Talk:List of states with nuclear weapons/Archive 4

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Pruning the list

I have deleted the sections listing Iran, Syria and Taiwan. None of these countries is believed to have nuclear weapons. If we want to list states that have, had, or are suspected of having or of having had nuclear weapons programs, that should be a separate article. List of states suspected of having nuclear weapons programs. Let's keep this article limited to known cases. NPguy (talk) 03:49, 7 February 2008 (UTC)

I have reinserted that information. The list has more than strictly "nuclear weapons states" listed in the various subsections - the entries for those countries are in accord with nonproliferation publications and common viewpoints. Please don't take the title of the list too literally - the other subsections are important, too. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 03:55, 7 February 2008 (UTC)

We've been through this before (see Major Dispute discussion). The problem is that there are no objective criteria for listing countries suspected of having nuclear weapons ambitions at some point in the past. The list was ridiculous. When Taiwan was added I realized that we were going down the same path again. There's no end to it. NPguy (talk) 03:44, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

I essentially agree as it seems ridiculous to list every country which has ever been accused of having a weapons program. --68.23.10.26 (talk) 04:05, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

All of these (all countries which have had, or been accused of having a nuclear program) are well sourced, and the sources support the categories they all are in. This is not a black/white situation - there are a lot of countries that walked up to starting programs, and then stopped, or started one and then stopped it under external pressure. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 04:24, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

As an aside, we know a fair amount about Taiwan's interest in a program, and South Korea's program, etc... Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 04:25, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

If you remove those states, you must also remove Israel. Israel has never declared that they have nuclear weapons, but the world (I use "rest of the world" very liberally) suspects they do. Since there are many sources linking all of the accused states of having nuclear weapons, I believe a consensus must be reached as to the exact nature of this article before any data is removed. As such, I am going to revert the article to the status before the three states were removed. In the future, please discuss any major changes on the Talk Page before making them. Goalie1998 (talk) 06:18, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

The difference of Israel is than an overwhelming number of countries and organizations (including some of its own leaders) assert it currently has actual nuclear weapons. Most of the outher countries being discussed for removal include states which some Western countries suspect or allege to have a nuclear weapons ambition. So when the leader of one of these countries accidentially slips that the country has nuclear weapons, the head of the IAEA says he believes the country has nuclear weapons, and when numerous countries work under the assumption that the country has nuclear weapons [1] [2] [3] etc., then we can assume they meet the threshhold for the article. --68.23.10.26 (talk) 16:00, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

The article doesn't assert that they have weapons, it states that there's verifyable evidence that they had or have programs, which is clearly true. South Africa has no weapons now, either, but it did - and admitted it, as part of the disarmament program and joining IAEA and the NPT. Others have disclosed programs to IAEA. Others (Iran, for example) have not. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 19:48, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

Israel's "admission" that they do in fact possess nuclear weapons is still debated. That wasn't the point of my statement; my point was simply that it is impossible to only include states that have definitely declared their weapon status. If we tried to do that, we would have to also remove the number of nuclear weapons per state because we assume that all of the governments have actually disclosed the true amount of weapons they possess (I do not believe in conspiracy theories; just pointing out that nuclear stockpile is a matter of national security and there is a possibility that numbers are not accurate). Anyway, my true point - in my opinion, it is better to air on the safe side and include all states that have been accused of possessing nuclear weapons. Goalie1998 (talk) 21:01, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

Where we define the threshhold is of course open for debate and I'm open to it. The best thing would de to come up with a clear and consistent standard so it is obvious whether something should or shouldn't be included in the article. Self-admission or investigation by international body would both seem like possible standards to me. Other thoughts or suggestions? --68.23.10.26 (talk) 02:31, 9 February 2008 (UTC)

Here's the logic to keeping Israel but deleting Iran, Syria and Taiwan. Isreal is widely presumed to have nuclear weapons. Its policy of opacity fools no one, particularly not since Vanunu. The others are/were suspected of having nuclear weapons programs. As long as the title of the article is "list of states with nuclear weapons," they don't belong. And if you look at what this page looked like six months ago you'll realize what a rathole you open up when you include countries suspected of having illicit nuclear programs. I don't mind having a separate article on states that have/had/are or were suspected of having nuclear weapons programs. But let's not confuse this page. NPguy (talk) 05:00, 9 February 2008 (UTC)

I mostly agree with this and note that Israel is defined as having a nuclear weapons program by an overwhelming majority of the reliable sources. If there are some secondary which describe a policy of ambiguity, then they can be listed in a secondary position. This article shouldn't list every country who has ever been accused of having one because it doesn't match the description and it would balloon the article too much. --68.23.10.26 (talk) 16:35, 9 February 2008 (UTC)

Fair use rationale for Image:Vanuunu-Article.jpg

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BetacommandBot (talk) 02:48, 12 February 2008 (UTC)

consensus to prune the list (?)

