently unethical and dehumanizing. The basic modus operandi of war is killing people on the other side, and always has been. Wouldn't it have been better to kill Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels, Streicher, Rosenberg, Ribbentrop, et al. — these criminal personalities — than to incinerate hundreds of thousands of anonymous men, women and children in German cities?

My view is, the Allies should have done everything in their power to kill Hitler and as many as possible of his crew of poltical gangsters at the earliest opportunity, particularly once they knew — and the British did know via their excellent intelligence services — what was going on in the concentration camps. Also, they should have done everything possible to disrupt operation of the camps. By 1944, they certainly could have bombed the rail connections to Auschwitz and at least some of the other camps to dust. This point is raised by, among others, Elie Wiesel, an Auschwitz survivor, who in his memoir All Rivers Run to the Sea asks why this never was done, and notes that this question never has been answered.

Please understand, no one is denigrating the bravery or dedication of the Allied airmen who flew the perilous missions against German cities. One questions the overall war policy and its priorities in relation to human lives lost. Irrelevant? Why?

PS: They knew exactly where the Berghof (residence) was from Day One of the war. And according to Traudl Humps (see above), Hitler himself believed they knew exactly where the Wolfsschanze was.

Sca (talk) 02:49, 18 May 2012 (UTC)

♠"this question never has been answered" Actually, it has. The answer is, repairs would have been trivially easy & the delay would have been insignificant, while the diversion would have been noticeable.

♠"They knew exactly where the Berghof was" Which means damn all unless they also know Hitler is actually there... Nor have you established an ability to hit the Berghof. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 00:17, 19 May 2012 (UTC)

What concrete change is being suggested to improve the article, backed by what sources? (Hohum ^@) 22:47, 17 May 2012 (UTC)

take the Air Force viewpoint. They had a doctrine of strategic bombing plus the planes and bases to make it work. They thought it would work. To have their plan overrules and weakened by politicians who knew nothing about air warfare for political advantages was to sabotage and hinder the war effort. By the way, how did the smart bombing of Bin Laden for 10 years work out? Rjensen (talk) 23:43, 17 May 2012 (UTC)

Nothing about this discussion is worthy of inclusion in the article. Bunker-busting bombs of the day were not capable of targeting the exact section of the bunker where they thought Hitler might be. And what section would that be? Nobody would know. The strategists of UK and US were against diversion of resources and the chance of success was nil. There was no effort to kill Hitler because it was nigh impossible. Keep this conjecture out of the article. Binksternet (talk) 00:46, 19 May 2012 (UTC)

I remain unconvinced that there were no grounds for making an attempt — one might say, to kill the beast in his lair. And I don't agree that it's ever been "answered" whether the Allies knew where and what the Wolfsschanze was. Maybe it has been told, but I've never seen it.

Sca (talk) 22:01, 21 May 2012 (UTC)

• Actually the Whermacht central communications hub at Zossen was heavily and quite accurately bombed in march 45 by the Americans. Jodl was nearly killed, I seem to recall. Its mentioned in Ryans Berlin, The Last Battle. So there is a precident. It could be added. Maybe a new section. Berchesgarten WAS attacked, and heavily damaged in April 1945 by BC. Irondome (talk) 21:40, 19 August 2012 (UTC)

Note the date: March 1945. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 05:02, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

• And your point? Irondome (talk) 14:15, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

I thought that was fairly self-evident. It was that late in the war before the bombers were able to hit a target so precise, by which time it was moot. Quite aside the relative irrelevance of Hitler's death to the Holocaust at that point, unless it actually ended the war, which is not a sure thing. (Highly probable, yes; certain, no.) TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 14:42, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

I was merely making the observation that very late in the war, there were some strategic attacks on higher headquarters by the Allies. I was suggesting that this could be placed somewhere in the article, in a small section. I would be happy to contribute. I have no sympathy with the argument of this thread, the killing Hitler through bombing idea. I was merely reading it and added the Zossen and Berghof attacks, to float the idea. Irondome (talk) 15:02, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

A fair point. I think you get into undue, tho. This was a fairly flimsy proposition with slim chance of making a difference. It's also extremely marginal to the subject. That being true, IMO an add of this kind doesn't deserve more than a sentence or two, if that. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 15:31, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

Agreed. Maybe 50 words briefly mentioning these? I would argue that it would fall into the strategic bombing article remit, as an early form of decapitation attack by air. I assume the Zossen attack was to cripple comms with the remaining Nazi occupied areas of Europe, i.e Norway. The Berghof and Zossen attacks may have been connested with the "Alpine Redoubt" semi-myth which appears to have been taken very seriously at SHAEF for a while.Just an idea anyway. Will have a look at anything out there thats available. Irondome (talk) 17:27, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

Zossen was bombed following a specific request of the Soviets, who at least seemed to know that the German General Staff resided there according to Ryan (pp. 71–2). What the western allies knew of the details of Zossen before this request I don't know.Nigel Ish (talk) 17:44, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

My copy of Ryan died on me years ago, so I was working from memory. Thanks for that. Suggest we put this out for consensus. Does the definition of "Strategic bombing" cover these attacks? If they do, then maybe a small addition Irondome (talk) 17:59, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

I do not see any consensus here. Besides by the mid point in the war (after El Alamain and Stalingrad) Churchill an others recognised that Hitler was not necessarily an asset to the Axis powers and said so publicly:

...I am free to admit that we builded better than we knew in North Africa. The unexpected came to the aid of the design, and multiplied the results, for which we have to thank the military intuition of Cpl. Hitler.

The touch of the master hand and the same insensate obstinacy which condemned von Paulu's army to destruction at Stalingrad brought this new catastrophe to our enemies in Tunisia. We destroyed or captured considerably more than 250,000 of the enemy's best troops, together with vast masses of material.

^{Bonus from Hitler} Nobody could count on such folly. They gave us, in the language of finance, a handsome bonus after a full divined

— Churchill in a speech to Congress on 21 May 1943.[3]

Also in practical terms -- the British were the only ones to have bunker busters/earthquake bombs (Tallboy from mid 44 and the Grandslam from March 45) and the only aeroplane able to carry them (so the USAAF could not carry out such a strategy of targeting bunkers even if they had wanted to). The RAF had plenty of tactical targets to go after such as the Tirpitz, Submarine pens and physical communications infrastructure (such as railway tunnels and viaducts), without wasting such limited ordinance on speculative raids which could only be based on information hours or days old (on targets which would have been, until the last months of the European war, 100 of miles behind the front lines and heavily defended), and Bomber Harris, OC of RAF Bomber Command (and so commander of any bombers that would have been used for such an operation), considered anything that did not involved 1,000 bombers pounding the city centre of a German town a "panacea", and so would not have supported such an initiative. So I think the genesis of this proposal is based on the false premise that the Allies had the equipment and the will to want to hunt Hitler as the USAF hunted for Saddam Hussein during the Gulf wars. As for attacking command and control, all sides did that, but only at a tactical level, because during World War II strategic bombing was still a bludgeon rather than a rapier that it would become by the second Gulf war. -- PBS (talk) 02:38, 21 August 2012 (UTC)

• I was NOT talking about Hitler. As I said upthread, that argument I have no time for. But what is ubdeniable, is that WERE several major attacks which were carried out by both the RAF and the USAAF which can only be described as "super strategic". The raid on the oilfields; Operation Tidal Wave, the dams raid, Operation Jericho, the RAF attack on Amiens prison, the 1943 Peenemunde attack, the Zossen raid and the Berghof raid. I would suggest that none of these operations fall comfortably into this article, and so a list of "one off" operations should be compiled. I am perfectly aware of the political background, the interservice rivalries, Harris, the aircraft, technology, weapons and their limitations within this timeframe, so again, please.
• I am suggesting an article listing one- off strategic raids, as are the examples I have listed above. Irondome (talk) 08:56, 21 August 2012 (UTC)

"I would suggest that none of these operations fall comfortably into this article" I'd agree, there. And with the idea of hiving off the "special ops". (I'd say they walk a fine line between "strategic" & "grand strategic" operations, so maybe they don't strictly belong here anyhow.) TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 11:41, 21 August 2012 (UTC)

• Cool. That was the consesnsus I was alluding to, the concept of "Grand starategic" one-off operations, and the thought of hiving them off to a section maybe titled "One Off Strategic air attacks of WW2". Irondome (talk) 22:26, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

How does Grand strategic bombing during the Second World World War grab you? :) (I can just see comments saying it should be merged here... :( ) TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 22:47, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

Sounds very good :). The talk page on it would make fascinating reading for sure. Its quite evident, my thought evolution from the Zossen example, to Grand Strategic operations. The Pacific war also lends examples, the Doolittle Raid and the airborne assasination of Yamato are two obvious examples. Arguably the A bomb attacks also. Glad and appreciative that you had the patience to bear with me on evolving this idea. It would be a cool article actually :) Irondome (talk) 23:12, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

♠I'll try not to be smug. :D

♠Happy to help out with your thinking. I find thinking out loud, as if explaining to somebody else, can make me find things I wouldn't have otherwise, too. :)

♠I do agree on your PacWar examples. They all fall outside strategic, & really are grand strategic, including the Bomb...tho we might argue it wasn't intended or seen as such at the time. (And then we're into the issue of its impact on Japan's surrender.)

♠One thing concerns me: the already raised issues of trying to stop the Holocaust. Advocates & complainers about it are liable to be attracted to a "spec ops" page like moths. We might end up needing a separate page dealing with that, just as Attack on Pearl Harbor has this. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 23:33, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

• I would suggest that firstly the Grand strategic article is commenced, and that a Staregic bombing and the Holocaust page be created. It would be good, and a strong addition to Wiki. I personally am sympathetic to some of the arguments for a short bombing campaign against the death camps. We should encourage editors to create it, to fallstall any argument or controversy on the main page. As there appear to have been no direct attacks on the Auschwitz communications links, etc, it wouldnt really be relevant for the Grand strategic page.

