Talk:Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact/Archive 5

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Neutrality and factual accuracy issue

Latest comment: 15 years ago14 comments3 people in discussion

To my opinion, the article do not meet neutrality and factual accuracy criteria. In gives undue weight to the Nazi-Soviet contact before late July, 1939 (the "German school"'s views). However, many scholars' opinion is directly opposite. For instance, Geoffrey Roberts states: "My own interpretation of the Soviet documents is well known: that Moscow neither responded to nor made any overtures to the Germans until the end of July 1939 at the earliest. The reason for this was that until summer 1939 Moscow was intent on a triple alliance with Britain and France. I have also described Soviet foreign policy in 1939 as passive, reactive, ad hoc, incompetent even."
According to Carley, "Soviet deceitfulness—though Stalin was certainly proficient in it—appears no worse than that of France and Great Britain."
To rectify the situation, the article should be re-arranged as follows.

The emphasis on the economic relations should be diminished. Some scholars (e.g. Overy) reasonably argued that "the short-term economic and social considerations played only the smallest part in Hitler's policy calculations"(Hitler's War and the German Economy: A Reinterpretation. Author(s): R. J. Overy. Source: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 35, No. 2 (May, 1982), pp. 272-291). From other hand, the Soviets were even less interested in economic collaboration with Germany than the Germans did. For instance, Ericson argued that "for if Germany was dependent on the USSR by 1939, the Soviets merely preferred working with Germany. The result was an economic relationship in which Stalin was in the driver's seat and drew out the negotiations to make sure he got a good deal. Before Prague and after the fall of France, the dynamic changed somewhat, but the Soviets still usually held the better cards." (Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1936-1941 Author(s): Edward E. Ericson, III Source: German Studies Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1998), pp. 263-283). Therefore, undue emphasis on economy gives undue weight to the "German school".
In the introduction, the economy paragraph should be either removed or dramatically reduced. By contrast, it should be clearly stated that although the relation between Soviet Russia and Weimar republis were generally good, a sharp turn occurred in 1933, when Nazi came to power.
The section telling about the negotiations themselves should be cleaned up of all events that can be interpreted ambiguously. As regards to German-Soviet contacts, the first document that unequivocally demonstrated the Soviet decision to initiate talks was the Molotov's telegram to the Soviet ambassador in 29 July 1939. It was the first document that authorized a Soviet official to establish a political dialogue with the German government on prospective political agreement. I think, it is quite clear that all previous real or alleged reverences towards Germany deserved no attention in that section, taking into account that full scale political negotiations were going in Moscow about the political and, possibly, military anti-German alliance.
All historical considerations should be moved into the "Post-war commentary regarding the motives of Stalin and Hitler" section. It probably makes sense to split it onto several sections, Another section should describe the Soviet motives, according to different historical schools ("from seeing the Soviets as far-sighted anti-Nazis, to seeing them as reluctant appeasers, as cautious expansionists, or as active aggressors and blackmailers."), and German motives ("capitalist aggressors, ideological fanatics, wily opportunists, or defensive practitioners of preventive war.").
The above proposal is equally relevant to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact negotiations article.
--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:33, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

1. Virtually every single thing stated in this number is incorrect. Almost without fail:

It is not the "German school" to discuss German-Soviet economic relations. You simply made this up after reading about the term "German school" in a Roberts article in a completely different context and then oddly accused another editor (me) of being within this term], which by the way has zero to do with the existence of economic talks or German raw materials crisis of World War II and before, which has been discussed at length, see Nazi–Soviet economic relations.
You cannot have more badly misrepresented these sources. For example, regarding Ericson alone, he has not only stated the opposite, but just to highlight how silly this utterly inaccurate this claim is, in 1999, Ericson wrote an entire book about it called "Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941". Therein includes:

--On Hitler's taking power, his plans to turn economically inward, and how this could destroy the vital German-Soviet economic relationship (by the way, economist Schacht was later thrown in a concentration camp, but it was for the July 20 plot)

(1935)"With Hitler renouncing the Treaty of Versailles and beginning official rearmament on March 16, 1935 the President of the Reichsbank had few other options to supply the expanding German war economy except to convert German trade to more of a barter system. If the Soviets stayed out, then other countries could pull back and the hole plan might fail. So Schacht wanted to press forward regardless of Brautigam's and others warnings that his demands could disrupt the vital German-Soviet economic relationship and that the 'New Plan" could even backfire if applied to the USSR."

-On the failed attempts in the mid-1930s reqarding this vital economic relationship:

(1936) "Despite the potential problems in the two recent economic treaties and the growing Soviet economic leverage over the Reich, German officials remained hopeful about the prospects for a renewed German-Soviet economic partnership. The new agreements had been successfully concluded, the Soviet Union still seemed interested in closer political ties, and Hjalmar Schacht had finally been converted to the view that expanded credits to the USSR were necessary if Germany wanted to receive more of the increasingly vital Soviet raw materials."

-Late Octobver 1938, Germany's building reliance:

Furthermore, despite the bloodless successes in Austria and Czechoslovakia, Germany's economic situation continued to deteriorate, and expanded trade with the USSR appeared increasingly vital for Germany. As a result of Germany's growing needs and the hope that Soviet desires to rebuild their military would mean an increased demand for German weapons and machines, the Germans returned in October once again to the idea of expanding economic ties between the two powers.

-March and April of 1939:

In order to build these huge arsenals, both sides required what the other power had--raw materials from the USSR in return for technology and machines from the Reich. A new series of German reports reinforced the long-standing point that Germany could not continue its rearmament drive without access to Soviet resources. War Economy and Armaments Office (WiRüAmt) officials complained on April 1 that the occupation of Bohemia had solved none of the economic dilemmas facing the Reich, but had instead merely added to Germany's raw material needs. As a result, the export situation was going from bad to worse. Similarly, an April 9 report on Germany's oil situation argued that if a long-term war developed against both the West and the USSR, Germany would have to secure at least Rumania and probably also the Caucasus to achieve victory, because current oil stocks were only sufficient for three to four months of war

-April 1939 Soviet need and knowledge of German need:

Combined with increasing demand for the rearmament program, the Soviets too supposedly had new-found economic incentive to reach a deal with Germany. Nevertheless, Stalin still held the upper hand in any potential economic negotiations. If war came, Germany had nowhere else to turn for certain raw materials such as manganese. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, still had possible connections to England or the United States to acquire manufactured goods, as demonstrated by the trading patterns of the previous two decades and also somewhat by lend-lease after 1941. As if to prove this point, the Soviets slowed their exports to Germany to a trickle. In a March 29 meeting, for instance, officials of the Four-Year Plan complained that the Soviets had cut back their shipments to the bare minimum required by earlier treaties. But the Germans felt they could do little to change the situation given Hitler's current policy.

-April 17 discussion:

This policy, however, was beginning to change, if ever so slightly. The Germans, and Hermann Göring in particular, carried out some tentative soundings in early April, which culminated in the April 17 meeting of Soviet Ambassador Merekalov and State Secretary Weizsäcker. Here Merekalov brought up the unresolved question of Soviet contracts with the Skoda arms factory in the former Czechoslovakia, the broken-down commercial negotiations, and even the possibility of closer political relations, explaining that "there exists for Russia no reason why she should not live with us on a normal footing. And from normal, the relations might become better and better."

-May 20, Molotov - could only do an economic deal if political bases covered:

After the repeated hints from Astakhov and Merekalov, Molotov appeared surprisingly reserved on May 20 when he met with Schulenburg. In reply to Schnurre's proposed journey to Moscow to restart the economic negotiations, " Herr Molotov replied that the course of our last economic negotiations had given the Soviet Government the impression that we had not been in earnest in the matter and we had only played at negotiating for political reasons. . . . The Soviet government could only agree to a resumption of the negotiations if the necessary 'political bases' for them had been constructed."

-May 30 decision by Germany to press for a broad deal, and the economic discussions were the only means available at the time:

Although the German fears proved unfounded and the Soviets quickly rejected the Western proposals, the Germans decided it was finally time to get back in the game, and on May 30 Weizsäcker notified Schulenburg, "Contrary to the policy previously planned, we have now decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union." The ensuing discussions were channeled through the economic negotiations, in part because the economic needs of the two sides were so great but also in part because close military and diplomatic connections had been severed in the mid-1930s and this was the only means of communication left open. . . .

The Soviets certainly seemed interested in a deal, assuming their conditions were met. During his May 30 meeting with Weizsäcker, Astakhov asserted that the barrier to any agreement had been raised by the Germans. Logically, therefore, the way was open to a closer relationship if the Germans changed their policy. Schulenburg also reported that Molotov's May 31 speech "avoided sallies against Germany, and showed readiness to continue the talks begun in Berlin and Moscow."

-June hints and talks (but still no full blown negotiations):

Although the Soviets did agree in principle by June 8 that Schnurre could come to Moscow to continue economic negotiations, the Russians stipulated that the Germans first accept the Soviet February proposals as the basis for discussions. These demands set off another series of "pow-wows" as first Schulenburg, then Hilger, and then Köstring trekked to Berlin to meet with Hitler. More positively, Astakhov paid an unusual visit to the Bulgarian Ambassador in Berlin on June 14 to inform him (and apparently the Germans as well) that the USSR "was vacillating between three possibilities, namely the conclusion of the pact with England and France, a further dilatory treatment of the pact negotiations, and a rapprochement with Germany. This last possibility, with which ideological considerations would not have to become involved, was closest to the desires of the Soviet Union."