The preceding topics "dispute," "major dispute" and "pruning the list" discussed whether to limit the scope of the article to match its title or change the title to match the list. It's hard to figure when you have "consensus," but I read the discussion as leading to the logical conclusion that we should prune the list. The discussion seemed to be hinge on whether we needed to keep a few extra countries as a cover for Israel, which doesn't formally acknowledge having nuclear weapons. I thought I had dispensed with that argument (since Vanunu, who doubts that israel has nuclear weapons), so I went ahead and deleted the extraneous references. Someone didn't like that, so I'm trying again. Let's give ourselves another week to sort this one out.

First, should we prune the list to match the title or should we change the title to match the list?

Second, if we prune the list, should we add another article with the borderline list?

Third, if we either start a new article or broaden the scope of this one, how do we make the list match the title?

I vote for pruning the list. The problem with the current list is that three of the entries (Iran, Syria and Taiwan) clearly don't match the title. If someone wants to discuss the grey list countries, let them start a new article on states that have or had nuclear weapons programs, or that are or were suspected of having such programs. Either way the list still wouldn't match because it's incomplete. What about Iraq, Libya, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil? The history of this article shows that quality control for the grey list will be difficult, with lots of junk entries (Canada, Australia, Spain, Poland). NPguy (talk) 21:40, 16 February 2008 (UTC)

So how do you define consensus? If no one replies (and no one objects) is that good enough? NPguy (talk) 02:15, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

Solution: Formally expand the scope of the article to include established and suspected (by a reputable agency, of course...) nuclear programs/stockpiles. Problem solved. MalikCarr (talk) 23:24, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

Also "current and historical..." Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 23:42, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

This sounds simple, but as noted above (under major dispute) it has major problems. Once you open the list to countries that have ever been suspected of having a nuclear weapons program, you lose all quality control. Have you seen what the list looked like six months ago? Poland? Spain? Canada? It made no sense. There is no more basis for including Syria than those countries. Taiwan is more plausible since at least there's some relevant information available, but then why not Brazil? Argentina? Where do you stop? And by the way, Taiwan is not recognized as a "state." NPguy (talk) 04:29, 5 March 2008 (UTC)

Sure it is. There's a difference between "diplomatically recognized as" and "recognized and treated as a country". People with Taiwanese passports can travel on them around the world, including to countries that rather specifically are hostile to Taiwan diplomatically.

The basis for including Syria is a presumptive secret nuclear materials program in progress at the presumptive reactor site. Every nation which has secretly sought to produce fissile materials has had a nuclear weapons program (as judged by international community consensus, including Iran now, though they may have stopped the active weaponization), except Syria about whom we're not sure. Every other country has admitted it, either to IAEA or others, and either abandoned it or gone nuclear in the end. I know some proliferation experts who feel that this correlation is overenthusiastic, but all the weapons technical experts I know take it pretty much as given truth, and I think that's the NPT community policy consensus. That said, we don't publically know anything more about Syria than that they had what appears to have been a reactor that appears to have been bombed.

If anything, there are known (in the community) programs not on here, which we can't publically document, but which entirely appropriately do belong here from a list contents point of view. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 05:28, 5 March 2008 (UTC)

The problem is that secret documents are meaningless to Wikipedia because you need a reliable source to support what you say. The second problem is that "a presumptive secret nuclear materials program in progress at the presumptive reactor site" neither proves a nuclear program nor is implied to be contained within the contents of the article via the article's title.

Just to note: The Federation of American Scientists has said "although Syria has long been cited as posing a nuclear proliferation risk, the country seems to have been too strapped for cash to get far"([4]) while the Nuclear Threat Initiative has said "although the Israeli and U.S. governments have expressed concerns about Syrian nuclear weapons aspirations, there is little convincing evidence of such an objective"([5]). The allegation may be noteworthy, but it needs to be included within an appropriate article based on rationale supported by reliable sources.

Renaming the article with a mutually acceptable and content appropriate title, as well as keeping in mind that the article must be based off of citable reliable sources, seems like the best option moving forward to me..--68.21.95.247 (talk) 06:13, 5 March 2008 (UTC)

Starting over again. There is no credible public evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Syria. Israel bombed a nondescript building. No one knows what it was but a nuclear connection is sheer speculation.