• I would advocate merely linking the A bomb attacks to the existing A bomb impact on Japans surrender page. I frankly see the A bomb strikes as anything other than the ultimate Grand strategic raid((s)
• The impact on the Japanese leadership I think is somehow a straw man, in that the Allies intentions should be seen as paramount in the strikes historical definition. Irondome (talk) 00:11, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

There is a Grand strategy article and in World War II the usual forum among the Western Allies for grand strategy was the Combined Chiefs of Staff with a political dimension through the Conferences such as the Arcadia Conference that gave political go-ahead for the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. There are also articles on Strategic bombing and the Holocaust. It is a very bad idea to consider creating speculative articles about a "short bombing campaign against the death camps". They are very difficult to write because any assertions have to be put into the article as facts or in other words "historians xyz have speculated ...". Wikipedia by it structure with the provisions of NPOV and no OR is not a suitable platform for such speculative articles. -- PBS (talk) 00:40, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

• "A short bombing campaign against the death camps" was my description of my thoughts on the matter. I WAS NOT advocating a page with such a title. Let those who are interested work on it. But a history of the argument is perfectly repectable as a part of the Holocaust section. There is literature out there that has discussed it, so such an article would not be speculative. Indeed all of those topics you linked above exist on Wiki. although taken in isolation they are incoherent to the concept of grand strategic air raids of WW2. Thats why a seperate article should be created on the subject Irondome (talk) 00:49, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

♠"I frankly cannot see the A bomb strikes as anything other than the ultimate Grand strategic raid((s)" That's why I was saying there's a problem. At the time, the Bomb wasn't seen as the grand strategic device it is now, not based on plans to use it. (I'll grant, I may be misreading the situation, & certainly the mooted effect on the Sovs was grand strategic.)

♠"The impact on the Japanese leadership I think is somehow a straw man" It can't be, tho, if, indeed, the Bomb was intended as a grand strategic attack. Was it decisive in the Japanese surrender? We may never know. If that's what you mean, I'll withdraw my comment, because we agree.

♠"arguments for a short bombing campaign against the death camps" I'm afraid that's asking for trouble, as already said. However, if you intend it as a "controversy" page, to keep the arguments in one place, I wouldn't oppose. As for PBS's opposition, I take his point, speculation is a bad idea. There is some serious commentary on the subject, & that deserves mention, if only to keep it from creating trouble elsewhere, as noted. And a grand strategic ops page that deals with killing Yamamoto (I have a real problem with calling it "assassination"; he wasn't a politician), frex, is likely to attract people who think bombing death camps or camp railways should've been done. So... TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 03:00, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

• I think it was grand strategic. It was the most expensive single outlay in US military spending in WW2, so I would strongly argue that its sole purpose was as a grand strategic instrument. I think the political and physical effect of the bomb was fully recognised by those in the loop by Aug 45. The casualty projections for Olympic were growing by the day, so its purpose was to finally end the war in one or two strokes.
• I think we agree on point 2. Its a complex point, but my thrust is that its operational intention in use by the United States was Grand Strategic in intent. What the Japanese leadership made of it is irrelevant. To the US its very use was Grand Strategy.
• I would advocate its creation both as a controversy page, and to allow the development of an article that explores current historical mainstream thought on the subject. It isnt "speculation" as such, or many historical articles could be brandeded as "speculation". Much of history is speculation, backed up by solid sources. Yamamoto I agree was killed. Assasination was a poor word choice. Once again I have to recap that "A short bombing campaign against the death camps" is merely my thought shorthand. No way would I suggest a title like that for an article. I suggest Strategic bombing and the Holocaust. Irondome (talk) 03:52, 27 August 2012 (UTC)

♠"I think it was grand strategic" Recalling the initial U.S. objective was to forestall the Germans being sole possessor, & the Brits' aim to develop a Bomb as much for prestige as for actual use, I'll agree & withdraw any objection about that. (Somehow I managed not to recall that... :( )

♠"operational intention...was Grand Strategic" We're agreed.

♠"both as a controversy page, and to allow the development of an article" What I meant was, you'll end up needing both: one the main Grand Strategic Ops page, the other for the death camp bombing loons.

♠"Strategic bombing and the Holocaust" I like that. :) (Wish I'd thought of it. :( ;p )

♠"Assasination was a poor word choice." I won't bust you for it, but I've heard it used seriously, & it always makes me think it's intended as a pejorative. I'm taking it you just couldn't come up with a better one than "killing" that captures the dramatic of it. (Me, neither. ;p )

♠"casualty projections for Olympic were growing by the day" Well... I'm far from sure. That, however, is for another page. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 20:18, 27 August 2012 (UTC)

• Agree with all the above. Maybe we should reflect on Operation Vengeance for thoughts on the definition for Yamamotos death? :)
• Are we getting towards a consensus for a Grand Strategic air raids article? I would NOT want to advocate a Holocaust and Strategic Bombing page btw, so scrub all my stuff on that upthread. On reflection I have enough stress in my life at the mo :/ Dont wanna kick off a painful and emotive subject which could cause deep misunderstandings among participants on the obviously massive talk page it would generate. Irondome (talk) 22:23, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

Please don't start an article called grand strategic bombing. There are no reliable sources that use this term. Binksternet (talk) 22:39, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

• Then we shall have to think of another title :). I assume you have read the discussion, what are your views on the creation of an article covering these niche raids? Irondome (talk) 22:46, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

I don't think we have a new topic. I think each notional "super strategic" or "grand strategic" bombing program is already covered somewhere else. I think that there was never a coordination of all of them. I think the most we can consider is to have a list article, but even then there is no reliable source that bundles them together. Binksternet (talk) 23:02, 30 August 2012 (UTC)

• I certainly take your point. But I have never claimed some seam or conscious operational linkage between this "class" of raid has ever existed. But there is a group of raids, undertaken in all theatres in WW2, which do not fit comfortably into this article. I am unsure whether an academic precident has to be found in naming an area of research, which determines whether such an article can be created on Wiki, as you seem to be saying. This puzzles me. if it is Wikipolicy, please excuse my ignorance, as I am a new editor. These are clearly "grand" or "super" strategic raids, the goals of which were far in excess of an average area or industrial strategic bombing raid or series of raids would achieve. Their existence and notability seems clear. Even as a list, which would be a positive step. Irondome (talk) 23:48, 30 August 2012 (UTC)

• How about "Panacea Raids"? Its a verifiable term often sputtered by Harris. We would be using it ironically, but it would sum them up rather neatly. Irondome (talk) 00:13, 31 August 2012 (UTC)

An article about Panacea Raids would be limited to Harris' observations. It would not include operations by other countries or in other theatres. If we shoehorned those in we would be guilty of synthesis. That's my take. Binksternet (talk) 03:02, 31 August 2012 (UTC)

Rastenburg

Pardon my persistence, but I'd still like to know what the Western Allies knew about Rastenburg and the so-called "Wolf's Lair" HQ, and when they knew it. Sca (talk) 17:15, 30 October 2012 (UTC)

Probably off topic for this page, try at the articles for those places. (Hohum ^@) 18:14, 30 October 2012 (UTC)

Allied air superiority over Western Europe in jan 44?

I've put a dubious just after the sub paragraph that claims that bomber movements were seriously disrupted in preperation for Steinbock. This would presuppose night as well as daytime air superiority over france, and the low countries. I didn't think the allies achieved that till the spring? A citation would be good, indicating GAF bomber losses destroyed in transit to jumping off airfields, etc. For sure by Jan 44 the British air defence system was almost impenetrable without unacceptable losses to an attacker (the radical HE177 attack profile used in Steinbock proves that the GAF were grimly aware of that) So I have no issues with that part. Irondome (talk) 20:51, 19 August 2012 (UTC)

The USAAF and RAF were putting nightfighters over the continent on Intruder missions to both counter German nightfighters looking for Bomber Command's raids, and pick up German bombers on the way back. But as to whether than is what the original editor was referring to...GraemeLeggett (talk) 23:05, 13 November 2012 (UTC)

Area bombing and oil bombing graph

Could someone please include this graph of Allied bombing target or create a new graph? http://pages.uoregon.edu/dluebke/Germany342/BombingTonnage.GIF

I think it is important to visually show what the main targets were.

Please also replace the image in the start of the article. Bombing of the Astra Romana refinery is very much not representative of strategic bombing since the graph shows that less than 10% of the Allied bombing was on oil installations, while more than 60% of bombing was area bombing. Please use an image of bombing of residential areas to replace the refinery bombing with. Thank you. — Preceding unsigned comment added by IkswejezreiM (talk • contribs) 14:47, 19 January 2013 (UTC)

Operation Crossbow

Note that Today's Featured Article (for March 25) concerns the Nazi-built Blockhaus d'Éperlecques, La Coupole and the Fortress of Mimoyecques in NE France, and says, "All three facilities were put out of action by the Allies' Operation Crossbow bombing campaign between August 1943 and August 1944."

I realize these targets were much, much closer to Allied airfields than was the Wolfsschanze, but the fact that they were so thoroughly ravaged by accurate bombing seems to show that a massive raid on Hitler's so-called Wolf's Lair might have been possible, or at least worth trying. As noted above, the RAF bombed Königsberg — only 45 miles from Rastenburg — with devastating effect in August 1944. Danzig, some 75 miles from Rastenburg, also was bombed by Allied and Soviet air forces late in the war.

