Talk:Project 112

Untitled

This is a work in progress. I intend to add references and further information as I update and flesh out the article. Baseproduct (talk) 16:12, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

References

All the references used in September 2012 were moved by DoD in November. the OLD link is here: http://web.archive.org/web/20101110200038/http://fhp.osd.mil/CBexposures/shad.jsp Johnvr4 (talk) 14:33, 23 December 2012 (UTC)

To combine SHAD under Project 112?

I think Project 112 (currently a Stub-Class entry) should be the main article for Project SHAD (currently a citation-lacking start-class article). Project SHAD took place under Project 112 and all of the records for SHAD are inseparable from Project 112. Therefore, Project SHAD should point to Project 112 as the main article.-JohnVR4 72.188.73.163 (talk) 03:01, 7 September 2012 (UTC)

eventually yes but right now there are reasons to keep them distinct. As one example, the SHAD II medical study and the evidence that not all of the information has not been released or properly investigated nor determined by DoD as part of either SHAD or 112. Johnvr4 (talk) 14:39, 23 December 2012 (UTC)

Not fully. SHAD is notable enough by itself with book-type coverage like Long-Term Health Effects of Participation in Project SHAD ISBN 0309102103. But a WP:SUMMARY should be included in this article. Also, the two editors having a dialogue above appear to be the same person based on [1]. 86.121.18.17 (talk) 23:52, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

It might be time.Johnvr4 (talk) 19:02, 25 April 2014 (UTC)

to do

under tests

• add external link / chart linking to or displaying .PDF fact sheet info from [url=http://fhp.osd.mil/CBexposures/factSheets.jsp] "Project 112/SHAD Fact Sheets"

• Images

72.188.73.163 (talk) 02:03, 12 September 2012 (UTC)

Incomplete/unencyclopaedic writing

This article is evidently incomplete, and thus should have been posted in the userspace, rather than in the mainspace where fully-fledged articles belong. Of course, no article is ever entirely "complete", but there are section headers here with no subsequent content. While I'm not sure how long this has been the case, nevertheless this should be rectified - I myself won't step in as I know nothing about this topic and it appears to a work in progress under the auspices of a specific user. I won't get in their way! :) Additionally, the style is rather weak in some passages, for example, this rhetorical question: "Specifically, would they produce disorganizing and disruptive effects on military units?", this unnecessary disclaimer: "Precise information on the number of tests, experiments, and participants is not available and the exact number of veterans exposed will probably never be known.", etc. etc. There are more, but I'm in a hurry. I might return later and endeavour to alter the language, but lack of expertise in the field might be more of a hindrance than it might first appear... Peace. Psychonavigation (talk) 05:06, 15 November 2012 (UTC)

"Precise information on the number of tests, experiments, and participants is not available and the exact number of veterans exposed will probably never be known." it was a direct quote from an An Overview on Cold War Era Programs (congressional testimony to the GAO) The entry and this subject should be approached with that statement in mind. It is accurate and there is good reason it was there. The fact sheets provided by DoD are incomplete and very short on details. Please don't alter it, if you don't understand it.Johnvr4 (talk) 22:15, 12 January 2014 (UTC)

Also note that when the GAO report I mentioned above was written in 1994, the names Project 112 and SHAD were still classified. The report describes some of the tests but not the actual name of the test or the umbrella program (or department) it fell under.Johnvr4 (talk) 18:45, 25 April 2014 (UTC)

Relevance of the putative Agent Orange tests in Okinawa

Even assuming they did happen (and are currently still being the subject of a coverup by US gov), two things are clear:

• some were probably conducted before Project 112 even began, cf. Harris quote, from which a sentence had been conveniently left out, now corrected. And
• no reliable sources relate defoliant tests somewhere else to Project 112 activities, even in some roundabout way. Defoliants like Agent Orange were not considered CW by the US at the time.