That exemplifies the problem with trying to expand this page to cover all the dubious cases. Let's limit this page to things we know and leave speculation to another page. I don't think broadening this page to invite further speculation is a good choice. NPguy (talk) 04:35, 6 March 2008 (UTC)

It is widely verifyably citably correct that many people in the global security and nonproliferation communities are speculating about a Syrian weapons program following the raid. We can say that perfectly validly here. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 04:18, 7 March 2008 (UTC)

It is also widely verifyably citably correct that many expert organizations feel the speculations are grossly overstated. The main question being raised is whether an allegation about every country belongs in the article, especially given its title.. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 05:37, 7 March 2008 (UTC)

It's a pretty low standard for inclusion in an online encyclopedia that there is widespread speculation. Is that really the standard we want? Shouldn't we demand relevant facts? NPguy (talk) 03:39, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

It's a speculation that led to an act of war by one country against another. That's only happened twice (Iraq / Osirak reactor attack by Israel, and Syria / possible reactor strike by Israel). It's significant enough to report here. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 03:48, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

Actually, we don't know what led to the act of war. That is, we don't know why Israel bombed the site in Syria. It's all just speculation. NPguy (talk) 20:40, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

Oh man, I take a break from this page in July, with a sense of "job well done" after NP Guy, me, and a few others finally win the fight to end the terrible hell that was this page, and come back here to find this. Here we go again with "suspected programs" etc. And, Taiwan? Yes, Taiwan had a nuclear weapons program that ended in the mid 1970s, and again terminated a small-scale effort in 1988. So what does that have to do with an article about states that have NW program today? Does anyone really think that Taiwan is moving forward on a NW program today? Anyone? Is anyone in the indicators and warnings community offering this? No. So why is it here? And why is Syria listed, when no one in the open community knows what was blown up by the Israeli's last summer? A good point is made, we lack evidence of an Israeli NW capability, but there is overwhelming consensus on the subject, so we include it. We have little evidence on Syria, and there is no consensus on the nature of what was blown up. Zero. So why are they on this page?

Finally, Georgwilliamherbert, if you really want to include all the cases of states that were rolledback, we already fought this battle last summer. Check out the discussion pages that NP referenced; hell, check out the "milestones" discussion on why it was decided to delete all those cases. There were very good reasons for doing so. CP Guy, March 14, 2008. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.76.89.7 (talk) 20:31, 14 March 2008 (UTC)

stockpile estimates

There was recently a change replacing the stockpile estimates of one source (the folks who write for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) to anotherset of estimates from another, less established source. This change was then reverted. Given that there are a variety of sources with a variety of stockpile numbers, how do we pick?

I'm inclined to select one source as reputable and representative. The current main source meets that standard. An alternative would be to take cite a number of sources and construct a meta-estimate from all of them. Another might be to produce a table that includes several of them. In any case, I think it makes sense to include alternate sources as references and to note the fact that there are various estimates and none is definitive. NPguy (talk) 02:22, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

I tend to trust the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists as the most reliable source for statistical information (regarding nuclear weapons and theories of nuclear war, maybe not so much). They're the tenders of the Doomsday Clock and all... probably know how things are. That's why I revered the new figures, since they were only cited to an online source I've never heard of before, not to mention cited very bizarre numerations in general. Also borked the rest of the references block... MalikCarr (talk) 23:22, 4 March 2008 (UTC)

NRDC via BAS is the easiest and usually most up-to-date approach to stockpile estimates, and their methodology has been consistent over time. Considering they update their estimates on a regular basis and make their methodology pretty transparent, I think that's the best approach. --Fastfission (talk) 15:09, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

Iranian nuclear program

The latest IAEA report and the director of the IAEA have both pointed out the major outstanding issue facing verification of the Iranian nuclear program is allegations put forth by the United States regarding alleged weapons studies that Iran has supposedly conducted in the past. Whether allegations of nuclear weapon ambition belong in the article is one issue, but the IAEA's current stance on the remaining verification issues is rather clear and it should be represented accurately. I am open to paraphrasing, but the summarisation should reflect what the IAEA has been saying. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 03:26, 7 March 2008 (UTC)

I think a neutral summary needs to indicate that Iran violated its NPT safeguards obligations for many years by hiding work on enrichment and reprocessing - the very technologies that are necessary to produce materials for nuclear weapons. As IAEA Director General ElBaradei has stated repeatedly, that created a "confidence deficit." That is, the previously clandestine program has raised doubts about the nature and intent of Iran's nuclear program. This is why the UN Security Council has demanded that Iran suspend that program. The fact that Iran has come close to meeting its safeguards obligations, while it continues to pursue this program in open defiance of the Security Council, does not erase those questions. A summary that omits these facts is not neutral.

As to whether Iran belongs on this page, I think it is the only one of the three listed (the others are Taiwan and Syria) that comes close to fitting the title of this article. If this article is split into two - one on countries that have (or had) nuclear weapons and another with countries that have, had, are or were suspected of having nuclear weapons programs, Iran could be removed from this article but placed at the top of the list of the new article. NPguy (talk) 03:36, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

A neutral wording can certainly document why the investigation was began and why it is on-going, but it should also note some of the progress from 5 years of investigation. 'Questions' just seems to be very ambiguous and only document one side..