The Western Allies, particularly the British, steadfastly refused to lend any encouragement to the German resistance circles plotting Hitler’s assassination, despite the plotters' multiple attempts at contacts. I cannot but suspect, and I tend to conclude, that the Allies similarly refused to consider killing Hitler because they believed only a total military defeat of Nazi Germany served their war aims. If that is the case, they ignored an opportunity to save several million human lives – lives lost in the last year of the war in Europe. This is just one more among countless examples of the dehumanization of war.

I believe they should have tried to kill the beast (and at least some of his rabid pack) in his "Lair."

Sca (talk) 16:26, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Is it even certain that the British know of an anti-Hitler faction that could be supported. Sefton_Delmer#Early_career_and_work_during_wartime suggests that the British were faking a German resistance to Hitler. GraemeLeggett (talk) 16:56, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Such an assertion is totally baseless and terribly wrong. As early as 1938, and intermittently into 1944, the resistance made repeated attempts to enlist support from the British and the American OSS.

I suggest you read (among others):

• Fest, Joachim. Plotting Hitler’s Death; The Story of the German Ressistance, Metropolitan Books, 2006. ISBN 0-8050-4213-X.

• Gill, Anton. An Honorable Defeat: A History of German Resistance to Hitler, Henry Holt and Co., 1994. ISBN 0-8050-3514-1.

• Deutsch, Harold C. The Conspiracy Against Hitler, University of Minnesota Press, 1968,

Fest, in discussing attempts by various resistance leaders to contact British notables, says: "But there was to be no help or any sign of encouragement, just a deep, persistent silence." (Page 209.)

PS: GraemeLeggett, please DO NOT again delete this reply.

Sca (talk) 22:11, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

As the page history shows, I haven't edited anything you wrote on this page. GraemeLeggett (talk) 06:27, 26 March 2013 (UTC)

This is a talk page to be used to discuss ways to improve the article, and not for a general discussion of topics related to it. Please see WP:NOTFORUM. Regards, Nick-D (talk) 07:22, 26 March 2013 (UTC)

Late 1940 British view on victory

Irondome and I are debating an edit on how the British in late 1940 thought they could win the war. I am using as source chapter 13 of Ralph Ingersoll's book Report on England, November 1940 (Simon & Schuster, 1940). Ingersoll was a well-known American journalist who visited Britain in October 1940 and met with Churchill, Bevin, Bracken, and other leading figures as well as many ordinary soldiers and civilians. Chapter 13 is called "The Hardest Questions", and the first paragraph is:

THE HARDEST questions to answer about the English are how they are going to win the war and what they are going to do when they've won it. The general belief in the government as well as in the Air Force is that it can and will be won by intensive bombing of Germany. It is recognized that this can be done only with American production of bombing planes and after the Empire pilot-training program is at least six months, possibly a year, older. The theory is that the industrial production of Germany can be crippled until Hitler hollers for help. The Greek show and the Middle East show are regarded as important but not crucial. But I don't think many people I have talked to would call me a liar if I said flatly that the heads of the British government do not know how the war is to be won. They simply propose to find out how and to win it. There was a great deal of talk about taking the offensive while I was there- somewhere in the Mediterranean, even in the north. But most of it was a bombing offensive on German industrial production.

In hindsight we know that British strategic bombing alone would not have been sufficient, any more than the Combined Bombing Offensive, but it seems reasonable that in late 1940—when the British had no realistic prospects of landing on the continent, and when "the bomber will always get through" had not been debunked—strategic bombing was the closest the British had to a war-winning strategy. Ylee (talk) 03:39, 24 July 2013 (UTC)

Indeed. But the point is, in this article of some sensitivity, "Seems reasonable" is WP:Synthesis. There is no evidence in primary sources that I have ever seem which specifically commited Britain to a bomber offensive as a definitive war-winning strategy, at the expense of ground and sea theatres, especially the critical and intensifying Battle of the Atlantic Churchill was ambiguious about the bombing offensive from its earliest days as a sole weapon of victory. You are using a contemporary American source which is merely surmising British strategy and intentions at that date. Even Harris 2 years later was severely constrained politically, and the ethics of bombing per se were being questioned at an early date. The air offensive was the only method of "striking back" at Germany, as such it was essentially retaliatory and defensive in nature. That is different from a proactive war-winning bomber strategy. Cheers Irondome (talk) 03:57, 24 July 2013 (UTC)

the British kept their top secret war plans to themselves in 1940. I suggest looking instead at: JRM Butler Grand Strategy: volume 2: September 1939-June 1941 (1957) especially chapters 15 17 and 24; Robin Neillands, The bomber war: The Allied air offensive against Nazi Germany (2001) chapter 8; Dennis Richards, The hardest victory: RAF bomber command in the second world war (1994) chapter 7 to 12; and Dudley Sayward, Bomber Harris (1985) chapter 13-14. Rjensen (talk) 03:59, 24 July 2013 (UTC)

I would rather see us drawing from post-war sources because of the greater objectivity gained thereby. The November 1940 report by Ingersoll is not needed here in this article. It is best used to illustrate a point in a history book, being as how a book has so much more room to discuss changing attitudes as the war progressed. Let's keep it simpler than that. Binksternet (talk) 04:00, 24 July 2013 (UTC)

Would agree with the importance of post-war sources having greater weight on this subject. I repeat, is there a memo or other PS that specifically commits Britain to a purely air war and that victory would be attained purely by that strategy? Its an extraordinary claim, and readers would expect extraordinary evidence. The British air offensive in terms of its own understanding and objectives were far more subtle and nuanced than that. Far more tanks than strategic bombers were bought from America in 40-41, so this would tend to weaken this theory of an apparent coup by the British "Bomber barons" Cheers Irondome (talk) 04:17, 24 July 2013 (UTC)

I'd say there's a difference between "committed to" & "believed in". The bomber officers, chief among them Harris, were pretty well convinced they could make invasion unnecessary (or, at most, mop-up). Everything I've read supports that view, & there was AFAICT strong resistance to "diversion" of strategic bombers to any other task. (See especially Terraine's The Right of the Line.) I think that bears mention. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 06:55, 24 July 2013 (UTC)

Very true. Both Harris and Spaatz were bombing fetishists, and very firmly fall into the "believe in" category. Harris was a unique subspecies. I believe both held to their views till the end of their lives. However they must be seen in the political context of the time. I think its Hastings, in Bomber Command, who claims that Harris' position was never secure, and hung on the political instinct and strategic whim of Churchill. Ironically, the Battle of the Ruhr had by July 1943, caused massive and cumulative damage to the German war economy, with critical bottlenecks and supply crisis, especially in coal, and great actual distruction of critical plant and rail links. Both Speer, Inside The Third Reich, and Tooze, The Wages Of destruction, discuss the Critical effect the Battle of the Ruhr was having. Bizarrely, Harris turned his attention to Operation Gomorrah, and ultimately Berlin. Harris got his way for 8 months to conduct his very explicitly expressed area bombing experiment. I think all this shows how Harris was a political tool, Churchill letting the experiment run, just in case, but dropping him like a hot spud after the Dresden bombing. Interesting conversation. Cheers! Irondome (talk) 22:25, 30 July 2013 (UTC)

I think that my comments here are off topic and if someone wants to remove them I will not object: Nuclear weapons were not the only weapons of mass destruction (WMD) developed in World War II. Pre-war and into the Blitz the British expected that poison weapons would be used. Gruinard Island was a testament to how much worse it could have been in the European theatre, and pound to a penny if the Germans had still been fighting in August 45 they would have been on the hot end of Little Boy. -- PBS (talk) 23:09, 30 July 2013 (UTC)

Absolutely. Irondome (talk) 00:25, 31 July 2013 (UTC)

As to your statement above "There is no evidence in primary sources that I have ever seem which specifically commited Britain to a bomber offensive as a definitive war-winning strategy", see the Singleton Report (Dehousing#Contemporary debate, the Butt and Singleton reports). -- PBS (talk) 13:46, 31 July 2013 (UTC)

Yes. I am reasonably familiar with both reports, though its been a few years. They are covered in some depth in Hastings who looks at the intense political/strategic turf wars played out at this period. But again, these were recommendations for force strengths and a list of cities to be attacked. And the greatest of all mirages. The "dehousing" and morale collapse argument. But Portal etc cannot be argued as codefying the definitive "war winning" strategy, quite apart from Churchills' political and military instinct never consistently and officially supporting it. It was just ONE of the available strategies, which took on a life of its own. In fact Churchills scepticism of its usefulness steadily grew. The wild and irresponsible claims made by Portal and Harris; "If I could wreck Berlin from end to end the war will be over in 4 months. Quicker if the Americans come into it" or words to that effect. This was autumn 1943! It didnt help their political credibility. It certainly gave the public the vivid impression of major offensive action and it could be thrown as a sop to Stalin, in his increasingly loud demands for the second front. Apart from the appalling navigational and targeting issues raised by Butt, the recommended bomber force to carry it out was estimated at 4,000 heavies. IIRC even at the zenith of Bomber Commands strength and technological blind bombing and navigation capability, in April 1945, BC had about 1500 heavies on tap. This entire 5 year strategic bombing effort Hastings estimates, was at a cost of well over 30% of Britains' total war production and technological effort, thats in all production, of all types of equipment. Massive. The cost of this treasure, as well as the lives of 55,000 of the nation and Empires' best and brightest, balanced aginst what was achieved in directly crippling the Nazi war machine, is the big debate. IMO this was the longest and bloodiest strategic blind alley in Britain's military history. Occasionally they would strike a vital spot, like Penemunde, the 43 Ruhr campaign, but then they would start to hack and stab elsewhere. A blind man in a knife-fight. Our knowledge of German war production was actually pretty crap for at least half the war also. Cheers! Irondome (talk) 18:16, 31 July 2013 (UTC)

♠Bombing was hampered by an inexplicable faith in its effectiveness, which was never tested, as well as by its unsystematic approach to targeting. Worse still, it was aimed at the wrong target: trying to break public morale, rather than break Nazi party confidence.

