Talk:Permissive action link

Additional Sources

• Article: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html — xaosflux ^Talk 23:59, 23 November 2007 (UTC)
• Another: http://www.cdi.org/blair/permissive-action-links.cfm — xaosflux ^Talk 00:02, 24 November 2007 (UTC)

UK

Perhaps this might be incorporated into the article: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/7097101.stm ? 88.148.207.23 21:25, 15 November 2007 (UTC)

• Done it! Although I'm biased I understand the MoD's point of view that PALs aren't effective. Those officers that are positioned to abuse such trust have been vetted and selected over a course of years. Furthermore they would be well placed to mis-appropriate a weapon even if it was fitted with a PAL.

Scruffy brit (talk) 11:48, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

Translating from featured article

• I am translating the PAL article on the German wikipedia into English. Please feel free to help clean up the language further and add more references and crosslinks. Bennyfactor (talk) 04:56, 1 April 2010 (UTC)

Minuteman III and Peacekeeper ICBMs

Minuteman III and Peacekeeper ICBMs were unique in that they did not employ a PAL. The used a different mechanism called the Secure Coded Device (SCD). The SCD was set using the 24-bit code sent in a valid Enable command. There where additional devices, CSDs, that also were part of the security chain. On top of this, the Reentry Vehicles (RVs) could not be armed if the Good Guidance discrete was not set to the proper state. The Good Guidance discrete was set by the MECA/IMU computer and guidance system when the missile was on an acceptable course.

The cryptographic components were changed a few years ago to newer equipment with a longer enable code, although trial and error of the SCD was never considered a viable threat due to the fact that all Launch Control Facilities (LCF) see any Enable command issued by a rogue LCF and the SCD, an electromechanical device, may not have been robust enough to withstand thousands of set operations. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.87.171.44 (talk) 19:29, 25 August 2010 (UTC)

There was considerable concern that in one of these countries the instructions of the civilian leadership could overrule the military.

? HughesJohn (talk) 10:43, 9 March 2011 (UTC)

• I understand how you see this might be ambiguous. I have clarified it. Bennyfactor (talk) 01:46, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

Permissive Action Link -- Bruce Blair

I don't think Blair's contention that the PAL was zeroed out until 1977 should stand as fact. It was rebutted by the USAF (January 2014, Foreign Policy website, "Air Force Swears: Our Nuke Launch Code Was Never ‘00000000.’"

I was a Minuteman II crew commander from 1970 to 1972, and I disagree with Blair; there was nothing in the crew checklist referring to checking for all zeros in the PAL. There are also some other problems with the technical details of his narrative.

Blair's contention has gained enough traction that I don't think it should be removed, but it should also be accompanied by the USAF denial. 121.163.188.1 (talk) 06:20, 19 November 2015 (UTC)

So do you feel that one person's reports should stand because they have gained popularity in media, despite anybody with actual missileering experience contradicting his claim? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2600:100F:B016:3D5B:394A:D44D:55EA:63F (talk) 09:54, 6 November 2016 (UTC)

I added some text quoting and citing the Foreign Policy article. 71.197.166.72 (talk) 01:20, 24 January 2017 (UTC)

External links modified

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Disputed, 2 man rule

I admit, I'm taking this info wholesale from the Gold Codes talk page Liastnir (talk) 22:10, 3 January 2018 (UTC)

22:09, 3 January 2018 (UTC) "This sentence is no longer valid

"A two-man rule applies, however: the National Command Authority comprising the president and Secretary of Defense must jointly authenticate the order to use nuclear weapons to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

The situation is complex so rather than edit the article right away I think I need to summarize what the situation is, then we can think about what to do about the article. The idea that it is a two-man rule stems back to this directive from 1971:

"The NCA consists only of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands." World-Wide Military Command and Control System, DoD Directive S-5100.30

This makes it pretty clear that the secretary of Defense could refuse to carry out Trump's command, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff could or the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands

But Perry, a former Secretary of Defense, so the very person who according to this theory should be able to stop the president from launching the nuclear weapons said he would not be in the loop of necessity, he said

“The order can go directly from the president to the Strategic Air Command. The Defense secretary is not necessarily in that loop,” Former Pentagon chief: Defense secretary couldn’t stop Trump if he wants nuclear war How is that possible? There's another DoD document that contradicts the first one that is more recent, from 2015. This is from: The President and the Bomb, Part III

"The President may direct the use of nuclear weapons through an execute order via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the combatant commanders and, ultimately, to the forces in the field exercising direct control of the weapons." And Perry is saying that too. So it seems that the Secretary of Defense is not in the loop after all. He or she would normally be consulted, but the president can bypass him.