Noting previous issues, continued enrichment, failure to fully and permanently implent the Additional Protocol, etc. are all fine as long as they represent the document and a different viewpoint is also provided. So, it'd probably be best for us to reach an acceptable version here.. I'd encourage you to start with one of the issues provided or your own, but to then note resolution of some major issues, lack of any specific evidence, Iranian rationale for continuing enrichment, etc. If you can't come up with one I'll try, but I tend to have spacial constraint issues.. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 23:26, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

Here is an example proposal:

The United Nations Security Council has imposed sanctions against Iran three times, because Iran refuses to suspend its nuclear enrichment. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been been able to resolve many outstanding issues of Iran's nuclear program but continues verification on alleged weapon studies and the status of Iranian uranium enrichment. Iran has argued the Security Council sanctions compel Iran to abandon its rights under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology.

I'm not perfectly attached to it, but it

• presents previous and current problems while acknowledging progress
• presents important specifics rather than ambiguous terms
• presents the perspectives of the most relevant parties

I'm not perfectly happy with it, but I would work with that or something similar you propose.. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 01:22, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

That's incomplete since it doesn't say why the Security Council imposed sanctions. I propose the following:

After investigating previously undeclared elements of Iran's nuclear program, the IAEA reported Iran's non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations in 2006. The UN Security Council demanded that Iran suspend uranium enrichment activities and imposed sanctions three times when Iran refused to do so. A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate of December 3, 2007 judged that Iran halted an active nuclear weapons program in fall 2003. Iran has stated that it categorically rejects the development of nuclear weapons.

In that context, the current status of the IAEA investigation is not essential since it answers the what but not the why of Iran's secret nuclear activities. You could add the IAEA's equivocal finding of "no evidence" of links to weapons and inability to verify the peaceful nature of Iran's program, but I don't think that adds much. NPguy (talk) 17:04, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

The current status of the IAEA investigation is essential because it verifies many of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear activities, and says the only major remaining issue is "alleged weapon studies" which so far have yet to turn anything up (and which the IAEA was able to share with Iran only right before the latest report, making it hard for Iran to directly respond to). The IAEA has also verified "the scope and nature of Iran´s enrichment programme". I think the first sentence should document the accusations/sanctions/..., the second sentence should document IAEA progress and continued needs, while the last sentence should document the Iranian perspective or response. So I guess I would propose:

After the IAEA found Iran in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations in 2006, the UN Security Council demanded that Iran suspend uranium enrichment activities and imposed three sets of sanctions against Iran. The IAEA reports it has clarified "all the remaining outstanding issues" of Iran's nuclear program except for "alleged weaponization studies that supposedly Iran has conducted in the past." Iran states that it categorically rejects the development of nuclear weapons.

Acknowledging the reason for sanctions is fine, but the IAEA's latest report and the Iranian perspective certainly would be acknowledged as well. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 18:25, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

The fact that Iran cheated on its safeguards agreement for 18 years with a clandestine enrichment program (a fact you have omitted) is more important than the fact that the IAEA has now figured out the scope (but not really the nature) of that program. Without clarification, the reference to "all outstanding issues" would suggest that Iran's underlying non-compliance has been (nearly) resolved. Since the Security Council demanded a suspension of enrichment as a necessary step to resolve questions about the peaceful nature of Iran's program, that seems misleading. NPguy (talk) 00:42, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

What we are doing is quoting the sources. You recommended including the IAEA's findings about Iran's previous noncompliance, so it was added in. The Security Council's demands are also being included, so I don't understand what your problem is. If you aren't happy with the paragraph, then come up with something you are happy with and suggest it instead. The director general of the IAEA has made these statements, and they are being quoted directly (they are found in the latest IAEA report as well); specifically, the document says the IAEA has resolved "the scope and nature of Iran´s enrichment programme" (note: the IAEA still needs to resolve "alleged weapon studies" and have the Additional Protocol implemented to verify the scope and nature of all of Iran's undeclared activities). So if you feel a fact has been glazed over, I would be happy if you'd point it out and make a new suggestion, but I don't understand how you can argue with the IAEA about what it has said. The only major issues I'm aware of that the IAEA is investigating are alleged weapons studies that Iran has supposedly conducted in the past and enrichment which Iran claims it has a right to, but please enlighten with whatever else.. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 06:19, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

I know this is frustrating. I haven't had time to look up references to fix this. One factual point: I do not find the cited quote that the IAEA has resolved the scope and nature of Iran's enrichment program. I may get to this in the next week or so. This can wait. NPguy (talk) 01:39, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

I appreciate you're just trying to reflect the history. For your reference, the IAEA http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/iranreport0208.html source] says "... we have managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of Iran´s enrichment programme...". This release came out before the latest sanctions and UNSEC resolution though, so I believe the statement will change slightly as the IAEA begins a few new tasks it was given. If you can come up with a specific wording for the past issues, I think I'd be open if a citation is also provided.. Beyond that, maybe it is better to see what the IAEA says after the sanctions and enrichment were added to its plate.. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 06:23, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