♠Beyond that, it ignores the moral failure of expending Allied aircrews to little benefit. (We crucify Haig for it; we should also crucify Harris.)

♠Perhaps worst of all, it was unnecessary, since there was a better option available, & one that wouldn't have left Germany in ruins postwar.

♠The effort expended was pretty enormous, but did make sense for a couple of reasons (within the limitations placed on the campaign by the leadership). One, airpower was capable of being scaled up more rapidly than anything else. (I don't recall why.) Two, there was a need for Britain to be seen to be striking back, or Winston's government might fall. (There were also grand strategic considerations.) TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 08:16, 1 August 2013 (UTC)

@Irondome I specifically singled out (pun intended) the Singleton Report (not dehousing) as AFAICT it is as close as an official policy statement as one can get. I think this thread is not contributing to development of this article so I shall say no more. -- PBS (talk) 10:09, 1 August 2013 (UTC)

'PBS. Just thinking that as an admin, you could transfer this thread to either the Butt or Singleton report{s} talkpages. I think the discussion would be more constructive in those talk spaces. I leave it up to your descretion as to what article talk is most relevant. Cheers. Irondome (talk) 03:32, 2 August 2013 (UTC)

Justifications for Bombing

Personally, I think the data on the German bombing seems very inaccurate. They might very well have been within the letter of the law but Warsaw and Rotterdam far as I know were aimed with terrorization in mind -- all too often many people have a way of following the letter of a law while completely and totally gutting its spirit when they want to do soimething bad enough; likewise according to Arthur T. Harris, he actually said that other than Essen most of the city bombings weren't aimed at industrial targets at all; they were merely bonuses with the main targets being the inner cities and/or city center.

Likewise, Dresden which inevitably comes up was little different in terms of the objective (mass destruction, mass murder) than any of the other city bombings particularly from 1942 on. The only real difference was that the city had no air defenses (which actually is significant as it made it completely and unambiguously illegal), and with the exception of the first few terror raids (Mannheim, 1940) the crews were told very clearly that the city was being targeted with the intention of killing it and its occupants with little other in mind. This was attested to by a RAF medical officer named Harry O'Flanagan. His statements were consistent with other orders circulated the same day which more or less stated the city was the last built-up area that the Germans had left, that it was around the size of Mancherster, loaded with refugees and would be a place where the Germans would feel it the most. 69.127.45.17 (talk) 18:36, 11 September 2013 (UTC)

Bombing of Nara and other Japanese cities

Greetings, I am confused about table showing % of bombed out area in japanese cities. Nara is among them but according to this : http://www.cis.doshisha.ac.jp/kkitao/Japan/Nara/ikaruga/ikaruga.htm Cities Nara, Kyoto and Kamakura were not bombed due to their cultural significance. Also this useful but unsourced article: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=94834 doesn't have Nara on bombed cities list. If Nara was indeed not bombed during ww2 then this table should either be removed or edited. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.167.236.119 (talk) 20:48, 16 September 2013 (UTC)

Worry in the 1930s

Arch dude with this edit you have changed a perception into a fact.

From

Before World War II began, advances in aviation had led to a situation where groups of aircraft could devastate cities. This worrying development ... As British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin warned in 1932, "The bomber will always get through".

To

Before World War II began, advances in aviation made groups of bombers capable of devastating cities. The new aircraft flew high enough that anti-aircraft guns were largely impotent and fast enough that fighters were unlikely to intercept them. As British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin warned in 1932, "The bomber will always get through".

By that, I mean although the previous wording was unsatisfactory, the point it was making was that it was believed by British politicians, that given the tonnage of bombs dropped on England in World War I and the death rates coupled to that tonnage along with the use of poison gas bombs, that the number of deaths in another conflict would be something like that which it was later believed would occur in a nuclear exchange in the Cold War, and just as in the Cold War, MAD affected how British politicians and the public approached international relations in the 20s and 30s. So there was a worry, which 20/20 hindsight tends to blur (mixed up metaphor intended). The easiest way to see the panic of the time is to look at its literature such as H.G. Well's The Shape of Things to Come and the 30s film adaptation Things to Come. For what ever reasons (MAD?) poison gas was not used in Europe and the bombing devastation alone did not cause mega-deaths as had been feared before the war, but that does not make the contemporary worries any less real. -- PBS (talk) 09:43, 29 December 2013 (UTC)

If you agree that the old version is awkward, but my replacment is incorrect, then please revert back to the original and then improve it. At least to me the original did not convey the intent you describe. Thanks for discussing this instead of merely reverting with a terse comment. A discussion is much more likely to yield an improvement, and it makes the whole editing experience more enjoyable. -Arch dude (talk) 18:45, 29 December 2013 (UTC)

unrestricted

this sentence says unrestricted but the source only talks about indiscriminate. "The Luftwaffe also began eliminating strategic objectives and bombing cities and civilian population in Poland in an indiscriminate[13] and unrestricted aerial bombardment campaign." clearly the luftwaffe was not unrestricted. the bombing of warsaw for example was tactical, the city was within the war zone and warsaw was a polish fortified city with heavy polish military presence. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 109.90.114.46 (talk) 15:02, 9 January 2014 (UTC)

Russia

According to this, Russia engaged in strategic bombing of Germany and Finland during the war. Thus, Russia needs to be mentioned as a belligerent in the infobox and have a paragraph on it in the text. Cla68 (talk) 23:26, 13 January 2014 (UTC)

the source (p 158) says the Russian strategic bombing was ineffective & trivial -- comprising about 2/10 of 1% of the Allied bombing. That's a good reason to leave it out of the summary box, which is aimed at providing the readers with the IMPORTANT results in a nutshell. Rjensen (talk) 01:28, 14 January 2014 (UTC)

City lists

There are two city lists. The European one has 25 cities the Japanese one around 75. I messed around with the positioning of the current Japanese list but it is too large even if it is put on the left with all the pictures on the right. I suggest that it is cut down to the 25 cities with the highs percentage of damage. If in the future the article expands then perhaps some more can be re-added but at the moment it is forcing some very amateurish looking formatting on the page.

If someone else knows of another suitable solution which does not involve reducing the numbers (drop down boxes are not acceptable) then please suggest or implement a solution. -- PBS (talk) 20:45, 18 January 2014 (UTC)

I have removed an image which is duplicated later, and two others which were crashing down from an earlier section to minimize the issue. For all but the widest resolutions, this seems to work fairly well. I'm not sure that cutting it to the 25 cities with the largest destruction is the best idea, since some of them may have been small. Also, does a larger number indicate a more widespread destruction of cities than in Germany? (Hohum ^@) 16:16, 19 January 2014 (UTC)

Thanks to Bomber Harris and his blue books (real RAF examples, of the "tight bomb pattern" that Colonel Cathcart is looking for in Catch 22), the destruction in Germany was percentage wise pretty uniform, but of course the destruction in scale differs depending on the size of the city. Bomber Harris Harris numbers in his book Bomber Offensive (page 261 in my paperback edition ISBN 1-84415-210-3):

The representatives of our Operational Research Section in Germany [after the war] were able to revise the measurement of the extent of devastation in German cities which we had obtained during the war from air photographs; these were taken under operational conditions and did not always give complete cover of the areas concerned. Seventy German cities were attacked by Bomber Command. Twenty-three of these had more than sixty per cent of their built up areas destroyed and 46 about half of their built-up areas destroyed. Thirty-one cities had more than five hundred acres, and many more of them vastly more than 500; thus Hamburg had 6200 acres, Berlin 6427—this includes about 1000 acres of destruction by American attacks—Dusseldorf, 2003, and Colonge 1944. Between one and two thousand acres were devastated in Dresden, Bremen, Duisburg, Essen, Frankfurt-am-Main, Hanover, Munich, Nuremberg, Mannheim-Ludwigshafen, and Stuttgart. As an indication of what this means it may be mentioned that London had about 600, Plymouth about 400, and Coventry just over 100 acres destroyed by enemy aircraft during the war.

— Bomber Harris

So as can be seen Bomber Command under Harris systematically achieved most if not al of his desired target of destroying all German cities with a pre-war population of more than 100,000 people (there were 58 of them -- (including cities in the east like Königsberg 20% of industry and 41% of the housing stock), I am not sure that the USAAF attacks over Japan over a shorter time period were as systematic. -- PBS (talk) 18:20, 19 January 2014 (UTC)

First strategic bombing of Germany by the RAF

With the edit, at 00:56, 29 December 2013,I corrected the date for the first strategic bombing of Germany by the RAF from 12 to the 15, noting it was after the Rotterdam Blitz and included a source with the change. The date change was altered today, by an editor making their very first edit (if I were not assuming good faith I might assume that this was a sockpuppet edit), back to 12 May. with the comment "The first RAF raid on Germany was on the night of 11-12th May 1940"

The raids on Germany west of the Rhine prior to night of 15/16 May 1940 were tactical theatre interdiction raids. Here is a source the explains them in more detail:

• Royal Air Force Bomber Command 60th Anniversary, Campaign Diary: The Battle of France (May-June 1940)

Note its entry for the night of 15/16 May 1940:

15/16 May - 39 Wellingtons, 36 Hampdens and 24 Whitleys (99 aircraft in total) despatched to 16 targets in the vital Ruhr industrial area of Germany. 81 aircraft report bombing their primary or secondary objectives. 1 Wellington lost. 6 Wellingtons and 6 Whitleys also raided targets in Belgium without loss. These are the first Bomber Command raids to the east of the Rhine and mark the beginning of Bomber Command's Strategic Offensive.