So while the topic of Agent Orange tests or use in Okinawa is surely an interesting one, and perhaps deserving its own Wikipedia article, it seems tenuously related to Project 112 based on the current sources. Time will tell, I guess. 86.121.18.17 (talk) 00:43, 20 June 2013 (UTC)

There's a beefy academic book about Agent Orange, The History, Use, Disposition and Environmental Fate of Agent Orange (2009), ISBN 0387874860, which does mention that certain R&D aspects were contracted to Fort Detrick under Project AGILE both before and after the Kennedy administration took over (pp. 26-27). Page 199 in that book also has a list of project names under which tests of Orange were made; initially that was Project AGILE, code names used later were much more cryptic, e.g. 2525W5. That book never mentions Project 112 anywhere, so the relation of the latter to defoliants appears very marginal if one existed at all. 86.121.18.17 (talk) 18:13, 20 June 2013 (UTC)

Harris indicates Rice blast in Okinawa in 1960 and defoliants came after. Other sources say the Rice blast research in 1960 and after was ongoing and that both a chemical and biological anti-crop agent for rice were standardized agents in 1957- so it's obvious some of this research came before PJ 112 ever started or contracts began for 1000 more chemical formulations that came after the Okinawa research.

Rice Blast was being grown not too far from the Wheat stem rust during project 112.

And less volatile Modified Herbicide Orange (Orange II) was a line item like Project 112 was. The source below is full of those cryptic project numbers which I have not even tried to sort out. Government and DoD have long argued the semantics of the herbicide program. It came from Ft. Detrick. It is still a controversy as to whether large scale use of this herbicide as a chemical or biological agent and I think it is the very reason they started distinguishing anti-crop agents, riot control agents and herbicides from chemical or biological agents.

The author Alvin Young as well as the aforementioned book has documented problems with facts and quotes as well as his sources of funding. He is a paid consultant for DoD, DOW chemical, Monsanto. See:Dr. Orange He is no expert on Project 112 and he pretty much skips crop agents. Anticrop Agent LNX is the equivalent of Agent Orange. It contained 50% Agent LNA plus 50% agent LNB.

"Time has told" I guess.

• Exclusive: Red Hat’s lethal Okinawa smokescreen
• U.S. Army tested biological weapons in Okinawa: Rice fungus released in at least two sites in early 1960s, documents show

Johnvr4 (talk) 22:29, 12 January 2014 (UTC)

Relevance of Okinawa or chemical herbicides to Project 112

Rocky Mountain Arsenal Summary of Major Events and Problems (Fiscal Year 1961-62, June 1962)

• Page 9 Project 112
• Page 124 112 and BZ
• Page 136 112 and drones
• Page 132 Anti Crop on Okinawa (Factories of Death cited Reference)
• Page 159 Nov. 1961, provide defoliant and other chemicals for emergency use SE asia
• Page 187 result of work was elimination of volatile herbicides (this is Modified Agent orange or Orange II)

Johnvr4 (talk) 17:10, 11 October 2013 (UTC)

Harris' source

As it sometimes happens with books that summarize events outside their main focus, Harris' book used a newspaper as source for the rather vague claim that: "These sites were located both in the continental United States and in foreign countries. The tests conducted there were aimed at both human, animal, and plant reaction to BW. It is known that tests were undertaken in Cairo, Egypt, Liberia, in South Korea, and in Japan’s satellite province of Okinawa in 1961, or earlier". His source for that was New York Times, 6 February 1989, II, p. 9. 86.121.18.17 (talk) 19:06, 20 June 2013 (UTC)

The above statement is absolutely incorrect information. Yes he used the NYT article as a reference and cited it in his book but NYT was not the basis of the Okinawa information. NYT was the source of Cairo, Egypt, Liberia, and South Korea. I have read both his book and the US Government sources and the article. NYT was not the sole source for Harris' statement and the Okinawa part came from other primary U.S. Bio-warfare program sources of the day which he also cites-see below. I explain the Okinawa link to Project 112 in a draft entry I am writing. sandbox draft