-Late July 1939 German need:

Germany's economic situation also continued to dictate a much closer relationship with the huge empire to the east. For example, an August report from the Office for War Economy Planning argued that in the case of a war that included the USSR as hostile, Germany and Italy would fall short of their mobilization requirements by 9.9 million tons of oil and 260,000 tons of manganese. 3 Furthermore, Germany was, among other things, still importing 20 percent of her foodstuffs, 66 percent of her oil, and 80 percent of her rubber. At the same time, Germany possessed stocks of rubber sufficient only for two to three months of war and oil sufficient for only three to six months. Since the English blockade would cut off most of the sources of these materials and since the Soviet Union was practically the only potential supplier for many of these items, an August report from the Office for Economic Development concluded that "making our greater economic sphere blockade-proof can only be achieved through close economic cooperation with Russia."

-July 26 Economic and Political Deal outline:

On July 26, Schnurre and his lastminute partner, the young Foreign Office official Walther Schmid, met Astakhov and Babarin at Ewest's, a Berlin restaurant, for dinner. Schmid, who had been told nothing of the nature of the upcoming conversation, was stunned when Schnurre proposed the following three-stage plan : " Stage One: The reestablishment of collaboration in economic affairs through the credit and commercial treaty which is to be concluded. Stage Two: The normalization and improvement of political relations. . . . Stage Three would be the reestablishment of good political relations, either a return to what had been in existence before (i.e. the Berlin Treaty) or a new arrangement which took account of the vital political interests of both parties. This stage three appeared to me within reach." The Soviets readily accepted the agenda. On the other hand, they also "emphasized that the tempo must probably be very slow and gradual." Over the next week the Soviets seemed remarkably agreeable. Astakhov met again with Schnurre on August 1 and laid down two Soviet conditions before political talks could begin: the cessation of all anti-Soviet attacks by the German media and the signing of a new economic treaty. Schnurre agreed without hesitation. On the same day, Babarin, Moscow's "postman," dropped off the latest Soviet economic proposals, after which Schnurre wrote, "I think we shall now manage to conclude an agreement."

-August 1939 deal played important part in Germany weathering the first two years of war and was key to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact:

Although clearly not "the last salvation" 50 that some were now claiming, the new commercial treaty would end up playing an important role in Germany's ability to weather the first two years of the world war. More immediately, however, the agreement also provided the key link to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23.

-September 1939 need for a bigger deal:

The Germans still got some of the vital raw materials that they wanted, but they really needed an economic alliance and not just an economic partnership. The next six weeks, therefore, saw the Germans push for an even closer economic understanding, especially after the war in Poland had begun. . . .

With the war now officially begun, Germany's reliance on Russia became less hypothetical and more real. The British blockade left the German economy increasingly desperate for a whole host of raw materials from oil to grain to various metals. These increasingly practical needs highlighted increasingly practical concerns about the details of this new trade relationship.

-October 1939 German military focus on Soviet oil:

Given its potential importance to the German war economy, Soviet oil became the focus of an extensive Army High Command (OKH) report from Dr. Erwin Haudan of the National Defense Institute at the University of Berlin. This study estimated that the Soviets, despite increasing internal demand, could send up to two million tons of oil to Germany in the first year alone and much more in later years.

-On importance for Barbarossa:

Without Soviet deliveries of these four major items (oil, grain, manganese, and rubber), however, Germany barely could have attacked the Soviet Union, let alone come close to victory. Germany's stockpiles of oil, manganese, and grain would have been completely exhausted by the late summer of 1941. And Germany's rubber supply would have run out half a year earlier. Even with more intense rationing and synthetic production, the Reich surely would have lacked the reserves necessary for a major campaign in the East along the lines of Operation Barbarossa. In other words, Hitler had been almost completely dependent on Stalin to provide him the resources he needed to attack the Soviet Union. It was no wonder that Hitler repeatedly insisted Germany fulfill the terms of the economic treaties. He could not conquer any Soviet territory until he first received enough Soviet raw materials.

2. See 1. If anything, the exact opposite is true.

3. Re: "The section telling about the negotiations themselves should be cleaned up of all events that can be interpreted ambiguously."

Specifics? And remember, this is a summary of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations, with main links thereto.

4. Re: "All historical considerations should be moved into the "Post-war commentary regarding the motives of Stalin and Hitler"

What "historical considerations"?

Re: "one of them should be devoted to early Nazi-Soviet contacts, Kandelaki's mission, Potemkin school etc, as well as to the alleged secret Soviet-German negotiations."

--This seems better suited for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations article.Mosedschurte (talk) 01:32, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Mosedschurte, I have to generally agree with Paul that there is too much emphasis on the economic side of the story. I am afraid you are relying on a single book too much. The book is not a general discussion on Mol-Rib pact or German-Russian relations, but specializes in a specific area of those relations. So naturally the book will make it look like economic reasons were the king. I never really studied the pact, but when I was reading the basic info & intro, the authors would stress the big-picture political motives and maybe would mention day-to-day economic reasons as a side note to the grand political circus.

P.S. the above quotes might creep into the territory of copyright violations. I would suggest removing them after discussion is over. Renata (talk) 02:15, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

It's not the only book. I cited Ericson because Paul Siebert claimed that he stated the opposite about their relations. To be honest, while I didn't really address this above, his mispresentation of the author's views was pretty troubling, to say the least.

On top of that, as far as I've seen, no sources minimize claim the countries' economic relations were insignificant. In fact, most of their contacts before and after the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal were economic, and it was pretty vital to Germany's needs for oil and rubber needed to prosecute Barbarossa.

That said, if you really wanted to cut one of the two paragraphs in the "Background" section -- which I don't agree with by the way -- the first one (the post World War II one) would be the one to cut, though I think even that provides insight into the relationship of the two countries. The second paragraph (on their actual economic needs) pretty clearly needs to stay as its the only one describing the parties economic needs from each other.Mosedschurte (talk) 02:53, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

I am not saying economic reason were wrong or insignificant. I am saying those were not the most important and not the only ones. All I am saying is that the article needs to find its balance between economic, political, military, etc. reasons. Right now it's a bit slanted towards one angle of the events. Renata (talk) 03:35, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: "It is not the "German school" to discuss German-Soviet economic relations." Fully agree. I just pointed out that the attempt to strengthen the 'German school' ideas with economic considerations is (i) not completely correct (ii) fit the WP:OR criteria. The economic considerations cannot take much space in the article that talks about a political treaty.
With regards to your major arguments, I got completely confused. What point are you trying to demonstrate? That Germany needed in a tactical alliance with the Soviets? Definitely true. That Germany desperately needed in Soviet oil, grain and manganese? Absolutely correct. That the Soviet Union needed new armament, industrial equipment etc? Correct. However, the point is different. According to Ericson, the USSR was much less interested in economic collaboration with Germany. According to other scholars, the USSR didn't respond on German overtures (I mean political ones) before late July. Soviet turn to Germany was swift and dramatic, but that happened in August, and before that there were no significant sign of that. From April 1939 the USSR wanted Nazi-Soviet relations to be normal, not more.
Therefore, my conclusion is that, although the latter statement cannot be in the "Negotiations" sections (as well as speculations of other historian's who disagree with that) no statement can be in that section that contradicts to it. Everything else belongs to the "Commentaries".
I'll continue when we come to agreement on that point.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:22, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: "With regards to your major arguments, I got completely confused. What point are you trying to demonstrate?"

--For one, that the source YOU CITED (Ericson) pretty clearly blew out of the water any notion that the economic relationship wasn't important.

--That's pretty clearly a bullseye given his views on the matter displayed above.

Re: ""It is not the "German school" to discuss German-Soviet economic relations." Fully agree. I just pointed out that the attempt to strengthen the 'German school' ideas with economic considerations"

--It has absolutely ZERO do to with strengthening the "German school" of views. Not a single source states this. This entire argument is frankly weird.

--The article just briefly mentions the economic relations. Given their importance, the fact that German-Soviet talks on the matter went through economic talks, the Soviets demanded the economic deal be done before the political deal, their statements of its importance afterwards -- all of this from the actual historic sources -- this is hardly unusual.

Re: "Therefore, my conclusion is that, although the latter statement cannot be in the "Negotiations" sections"

--Huh? What "latter statement"?

_____________________________________________________________

Ericson blew out Overy? I thought WP's aim is not to decide who is right, but to represent both points, taking into account that both these authors are reputable scholars who study war time economy of Germany (among some other problems).

Re: "It has absolutely ZERO do to ... etc" It has. For inexperienced readers, the concurrent discussion of Anglo-Franco-Soviet political talks and Germano-Soviet economy agreement creates an impressions that the Soviet Union simultaneously and equally negotiated with both sides. Although experienced reader is able to extract truth, the text looks like a dishonest attempt to strengthen a 'German school's point of view. Note, I wrote "looks like" because, I believe, it was not your actual intention.
Re: "Huh? What "latter statement"?" I meant that the story of Soviet-German talks should start with the Molotov's telegram. All preceding events (in actuality, interpretations) belongs to "Commentary".--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:54, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: "the Soviets demanded the economic deal be done before the political deal" Some scholars disagree with that statement. According to them, the Soviets simply avoided to discuss a possibility of political rapprochement. I mean, before 28 July.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:01, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re:"Ericson blew out Overy?"

--Huh? NEITHER said the economic relationship was insignificant, Overy is cited at length in German-Soviet economic relations, and I just cited Ericson at length saying the opposite.

--I've never seen a historical source saying it was insignificant.

Re: "For inexperienced readers, the concurrent discussion of Anglo-Franco-Soviet political talks and Germano-Soviet economy agreement creates an impressions that the Soviet Union simultaneously and equally negotiated with both sides."

--Not only is this 100% incorrect, but the article goes out of it's way to say the opposite in the "Initial Talks" subsection, stating only that "German and Soviet officials made various statements regarding the potential for the beginning of negotiations for a political deal" which had to be "to be channeled through the countries' economic negotiations, because close military and diplomatic connections had been largely severed in the mid-1930s"

--Meanwhile, it specifically states that the USSR and Britain-France were actually going so far as to:

trade actual proposals and counterproposals
goes into their actual intentions during those political talks,
states that they "formally" began in May,
and even further goes into further proposals and counterproposals in June and July.