This is in line with the Taylor source cited in the article that explains it was on the 15th that the British Cabinet gave the go-ahead for strategic bombing of Germany and the issuing of a new RAF directive. -- PBS (talk) 18:59, 30 December 2013 (UTC)

The fact is that the RAF first bombed Germany (Cologne and the Ruhr Valley) on the night of the 11-12th May 1940. (ChuckOvereasy (talk) 20:11, 30 December 2013 (UTC))

The above editor is a sockpuppet of banned editor HarveyCarter. Binksternet (talk) 17:07, 20 February 2014 (UTC)

(a) As far as I can tell Cologne and the Ruhr Valley was not bombed that night the RAF diary states: "11/12 May - 19 Hampdens and 18 Whitleys bomb road and rail targets in München-Gladbach - the first raid on a German town. 2 Hampdens and 1 Whitley lost; 4 people killed." What is your reliable source that the RAF bombed "Cologne and the Ruhr Valley"?

It certainly was not the first bombing attack on German territory by the RAF as that was conducted against the island of Sylt on 17 March 1940.[4][5] But that is not the point as the RAF was targeting flying boats at one of their bases and as such it was a tactical mission. This is NOT an article about bombing it is an article about strategic bombing and the RAF's strategic bombing campaign against Germany did not start until night 15/16 May attacks before that were in support of the British Army and Royal Navy and were considered to be tactical attacks mostly interdiction. -- PBS (talk) 11:14, 31 December 2013 (UTC)

Maginot Line

Closing discussion started by a sockpuppet of banned editor HarveyCarter. Binksternet (talk) 17:07, 20 February 2014 (UTC)
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.
It's important to mention why Hitler had to invade Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg - in order to avoid the Maginot Line. As France and the UK and all of the British Empire and Commonwealth apart from Eire had declared war on Germany, Hitler had to invade France in order to end the war and the economic blockade, and the only way to do so was by bypassing the Maginot Line. (ChuckOvereasy (talk) 20:15, 30 December 2013 (UTC)) a lot happened in WW2 that was not closely connected to strategic bombing. In this case the goal was to lure the Allies deep into Holland then cut them off. Rjensen (talk) 20:23, 30 December 2013 (UTC)

Unsourced additions

• IP 92.11.196.195 I presume that you are using more than one IP address from the same range. If not then state that you are a different editor. I take it from your patten of edits that you are not a new editor. If that is not true then please state so.

92.11.x is a sockpuppet of banned editor HarveyCarter. Binksternet (talk) 17:09, 20 February 2014 (UTC)

Edit history

• 19:24, 12 February 2014‎ PBS (rv to version at 11:50, 4 February 2014 -- unsourced additions)
• 07:49, 13 February 2014‎ 92.11.205.37 (Undid revision 595183600 by PBS (talk))

As an experienced editor I would expect you to be familiar with the following but in case you are not: See WP:BRD and see WP:PROVEIT "Attribute all quotations and any material challenged or likely to be challenged to a reliable, published source using an inline citation" -- It is up to you to provide sources for your additions -- PBS (talk) 10:12, 13 February 2014 (UTC)

No citations are needed, it just says Churhill ordered the change in strategy and that residential areas were bombed on 11th May. (92.11.196.16 (talk) 17:22, 13 February 2014 (UTC))

The above editor is a sockpuppet of banned editor HarveyCarter. Binksternet (talk) 17:09, 20 February 2014 (UTC)

It is not up to you to decide if citation are needed. You have to provide sources for all the changes that you made per WP:PROVEIT.

1. source for "The attacks by the RAF on German cities began with the attack on Wilhelmshaven on 5 September 1939." because the RAF diary says that it was an attack on the ships within the port (RAF Bomber Command Campaign Diary 1939)
2. source for "On 11 May 1940, the day after be became Prime Minister, Churchill ordered the bombing of residential areas in Mönchengladbach". The prime minster could not order the armed services to do anything (he was not a dictator). He could ask the air ministry to issue a directive to the RAF, but that is a War Cabinet issue so as the wording is clearly wrong you will have to provide a source that indicates that he did what you state he did.
3. "From 11-13 May 1940, the Germans registered a total of 51 British air attacks on non-military targets" What the German authorities registered is from a primary source and not relevant. If you want to include this then you need a qualified historian to judge how likely it was that the contemporary German assessments were accurate and that the British attacks were on non-military targets rather than collateral damage due to inaccurate bombing (see the Butt Report).
4. "The first carpet bombing of a German city was in the night from 15 to 16 May 1940 in Duisburg." you source for this claim because the directive issued was for attacks on specific targets (such as smelters that were self illuminating) and there are two reliable sources in the article to back it up. At that stage in the War the British Were incapable of "carpet bombing" a German city even if they wanted to (see the Butt Report). Also this addition is in the wrong place in the article see the paragraph in the section "British response" in which it is reported that " On the night of 15/16 May, 96 bombers crossed the Rhine and attacked targets in Gelsenkirchen. 78 had been assigned oil targets, but only 24 claimed to have accomplished their objective" That sentence caries three citations. So were is your citation for an attack on Duisburg?

It is for these reasons that all your additions which add surprising information that contradicts what is in the article needs to have citations to reliable sources (WP:PROVEIT).

-- PBS (talk) 18:26, 13 February 2014 (UTC)

I have found a source for these additions. The information comes from Hitler on the Blitz in London published by David Garcia Antoñanzas. Antoñanzas has collected together a number of sources and republished them. In this case his source is anonymous email forwarder (The_Churchill_Centre_and_Museum@mail.vresp.com,propagandaleiter(propagandaleiter@yahoo.com) -- Therefore not a Wikipedia reliable source. It may turn out that the the source of the information can be traced to a reliable source, but given the known inaccuracies in it I doubt it. The sentences "The attacks by the Royal Air Force (RAF) on German cities began with the attack on Wilhelmshaven on 5 September 1939" and "The first carpet bombing of a German city was in the night from 15 to 16 May 1940 in Duisburg." are take verbatim from the sources and are therefore a copyright violation without quotes or inline attribution. -- PBS (talk) 13:46, 14 February 2014 (UTC)

This IP editor from 92.x is persistent WP:LTA sockpuppeteer User:HarveyCarter. His additions should be deleted on sight. Binksternet (talk) 14:59, 14 February 2014 (UTC)

Should we have a city countermeasures section?

The following first stag at a topic that I feel was seriously lacking in this article, is being censored.

This is it.

~~Perhaps. I would avoid getting into cold war preparations, even if some WW2 activities continue beyond 1945. The U.S. wasn't on the receiving end of strategic bombing (unless you count Japanese bomber balloons). The section might get a warmer reception if it opens with the preparations performed by countries that were attacked. Check the rest of the article to see if there are bits and pieces that can be moved to this new section. Information on industrial countermeasures could also beef your proposed section. The civilian part of things isn't my area of expertise so I can't be of much help to you. I am watching this page, so I can help with edits.~~ — Preceding unsigned comment added by Jtgelt (talk • contribs) 21:54, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

Civilian countermeasures

See also: Blackout (wartime), Air raid shelter, firebreaks, and duck and cover

During the 1940s and 1950s, neighborhoods such as Detroit, MI would practice blackout air raid drills. During this time, the city's Civil Defense workers would immediately activate the neighborhood air raid siren, and families would be required to do the following in order: 1. Shut off all appliances, such as stoves, ovens, furnaces; 2. Shut off valves for water and natural gas or propane, as well as disconnect electricity; 3. Close blackout curtains (plain black curtains that would block light from coming in or going out). This step was changed after the atomic age began, where white curtains began to be preferred as they reflect the thermal radiation of the bomb to a greater degree(see anti-flash white), black curtains were used in WWII to prevent any airborne enemies from seeing light from windows; 4. Get to a public shelter, such as a bomb shelter, or the household basement, and stay there until the local police or block warden dismissed the blackout.

In Germany, blockhouses were built in cities, such as Trier, these Hochbunker/ "high-rise" bunkers were a peculiarly German construction, with no equivalents of hochbunkers in the cities of the Allied countries.

Detroit is not important--the goal was only to maintain morale not protect against bombers (look at the map). Even better look, at Richard Overy's new book on the Bombers and the Bombed which has very full coverage on European civil defense. Rjensen (talk) 22:26, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

References

I know detroit was not very important, however I was simply providing a reader with the type of countermeasures that were practised in a nation of the war. If your cited book has a summary of the typical steps taken, as I detailed above, then great we should include that ref instead, what page is that on? Secondly, blackouts weren't done for mere morale boosting reasons, it's inconceivable that being in pitch darkness boosted morale one iota, the countermeasures really did work. Lastly, just for confirmation: you do agree with a short "countermeasures" section being in the article?

86.44.234.63 (talk) 23:40, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

Overy has several hundred pages on how the people on the ground reacted. the Germany civil defence was superb. other countries like Italy pathetic. browse it at Richard Overy (2014). The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe 1940-1945. Penguin Group US. Rjensen (talk) 23:48, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

Civilian responses to strategic bombing should be sourced from books written by mainstream historians talking about measures taken in Berlin, London, Tokyo, etc. A notional section about "Civilian countermeasures" should discuss civilian volunteerism, ground observer programs, firefighting programs, the establishment of bomb shelters, blackout programs, and the clearing of firebreaks in cities in which buildings were torn down and both businesses and residents were displaced. There is absolutely no reason to talk about exercises taken in Chicago, nor is there reason to mention German blockhouses which were not civilian. Binksternet (talk) 00:02, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

I would, moreover, beware of mentioning actions in Detroit (or anywhere in the U.S.), since those will, in the main, be reactions to Soviet bombing in the '50s, not the subject of this page.