Okinawa as a test site is mentioned on Page 131 of RMA Summary History 1961-62

It states

During FY 1961 research on anticrop agents proceeded at the pace dictated by the limited resources available. Field tests for stem rust of wheat and rice blast disease were begun at several states in the Midwest and South U.S. and in Okinawa with partial success and the accumulation of useful data. Stripe rust of wheat was also under investigation, and the usual screening program for chemical anticrop agents was continued. At the outset of FY1962 an important increase in emphasis in this field for technical advice on the conduct of the defoliation and anticrop activities in Southeast Asia. In addition to work done in that theater, the screening program for chemical defoliants was greatly accelerated. By FY 1962 contracts for synthesis and testing of a thousand chemical defoliants were in the process of negotiation.[16] A gradual increase in the scope of the rest of the anticrop program accompanied this development. Large scale greenhouse experiments on stripe rust of wheat yielded considerable information on the degree of crop injury in relation to the time and number of inoculations. Both field tests and process research were maintained for the agent of rice blast disease. A new investigation to find the pathogen suitable for use against the opium poppy was begun in the third quarter of financial year 1962.

Worth mentioning is this item discussing Fort Detricks biological crop destruction research on Okinawa (another Army report states these tests at 4 sites led to the use of herbicide agents for crop destruction. from: Thomas H. Barksdale; Marian W. Jones (June 1965). Technical Report 60: Rice Blast Epiphypology (U) (Report). U.S. Army. Retrieved April 20, 2013. (this isn't an exact quote but it was is the source of the information)

Although use of a chemical or biological agents to destroy rice was contemplated during World War II, the research gained on rice blast fungus from the field and laboratory experiments conducted in Okinawa and Florida by Fort Detrick's Crops division, Directorate of Biological Research; and Biomathematics division, Directorate of Technical services; increased the knowledge required to use this crop disease a strategic weapon of war and limit an enemy's food supply. The focus of this research was sources of inoculum and the minimum amount required to cause the disease, spore dispersal, meteorological and other conditions required for establishment of infection and disease buildup, spread, yield reduction, control measures, and the present ability to predict disease outbreak, buildup, and yield losses.[88]"

The research was conducted in other states at this time and even prior to 112. The was another anti-plant test very much like the one in Okinawa. When the same Anti-plant research was conducted in Florida as 69-75 in 1968 near Yeehaw Junction, FL, DoD included it in Project 112. Click on test 69-75 http://mcm.fhpr.osd.mil/cb_exposures/project112_shad/shadfactsheets.aspx

Factories of Death Factories of death Page 232 states:

PROJECT 112

Upon taking office in January 1961, President John F. Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, initiated a survey of Defense Department projects that would give him an understanding of the United States military capability. Approximately 150 studies were undertaken. One, code name, “Project 112,” was designed to evaluate CW and BW potential as weapons for “use as strategic weapons and for limited war applications.”51 McNamara directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider CW and BW as a possible “alternative to nuclear weapons.” The Joint Chiefs, in turn, established a task force that ultimately recommended a three pronged program of research and development.52 One key component of the lengthy report was a Project 112 requirement that the military establish a “Joint Task Force to undertake extra continental testing of chemical and biological agents.” The Joint Chiefs accepted the recommendation, and established, under Army responsibility, a new command in spring 1962 to be known as the Deseret Test Center. The Center was located at Fort Douglas in Salt Lake City, Utah, but received administrative support from Dugway Proving Grounds, 83 miles to the west. Since the tests were to be designed to assist all three military branches (Army, Navy, and Air Force), the Deseret Test Center was funded by contributions of the three services. Its basic mission, as outlined by a Chemical Corps directive of 28May 1962, was to prepare and conduct extra continental tests to assess chemical and biological weapons and defense systems, both by providing supporting data for research and development and by establishing a basis for the operational and logistic concepts needed for the employment of these systems.53 The test program, which began in fall 1962 and which was funded at least through fiscal year 1963, was considered by the Chemical Corps to be “an ambitious one.” The tests were designed to cover “not only trials at sea, but Arctic and tropical environmental tests as well.”54 The tests, presumably, were conducted at what research officers designated, but did not name, “satellite sites.”55 These sites were located both in the continental United States and in foreign countries. The tests conducted there were aimed at both human, animal, and plant reaction to BW. It is known that tests were undertaken in Cairo, Egypt, Liberia, in South Korea, and in Japan’s satellite province of Okinawa in 1961, or earlier.56 This was at least one year prior to the creation of Project 112. The Okinawa anti-crop research project may lend some insight to the larger projects 112 sponsored. BW experts in Okinawa and “at several sites in the midwest and south” conducted in 1961 “field tests” for wheat rust and rice blast disease. These tests met with “partial success” in the gathering of data, and led, therefore, to a significant increase in research dollars in fiscal year 1962 to conduct additional research in these areas. The money was devoted largely to developing “technical advice on the conduct of defoliation and anticrop activities in Southeast Asia.”57 By the end of fiscal year 1962, the Chemical Corps had let or were negotiating contracts for over one thousand chemical defoliants.58 The Okinawa tests evidently were fruitful.59