--In fact, when doing this summary before sending all of the underlying material to Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations, I made this distinction very clear, including stating that they had to channel these talks about talks only through their economic negotiations. I did this so there could no doubt that they were not yet conducting such full negotiations until July.

--To be perfectly frank, I blew extra text in this section making this distinction just to avoid yet another edit war with you on this issue, and that EVERY source agrees on this very limited talking relationship at the time, including even Roberts, et al., who is actually cited for Roberts exact quote "For months the Germans had been hinting that they could offer better terms than the British and French." (Roberts 2006, page 30-1).

--I'm not sure how much more you could possibly want on the statements of the issue. Nowhere are the April, May, June statements quoted or even specifically referred to, and it is stated in the most minimized terms possible -- frankly overminimized to be honest -- just to avoid edit wars.Mosedschurte (talk) 04:23, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

(outdent)

Re: Re: "Ericson blew out Overy?". If you look at the initial text, you will see that I just presented a quote from Overy. If you think that the quote has been taken out of context, or misinterpreted, please explain you point.

Re: "Not only is this 100% incorrect" etc. Let's see. The section states:

Germany and the Soviet Union had discussed entering into an economic deal throughout early 1939.^[1] For months, Germany had secretly hinted to Soviet diplomats that it could offer better terms for a political agreement than Britain and France.^[2]^[3]^[4] German and Soviet officials made various statements regarding the potential for the beginning of negotiations for a political deal.^[5]^[6] ^[7]^[8] I'll try to analyze the para sentence by sentence.

1.Germany and the Soviet Union had discussed entering into an economic deal throughout early 1939.^[1] That is good, however, it definitely belongs to the "Background".

2.For months, Germany had secretly hinted to Soviet diplomats that it could offer better terms for a political agreement than Britain and France.^[2]^[3]^[4] The first source is a Roberts' book. The sentence literally reproduces his words. Let me point out, however, that the next sentence on the page 32 directly states that Stalin had not given any encouragement to Ribbentrop until July. Therefore, although this source supports the sentence, it directly contradicts to the next one. By the way, the second source, the Weizsacker's memorandum, do not support this claim. It states: "I replied to Herr Merekalov that, as everybody knew, we had always had the desire for mutually satisfactory commercial relations with Russia." Nothing else.

3. German and Soviet officials made various statements regarding the potential for the beginning of negotiations for a political deal.^[5]^[9] ^[7]^[8]. In actuality, the only "various statement" the sources discuss is the Weizsacker's memorandum, a second source from the sentence #2. In his article (a third source in the current sentence) Roberts analysed this memorandum and compared it with the Mekeralov's telegram to Moscow (Merekalov was a Soviet ambassador, a second participant of the meeting). He concluded, that, more likely, Weizsacker misinterpreted Merekalov's words, and the idea that this meeting gave a start to the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement is a cold war myth (Roberts' own words). Zachary Shore (a first source) generally agreed with Roberts although he is not so categorical. Nekrich belongs to the 'German school' therefore he relied on the Weizsacker's interpretation only. Erickson (the fourth source) on the page 43 just quotes the Weizsacker's account (the alleged Merekalov's words
"Russian policy had always moved in a straight line. Ideological differences of opinion had hardly influenced the Russian-Italian relationship, and they did not have to prove a stumbling block with regard to Germany either. Soviet Russia had not exploited the present friction between Germany and the Western democracies against us, nor did she desire to do so. There exists for Russia no reason why she should not live with us on a normal footing. And from normal, the relations might become better and better.")
However, according to Roberts' the Soviet de-classivied archives do not confirm that Merekalov was authorized to make this statement. They tell nothing about that, so probably it was just a polite phrase.
The obvious conclusion is: the first sentence is irrelevant, the second is too vague and only partially supported with the sources, the third one is wrong and contains a direct misinterpretation of the sources.
And I cannot understand why do I need to use so much efforts to convince you in so obvious things.

The third paragraph can be subjected to the same analysis. Conclusion will be similar: all sentences are either irrelevant, or biased and incorrect. Of course, I can do that, but I would prefer to do that tomorrow.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:42, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: That is good, however, it definitely belongs to the "Background".

--It's for the context of the sentences that follow, just like the first sentence of the paragraph preceding it. In fact, all of their early talks came through the economic negotiations, as stated.

Re: "The first source is a Roberts' book. The sentence literally reproduces his words. Let me point out, however, that the next sentence on the page 32 directly states that Stalin had not given any encouragement to Ribbentrop until July. Therefore, although this source supports the sentence, it directly contradicts to the next one.""

--Honestly, it's difficult to get a more bizarre take on "contradiction."

--NOWHERE in the article does it state that Stalin had given Ribbentrop encouragement before this. In fact, nowhere before July is any enouragement mentioned, and, Stalin and Ribbentrop aren't even mentioned until August.

Re: "If you look at the initial text, you will see that I just presented a quote from Overy."

--It certainly doesn't say the economic relationship is isngifnicant, and if you really want me to blow time going into Overy's books, extensively cited in German-Soviet economic relations, you won't like the result.

--Just to obliterate any notion of this, here's your often cited source Roberts 2006 on this exact issue, by the way, quoting Ericson in the last part:

Roberts 2006, psges 42-43:
But with the Nazi-Soviet pact there was a significant revival of economic relations between the two states. Under the aegis of economic agreements signed in August 1939, February 1940 and January 1941 Soviet-German exports and imports increased tenfold, reaching levels they had not attained since the early 1930s. . . .

Particularly important were grain, petroleum, manganese and chromium -- vital ingredients of the German war economy that now faced a British naval blockade. The Soviets also signed a secret protocol with the Germans to act on their behalf as a third-party buyer and ship goods to Germany via the USSR. For their side of the deal the Soviets received an equivalent amount of machine tools, finished metals, chemical products and military and other equipment. In value terms the imports and uports balanced out at around 500 million marks each way, but the strategic gain to Hitler was far greater than that to Stalin. As Edward E. Ericson commented:" without Soviet deliveries . . . Germany could barely have attacked the Soviet Union, let alone come dose to victory. Germany's stockpiles of oil, manganese, and grain would have been completely exhausted by the late summer of 1941 . And Germany's rubber supply would have run out half a year earlier ... In other words, Hitler had been almost completely dependent on Stalin to provide him the resources he needed to attack the Soviet Union. It was no wonder that Hitler repeatedly insisted Germany fulflll the terms of the economic treaties. He could not conquer any Soviet territory until he first received enough Soviet raw materials."

Re: "He concluded, that, more likely, Weizsacker misinterpreted Merekalov's words, and the idea that this meeting gave a start to the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement is a cold war myth"

--Again, what a truly bizarre statement given the current state of the article, which has -- as discussed -- been scrubbed of all mention of early German-Soviet rapprochement. No one is saying ANY of the April, May or June conversations were the start of the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement.

--In fact, in writing the summary, I have gone out of my way NOT to state this, bur rather just to state they discussed the potential of political talks only, specifically not to run afoul of the Geoffrey Roberts take, which by the way is only limited to that April memo, just to avoid some crazy edit war.

--No historical source I've seen disagrees with that limited take, which is why it was used.

____________________________________
Re: "--NOWHERE in the article does it state that Stalin had given Ribbentrop encouragement before this." Not correct. The article states: "For months, Germany had secretly hinted to Soviet diplomats that it could offer better terms for a political agreement than Britain and France. German and Soviet officials made various statements regarding the potential for the beginning of negotiations for a political deal" In other words, "Germany hinted", and "Soviet officials made various statements regarding the potential for the beginning...". However, Roberts directly states that they didn't.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:06, 22 February 2009 (UTC)
As regards to Overy, let's continue in a separate section, otherwise it is hard to follow the discussion.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:06, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: "--Again, what a truly bizarre statement given the current state of the article, which has -- as discussed -- been scrubbed of all mention of early German-Soviet rapprochement. No one is saying ANY of the April, May or June conversations were the start of the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement."
Yes. The article doesn't state that. However, the story about the political (Soviet-Anglo-French) negotiations are so dramatically diluted with Soviet-German economic talks (in actuality, even not the talks, but an exchange with opinions about prospective talks) that the reader becomes completely confused.

Re: "--In fact, in writing the summary, I have gone out of my way NOT to state this" To my opinion, it should be not a summary, but a story about major events (without any interpretations):
Britain rose the question of alliance, the USSR put forward a proposal (17 April), Litvinov was dismissed. Molotov proposed to sign a military treaty. Strang came to Moscow, negotiations started, etc.
With regards to historical considerations, they belong to the "Commentarires" section.
--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:16, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re:"No one is saying ANY of the April, May or June conversations were the start of the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement. Yes. The article doesn't state that.

--Great, then we're done.

Re: "'In fact, in writing the summary, I have gone out of my way NOT to state this" To my opinion, it should be not a summary, but a story about major events"

--Then you should write a book. This is an encyclopedic Wikipedia article that not only summarizes events, but on the topic of Mololtov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations, summarizes the more specific Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations Wikipedia article addressing the topic.