The rhetoric indeed seems to have shifted somewhat (though I'm not sure how much has to do with the latest sanctions). More recently, ElBaradei has told reporters the IAEA is in a "stalemate" and that it cannot resolve "outstanding issues of concern", while also saying the Agency had "not seen any diversion of nuclear materials... nor the capacity to produce weapons usable materials". I still believe the quote should show some signs of progress from four years of investigation, but the quotes make it clear that there is still a significant amount of investigation going on.. Sorry about the nitpicking earlier.. --68.23.8.245 (talk) 06:26, 16 March 2008 (UTC)

I updated the text in the article. Hopefully this resolves most of the issues about unresolved issues.. --68.23.8.245 (talk) 06:53, 16 March 2008 (UTC)

Thanks. I added a sentence at the front identifying the root cause as Iran's sareguards violations and secret enrichment program. NPguy (talk) 01:08, 17 March 2008 (UTC)

I tried to reduce the wordage in the lead a bit since this article is supposed to be about a lot of states, but I tried to maintain the meaning.. --68.23.8.245 (talk) 06:16, 17 March 2008 (UTC)

I hate to go in to nitpicking mode again, but both the sources cited say Iran had many "failures and breaches" of obligations under its Safeguard Agreement including "reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material had been processed and stored"; however, the sources do not specifically mention secret enrichment activities as far as I can tell. Both documents do call on Iran to immediately suspend its enrichment.

So I think it would be fine to say Iran's failures/breaches of its obligations under its Safeguard Agreement, specifically listing any of the things listed in the quote above. I also think it would be fine to note the IAEA calling on Iran to immediately suspend its enrichment. The document doesn't say that Iran "violated" its safeguard agreement by pursuing a "secret uranium enrichment program" though. I'm only open to this wording if it can be specifically presented in a source. Again, sorry for the nitpicking. --68.23.8.245 (talk) 08:04, 17 March 2008 (UTC)

The IAEA reports say "failures and breaches," but the Board of Governors resolution in September 2005 says "non-compliance," which is synonymous with violation. NPguy (talk) 03:23, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

• ""Iran’s policy of concealment has resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with its Safeguards Agreement"
• "Recalling Iran’s failures in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 214)..."

Those are two of the relevant quotes I can find in the reports cited. The word non-compliance or violations may have come up in other reports (or may have been in the spirit of these resolutions), but it also may not have been. To avoid potential disputes, it would be best to stick as close to the language of the reports as possible. Using the word non-compliance is fine with me if you can point out where it appears.. --68.23.8.245 (talk) 12:15, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

The two key paragraphs of the September 2005 resolution are the first two operative paragraphs:

The Board of Governors, . . .

1. Finds that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute;

2. Finds also that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director General’s report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;

The relevant excerpts from the February 2006 resolution are:

The Board of Governors, . . .

2. Requests the Director General . . . to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue;

Article XII.C of the Statute requires the Board to report non-compliance to the Security Council. Normally that is done at the same time as the non-compliance finding, but in this case the Board chose to separate the two actions.

In any case it is not the reports of the Director General, but the decisions of the Board of Governors, that are definitive.

Please don't go back and edit the text to quote this more directly. That will make the text less readable and no more accurate. NPguy (talk) 03:10, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

Just to point out, the quotes you provided still don't support the original version which was edited out of the article. Some might argue that "violates" and "secret enrichment program" carry certain connotations with them, as others might argue that a correct summarisation of the document is that Iran had a "discontinuity in particular aspects of its safeguards program" which "required Security Council channels for resolution". This is why it would be best to stick as close to the language of the document as possible (and provide a blockquote with citations to help readers quickly locate the material you are using). --68.23.8.245 (talk) 03:47, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

The quotes I cited support the statement that Iran "violated its safeguards agreement." You have to read a little farther than those resolutions - particularly the IAEA report of November 2003 which those resolutions cite - to see that the "history or concealment" and "many failures and breaches" refer mainly to Iran's having kept its enrichment program secret from the IAEA. It's all there. NPguy (talk) 01:47, 20 March 2008 (UTC)

Using either of those quotes is fine. The point is for the reader to be able to verify that these are the actual findings of the IAEA, and not the analysis of a well-informed, well-intentioned, etc. analyst. That Iran "violated its safeguards agreement" may or may not be true, but the information has to be attributed and verifiable. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 22:39, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

Someone just reverted my change, inappropriately. The relevant quotes from the two resolutions are cited above. NPguy (talk) 03:19, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

The quotes still say non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute, not non compliance with its safeguards agreement per se. The article must have verifiable material. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 14:51, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

Article XII.C is the mechanism for reporting non-compliance with safeguards agreements. There is no other possible form of non-compliance at issue with Iran. NPguy (talk) 14:57, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

If the document doesn't say this, then I believe you may be engaging in original research. The best way to resolve this would probably be through dispute resolution or a third opinion. I believe it is very important not to bend the language of the sources, specifically given your past misinterpretations. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 15:02, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

References

Problems with original analysis

In regards to our discussion about the IAEA reports in the lead, Wikipedia: No original research states:

Wikipedia does not publish original research (OR) or original thought. This includes unpublished facts, arguments, speculation, and ideas; and any unpublished analysis or synthesis of published material that serves to advance a position. ... you must cite reliable sources that provide information directly related to the topic of the article, and that directly support the information as it is presented.

