Talk:Manstein plan
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A note on the map
editThe map used here - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1939-1940-battle_of_france-plan-evolution.jpg - may have two issues. First, it doesn't (claim, at any rate) to have the final plan illustrated; that is, the revision of 20th February, several days after Hitler and Manstein met after Manstein's transfer to 38th Corps. It has, in other words, 3 "old style" Army Group B offensive revisions - 2 in October, 1 in January - but not the final plan adopted more or less as Manstein proposed.
But more fundamentally, the map illustrating Manstein's October proposal is, I think, a misunderstanding. That was the very first Army Group A counterproposal; at that point whatever Manstein had in mind, he was primarily arguing for Army Group A to be strengthened (if only on a defensive basis.) On the basis of Ernest May and KH Freiser my understanding is that the full-fledged Manstein plan was first expressed on paper on 18th December, not 31st October or any of the intervening memoranda. May's quite explicit. Of course the sickle-cut for the channel may have been the idea for some time before that - perhaps he left it unarticulated for fear of Army Group B getting into a bureaucratic wrestling match if the scope of the changes became clear.
May writes about this around pp. 235-238 or so in Strange Victory, Frieser around 74-78 in Blitzkrieg Legend. Frieser is mostly concerned with debunking the idea of crediting Halder or Hitler with the complete sickle cut premise, May has a slightly more nuanced narrative (in spite of, rather wrongly, arguing against Manstein's primary "authorship" of the plan. At any rate: my best information is that the Manstein Plan was made explicit in the December 18th Army Group A memorandum; rejected once again by OKH, and only "brought back to life" by a meeting with Hitler on Feb. 17 1940, which then led to a Manstein-Plan operation order on the 20th. Halder thereafter changed his mind completely on the plan, and sustained it against doubts even from Army Group A, which in the absence of Manstein was getting very antsy about the Meuse crossing.
So... whether or not a final February 20th map is added, I don't know of any source that would support the 31 October map in the image being so fully fleshed out. 99.192.48.185 (talk) 21:23, 26 July 2009 (UTC)
- Yes, the map does not show the final plan (it would indeed be nice to have such a map, if of sufficient quality). As the caption states: "the original Manstein Plan as first presented to the OKH". This, of course, should not be read as: "the original Manstein Plan, that was presented to the OKH". It wasn't. The map show the plan as it was presented, i.e. deviating from von Manstein's real intentions. I'll change the caption to prevent this misunderstanding.--MWAK (talk) 05:50, 27 July 2009 (UTC)
- I hate to quibble further, but I had the strong impression the 31 October presentation just didn't look like the map - in the sense that the 31 October presentation was much more circumspect where the map looks like the sort of thing he presented on December 18th. (With the February 20th plan being yet another, similar "map," but without Manstein's idea of a southern envelopment for Fall Rot.) Frieser, May, Manstein himself and Jackson are no immediate help in sussing out what the 31 October memo "looked like," but May has evidently seen the "originals" via Hans-Adolf Jacobson; the footnotes are actually a bit obscure as to -which- of Jacobsons work they're in. (Notes 15 and 17, for Chapter 16 of Strange Victory.)
- May does give excessively diffuse credit for the plan to too many 'contributors,' while (over?)emphasizing Manstein's gradual move from a "strengthen Army Group A" position to a "sickle cut." But he's quite specific (and I'd say reliable) on two points: that the 31 October memorandum didn't imply an Army Group A-led offensive, and that the 18th of December was the first time the sickle cut towards the Somme Valley was put on paper.
- If he's saying that with reference to the original memos, that to me means either he's badly misread them or the map is inaccurate for 31 Oct. That still leaves a lot of ambiguity about when strengthening AG-A turned into a left hook for the Somme; it could have been very early, with Manstein playing his cards close to his chest to avoid getting into a fight with Bock and AG-B. For a caption I'd suggest saying the 31 October map represents ideas Manstein evolved between October 31 and December 18th. Thanks for responding. 99.192.94.60 (talk) 22:00, 28 July 2009 (UTC)
- Your remarks make a lot of sense — and you could be correct: I haven't read the text of the original document either. But I also get the impression you are misreading the map. The main efforts are presented by the broad pink arrows. So the 31 October map does in effect not show a "left hook to the Somme" in the Blitzkrieg sense of a strategic penetration avoiding entanglement, it should instead be interpreted as: "Main dislodging of Allied front by Army Group A; Army Group A immediately turns right threatening to roll up Allied front from the south; Allied troops in response retreat to the west pursued by Army Group B; gap hereby opens up on the left flank of Army Group A; Army Group A through it sends "swift forces" to the west to cut off an Allied retreat to the south and at the same time to the south to pre-empt an enemy flank attack from that direction".--MWAK (talk) 16:23, 29 July 2009 (UTC)
- May said that the first memorandum didn't contemplate the switch to an Army Group A offensive; to my mind that switch, and the sickle cut, probably emerged in Novemeber and the map may be precisely what the 18 December memorandum proposed, the one May said was the first to explicitly make a sickle cut. To my mind, there's no question that there's a sickle cut here even with the smaller force than the 20 February orders.