Re: "With regards to historical considerations, they belong to the "Commentarires" section"

--This is the second time you've stated this, and the second time it's made no sense. What is a "historical consideration"? ________________________________________
Again, I would be grateful if you put your signature.
Re: " What is a "historical consideration"?" See below.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:27, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Initial talks paragraph 3

Latest comment: 15 years ago9 comments2 people in discussion

Third para is:
In May, the Soviet Union replaced Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, who was pro-western and Jewish, with Vyacheslav Molotov, permitting the Soviets more latitude in discussions with Germany.^[10]^[11]^[12]^[13] The Tripartite discussions progressed with offers and counteroffers.^[14] German war planners estimated massive raw materials shortfalls if Germany entered a war without Soviet supply.^[15] German and Soviet officials made statements potentially signaling the idea of beginning political negotiations.^[16]^[17]^[16]^[18] Ensuing discussion of any potential political deal between Germany and the Soviet had to be channeled through the countries' economic negotiations, because close military and diplomatic connections had been largely severed in the mid-1930s.^[18]
1. In May, the Soviet Union replaced Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, who was pro-western and Jewish, with Vyacheslav Molotov, permitting the Soviets more latitude in discussions with Germany.^[19]^[20]^[21]^[22] A first source is Nekrich ('German school'), therefore, it is not a big surprise that he consider this step primarily as a reverence towards Germany. However, according to Shirer (a second source) this step was both a warning addressed to Chamberlain and a sign addressed to Hitler. Shirer directly stated that by that step Stalin, probably tried to put a pressure on Britain to make a negotiations more successful. Resis (the third source) states: " The sources available at this time show that the immediate cause of the dismissal of Litvinov was the disagreement between him and the chetverka over how to deal with Britain and France." Watson (a fourth source) states: "Whether the reasons for Molotov's appointment head of Narkomindel were internal as rather than foreign policy factors is still subject to debate." Conclusion. Three out of four sources are misinterpreted here. However, taking into account that the sources are reliable, it would be better to bring the sentence in accordance with them rather than to replace them with other sources.
Another option would be to move everything into the "Commentaries" and replace it with the German ambassador's words:"His (Molotov's) appointment is apparently to guarantee that the foreign policy will be continued strictly in accordance with Stalin's ideas." I already did it before, but you removed it without any explanations.
2. The Tripartite discussions progressed with offers and counteroffers.^[14] Weasel words. It is especially vexed, taking into account that only that and the previous sentences has a direct relation to the section. It must be expanded. To save space, most of other text should be removed.
3. German war planners estimated massive raw materials shortfalls if Germany entered a war without Soviet supply.^[15]
Has only marginal relation to political talks. Distracts a reader from the point. Should be removed to save a space for the talks themselves.
4. German and Soviet officials made statements potentially signaling the idea of beginning political negotiations.^[16]^[23]^[16]^[18] The first source (Erikson) does not support the statement directly. The second source is Nekrich ('German school'). The third source is the page 46 of the same Erickson's book. I haven't found any statement that directly support the sentence. The fourth source (the same Erickson's book, page 54) tells about July, so it is chronologically irrelevant.
Conclusion: weasel words hardly supported by sources. In addition, it is just a duplication of the sentence from the previous para.
5. Ensuing discussion of any potential political deal between Germany and the Soviet had to be channeled through the countries' economic negotiations, because close military and diplomatic connections had been largely severed in the mid-1930s.^[18] This source (Erickson's book again) tells mostly about the economic deal. The source tells almost nothing about politics. The meeting between Astakhov and the Bulgarian ambassador Erickson refers to is also questionable. Roberts presented a new data demonstrating that the Astakhov's words were probably wrongly interpreted.
Conclusion: a lot of weasel words, a lot of redundant information, and almost nothing has been said about really important things.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:25, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: "The Tripartite discussions progressed with offers and counteroffers.^[14] Weasel word:

--Not a single weasel word in the sentence. It's short, declarative and descriptive.

Re: "German war planners estimated massive raw materials shortfalls if Germany entered a war without Soviet supply.^[15]
Has only marginal relation to political talks. Distracts a reader from the point."

--Dead wrong. Again. Regarding the importance of the sentence, read the sources on the relations between the two and the importance of the economic deal, which was driven by German need for raw materials, for the political deal:

By the late 1930s, because an autarkic economic approach or an alliance with Britain were impossible, Germany needed to arrange closer relations with the Soviet Union, if not just for economic reasons alone. Ericson, page 1. The German raw materials crunch had become so bad, that Hitler told his generals that he would have to take over a neighboring country to ensure the supply of agricultural land and raw materials, equating this massive economic need with Lebensraum. Overy, 2004, page 425. The day German forces entered the Czech Sudetenland, Herman Goring poured over figures with generals covering every item of Sudeten economic resources, from lignite to margarine, so that it could be allocated to the Four Year Plan. Overy, 2004, page 425. Every internal German military and economic study had argued that Germany was doomed to defeat without at least Soviet neutrality. Ericson, page 56.
"Interestingly enough, Stalin believed that the trade treaty was more important to Moscow than a nonaggression pact". Philbin, page 43. Schnurre also wrote at the time of "[a]part from the economic import of the treaty, its significance lies in the fact that the negotiations also served to renew political contacts with Russia and that the credit agreement was considered by both sides as the first decisive step in the reshaping of political relations." Grenville, page 228. After the signing of the economic deal, Pravda wrote that the August 19th deal "may appear as a serious step in the cause of improving not only economic, but also political relations between the USSR and Germany."

Where are all of the sources that say that this has nothing to do with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact? There aren't any.

Re: "German and Soviet officials made statements potentially signaling the idea of beginning political negotiations. Conclusion: weasel words hardly supported by sources. "

--Dead wrong. Again. Read the sources on the matter, especially those in the article specifically dealing with the topic, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations article which this article summarizes:

April 7 - Soviet diplomat Georgii Astakhov stated to the German Foreign Ministry that there was no point in continuing the German–Soviet ideological struggle and that the two countries could come to an agreement.
April 17- prior discussed, as some aren't sure whether the German account was exaggerated
May 17- the Soviet ambassador told a German official that he wanted to restate "in detail that there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and Soviet Russia and that therefore there was no reason for any enmity between the two countries."
May 20 - Molotov told the German ambassador in Moscow that he no longer wanted to discuss only economic matters, and that it was necessary to establish a "political basis".
May 31 - In his first main speech as Soviet Foreign Minister on May 31, Molotov stated that the Soviets did not "consider it necessary to renounce business relations with countries like Germany" and proposed to enter a wide-ranging mutual assistance pact against aggression.
June 15 - the Soviet ambassador told unofficial intermediary Purvan Draganov that a Soviet deal with Germany better suited the Soviets than one with Britain and France, or a inconclusive negotiations.

I did notice that the sentence summary was essentially repeated in two paragraphs. I eliminated the repetition and made the time frame clear: "From April to June, German and Soviet officials made statements regarding the potential for the beginning of political negotiations, while no such negotiations took place during that time period."

Re: "Ensuing discussion of any potential political deal between Germany and the Soviet had to be channeled through the countries' economic negotiations, because close military and diplomatic connections had been largely severed in the mid-1930s.^[18] This source (Erickson's book again) tells mostly about the economic deal. The source tells almost nothing about politics."

--Dead wrong. Again. Ericson discusses the political negotiations between the parties in great detail. In fact, he takes them, along with the economic negotiations in which they were channeled, on an almost day-by-day basis for a large section of the book.
--Moreover, what source would even contradict the notion that these were channeled through the economic negotiations at the time? None. This is what the countries had been negotiating since late 1938. I'm not getting even your argument about the alternative of these two sides constantly talking from late 1938 onward. Do you think they were speaking to each other in some secret political negotiations?

--By the way, here is the actual quote from the source:

Ericson, page 46:
"The ensuing discussions were channeled through the economic negotiations, in part becaue the economic needs of the two sides were so great, but also in part because close military and diplomatic connection had been severed in the mid-1930s and this was the only means of communication left open."

Re: Litvinov lattitude quote

--Good God, I replaced Germany with "all parties" now, so it's in line with every potential read/misinterpretation of every source now. The damn thing is a summary of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations and the nitpicking here is simply unreal.
--If you're going to go back to your "we can't discuss the Litvinov Jew" WP:Fringe theory, please tell me so I can link back to the prior embarrassing discussion of the matter rather than blow more time on this. Humorously, I had already deleted in the summary all mention of the fact that Stalin purged the entire foreign ministry of Jews at the same time just to avoid more edit warring.

__________________________________________________

I would be grateful if you put your signature.

Re: "Not a single weasel word.." If the section is devoted to the talks it must tell about the talks. Instead of that, you tell almost nothing about the talks themselves, and introduce a lot of irrelevant things. If we translate the section to the normal language, it will look like: "The triple talks proceeded in a normal way. During that time German planner had come to a conclusion that they desperately need in Soviet resources. They also decided to consider a possibility to make a deal with the USSR, although no one knew what type of deal it would be. They started to send some signals although it was not clear if the USSR is ready to accept it... etc". Remember, during that time Britain, France and the USSR discussed the details of concrete anti-German alliance. The section create an impression that someone tries to conceal this fact by any means. In other words, it create an impression that the author is biased.

Re: "Dead wrong. Again. Regarding the importance of the sentence, read the sources" Disagree. Of course, the economic considerations are important. However, they are not relevant to this concrete section. They belong to the introduction or to a separate section (something like "On the role of economy in the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement".

Re: "Dead wrong. Again. Read the sources on the matter, especially those in the article specifically dealing with the topic, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations article". First of all, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations is terrible. You moved there all statements I disagree with. With regards to the list of the events you presented, I appreciate it. Let's analyze it.