If so - then it would be up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff - so the military - to refuse the order if Trump made some ill judged order to fire a nuclear weapon. At that point it is a military rather than a political decision to refuse the president’s order.

That's why many in Congress want to change this situation. See Take Away Trump's Power to Nuke First - ICAS

“Earlier this year Ted Lieu (D-CA) and Senator Ed Markey (D-MA) introduced the “Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2017,” which would do exactly that. The legislation requires a Congressional declaration of war before the commander-in-chief can initiate a first nuclear strike. While the president would retain the full authority to launch a nuclear counterattack, thus preserving the long-standing policy of mutually assured destruction (MAD), this legislation would significantly bolster global stability. Potential adversaries would be far less concerned about the prospect of an American surprise nuclear attack if doing so would require lengthy deliberation in the halls of Congress. In a crisis scenario, this removes a significant element of uncertainty, reducing the risk of a misunderstanding and conflict escalation.” Former Pentagon chief: Defense secretary couldn’t stop Trump if he wants nuclear war Those bills have stalled in Congress Don’t Count on the Cabinet to Stop a Trump-Ordered Nuclear Strike

So that’s where the autumn 2017 Senate hearing planned on Trump’s ability to authorize nuclear strike

WATCH: Senate committee holds hearing on president's ability to authorize nuclear weapons

The hearing starts 15 minutes in after other business.

It’s the first such since 1976, held out of concern about the level of authority a president has in view of Trump’s tweets about nuclear weapons. Senator Kane explained (1 : 10 into the hearing) that he is concerned that the president of US is so unstable, so volatile, and has a decision making process that is so quixotic that he might order a nuclear weapons strike that is wildly out of step with US national security interests.

They explained that a president can actually issue an order directly to the four star general in charge of launching the nuclear weapons, bypassing the defense secretary. The military responsibility to launch the weapons then lies with the general. Those below him in the command chain, those who launch the weapons, don’t know enough about what is going on to question the order.

He or she would however apply the test of whether it is legal. It would have to fulfill the tests of being necessary and proportional. And if not he would not only be able to refuse the order but would be required to do so. U.S. nuclear general says would resist 'illegal' Trump strike order

I did a summary of this hearing as a blog post Can Trump order a nuclear attack on civilians in North Korea in peace time without Congress approval? General Kehler says no.

That is my own summary so it is not a WP:RS but the hearing it summarizes is publicly available for anyone to listen to and we could transcribe / quote from it (I'm not sure if it would be a primary or secondary source, probably depend on the way in which it is used). Also, there are many articles about the hearing in the press so we could surely find one that counts as a WP:RS for wikipedia.

So, I think this sentence needs to be updated. But it would not be correct to just remove the bit about it being a two stage process without going into these matters of the right and indeed requirement of the general to disobey an illegal order, and something of the whole recent history of this situation. That's quite a major revision of this page. For now I have just added an inline disputed - discuss tag linking to this section on the talk page. Robert Walker (talk) 22:47, 23 December 2017 (UTC)

^ Jump up to: a b c Jeffrey Lewis (5 August 2016), "Our Nuclear Procedures Are Crazier Than Trump", Foreign Policy magazine, retrieved 5 November 2016 Jump up ^ Zbigniew Brzezinski (30 March 2012), "A Conversation with Zbigniew Brzezinski", Council on Foreign Relations, YouTube, retrieved 5 November 2016" — Preceding unsigned comment added by Liastnir (talk • contribs) 22:09, 3 January 2018 (UTC)

Laptop

I actually used to own the machine pictured! If memory serves it was a 386 with 387 co processor socket. Had 2MB RAM and a monochrome LCD with CCFL backlight. http://designblog.nzeldes.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/386-notebook1.jpg

Just thought I'd share that. Maybe it was used because custom silicon could be placed in the 387 or non standard RAM socket, containing the secret instructions and codes? Also supplementary memory wasn't out of the question.