So the issue is about whether the IAEA references cited support the position that the IAEA found Iran in "non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement". The IAEA document cited says "Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute". So either Iran had "many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement" or Iran's actions "constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute". Using the language of the documents is required by WP:V, and is especially important given past original analysis issues with this topic.

I welcome NPguy's response to this, and would encourage any other editors to leave their feedback as well. I see nothing wrong with using either of the quotes supplied, finding another IAEA document which supports the statements being made, etc. I'm also curious what is so wrong with directly paraphrasing the IAEA quotes given above. Whether we agree or not though, Wikipedia requires sources which directly support the material being added. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 16:38, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

If we wish to make the assertions noted using NPGuy's language, it may be more appropriate to cite the US Department of State:

"It is clear now that for 18 years, while portraying itself as in full compliance with the NPT, Iran violated safeguards, engaged in deception and denial, and conducted undeclared, clandestine experiments in all sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle," he said. "Iran's pattern of deception and denial continued even after the commencement of investigations by the IAEA; we believe it continues to this day. Iran grudgingly admits to facets of its sprawling secret nuclear program only when confronted with evidence that disproves its previous denials."- America.gov: U.S. Cites Response to NPT Noncompliance As Greatest Challenge

It is clearly wrong to read information or labels from the US Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs in to the IAEA's report though, just as it would be wrong to read Iranian denials in to them. The documents should speak for themselves (which would require using quotes, paraphrases which aren't challenged, etc). --68.253.50.109 (talk) 16:48, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

I have also found a source from the US delegation which uses similar language, a source from the IAEA which uses the language with North Korea, and one from the IAEA which describes why they don't use this characterization with Iran. I don't understand why using the IAEA language is so controversial when we are reporting what they are saying, and I have selected a quote from the IAEA which NPguy recommdended above. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 16:30, 31 March 2008 (UTC)

This whole discussion is assinine and pedantic. Iran was found in non-compliance. With what? The only actions cited were failures to comply with its safeguards agreement. That's the only legal obligation that the Board could have been referring to. This is not original research. It's understood by all in the nuclear nonproliferation community. It's inappropriate to link it to the U.S. government since it's universally understood. The insistence on direct quotes - as opposed to summaries - of the basic document has left us with a muddled and incomprehensible mess instead of a crisp summary of the facts. I find it hard to believe that people are making so much effort to take a clear explanation and make it muddy.NPguy (talk) 04:00, 1 April 2008 (UTC)

WP:V is neither assinine nor pedantic. The IAEA uses the language it does for a reason, and the resolutions which are voted on undergo many draft versions and are voted on in a particular final form (one in the nuclear nonproliferation field might know this?). To one in the "nuclear nonproliferation community" (of which country?) it may be universal, but to other parties (notably the IAEA which is being cited) there may be (and is) a very particular reason why certain language is used. A clear explanation is stating what the document says, not summarizing it with certain assumptions. So any of these are fine:

After the IAEA Board of Governors

• reported Iran's failures to meet obligations of its NPT Safeguards Agreement
• found Iran breached obligations of its NPT Safeguards Agreement
• found Iran in non compliance with the Agency's Statute

These are three easy to read statements which are actually supported by the IAEA documents cited. Rather than continually getting miffed, it would be better to propose something which is easy to understand and which is directly supported by the documents.. If you still find these statements lacking, then just propose something here which is directly supported by the sources. --68.253.50.109 (talk) 11:41, 1 April 2008 (UTC)

What is pedantic is insisting on repeating the words of the resolution verbatim rather than trying to understand what they mean. The resolution cites "non compliance" and refers to Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. This does not mean that Iran violated Article XII.C (the suggestion in the third bullet above is incorrect). Violations of the statute are dealt with elsewhere (mainly Article XIX). Article XII.C is the mechanism in the Statute for responding to safeguards violations. It says that safeguards inspectors shall report non-compliance to the Director General, who shall report to the Board of Governors and the Board shall report it to the Security Council. The Board has ultimate responsibility for deciding what is and is not "non-compliance."

Article XII.C It refers to non-compliance with conditions in an agreement between the State and the IAEA. The relevant agreements are those that relate to safegaurds, which are described in Article III.A.5. In this case, the agreement in question is Iran's safeguards agreement. By its own terms, that safeguards agreement is pursuant to the requirements of the NPT. Such agreements are known as "NPT safeguards agreements."