Outside that, however, I'd agree with Bink. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 20:57, 10 March 2014 (UTC)

The Second World War German Hochbunkers (blockhouses) were build for several reasons and one of them was as civilian air-raid shelters. This is an article on Strategic bombing during World War II cold war defensive measures are better placed in other articles, indeed while a summary sentence or two can provide hooks in this article for links into other articles, details of civil defence measures such as the different types of air-raid shelters are better placed in more specialised articles. -- PBS (talk) 03:05, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

Yes thank you PBS, they were sometimes built for civilians, I understand the confusion though as unbeknownst to me, my earlier link was to the military-centric blockhouse article which is without any mention to civilian uses. The civilian Hochbunker at Trier was indeed the buildings I was referring to, I'm glad at least 1 person here is knowledgeable of these things to be able to catch that. I also completely agree with you that a long winded section that covers firebreaks etc. is not really warranted, that's why I added the see also tags, in an attempt to keep it short. The perhaps odd Detroit pick was simply because I was looking for a description of the generic civilian countermeasures, typical in all combatant countries, to give readers an idea of what most cities at war planned for. Furthermore the Detroit references and countermeasures deal with 1944, so they're not really Cold War related as suggested, I simply added that bit about Blackout curtains being replaced with white ones as the Blackout curtains at Hiroshima and Nagasaki actually made the likelihood of fire higher than it would have otherwise been/they became counter-productive once WWII entered the nuclear war age. If anyone has a better alternative to Detroit being the generic case, then great, even better!

The only addition I would argue for the above short section is probably a sentence about civilian evacuations of cities, as arguably that had the greatest effect at reducing Strat bomb casualties.

A nice concise countermeasures section is all I think this article is seriously missing.

86.41.239.213 (talk) 08:08, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

United States Bombing of Japan

This section of the article is the only one that has a conclusion statement:

"On 15 August 1945, Japan announced its surrender to the Allied Powers, signing the Instrument of Surrender on 2 September which officially ended World War II. Furthermore, the experience of bombing led post-war Japan to adopt Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which forbade Japan from nuclear armament."

I am not disputing that the above statement is a fact. I am suggesting that it is superfluous to this particular article. Note that the sections on the aerial bombing of every other nation in the rest of the article have no conclusive statements. The section on Italy does not end with their overthrow of Mussolini. The German section does not end with signing of an unconditional surrender. If you look at the article on submarine warfare,there is no conclusion statement.

The issue is, why is it here and only here in this context? The statement, especially since no other section on bombing has a similar conclusive statement, infers that the nuclear bombardment of Japan caused Japanese surrender. Inferring the cause and effect of Japanese surrender goes beyond the scope of this article.

I agree that nuclear bombs contributed to Japanese surrender. The bombs probably were their number one concern at the moment of decision. However, there are other contributors. These contributors and conditions are dealt with in Wiki article "The Surrender of Japan."

I highly recommend striking "On 15 August 1945, Japan announced its surrender to the Allied Powers, signing the Instrument of Surrender on 2 September which officially ended World War II." The second sentence seems very awkward "Furthermore, the experience of bombing led post-war Japan to adopt Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which forbade Japan from nuclear armament." It probably should be reworded or dropped.

The other alternative is to write a conclusion for every nation. I recommend against that. The results of bombing campaigns is a highly contentious issue. Trying to draw such conclusions will undoubtedly open a can of worms. Again I see conclusion statements as being beyond the scope of the article. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Jtgelt (talk • contribs) 18:19, 17 May 2014 (UTC)

Metodology of counting destroying

Hi, In this tabels, where are presended percentage destroing, it concerns total destroyed buildings, or all that have been light, or medium destroyed? Bmp91 (talk) 09:56, 29 September 2014 (UTC)

Bombing Germany began on 11 May 1940

Closing discussion initiated by banned HarveyCarter. Binksternet (talk) 17:56, 14 February 2015 (UTC)
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.
The RAF began bombing Germany on 11 May 1940, before the Rotterdam Blitz. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-two/11410633/Dresden-was-a-civilian-town-with-no-military-significance.-Why-did-we-burn-its-people.html (TaylorLaundry (talk) 13:39, 14 February 2015 (UTC)) I strongly suspect you are not here to create an encylopedia. See WP:NOTFORUM. Read it very carefully. Have you been active on here in the last couple of days? Irondome (talk) 13:44, 14 February 2015 (UTC) Technically, the Battle of the Heligoland Bight (1939) December 1939 a British bombing attack on ships in the port of Wilhemlshaven was probably the first British attack on Germany. But then the Luftwaffe had tried much the same thing on Rosyth in October 1939 with about the same effectiveness. Looks like they started it. GraemeLeggett (talk) 13:54, 14 February 2015 (UTC) Graeme, we have seen the same "point" raised at the Winston Churchill and Dresden articles over the past couple of days. I suggest not feeding at this point Irondome (talk) 13:58, 14 February 2015 (UTC)

POV?

I'm at a loss to understand how one word on the miniscule scale of the Farman raid on Berlin is "POV-pushing". Anybody who has bothered to look at the scale of any bombing mission on any city should realize one bomber has a trivial effect. "Non-negligible"? Compared to what? To not being bombed at all, yes; to being bombed by Bomber Command in 1944, it's a joke. The Doolittle mission against Tokyo dropped 16 tons of bombs, & it's considered insignificant in its actual effect. Elevating this attack to an exalted status simply for being first (or being French, which, judging by the source, is probable) is POV--& unwarranted. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 11:21, 2 August 2015 (UTC)

It should not even be a debate : your point of view is not neutral and unsourced, the current version is sourced and neutral (you're lying when you say the current version, which is purely factual, elevates this attack to an "exalted status"). Blaue Max (talk) 19:12, 2 August 2015 (UTC)

"should not even be a debate"? Sourced POV is still POV, & saying it's not a minor nuisance attack is certainly POV, sourced or otherwise. You want it in, show me why it's not POV. Show me how an attack by a single aircraft does anything but trivial damage. Show me one source that isn't French, & without an axe to grind, that says such a minor attack is anything but a footnote. My view is the common view in historiography: this sort of thing is a nuisance raid, nothing more. Yours is the one that's contrary to the mainstream. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 19:31, 2 August 2015 (UTC)

The current version is sourced and is not POV as it does not make any comment about the importance of the attack, it's purely factual. Your point of view is not neutral and is in conflict with the provided source (whether it is a French source or not is not a valid argument), your personal opinion on the subject has no reason to be included. "Show me one source that isn't French, & without an axe to grind, that says such a minor attack is anything but a footnote": Ok, click here. Blaue Max (talk) 20:36, 2 August 2015 (UTC)

♠"epic and courageous" doesn't equate with "effective" or "consequential". It wasn't. How did this, in the slightest way, affect the course of the war? It didn't.

♠Notice, I am not opposing inclusion of the mission; its historical significance isn't in dispute. Only its influence. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 21:31, 2 August 2015 (UTC)

Nobody says that this raid devastated Berlin, I never add any POV exalting this attack, I just wrote a factual sentence: "A French Farman bomber was the first Allied bomber to raid Berlin with 2,8 tons of bomb". That's very good the way it is. No need to burden the article with (unsourced) POV such as "mere" or even with sourced POV like "non-negligible", "epic" or "courageous". I don't understand why you want to push your unsourced opinion about it... This book presents the attack in a very factual manner and we should inspire ourselves from it. Blaue Max (talk) 21:51, 2 August 2015 (UTC)

"I never add any POV exalting this attack" You're removing any comment at all on how insignificant it is. That is POV, too, whether you like it or not. There's a difference between "analysis" & "bias". Clearly you don't know what it is. And you were the one putting up the source defending your desire to put it in, defending its significance beyond merely being first. So, why don't we do this? Take out any reference to it at all, because one lousy aircraft doesn't amount to more than a token attack in the first place. You want it in? Show how it's more than that. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 01:46, 3 August 2015 (UTC)

I'm just removing unnecessary WikiUser's opinions, per WP:OR. The sentence was already present in the article when I added a source and the figures [6]. You have no valid arguments, you started by criticizing the French source and the fact that the sentence was exalting this attack. I brought English sources and showed you that the sentence was factual. I also proved that your personal opinion was in conflict with reliable sources. And now, short of argument, you're suggesting to remove the whole sentence... hours after you said the raid's historical significance was not in dispute... Removing sourced material could be considered as vandalism.Blaue Max (talk) 08:53, 3 August 2015 (UTC)

The article is "Strategic bombing during World War II", a raid by a single bomber is out of scope. It should not be in the article. (Hohum ^@) 17:16, 3 August 2015 (UTC)

Where should it be? Srnec (talk) 18:04, 3 August 2015 (UTC)

Some writers have deemed necessary to make a reference about it. The only place where it should be is here. Blaue Max (talk) 21:34, 4 August 2015 (UTC)

There's no rule which says it must be anywhere.Volunteer Marek (talk) 21:39, 4 August 2015 (UTC)

It satisfies Wikipedia rules of notability so it can be included. Blaue Max (talk) 21:43, 4 August 2015 (UTC)

No it doesn't. In the sense that "notability" is irrelevant here. Notability: "On Wikipedia, notability is a test used by editors to decide whether a given topic warrants its own article." Notability is about whether something deserves its own article. This is about the factoid simply being off-topic. Again, not every single bit of trivia belongs in an encyclopedia.Volunteer Marek (talk) 21:48, 4 August 2015 (UTC)