April 7 - Soviet diplomat Georgii Astakhov stated to the German Foreign Ministry that there was no point in continuing the German–Soviet ideological struggle and that the two countries could come to an agreement.
It is just a historians' interpretation of his alleged words. I found this statement only in a couple sources, and I failed to understand what concretely did Astakhov said.
April 17- prior discussed, as some aren't sure whether the German account was exaggerated
That is why it belongs to "Commentaries"
May 17- the Soviet ambassador told a German official that he wanted to restate "in detail that there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and Soviet Russia and that therefore there was no reason for any enmity between the two countries."
~~Well established fact. Belongs to this section.~~Sorry. I thought you meant 17 "April", the Litvinov's proposal to Britain and France. As regards to 17 May, you probably mean the meeting between Schnurre and Astakhov om 15 may? I compared the Astakhov's account on the meeting on 15 May (AVP SSSR, F. 082, оп. 22, п. 93, д. 7, л. 220-221.[1]) and Schnurre's account about the telephon talk on 17 May [2], it seems that both of them mean the same. Both of them discuss the trade mission in Prague, both of them tell something about Nazi-Soviet relations. However, according to Astakhov, it was mostly a Schnurre's monologue. According to Astakhov, he just politely responded.
Conclusion: Questionable. Belongs to "Commentaries".
May 20 - Molotov told the German ambassador in Moscow that he no longer wanted to discuss only economic matters, and that it was necessary to establish a "political basis".
The original source (a summary of the Molotov's conversation with Schulenburg) states that Molotov insisted that a new political base has to be established for the economic talks to be successful. In addition, Molotov separately states that he refused to answer the ambassador's question what such a base would be (AVP SSSR, F. 06, оп. 1, п. 1, д. 2, с. 24-26)[3]. If you compare these words with the Erickson's note:"because close military and diplomatic connections had been largely severed in the mid-1930s.", it becomes clear that Molotov meant that the relations were so bad that almost no normal economic collaboration was possible. Nothing else. One way or the another, the interpretation of this talk also belongs to "Commentaries"
May 31 - In his first main speech as Soviet Foreign Minister on May 31, Molotov stated that the Soviets did not "consider it necessary to renounce business relations with countries like Germany" and proposed to enter a wide-ranging mutual assistance pact against aggression.
Well established fact. Belongs to this section.
June 15 - the Soviet ambassador told unofficial intermediary Purvan Draganov that a Soviet deal with Germany better suited the Soviets than one with Britain and France, or a inconclusive negotiations. Roberts gives another interpretation to this talk. According to the Astakhov's diary [4], during this meeting Draganov generally discussed Bulgarian problems, especially, he was interested in Astakhov's opinion on the Bulgarian rights on the Dorbuja province (during that time a Romatian territory). Astakhov noticed that Draganov was much more pro-German than before. Draganov warned Astakhov against alliance with Britain, because, according to him, Germany would start a war in that case. Therefore, the Draganov's call [5] to Woermann was probably his own political game. As regards to Astakhov himself, he didn't mention any serious discussion of Soviet-German relations during this meeting. In addition, it looks funny. The USSR, Britain and France discuss concrete details of the anti-German alliance, whereas Soviet ambassador in Berlin discuss a possibility of some prospective rapprochement with Germany with the Bulgarian ambassador. Was Germany a Bulgarian province? You cannot even think about a possibility to give any weight to this stuff.
Conclusion: Move to "Commentaries".

In addition, it would probably make sense to mention the Mikoyan's words on 2 June that Russia "had lost all interest in all economic negotiations" (Erickson's book, same page). This would demonstrate that the signals were definitely "mixed". However, I do not insist.

Re: "Dead wrong. Again. Ericson discusses the political negotiations between the parties in great detail. "
I found not a single word "politic" on the page 46. In addition, let's compare the source and the article.

Erickson:

Ericson, page 46:
"The ensuing discussions were channeled through the economic negotiations, in part because the economic needs of the two sides were so great, but also in part because close military and diplomatic connection had been severed in the mid-1930s and this was the only means of communication left open."

Article:

Ensuing discussion of any potential political deal between Germany and the Soviet had to be channeled through the countries' economic negotiations, because close military and diplomatic connections had been largely severed in the mid-1930s.

I think, the difference is obvious.

Re: "Re: Litvinov lattitude quote". Sorry, there is nothing about WP:Fringe here. Just accuracy. You cite good sources, but you have to present the author's point correctly.
--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:19, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: "I did notice that the sentence summary was essentially repeated in two paragraphs... etc" Good. To my opinion, it is the only informative sentence on the Soviet-German contacts in April-June. The rest should be Triple talks.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:22, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: " If we translate the section to the normal language, it will look like: "The triple talks proceeded in a normal way."

--"Proceeded in a normal way"? What does that even mean?

Re: "Of course, the economic considerations are important. However, they are not relevant to this concrete section."

--Again, this makes no sense. The May report came in setting off alarm bells for Germany. And what the heck is a "concrete section"? Anyway, it is a single sentence that states nothing more than "German war planners estimated massive raw materials shortfalls if Germany entered a war without Soviet supply", which is entirely accurate and relevant to the Germans' need to do a deal, as discussed by the actual sources above, not speculation.

Re: "If the section is devoted to the talks it must tell about the talks. Instead of that, you tell almost nothing about the talks themselves"

--Read the article. It states that UK/France and USSR traded written counterproposals regarding a political and military agreement, goes into the reasons for consideration of doing a deal, gets into the specific hangup over the Baltic states and indirect aggression, gets into the military negotiations issues over troops in Poland with the Poles refusing to bend to UK/French pressure, etc.

--Meanwhile, here are the following details regarding potential deal provisions that it goes through on the proposed German political deal: [crickets chirping]. Instead, it discusses that they must firt go through an economic deal and they had to address their past hostilities.

---To demonstrate how silly this already is, realize that this article is on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact -- a deal between Germany and the Soviet Union, not the UK and France. And this is a summary article. For additional details, go to Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact negotiations.

Re: "First of all, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations is terrible. You moved there all statements I disagree with."

--This is, yet again, simply bizarre. ALL of the statements -- the ENTIRE NEGOTIATIONS SECTIONS -- were simply moved to Molotov Ribbentrop Pact negotiations. What remains here is just a summary, not the day-to-day descriptions of individual early statements, which had ballooned into nearly a third of this entire article.

--Further capping off the silliness of that sentiment, after I moved the material to Molotov Ribbentrop Pact negotiations, here were you exact words on that article's talk page "Good idea. I was thinking about doing the same." (Paul Siebert)

Re; All of the sourced statement that contradicted your WP:Fringe theory, and are for the summary statement for Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations: "From April to June, German and Soviet officials made statements regarding the potential for the beginning of political negotiations, while no such negotiations took place during that time period":

April 7 - "It is just a historians' interpretation of his alleged words." -no, it's what happened from an actual cited historical source, not Paul Siebert's speculation.
April 17 - "That is why it belongs to "Commentaries". Reality -It's not even in this article. It's in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations, with the actual quote there and statement that it might have been exaggerated in the article that addresses it, not here.
May 17 - "I compared the Astakhov's account on the meeting on 15 May [citing primary source]" -> WP:Original Research to make a point you (misguidedly) believe. Write your own book. The actual statement is from a historical secondary source. And by the way, this argument should be for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations article, not this one.
May 20 - "The original source [links to primary source document] . . . compared to Ericson's . . . " ->Even moreWP:Original Research to make a point you believe. Again, write your own book. And by the way, this argument should be for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations article, not this one.
May 31 - "Well established fact. Belongs to this section."-> Great, yet another reason for the primary sentence.
June 15 - "Roberts gives another interpretation to this talk. According to the Astakhov's diary" - if you are referring to footnote 24 in the back of Roberts' 1992 article, that's not what Roberts said. Rather, Roberts just goes through the Astakhov memo on the account which states Draganov's statement on the matter. He says "those historians who argue that Moscow wanted a deal with Berlin all along" cite this, but that's not what this article (or even the negotiations article) state (in fact they take great pains not to do so).

Re: "In addition, it would probably make sense to mention the Mikoyan's words on 2 June

--You don't seem to get the concept of this encyclopedic Wikipedia article: the early day to day conversations are all in Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations article. None of the above are discussed in this article. This is a summary of the main article, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations. When the change of describing the early day-to-day communications in the other article occurred, with a summary here, you stated: "Good idea. I was thinking about doing the same." (Paul Siebert)

Re: I think, the difference is obvious.

--This should be fun. What talks do you think Ericson was referring to in his statement "The ensuing discussions were channeled through the economic negotiations, in part because the economic needs of the two sides were so great, but also in part because close military and diplomatic connection had been severed in the mid-1930s and this was the only means of communication left open"?

--We can change it from "political" to "military and diplomatic" if you'd really like to parrot some language from the source.Mosedschurte (talk) 23:14, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: With regards to: "Good idea. I was thinking about doing the same." (Paul Siebert) I see no contradiction. The idea was good. The implementation was bad.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:59, 23 February 2009 (UTC)

With regards to my alleged fringe theories, I would like to say that I just compared the Roberts' conclusions with the original sources he used. My conclusion was that he was right. I don't think the statement that some historian is right constitutes WP:OR.

Re: "if you are referring to footnote 24" No. I refer to another Roberts' article (a review of the Nekrich's book). He analyzed a Astakhov-Draganov meeting there. His analysis is below:
"At the present time, however, the available evidence points in a different direction. In the case of the Astakhov-Draganov conversation we now have (and have had for some time) two documents additional to that by Woermann. First, there is Astakhov's diary-report on the meeting. In Astakhov's version of the conversation the remarks attributed to him by Woermann's report were, in fact, Draganov's opinions! Second, there is Draganov's report on the meeting, sent to the Bulgarian Prime Minister on 14 June. In this account Draganov does not quote the Soviet diplomat but reports impressions arising from a long conversation (nearly two hours) with Astakhov, i.e. that under certain conditions the Soviets might be prepared to do a deal with the Germans. Such a deal, Draganov notes, could be favourable to Bulgaria which would be able to recover from Romania the disputed territory of Dobrudja"
My conclusions about the primary sources fully coincide with those of Roberts. I don't plan to "write my own book" on that account, I just explain why Roberts was right.

Re: "All of the sourced statement that contradicted your WP:Fringe theory". I just analyzed the major events you outlined, and I don't think you were able to refute my arguments.