The Board of Governors has made a non-compliance finding under Article XII.C on six other occasions: once in Iraq (1991), once in Romania (1992), three times in North Korea (1993, 1994, 2003) and once in Libya (2004). In each case the non-compliance was with an NPT safeguards agreement.

The fact that Article XII.C is the mechanism for reporting safeguards violations is widely understood - and seems fairly obvious.

The central element of the September 2005 resolution is the "finding" of "non-compliance" with Iran's NPT safeguards agreement. The central element of the February 2006 resolution is the "report" of that finding to the UN Security Council. If you want to amplify, you could add the secondary finding (from September 2005) that Iran's nuclear program raised questions of international peace and security (as provided in Article III.B.4).

One final point - just as the Board of Directors is a part of the corporation it directs, the Board of Governors is part of the IAEA. Under the Statute, it is the part of the IAEA responsible for identifying and reporting safeguards non-compliance. So it is perfectly accurate to say that the IAEA took action - just as we might say that the UN acted based on a decision of the Security Council or a company acted based on a decision of its Board.

So it is entirely accurate - and not in any way misleading - to summarize the two cited sources by saying:

The IAEA reported Iran's non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement to the UN Security Council.

Since this is the overview, there is no need to amplify on this summary, but further explanation could be provided elsewhere - either further down in the body of the article or through a link to a separate article. Stringing together quotes from the resolution serves only to obscure the point - not clarify. It is not more accurate to use any of the formulations you suggest; in fact, they are all less accurate (and less comprehensible) summaries of the two resolutions. NPguy (talk) 02:35, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

I see no stringing together of quotes, I see a desire to reflect the sources via Wikipedia's policies of WP:V and WP:NOR which I have explored above. I will note that the only reason that using these quotes is necessary is because your past interpretations of the IAEA documents have more reflected the view of the US IAEA delegation or US State Department than those of the document itself. The very fact that you disagree with my paraphrasings is why quotes were introduced (to avoid any potential misparaphrasings).

When there is a debate about the meaning of documents, WP policy says that passages open to interpretation should be precisely cited or avoided. WP:NPOV also requires including significant viewpoints, and what might be relevant to include here is the fact that the resolution also called on Iran to return to the negotiation table or that the resolution passsed in a vote with 12 abstentions (which is fairly rare, as noted in the American Society of International Law source).

I believe that your paraphrasing is fundamentally correct, but that it does not capture some of the other main points associated with the document (i.e. calls to return to the negotiating table, how uncommon a non-consensus decision is, etc). Nonetheless, here is another proposition:

After the IAEA found Iran in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement in a rare non-consensus decision, ...

So if we don't want to 'pedantically' quote the source, then we have to reach a consensus about the paraphrasing. Try to propose a few more if you disagree with the one I have come up with.--68.253.50.109 (talk) 16:41, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

Another option would be:

After the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Iran three times when it refused to suspend enrichment. Iran argues that the sanctions are illegal and compel it to abandon its rights under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology.

Here we would offer an attributed Iranian opinion that the sanctions are illegal (supported by an information circular Iran provided to the Agency recently). My concern is just to stay close to the document and to offer multiple perspectives.--68.253.50.109 (talk) 20:32, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

That is much better, but it still misses one key fact: that Iran had kept its enrichment program secret for 18 years. I propose the following (with appropriate references):

In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Iran three times in 2006-2008 after Iran refused to suspend its previously undeclared uranium enrichment program. Iran argues that the sanctions are illegal and compel it to abandon its rights under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology.

—Preceding unsigned comment added by NPguy (talk • contribs) 02:24, 3 April 2008 (UTC)

I'm mostly okay with what you suggest, I'm just not sure why you'd want to include a timeline on the sanctions as the sanctions are quire current and ongoing. Also wasn't sure how my proposal missed "that Iran had kept its enrichment program secret for 18 years" and how yours compensated for this, but again yours looks mostly alright to me. I think putting a timeline on the sanctions makes it look like they ended though. --68.253.35.13 (talk) 08:23, 3 April 2008 (UTC)

The delete the dates on the sanction. The only important date is 2005. If this is OK I'l make the change tomorrow, including citations. NPguy (talk) 01:30, 4 April 2008 (UTC)

I went ahead and made the changes as I think we agreed to. If there's anything else, I don't think it should be as major of an issue.. --68.253.35.13 (talk) 03:51, 4 April 2008 (UTC)

Syria

There is no consensus that Syria is pursuing NW. Besides which, this is not a page about who is pursuing NW, but about who has NW. CP Guy, April 28, 2008 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.76.89.7 (talk) 17:14, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

I disagree on this one. With the revelation of on-site photographs of an undeclared production reactor, and with the White House statement, I think there is about as good a basis for listing Syria as Iran. As long as the issue is whether they are accused of having a nuclear weapons program, I think Syria fits the bill. Consensus is not the criterion, or else Iran would not be listed. I do think the entry Syria could be shortened.