I would suggest that it deserves a sentence, in that it was the first Allied bombing attack on the German capital. It has some passing interest to the reader. However it should not be as WP:UNDUE as the latest edit is attempting to give it. Irondome (talk) 22:11, 4 August 2015 (UTC)

I agree that it deserves to be here. The point of my question was that it could be excluded everywhere on the grounds that it was really small, which we obviously don't want (it being the answer to a very typical question). So those who want it removed should tell us what article it does belong in if not an article on strategic bombing. It certainly wasn't a tactical bombardment. Srnec (talk) 23:23, 4 August 2015 (UTC)

I believe it is out of WP:Scope for this article on Strategic Bombing in WWII to include an attack by a single bomber. It's trivia. I could live with a single short non WP:Peacock sentence though. (Hohum ^@) 23:44, 4 August 2015 (UTC)

I would suggest a return to the original, short and bland sentence with the original sourcing. Allied response as a section heading I would support in addition. It does no harm to the article, and is not undue as it would stand. But certainly no more than that. I would suggest that it is not out of scope, as it was a strategic raid, bombing an enemy capital, even if it was on the smallest conceivable scale. Thoughts on this compromise? Irondome (talk) 23:54, 4 August 2015 (UTC)

Allowing an enemy bomber to hit your capital city is a spectacular event as far as its impact on the people and the leaders of the city. Recall an episode in 1987 when Mathias Rust flying alone from Finland landed his small plane in Red Square in front of the Kremlin. (without bombs)--Gorbachev purged the Soviet leadership. It proves a failure of air defense at the highest levels. The Doolittle raid on Tokyo radically changed Japanese policy. Rjensen (talk) 03:01, 5 August 2015 (UTC)

Maybe so, but this particular bombing had a negligible impact. The first British bombing of Berlin had far more propaganda value.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 03:51, 5 August 2015 (UTC)

I fail to understand how the first air raid on Berlin could be considered as trivia, we're not talking about a South Park episode here, but a well known historical event. A single sentence, that meets all criteria of verifiability and notability, does not give undue weight to this event and shouldn't be removed on the grounds that it burdens the article.... Blaue Max (talk) 08:20, 5 August 2015 (UTC)

It's trivia because it was unimportant. I support Irondome's suggestion. (Hohum ^@) 18:02, 5 August 2015 (UTC)

We know what you think, because you've stated it again and again. You say you can live with one sentence. Well what was wrong with the one sentence we had? Srnec (talk) 22:53, 5 August 2015 (UTC)

It is not a question of whether I can live with it, it is a question of whether other colleagues can. We need a majority viewpoint here. I would trim the wording in any event. Irondome (talk) 22:59, 5 August 2015 (UTC)

I propose on the night of the 7/8th June a single French F.223 (Link F.223) aircraft bombed Berlin, the first recorded Allied attack on the German capital. This was in retaliation for a German attack on Paris on the (give precise date). No more, no less. "Furthermore", and giving the weight of bombload dropped gives it a rather desperate air. My wording is accurate and dignified, by being understated. Irondome (talk) 23:12, 5 August 2015 (UTC)

I agree with Irondome. (but the first recorded Allied attack should be replaced with the first Allied attack). No one suggests there were mystery air raids not in the records. Rjensen (talk) 01:32, 6 August 2015 (UTC)

I agree with Irondome's suggestion and Rjensen's comment. The precise date of the German attack on Paris was 3 June 1940 Blaue Max (talk) 08:13, 6 August 2015 (UTC)

Agree with Rjenson's suggested changes. Thanks for providing the date, Blaue Max. Any more supports? I think we can wrap this up amicably colleagues, and fast. Irondome (talk) 12:14, 6 August 2015 (UTC)

I agree with the wording. (Hohum ^@) 17:30, 6 August 2015 (UTC)

References

• Done. Used consensual wording. Thanks colleagues Irondome (talk) 21:22, 6 August 2015 (UTC)

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Nuclear Bombing

I changed the words "a wing of B-29 bombers" to reflect the actual number used. Whoever wrote that doesn't know what a wing of bombers is. Hildenja (talk) 15:44, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

Accurate?

"Before World War II began, advances in aviation made groups of bombers capable of devastating cities. The new aircraft flew high enough that anti-aircraft guns were largely impotent, and approximately as fast as the fighters that were in use at the time and would seek to intercept them. "

I'm not sure this uncited content is accurate. Before WW2, the combined bomber forces of all air forces in the world would barely have been capable of 'devastating' a city. Maximum efforts early in WW2 resulted in fairly limited damage. It seems to me it was only in the second half of the war that bombers were big enough, numerous enough and effective enough to devastate a city. Of course the word 'devastate' is doing a lot of work here.

Also, I imagine a lot of WW2 aircrew would have been very pleased to learn that their aircraft were largely immune to flak and were as fast as enemy fighters.

Should we perhaps re-word this paragraph to tone it down a bit? DMorpheus2 (talk) 18:39, 19 August 2016 (UTC)

it needs to be reworked. Watch the dates tho-- the light AA guns used in 1939 did little damage. The bombing of Warsaw & Rotterdam in 1939-40 did meet expectations. Rjensen (talk) 18:55, 19 August 2016 (UTC)

The original claim specifically was that the flak of 1939 lacked the range to hit high flying bombers. Some early-war guns: German 88 (range 32,000 ft), British 3.7 inch (30,000 ft), soviet 85mm (34,000 ft). Wasn't 20-30,000 ft the typical heavy bomber altitude? I honestly do not know for sure but that sounds about in the ballpark.

The word 'devastate' is of course so vague as to be meaningless. Rotterdam took about 800-1,000 killed. I would not think that resulted in crippling losses to any industry nor would it destroy morale. Hiroshima, nagoya or Tokyo are of course at the other extreme....but they were all destroyed in 1945, by an air force that had massively better capabilities than anyone had in 1939.

Maybe we should figure out what we really mean here. My guess is that pre-war leaders *feared* that bombers had a lot more power than they really did, and that early-war bombing efforts had for the most part (not all but most) poor results. That changed rapidly so that by 1945, but no earlier, an air force really could win a war single-handedly, just as they'd been claiming in the 1930s. DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:16, 19 August 2016 (UTC)

I took a stab at a quick fix but I suggest more work is needed to make cited statements about pre-war beliefs and the real capabilities of air forces in 1939. DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:19, 19 August 2016 (UTC)

The "advances" referred to here must be aircraft such as the B-17 Flying Fortress, which flew very high and fast. However, there were not many of them made. The concepts were proven, but the numbers were not there yet. Binksternet (talk) 19:22, 19 August 2016 (UTC)

I'm pinging Jim Jim.henderson as he made the initial edit, for any insights he may have on this. My 2p at wording:

• Before World War II began, the perception of strategic bombing in the public mind tended to over-estimate offensive bomber capabilities and to underestimate the power of defensive weapons, such as the new generation of monoplane fighters being rapidly introduced by the leading powers, heavy anti-aircraft artillery and the rapid development of Radar, which was completely unknown to the public. Bombers tended to be most efficient used en masse during daylight raids, and when air superiority had already been gained. I think we can source that sufficiently. Irondome (talk) 19:34, 19 August 2016 (UTC)

Binksternet, right, aircraft such as the B-17 existed but only a few dozen were in service. Planes such as the B-24, Lancaster or B-29 didn't yet exist. The Red Air force's heavy bomber units were a joke and the Germans had lots of mediums but no heavies. I don't know what the French had.....

So I don't think any air force in the world in 1939 could really devastate a city for any useful definition of the word 'devastate'. As late as late 1943, the USAAF had trouble crippling single large installations such as Ploesti, and hadn't touched Japan yet. The concept *existed* but was not proven till 1944-45.

I am sure my small edit can be improved dramatically; I just wanted to get something minimally accurate in there to start. DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:38, 19 August 2016 (UTC)

Drat; I hate it when my haste puts me up against more precise minds than mine. Irondome looks best among the suggestions made thus far. Fortunately, real world commitments in the next couple days will prevent me from getting into much more trouble by interfering with what seems like progress towards making the proper distinctions. Umm, Chamberlain's remark was in 1932, when the public had no clue of rapid technical developments that the PM perhaps ought to have been able to evaluate. Or not. Jim.henderson (talk) 19:48, 19 August 2016 (UTC)

Interceptor_aircraft#History may enlighten. Jim.henderson (talk) 00:11, 20 August 2016 (UTC)

United Kingdom, number of airmen lost in Europe

The infobox states that United Kingdom alone lost 160,000 airmen in Europe. Is this really correct? I have seen the number before, but only for United Kingdom and United States combined. /EriFr (talk) 20:47, 12 February 2017 (UTC)

RAF Bomber Command lost around 55,000 aircrew in the bombing of Germany. That figure does not include Fighter Command or Coastal Command, and the 160,000 figure seems rather high. I suspect the correct figure for all RAF aircrew losses would be something like 60,000 so the quoted figure may just be a typo. The corresponding figure for the US was IIRC around 20-30,000. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.100.238 (talk) 11:02, 16 March 2017 (UTC)

Rotterdam revisionism

I have removed these sentences:

'Furthermore, the bombing was against well-defined targets, albeit in the middle of the city, and would have assisted the advancing German Army'

well defined as in every house in the area?

'In legal terms, the attack was performed against a defended part of a city vital for the military objectives and in the front-line, and the bombing respected Article 25 to 27 of the Hague Conventions on Land Warfare.[1]'

The Hague convention was held before bombers even existed. It is hard to imagine that this applies here.