In addition, I like the phrase "From April to July, German and Soviet officials made statements regarding the potential for the beginning the normalization of Soviet-German relations, while no political negotiations took place during that time period'". To my opinion, the "Negotiations" section should start with these words. After that, the story of triple talks should go (until the end of July). After July 26, the story of triple talks and Nazi-German talks should go in parallel.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:59, 23 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: "You don't seem to get the concept of this encyclopedic Wikipedia article". Let me just friendly remind you that such a statement may fit the WP:OWN criteria, that is one of WP:DE's sign. It is "the concept of this encyclopedic Wikipedia article" that we currently discuss.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:15, 23 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: "Write your own book. The actual statement is from a historical secondary source." I write the peer-reviewed articles in completely different field. I am amateur historian, and, like you, I don't plan to write my own history book. My analysis of the primary sources is for the talk page only. My conclusion is: a direct comparison of the Nazi-Soviet documents from the Avalon project and their Russian counterparts from de-classified Soviet archives demonstrated the limitations of the conclusions drawn from the formers. Of course, I am not intended to present this conclusion in the article. However, this conclusion is sufficient to remove all historians' interpretations based on the Avalon documents solely from the "Talks" section to "Commentaries". Moving the sources, or their complete removal does not constitute OR.
If you disagree with that text rearrangement, the burden of evidence rests on you.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:07, 23 February 2009 (UTC)

Re: With regards to: "Good idea. I was thinking about doing the same." (Paul Siebert) I see no contradiction. The idea was good. The implementation was bad.

--All I did was move that material which was to what you responded "Good idea. I was thinking about doing the same." (Paul Siebert). That you now have a problem with it is fairly amusing.

Re: "I just analyzed the major events you outlined, and I don't think you were able to refute my arguments."

--You mean all of the facts in the actual sources? Against your arguments actually pointing to primary research documents, and your claims that your primary research shows they didn't say what all of the actual legitimate sources stated -- the very definition of WP:Original Research.

--That most of the arguments were silly was of no consequence, since I'm not EVEN CLOSE to wasting time in some argument with you about your own original research. Write a book if you'd like.

Re: In addition, I like the phrase ""From April to July, German and Soviet officials made statements regarding the potential for the beginning the normalization of Soviet-German relations, while no political negotiations took place during that time period"

--It's not really accurate because the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations article just goes through sources discussing this through June, though I suppose you could count the early noises of the talks starting on July 21.

--My real answer: why not? Frankly, I give in to all sorts of inaccuracies on these crazy WP:Fringe notions just to avoid further edit warring.

Re: "I write the peer-reviewed articles in completely different field."

--I'm not touching that with a 10 foot pole.

Re: " a direct comparison of the Nazi-Soviet documents from the Avalon project and their Russian counterparts from de-classified Soviet archives demonstrated the limitations of the conclusions drawn from the formers. Of course, I am not intended to present this conclusion in the article. However, this conclusion is sufficient to remove all historians' interpretations based on the Avalon documents solely from the "Talks" section to "Commentaries"."

--Reality#1: No one is changing or moving anything in the Wikipedia article because of your own WP:Original Research of what you think documents state. In fact, frankly, no one is probably going to even waste time debating your research. As stated, write a book if you want to deal with such matters.

--Reality#2: These individual conversations aren't even described in this article anymore. They are now described in Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact negotiations, the concept of which appears to be quite elusive. Mosedschurte (talk) 06:26, 23 February 2009 (UTC)

Post-war commentary regarding the effects of purges

Latest comment: 15 years ago1 comment1 person in discussion

This section (that contains no references, by the way) has only indirect relevance to the article's subject (in its present form). It seems to be a previous (terrible) version's legacy and should be removed. If we discuss the effect of Stalin purges here, the discussion of German domestic crisis seems to be equally relevant. To my opinion, both of them are equally irrelevant, however. What do you Mosedschurte think about that?
Regards,
--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:58, 24 February 2009 (UTC)

The Invasion of Poland 1939

Latest comment: 15 years ago3 comments3 people in discussion

I propose this as a subject for analysis and debate, among the Wiki community, because there is a hiatus in the record on one very important key issue: which is this: Germany invaded Poland in 1939. One of the best accounts is that written by General Guderian. However, the Soviet Union also invaded Poland at the same time. General Guderian even describes his meeting with a Sovier Army Liaison Officer when the 2 armed forces met somewhere to the east of Warsaw. The German operation resulted in a declaration of war by Britain, as is well known. However, the same invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union did not produce any reaction at all by Britain. No declaration of war against the USSR, no criticism of Stalin. And, until today, complete silence. comments please!!Miletus (talk) 21:47, 14 March 2009 (UTC)

Also note the peculiar phrasing of the last paragraph before the main body, in the intro, which talks about the areas which came under "either Nazi Germany.." - note that the editor put Nazi Germany first - "...or the Soviet Union". The way it is written, this is a true statement; however, it ignores the fact that ALL except Poland were exclusively attacked and seized by the Soviet Union, and Romania only became part of Germany's sphere due to the allied regime which emerged there. It is no surprise that Romania fought alongside Germany in the Soviet Union.

I have changed the last section to better reflect the reality of what happened, without seemingly pro-commie cheat-phrasing.--88.73.243.133 (talk) 17:06, 5 April 2009 (UTC)

The discussion just finished on the Talk:Estonia in World War II where the subject was dissected in the details.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:35, 5 April 2009 (UTC)

Attacks on Molotov

Latest comment: 14 years ago2 comments2 people in discussion

Molotov was not an anti-semite. It is the pincle of ignorance to state this. One - he made famous pronouncements against Anti-Semitism - two - his wife was Jewish.

Stop smearing his good name. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 193.253.188.134 (talk) 09:12, 29 May 2009 (UTC)

I have no position (or knowledge) on his standpoint on semitism, other then that in the deportations he organized, a higher percentage of Jews died then in their native countries. However, a "good name" - we are talking about Vyacheslav Molotov, one of the principal organizers of the catastrophe of collectivization, including partial responsibility for Holodomor. He helped to create the Great Purge, in which millions died. He helped to purge Soviet high command just before the World War II, effectively castrating the army.

So, I do think that Molotov managed to smear his "good name" all by himself. -- Sander Säde 09:26, 29 May 2009 (UTC)

Recent odd modifications

Latest comment: 14 years ago14 comments4 people in discussion

Somewhat strange modifications have been made recently in the lede. The last para has become absolutely odd:

"In addition to stipulations of non-aggression, the treaty included a secret protocol "dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of influence." In effect, this opened the door for the Soviet Union to conquer most of Eastern Europe and absorb the independent countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Only Finland was able to defend itself against the Soviets and remain an independent country. In exchange, the Soviet Union helped Nazi Germany attack Poland. After Poland fell, the country was split between the Nazis and the Soviets."

This is quite biased version that presents events as if the USSR was the major aggressor. Obviously, this wasn't the case. The main result of MRP was the WWII's outbreak, and this happened with German invasion of Poland. Secondly, the USSR didn't conquer most of Eastern Europe: the Baltic countries were absorbed formally peacefully. Bessarabia and north Bukovina was annexed without declaration of war, and invasion of Finland wasn't too successful.
The level of coordination, not even cooperation between the USSR and Germany was pretty low during the most decisive days of the invasion.
I assume this modifications are strongly biased and factually incorrect and I revert them.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:08, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

It is not "biased" in that the USSR was the major aggressor in the Baltics and wound up with 51% of Polish territory. It's frankly a load of crap to contend that the Baltics were "absorbed formally peacefully." They were invaded, most of their governmental authorities deported while they were still sovereign even by Soviet accounts, and those authorities replaced by puppets which then conducted elections which weren't and "petitioned" to join the happy Soviet family. As for coordination, the Soviets transmitted radio signals supporting the Luftwaffe invasion of Poland. And telegraphed congratulations to Hitler on the fall of Warsaw. As it happens, both the election "results" and the congratulations on Warsaw both came before the events had occurred. Damn inconvenient, that sloppy sense of Soviet timing. PetersV TALK 22:32, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

And don't get me started on Bukovina, Bessarabia et al. And on Finland, the Soviet invasion wasn't "too successful" and should therefore (I assume) be somehow discounted? That was the fate of the Baltic states had they refused the pacts of mutual assistance as Finland did. I'm sorry, Paul, you usually make a good case even if I don't always agree. Your contentions of "bias" here, however, have no historical factual basis. PetersV TALK 22:36, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

Agree with Vecrumba. This version merely described what had actually happened.Biophys (talk) 23:18, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

Dear Peters,
To my opinion, everyone whose aim is to "refute post-Soviet Stalinist propaganda by rigorous application of facts" should agree that all critique of Stalin's deeds has to rest on a rock solid ground.
"Absorbed formally peacefully" doesn't mean "absorbed legally". I didn't state and I didn't mean that the annexation of the Baltic states was legal or morally justified. Definitely, it was an absorption against the peoples' will, however, it was neither an invasion nor a conquest. Of course, the behaviour of the Soviet authorities in the annexed Baltic countries looked like the conqueror's behaviour, however, there were no military conquest in that case, as there were no conquest of Austria, for instance.
It is more correct to state that in 1939-1940 the USSR conquered almost nothing, although its territory expanded dramatically via annexation of its neighbour's territory. Note, during that period the USSR was formally at war with Finland only.
Secondly, as I already pointed out, the major and the direct result of the pact was the outbreak of WWII. Mentioning of the alleged Soviet conquest and non-mentioning the outbreak of WWII is a blatant bias.
Thirdly, signing of MRP was much more beneficial for Germany that for the USSR, so it is absolutely unclear for me why MRP is being discussed mostly in the Soviet context.
I believe I provided exhaustive arguments in favour of the old (Mosedschurte's) version of the lede that seems to be rather correct and balanced.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:04, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

This may be one of those rare instances where there is not actual disagreements on the facts here. For example, re the Baltic issue, from prior Talk page discussions with Paul Siebert, he knows well about the 1940 invasions, forced parliamentary elections and "incorporation" votes (see sections below in the article). I think this may be an issue of wording. How about this to accurately convey the facts:

Possible Modifications of Paul Siebert's last version:
In addition to stipulations of non-aggression, the treaty included a secret protocol dividing Eastern Europe into German and Soviet "spheres of influence", anticipating potential "territorial and political rearrangements" of these countries. ~~Thereafter,~~ The agreement was in concordance with the subsequent invasions and coordinated occupations by Germany and the Soviet Union ~~invaded~~ of their respective portions of Poland,; ~~followed by~~ Soviet occupations and annexations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and the Soviet annexation of part of northern Romania. Part of eastern Finland was annexed by the Soviet Union after an unsuccessful attempted invasion.