References Harris cites:

• 51 Summary of Major Events and Problems, United States Army Chemical Corps.(U), Fiscal Years 1961–1962 (US Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland, 1962), p. 9.
• 52 ibid., pp. 9–12.
• 53 ibid., p. 15.
• 54 ibid., p. 16.
• 55 US Army Rocky Mountain Arsenal Semi-Annual Historical Report,1 July 1963 through 31 December 1963, (Denver, Colorado), p. 6.
• 56 New York Times, 6 February 1989, II, p. 9.
• 57 Summary of Major Events, pp. 131–132.
• 58 ibid.
• 59 For a thoughtful discussion of the risks in conducting defensive BW research, see Cole, Leonard A., “Risk and Biological Defense Research,”Physicians for Social Responsibility, March 1992, vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 40–50.

Thus, Harris' listed sources for the information were:

• New York Times, 6 February 1989, II, p. 9.

• Summary of Major Events and Problems, United States Army Chemical Corps.(U), Fiscal Years 1961–1962 (US Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland, 1962) http://rockymountainarsenalarchive.wordpress.com/2011/07/09/summarymajorevents/ or http://www.healthycitizens.com/army%20chem%20corp%20196162.PDF (missing pages)

• US Army Rocky Mountain Arsenal Semi-Annual Historical Report, 1 July 1963 through 31 December 1963, (Denver, Colorado)

Johnvr4 (talk) 17:31, 11 October 2013 (UTC)

I don't understand a sentence

Hello. I'm French, now translating this article to French. I don't understand the and in the sentence "The Joint Chiefs established a Joint Task Force that recommended and a five-year plan to be conducted in three phases". (At the beguinning of Top-level directives. Being not an native English speaker, I don't dare deleting this apparently useless and. Thanks. --Jojodesbatignoles (talk) 12:56, 9 August 2015 (UTC) It's a typo. Remove the 'and'. 214.27.9.201 (talk) 13:17, 10 November 2015 (UTC)

Intelligence agency / CIA link

• Project MKULTRA APPENDIX A, XVII. Testing And Use Of Chemical And Biological Agents By The Intelligence Community (quick link for quote. there are RSs out there)

• in the mid-1970s the Central Intelligence Agency acknowledged that it had developed and field tested methods for conducting covert attacks that could cause severe crop damage.

Jonathan Ban (2000). Agricultural Biological Warfare: An Overview. Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute. Retrieved 25 April 2013. 

Johnvr4 (talk) 15:35, 15 December 2016 (UTC)

External links modified (January 2018)

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

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• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20130726023840/http://mcm.dhhq.health.mil/cb_exposures/project112_shad/shad.aspx to http://mcm.dhhq.health.mil/cb_exposures/project112_shad/shad.aspx
• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20140102195901/http://www.olmstedfoundation.org/olmsted/data/attachments/e20080613.pdf to http://www.olmstedfoundation.org/olmsted/data/attachments/e20080613.pdf
• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20140102195901/http://www.olmstedfoundation.org/olmsted/data/attachments/e20080613.pdf to http://www.olmstedfoundation.org/olmsted/data/attachments/e20080613.pdf
• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20040203132434/http://www.healthycitizens.com/WarCrimesFull.pdf to http://www.healthycitizens.com/WarCrimesFull.pdf
• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20121207034317/http://mcm.dhhq.health.mil/cb_exposures/briefings_reports.aspx to http://mcm.dhhq.health.mil/cb_exposures/briefings_reports.aspx
• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20080408215505/http://www.deploymentlink.osd.mil/shad/index.jsp to http://www.deploymentlink.osd.mil/shad/index.jsp

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