This reeks of revisionism. The fact that the Germans threatened to bomb Utrecht goes directly against these two statements. And reveals their real intentions was not to destroy specific military targets, but rather intimidation.

The reason why Rotterdam was bombed is simple The schlieffen plan needed to be executed as quickly as possible. And the Gemans needed to get to Paris. Destroying a city would send a clear message to others and aid their advance. Rotterdam had the best port facilities in Europe it needed to be captured or destroyed in the first days of operation fall gelb or the allies might be able to use it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.172.137.53 (talk) 02:24, 28 December 2016 (UTC)

However I may agree with your position on potential "revisionism", I must ask that the material stay for the present until a discussion can develop and consensus among colleagues reached. This is part of the WP:BRD process, which although not a policy is considered best practice on WP. The material you have issues with is sourced, and we need to discuss it's reliability before removing it. This will require a discussion. I am sure you understand that we must go by procedure and examine the evidence first. Regards Irondome (talk) 02:33, 28 December 2016 (UTC)

In addition, I would suggest you initially check out Aerial bombardment and international law#International law up to 1945 which indicates what a legal and ethical morass this period was. Irondome (talk) 03:02, 28 December 2016 (UTC)

Thanks for the reply. I took a quick look at the relevant wikipedia articles of the Hague convention and the article on the Rotterdam blitz itself. Based on them I seriously doubt the sources used in those sentences. Article 27 of the Hague convention seems to be applied way to liberally by the sources. The Germans decided to carpet bomb instead of using Stukas and flattened many monuments which is specified in no. 27. This can be attested by the other sources in the Rotterdam blitz article. But even more amazingly the wikipedia article you have linked to even specifies the Rotterdam blitz as one of the raids in which the treaty was dishonored.

As horrible as it seems today, the indiscriminate bombing of cities was legal at the time of World War II. Attacks on virtually any city met the very lax criteria set by international law at the time and, from memory, no Axis military commanders were prosecuted for ordering or conducting such attacks after the war. Even critics of attacks on cities such as Dresden and the use of the atomic bombs generally concede that these operations were legal: their argument is that they are morally indefensible as the costs far outweighed any military or other benefits. Deliberate air attacks on civilian areas became illegal following changes to the laws of warfare in the years after World War II. Nick-D (talk) 22:54, 29 December 2016 (UTC)

it was legal to bomb defended cities. It was only illegal to bomb undefended ones.

"Defended" means in-effect anti-aircraft guns, fighters, barrage balloons, etc., and not whether a friendly army is fighting for the city on the ground. In other words, the defences must impose some element of risk on the attackers attempting to bomb the city for the bombing to be legal, i.e., the city must be in a position to fight back directly against the bombers and pose some real and credible risk of loss-of-life to the aircrews.

Generally, a few troops on the ground shooting at the bombers with rifles and light machine guns wouldn't count as the city being 'defended' for the purposes of the various Conventions. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.100.238 (talk) 11:28, 16 March 2017 (UTC)

Dates for stratigic bombing of Japan

The lead sentence for this section stated that bombing occurred from 1942 to 1945. While true, this is very misleading, as described in the detailed subsections. There was a single raid (Doolittle raid) in 1942, and then ineffective raids from Chinese airfields in June to December 1944. Thus, the enormous damage almost all occurred in in January to August, 1945, less than eight months rather than the 4-years implied by the old wording. I did not add references here because this is a summary of the rest of the section, which is referenced. -Arch dude (talk) 01:51, 17 August 2017 (UTC)

Trouble verifying the following claims about Poland

They sound plausible, but I can't verify the two claims: 1) "Polish historians Paweł Puzio and Ryszard Jasiński, had no targetable industry and no military units were stationed there, the bombing of Frampol has been described as an experiment to test the German tactics and weapons effectiveness." and 2) "In his book, Eyes on the Sky, Wolfgang Schreyer wrote". First, and more worryingly, I can't even find out that such historians exist or that people with such names (Paweł Puzio and Ryszard Jasiński) wrote a book about Frampol. I checked worldcat, and the only hit for Puzio is a co-authored historical book on World War I, and as for Jasinski, he has several books about agriculture. Second, the book by Schreyer cited is likely only available in German (Augen am Himmel, [7]), so the translation of the title is OR, and the quote doesn't give page numbers). --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here} 05:17, 15 May 2018 (UTC)

PS. I was able to trace the sources for 1) based on pl wiki. Jasinski's is mentioned in [8] and described as a 'regional historian'; I can't find any bio of his and he does not seem to be an academic; he is the co-author of a book on Frampol (worldcat) published by a "Frampol Friends Society" (so, effectively self-published, likely). Puzio is a journalist, an author of this article ([9]) in Polish local newspaper pl:Dziennik Wschodni. He does not cite any academic sources in his article. I think we need better claims than a journalist and an amateur historian. --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here} 05:31, 15 May 2018 (UTC)

The Polish page quotes Norman Davies and a German writer.Xx236 (talk) 08:42, 23 July 2018 (UTC)

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Strategic bombers as bait

When General Curtiss LeMay took over air operations, he re-ordered priority from fighters defending bombers to eliminating Nazi fighters That is seeking air superiority. Fighters were sent before and after bomber groups because even superior German fighters were vulnerable on landing and takeoff (Nazi fighters had limited range, aka loiter time). Shjacks45 (talk) 05:29, 11 November 2019 (UTC)

Hinchliffe references don't point to a book

Kurfurst added some Hinchliffe references in 2009, but none of the citations were ever complete. It's not clear which Hinchliffe book was the source.

What can be done about this? Binksternet (talk) 09:03, 24 June 2020 (UTC)

Strip them out, replace with 'cite needed'. it's the only way to be sure we're not introducing errors.GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:04, 24 June 2020 (UTC)

Done. Binksternet (talk) 16:50, 24 June 2020 (UTC)

Workers are civilians

" workers' and civilian housing, and industrial districts in enemy territory during World War II," it says in the introductory paragraph. This is redundant. Workers' housing is civilian housing even if it were, say, dormitories attached to munitions factories -- a claim which is not being made here.

This whole article needs a more balanced treatment of Allied terror-bombing aimed at German civilians. I'm not currently up to date on the subject, but I remember reading plausible RAND corporation stuff on it back in the 1960s. Did Churchill believe that the German bombing of Poland and Holland in 1939 legalized Allied area bombing of German cities? What was and is the law on the topic? I don't know, and I'd like to.

David Lloyd-Jones (talk) 02:35, 16 September 2020 (UTC)

Bogus Statistic

". The Luftwaffe was blamed for not warding off the attacks and confidence in the Nazi regime fell by 14 percent."

Morale is not numerable and so cannot be percenticized. ("percentilificated"? 😎🤦‍♂️) Even claims of it having a direction, and of that direction being believably identified, improving or declining, are speculative, personal, and entirely subjective.

The reports in which Germans claim after the fact to have been demoralized are meaningless without context. I am perfectly willing to believe unattributed, context-free, claims that a housewife was afraid of bombers. If she is said to have added that this made her a less enthusiastic Nazi I think anybody would want some evidence. Sadly, it is in the interest of both the bombers and the bombed to agree that such loss of blood-lust, jingoism, and worship of Hitler came about. Both sides naturally feel that their enemies' agreement strengthens their cases.

David Lloyd-Jones (talk) 02:51, 16 September 2020 (UTC)

Not according to Freeman Dyson

No effort to examine the effects of bombing was ever made.

I've listened to many hours of conversation with Freeman Dyson, some of this concerning his time as a young mathematical prodigy—under the guidance of C. P. Snow—calculating the cost–benefit of every aspect of the British bombing campaign.

The main tenor of his observations: the great secret of the war was that mass bombs dropped from the air almost never hit anything, Pearl Harbor being the one notable exception, an exception that induced excessive excitement for the strategy forever afterward. Sometimes you got "lucky" due to air conditions and burned an entire city down (Hamburg, Dresden).

Hamburg had been a viable military target, associated with U-boat production.

Here are a few of my notes concerning Dresden.

• A Glorious Accident (5 of 7) Freeman Dyson: In praise of diversity — uploaded 30 August 2016

Dresden. February 1945. German defenses largely disintegrated. We could destroy whatever we wished.

Dresden for us was nothing special, it wasn't a particularly heavy attack, just one of many. We knew Dresden was a historical city, but that was true of many other places, and it wasn't unusual.

They didn't expect the firestorm. There were only two in the war, and it probably depended on local weather conditions.

Dresden was clearly wanton destruction, happened so late in the war, had no impact on the outcome of the war. None of these attacks by this point had any point. Mainly bureaucratic inertia.

In any case, extremely smart people within this group performed extremely detailed calculations of many detailed aspects of the bombing campaign.

I recall that Dyson was rather dismissive of the effectiveness of this program toward the end, in cost–benefit terms. What's annoying about Dyson is that he tends to swoop in, make a precise, but limited comment and then swoop out again. Whatever he actually says is usually gold, but he mainly delivers this gold in extremely tiny flecks.

What the statement we presently have in the article probably amounts to: no august committee was convened to generate a public report after the fact.

Dyson also said that since the bombing itself (by the end) was accomplishing so little of strategic importance, he mainly worked on how to accomplish these meager outcomes with the least possible loss of British aviators and servicemen. — MaxEnt 00:32, 28 November 2020 (UTC)

I agree that this is completely wrong. David Bensusan-Butt was given responsibility for a major and very damning examination of the efficiency of RAF bombing in Germany at the end of 1941 (this is addressed in Todman, Britain's War, vol 1). We even have an article on the Butt Report. —Brigade Piron (talk) 12:10, 7 December 2020 (UTC)

References

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