Clean text version of potential text:
In addition to stipulations of non-aggression, the treaty included a secret protocol dividing Eastern Europe into German and Soviet "spheres of influence" anticipating potential "territorial and political rearrangements" of these countries. The agreement was in concordance with the subsequent invasions and coordinated occupations by Germany and the Soviet Union of their respective portions of Poland; Soviet occupations and annexations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and the Soviet annexation of part of northern Romania. Part of eastern Finland was annexed by the Soviet Union after an unsucessful attempted invasion.

I put "part of" in front of "northern Romania" because the M-R secret protocols didn't grant the Soviets a sphere of influence over Bukovina (though they annexed it).

This should be one of those (perhaps rare) instances where an agreement should be fairly easy to reach on a description of events.Mosedschurte (talk) 00:23, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

Re: "Thirdly, signing of MRP was much more beneficial for Germany that for the USSR, so it is absolutely unclear for me why MRP is being discussed mostly in the Soviet context." (Paul Siebert)

To clarify, in terms of German benefits, I think you're referring primarily to Germany's ability thereafter to prosecute a one-front (western) war in Europe (obvious benefits; German generals wouldn't even sit down with Hitler to plan a two-front war in 1939, causing internal problems) and the Soviet raw materials support. In terms of land under spheres of influence, I'm not sure there is disagreement that the Soviets received more overall than Germany.Mosedschurte (talk) 00:38, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

(edit conflict) To Paul, an invasion which results in the immediate deportations of entire governments while still sovereign even by Soviet accounts—an act of war—and later mass deportations is not "peaceful." It was an invasion and a conquest. That the Baltics chose to live to fight another day does not detract from the act of invasion and conquest, that is, acquisition of territory by force. You WP:OR confuse the Soviet act with the choice of how the Baltics chose to react. The reaction does not make the action.

I do agree that the outbreak of WWII should appear in the lede. I'm fine with Mosedschurte's proposed text. PetersV TALK 00:44, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

P.S. For what it's worth, with parents born before WWI (mother still alive) and a perspective that separates me from my maternal grandfather, born in 1869, by only one generation, I have had the privilege of being informed by the first hand accounts and experiences of my parents and their generation that most editors here do not have. That is not bias, that is perspective. PetersV TALK 01:04, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

Dear Peters, my family members also had very negative personal experience during 1939-1945 events, however, WP is not a good place to present one's personal experience. In addition, let me point out that, as I already wrote, I fully agree that the behaviour of the Soviet authorities in the Baltic countries resembled the behaviour of a conqueror, so the Baltic citizen could consider the 1939 event as a conquest. However, since there were no declaration of war, no hostilities, and the international law were formally observed (note, I write "formally", because I fully agree that the staged elections were in actuality a fake), majority sources consider these events to be annexation, or occupation.
I agree that, similar to what happened in Austria, it is hard to find adequate words to describe these events correctly. that is why historians used to use a German word Anschluss for Austrian absorption. I would say, for the Baltic events in 1939, the most correct term would be occupation followed by annexation.
With regards to the Soviet authorities' crimes, please, take into account the following. NKVD's crimes in newly annexed territories weren't something outstanding for the USSR: the population within pre-1939 USSR borders suffered equally. What happened with your ancestors were just the Great purge+dekulakisation. You argue that the entire governments were arrested and deported, however, in the USSR itself almost entire government was also arrested and executed during 1935-39. The behavour of the Soviet authorities in Baltic states was brutal, but it wasn't more brutal then in the metropolia.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:38, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

Dear Mosedschurte, I generally agree, especially, taking into account that the previous version was also written mostly by you. However, let me remind you that during our recent discussion on the Estonia in World War talk page we came to a conclusion that almost no documentary evidences exist about any coordination between Germany and the USSR during the period of 1 to 9 Sept 1939 (except notorious Molotov's resolution, see АВП СССР, ф. 06, оп. 1, п. 8, д. 74, л. 20. л. 26.). In other words, during the most critical days of the invasion of Poland Germany acted on her own.
Therefore, it is a little bit unclear for me why did you added the words about "coordinated invasions". It is also incorrect to say that the "agreement accorded" any invasion, because it had been said, although indirectly, in the secret protocol only, not in the pact.
These your statements are inaccurate and incorrect, and, frankly, I liked your older version more.
In addition, the scope of this paragraph is too local. As I already pointed out (and Peters agreed), the major consequence of MRP, the outbreak of the world war, should be stated explicitly. I made no changes in the text proposed by you because I believe you can do it better.
regards,--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:06, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

With regards to the Nazi-Soviet economic relations, I think you exaggerate their role in German 1939-40 war efforts. Ericsson, your lovely author writes clearly (Edward E. Ericson, III. Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1936-1941 German Studies Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1998), pp. 263-283): "While playing little role in Germany's victories in the West, Soviet shipments did provide the margin of resources needed to launch Operation Barbarossa, but not enough to sustain the invasion into 1942." This completely contradicts to your words.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:13, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

Re: " However, let me remind you that during our recent discussion on the Estonia in World War talk page we came to a conclusion that almost no documentary evidences exist about any coordination between Germany and the USSR during the period of 1 to 9 Sept 1939"

That's correct. I was thinking coordinated occupations, not invasions. I changed the above text.

Re: " It is also incorrect to say that the "agreement accorded" any invasion, because it had been said, although indirectly, in the secret protocol only, not in the pact."

The secret protocols are part of the agreement. This may be an English issue. The "agreement" isn't a shorthand for the proper noun encompassing only the public portions. Rather, it refers to the agreement in total, which includes the unpublished secret protocols.
Also, instead of "accorded" (which can be read different ways), I changed it to "was in concordance with".

Re: "With regards to the Nazi-Soviet economic relations, I think you exaggerate their role in German 1939-40 war efforts. Ericsson, your lovely author writes clearly (Edward E. Ericson, III. Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1936-1941 German Studies Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1998), pp. 263-283): "While playing little role in Germany's victories in the West, Soviet shipments did provide the margin of resources needed to launch Operation Barbarossa, but not enough to sustain the invasion into 1942." This completely contradicts to your words."

You seem to be mistaken. I didn't write anything about the effect of the raw materials shipments, especially on the western ground front (shipments came far too late to matter). Not only does it not "contradict to [my] words", it comports with everything I've said on the subject.Mosedschurte (talk) 04:31, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

(Outdent)I probably misunderstood something, but the phrase:"The agreement was in concordance with the subsequent invasions ..." reverts the casual linkage. Nothing can be in concordance with something that haven't happened yet. Not the agreement was in concordance with subsequent invasions, but the invasions were in concordance with the agreement. In addition, the connection between MRP and WWII outbreak is still missing. Peters and I agree that this fact should be reflected. What about that?

In addition to stipulations of non-aggression, the treaty included a secret protocol dividing Eastern Europe into German and Soviet "spheres of influence" anticipating potential "territorial and political rearrangements" of these countries. In concordance with the agreement, Germany attacked Poland thereby unleashing World War II. Subsequent soviet invasion and coordinated Soviet-German occupation led to complete partition of this country. Occupation and annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and annexation of part of eastern Romania brought almost all territories within Soviet "sphere of interests" under Soviet control. However, attempted Soviet invasion of Finland was unsuccessful that allowed her to preserve an independence at cost of minor territorial losses.

I don't pretend my style to be comparable with that of Mosedschurte, I present this version just to demonstrate my point.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:41, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

International law

Latest comment: 14 years ago7 comments2 people in discussion

Dear Paul, international law was only "formally" observed with the initial stationing under the pacts of mutual assistance, however, as done under duress, still contrary to international law. The invasion and subsequent actions were all illegal under international law, abrogated numerous treaties, and (as I'm most familiar with Latvia) also illegal according to the Latvian constitution. That's per Hough's seminal work, not just Baltic sources. "No declaration of war?" That is WP:OR.

Also, about 'You argue that the entire governments were arrested and deported, however, in the USSR itself almost entire government was also arrested and executed during 1935-39. The behaviour of the Soviet authorities in Baltic states was brutal, but it wasn't more brutal then in the metropolia.'
   That Stalin was brutal to the Soviet Union has no bearing on and in no way ameliorates Soviet action in the Baltics. Because he murdered his own by the millions, that he invaded and murdered in the Baltics is somewhat lessened?
   You completely miss the point regarding deportations of the Baltic governments. That was done while the Baltic states were still sovereign even by Soviet accounts. That is, the USSR invaded sovereign states and deported citizens of those sovereign states to the territory of the USSR, the invading power. Illegal, illegal, illegal.
   I am sorry, Paul, but your latest contentions sound like the WP:OR and WP:SYNTH on RU:WP, not anything based on serious scholarship.