- I'll check in the next few days if some of the Jacobson stuff is available at my library or electronically; no point parsing the difference between this and October's memo when I haven't seen it. Cheers. 99.192.73.229 (talk) 20:17, 29 July 2009 (UTC)
Coincidence?
editThe second paragraph says "In the final version of the plan, the main effort of the German invasion was made against the Ardennes, which by coincidence, was the weakest part of the Allied line". This doesn't seem right, it wasn't just coincidence - the Germans expected the Ardennesto be more weakly-defended because of the more defensible terrain, and possibly units defending there would be out of position to help defend Belgium.
I haven't edited the page yet because I want to find a particular source or two for the particular reasoning, but in the meantime, we can agree it wasn't just pure chance that resulted in the Manstein Plan's attack just luckily running into a weakly-defended area, right? Statalyzer (talk) 14:06, 14 March 2021 (UTC)
- Good point. I changed the lead.--MWAK (talk) 09:09, 15 March 2021 (UTC)
SCHMUNDT ≠ ROMMEL
editIn the lemma entitled “Battle of France” (WWII) in the description of the Manstein Plan it is indicated that Hitler received Von Manstein on 17 February together with Schmundt and Jodl. In the lemma entitled “Manstein Plan” the same meeting is described - but here the co-attendees are named as Rommel and Jodl. Clarification seems required, but I do not regard myself as sufficiently qualified. 16 August, 2015 — Preceding unsigned comment added by Wikifrank40 (talk • contribs) 23:05, 15 August 2015 (UTC)
- Well, Schmundt was obviously not Rommel, but the lunch was attended by several people. There is no logical contradiction.--MWAK (talk) 06:06, 16 August 2015 (UTC)
- Any particular reason only Jodl and Rommel are mentioned in this one? Statalyzer (talk) 14:06, 14 March 2021 (UTC)
Schlieffen Plan
editI wouldn't make too much of a comparison with the Schlieffen Plan because it has been substantially debunked. The course of operations in 1940 bore little resemblance to the events of 1914 and the events of 1914 bore less resemblance to the Schlieffen memorandum of 1905–06. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 09:18, 30 August 2016 (UTC)
Recent edits
edit@MWAK, apols I got an edit conflict amending the recent edits and blanked your changes. @all, how can it be a B class when there are citations missing?Keith-264 (talk) 08:06, 6 March 2017 (UTC)
- Filled in the missing citations and imported a bit of narrative about the battle; the section remains incomplete. Keith-264 (talk) 10:23, 17 March 2017 (UTC)
Sichelschnitt
edit@2a01:827:283:f500:2c42:3a64:feee:558c: Sichelschnitt is a transliteration of the English "Sickle Cut", coined by Winston Churchill. Keith-264 (talk) 12:16, 9 September 2023 (UTC)
Pervitin’s role is missing
editThis page is simply missing one of the most critical elements of this plan/battle. Pervitin was not just tangential, it was an absolutely necessary component of the Blitzkrieg through France. The Germans were required to fight without sleep for several days straight. Blitzed by Ohler is of course my main source for this. It has become well-known generally, yet is not mentioned on this page. 2600:4040:A5B1:1200:AD2B:168F:1C41:8387 (talk) 19:48, 9 May 2024 (UTC)
- That's OR, it might be that reliable sources agree but you can't put opinion into the article. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 21:32, 9 May 2024 (UTC)
Sichelschnitt as translation, not transliteration
editThe article refers three times to Sichelschnitt as a 'transliteration' of the English 'sickle-cut'. This is a translation - it represents the meaning which is expressed in English by 'sickle-cut', in German. A transliteration is a representation of a word conventionally represented in a language which uses one alphabet or script, in the alphabet or script of another. For example, 'drepáni' would be a transliteration into the Latin script (as used in English and German) of the Greek δρεπάνι, whereas 'sickle' (in English) or 'Sichel' (in German) would both be translations of δρεπάνι. Perhaps what is meant in the article is a literal translation (rather than, perhaps, the most idiomatic) - but it is nonetheless a translation rather than a transliteration (as both English and German use the Latin script). Carminowe of Hendra (talk) 17:26, 20 May 2024 (UTC)
- Thanks but that's OR. Keith-264 (talk) 21:44, 20 May 2024 (UTC)
- Do you mean original research? It isn't any sort of research - merely a talk page comment on the commonly-understood meaning of the word transliteration (which is similarly detailed at that page). I'm not suggesting that we add an explanation of what transliteration is to the article on the Manstein Plan (to which such an explanation would be irrelevant, whether sourced or not) - merely that words used in this article should be used to mean what they are generally understood to mean, rather than thrice describing a word-for-word translation as a 'transliteration', as if German were written in a different script to English. Carminowe of Hendra (talk) 23:00, 20 May 2024 (UTC)