Lastly, annexation in and of itself does not terminate occupation, more WP:OR. PetersV TALK 14:36, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

Dear Peters, accusations in WP:RU is not a good argument. I hate wikilawyering, as well as refering to WP:CIVIL, let me just point out that, in contrast to many other editors I concede that I can be biased, moreover, my possible bias is my serious concern. That is why I try to take seriously all arguments of those editors who seem to be biased towards the opposite side. To my opinion this helps to elaborate really neutral point of view.
Revenons a nos moutons, hovewer. I fully agree with your statement "international law was only "formally" observed with the initial stationing under the pacts of mutual assistance". I also agree that the next Stalin's steps were very questionable from the point of view of international law. However, the question was not about legality or illegality of occupations and annexations, but about a possibility to consider them as a conquest of invasion.
Accusation in WP:OR and WP:SYNTH is serious, so let me support my claims with the sources. Below I present reliable sources that use terms "annexation", "absorption" or similar words to describe the 1939 events in Baltics:
1. Max M. Laserson (The Recognition of Latvia Source: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Apr., 1943), pp. 233-247) states: "On July 23, 1949, the acting secretary of State, Sumner Welles, denounced the tactics of the Soviet Union in "deliberately annihilating" the independence of three Baltic States and declared that the United States will not recognize their absorption by Russia."
2. Alfred Erich Senn (The Sovietization of the Baltic States Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 317, The Satellites in Eastern Europe (May, 1958), pp. 123-129) states: "ALTHOUGH the three Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia had previously existed as independent states for only two decades, their annexation in 1940 by the Soviet Union remains an international issue."
3.Waldemar Gurian (The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia. Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr., 1943), pp. 177-193) states: "The Baltic States became parts of the Soviet Union after plebiscites which, of course, cannot be described as free elections"
4. Ben-Cion Pinchuk (Was There a Soviet Policy for Evacuating the Jews?: The Case of the Annexed Territories Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Mar., 1980), pp. 44-55) states: "As result of Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, eastern Poland, Bessarabia and north Bukovina, the Soviet Union was left with the larges jewish population in Europe."
5. Arieh J. Kochavi (Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied war crimes policy and the question of punishment. Published by UNC Press, 1998ISBN 080782433X, 9780807824337, p. 57) states: "The Soviets were aiming for international recognition of their annexation of the Baltic states."
6. Finally, the chapter of the Rein Taagepera's book (Estonia: return to independence.Contributor Rein Taagepera.Edition: illustrated.Published by Westview Press, 1993.ISBN 0813317037, 9780813317038) telling about 1939 events is named "Soviet annexation".
I believe I have been able to demonstrate that during the last part of XXth century western scholars used the terms annexation, as well as similar rather neutral terms, to describe the 1939 events in Baltics. Therefore, your allegations about WP:OR or WP:SYNTH had no ground.
regards,
--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:44, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

(od) Paul, you are inappropriately conflating descriptions of events with judgements regarding international law, starting with "annexation" being a de facto administrative term while "occupation" (with regard to Soviet actions in the Baltics) is a de jure violation of sovereign rights. I don't believe your contentions are WP:SYNTH based on bad faith, however, I must advise you that, for example, concluding that "absorbed" as a description of an event means "not occupied" from a juridical standpoint is a pure leap of synthesis on your part. Acquisition of territory by force is conquest. There is no "questionable" regarding Stalin's actions after the initial pacts of mutual assistance. BTW, Hough's seminal work, "The Annexation of the Baltic States and Its Effect on the Development of Law Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory"—specifically dealing with international law, does use "conquest" to describe Soviet actions.

I don't mean to be harsh, but your position as to words used to describe the events surrounding incorporation versus words to describe illegality according to international law is one of the fundamental issues regarding portrayal of the Soviet invasion and occupation of the Baltics and contentions of no occupation, from "no declaration of war" to "no armed resistance" to the as yet unmentioned here "no occupation can last 50 years." If you wish to contend the Baltic states were not invaded and occupied for the duration of Soviet presence, then the onus is on you to provide scholarly sources which, in regard to international law as it specifically relates to Soviet actions in the Baltic states, discuss those actions. None of the sources you quote deal specifically with the act of occupation of a sovereign state, but rather deal with the administrative aspect (annexation). The two are not the same. Administration does not equal "not occupied" or "not conquered," nor is a description of administrative arrangements (annexation) a "neutral" language substitute for Soviet acts against Baltic sovereignty. I hope this helps. It's not about "bias" or using "more neutral" words, it is about de facto versus de jure. PetersV TALK 19:14, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

(edit conflict)Peters, as you probably remember, yesterday I wrote "that the most correct term would be occupation followed by annexation." Taking into account that you almost literally reproduced that formula in your last post, I think the dispute is resolved. With regards to your the Hough's seminal work, let me point out that the very title of this work implies that there were a huge hole in internation laws that allowed Stalin to annex the Baltic states formally peacefully and legally.
Let me outline again my major point:
1. I Characterise the events in Baltics as "occupation and annexation"
2. According to those time laws this action could be presented as a legal one.
3. I oppose to the use of the word "conquest", because it implies declaration of war and at least minimal hostilities.
Since we both agree that the last version of the lede paragraph uses correct words to describe the 1939 in Baltics, I propose to end the discussion.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:47, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

1. Occupation and continued occupation while annexed would be proper.

2. According to no laws of the time can the invasion and occupation be in any way construed to be legal; if you have a law in mind, please produce it; I have gone through all the treaties, all the laws (with respect to Latvia), and through Baltic and non-Baltic sources dealing specifically with international law; none contends there is any way possible to construe Soviet acts as legal.

3. Invasion, occupation, conquest do not require armed hostilities, that is your personal opinion. Conquest is a rather old-fashioned term, I have not stake in using that, I'm fine with invasion + occupation.

As for "implies that there were a huge hole in internation laws that allowed Stalin to annex the Baltic states formally peacefully and legally" I'm afraid it does not do so. It discusses that for the first time in recorded history international law was observed and recognition of forcible acquisition of territory not recognized for an extended period of time by the majority of the international community. I don't want to beat the horse to death and then some, but there is absolutely no basis for any contention regarding "legal". PetersV TALK 22:51, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

I am just curious, what does continuous occupation mean in that case? Were the Baltic people the "second sort" Soviet citizens? AFAIK, no. They had as much rights as all other Soviet citizens did, the only problem was that all Soviet peoples had not much rights.

Of course, no laws of the time considered invasion and occupation be legal. I am telling about the tricks that allowed Stalin to claim that it was neither invasion nor occupation.

For me it is sufficient that you agreed that the word 'conquest' was not appropriate.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:58, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

Well we appear (finally) to be on the same page. Continuous occupation would mean occupied until the Soviet Union dissolved, sovereignty was restored, and it has been argued until the last troops left that didn't "retire" to the Baltics. Stalin's tricks weren't really tricks as the ultimata prior to invasion were largely all concocted based on staged incidents and outright lies. The Soviet information bulletin about the evil Baltic states contends they could have been good neighbors, look at the peace treaty only recently signed between the Finns and Soviets as a sign of neighborliness. (No mention it was a treaty after a war precipitated by a Soviet invasion!) "Rights" are relative. Again, that the Soviet Union oppressed everyone does not ameliorate its oppression of peoples who were free in their own countries. Those that were taken to Siberia to die there, or if lucky, to make it home after 15 or 20 years would argue that "rights" did not exist. "Conquest" is appropriate, actually, but I'm not married to it. Technically, the Courland pocket held out to the end of the war the second time around, but that's another topic. PetersV TALK 02:39, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

^ ^a ^b Ericson 1999, p. 23-35
^ ^a ^b Roberts 2006, p. 30
^ ^a ^b Tentative Efforts To Improve German–Soviet Relations, April 17 – August 14, 1939
^ ^a ^b "Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War 1917–1991" by Robert C. Grogin 2001, Lexington Books page 28
^ ^a ^b Zachary Shore. What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy. Published by Oxford University Press US, 2005 ISBN 0195182618, 9780195182613, p. 109
^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 107
^ ^a ^b Roberts (1992; Historical Journal) p. 921-926
^ ^a ^b Ericson 1999, p. 43
^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 107
^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 109-110
^ Shirer 1990, p. 480-1
^ Resis 2000, p. 33-56
^ Watson 2000, p. 695-722
^ ^a ^b ^c Cite error: The named reference dwatson698 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ ^a ^b ^c Ericson 1999, p. 44
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Ericson 1999, p. 45
^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 111
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Ericson 1999, p. 54 Cite error: The named reference "ericson46" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 109-110
^ Shirer 1990, p. 480-1
^ Resis 2000, p. 33-56
^ Watson 2000, p. 695-722
^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 111

[ericson22-1] Ericson 1999, p. 23-35

[roberts30-2] Roberts 2006, p. 30

[tent-3] Tentative Efforts To Improve German–Soviet Relations, April 17 – August 14, 1939

[Grogin-4] "Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War 1917–1991" by Robert C. Grogin 2001, Lexington Books page 28

[zshore-5] Zachary Shore. What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy. Published by Oxford University Press US, 2005 ISBN 0195182618, 9780195182613, p. 109

[6] Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 107

[groberts-7] Roberts (1992; Historical Journal) p. 921-926

[ericson43-8] Ericson 1999, p. 43

[9] Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 107

[10] Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 109-110

[11] Shirer 1990, p. 480-1

[12] Resis 2000, p. 33-56

[13] Watson 2000, p. 695-722

[dwatson698-14] Cite error: The named reference dwatson698 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[ericson44-15] Ericson 1999, p. 44

[ericson45-16] Ericson 1999, p. 45

[17] Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 111

[ericson46-18] Ericson 1999, p. 54 Cite error: The named reference "ericson46" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).

[19] Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 109-110

[20] Shirer 1990, p. 480-1

[21] Resis 2000, p. 33-56

[22] Watson 2000, p. 695-722

[23] Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 111

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