I'll let this discussion go on, but my inclination is to restore a shortened entry for Syria. The alternative would be to take out Iran as well and start a new page on States accused/suspected of having nuclear weapons programs, either now or in the past. NPguy (talk) 00:51, 29 April 2008 (UTC)

You raise a good point. I've actually been pretty uncomfortable with Iran being listed on this page. I would be much more comfortable with a "states accused of pursuing nuclear weapons" page than Iran being listed here. It does not have NW, so it should not be listed. Similarly, I deleted the weapons sharing section. Seriously, does anyone think that a state that has American NW on their soil, under American guards, that can only be detonated using American codes, is the same thing as having an indigenous arsenal? CP Guy —Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.76.89.7 (talk) 16:47, 29 April 2008 (UTC)

If you want to create other pages as new main pages for countries in weapons sharing programs (ex-USSR states might count as well) and states credibly accused of weapons programs, and link to those main pages from here, that's fine.

Continuing to just delete sections off this article and making the content go away entirely, without moving it, is vandalism, and not appropriate behavior.

198.76.89.7 - You have already violated Wikipedia's 3 revert limit policy on this article. Further reversions of the content will lead to a 24 hour block on your editing, per the 3RR policy. If you create a new page and move content and link to it, that will be acceptable. But no more reversions / vandalism. Please work harder to find consensus on the talk page here, and avoid deleting material. Thank you. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 23:22, 29 April 2008 (UTC)

I think it's fine to list the material with countervailing opinions, but I also think it would be appropriate to start another list for states "credibly" accused of weapons programs. What constitutes a credible accusation is another matter, but that could be taken care of there. The controversy seems to be semantic, and I think this would resolve it. --68.72.46.218 (talk) 23:50, 29 April 2008 (UTC)

Greenland?

On the associated map, Greenland is shown as "Suspected Nuclear Weapon State". I wonder...

1. Greenland is not a state.

2. As part of Denmark it is supposed to be a nuclear weapon free zone.

Is it maybe because of the U.S. Airforce bases? They purportedly did not normally station nuclear weapons on Greenland, and even if they did do it in secret at one time, I doubt very much that is the case today. The days of nuclear bomb carrying B-52's lumbering around the polar regions must surely be ancient history now. --RenniePet (talk) 19:44, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

India estimates

As there's been some editing back and forth on the article...

To the IP editor - You appear to be misreading the nuclearweaponarchive.org data you cited. The reference of "up to 1,000" weapons was the quantity that might be produced if India had reprocessed and separated its entire national inventory of plutonium, which they clearly (by all sources) have not done or tried to do. All the sources agree that though India has a significant quantity of raw material available, they aren't actively weaponizing it all. Plutonium sitting in unreprocessed reactor fuel isn't useful for making nuclear weapons at all. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 02:31, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

Map

The map doesn't show Greece as a NATO nuclear weapons sharing country, which it is. 88.109.71.149 (talk) 02:37, 14 July 2008 (UTC)

India and NSG

Does NSG granting India a clean waiver and allowing it civilian nuclear commerce count as India's admission in the "nuclear weapons states" list? That is what india's biggest english newspaper says: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India_gets_NSG_waiver_at_Vienna/articleshow/3452272.cms

any comments on this one? should we be updating the map and the article to include that? Lucifer (Talk) 23:00, 8 September 2008 (UTC)

The NSG waiver does not constitute formal recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state. The only definition of a nuclear weapon state that has international standing is that in the NPT: a state that tested a nuclear device before 1967. The article cited above referred to India as a "nuclear weapons power" being welcomed into the "nuclear club," but these are not terms that has any formal meaning internationally. NPguy (talk) 00:05, 9 September 2008 (UTC)

Alright, makes sense. (Makes sense in the sense that it makes sense according to the definition. The definition itself however does not make any sense, atleast not according to commonsense). But well, in any case, we'll just leave it as it is. Thanks for the clarification :D Lucifer (Talk) 15:18, 9 September 2008 (UTC)

The NSG waiver puts India into the club without signing the NPT. So the list can be Nuclear weapons states from the NPT/NSG WavierChanakyathegreat (talk) 14:57, 15 September 2008 (UTC)

No. I don't understand this obsession with being part of a club. There is no club. India has nuclear weapons, but the term "nuclear weapon state" is defined only in the NPT, and does not apply to India. The NSG has not changed this definition. NPguy (talk) 01:42, 16 September 2008 (UTC)

Page semi-protected indefinitely

Apparently IP editors in India and Pakistan can't restrain themselves from edit-warring over their respective countries' nuclear capabilities and programs. As this is not acceptable editing behavior on Wikipedia, the ability of IP editors and brand new accounts to edit this page has been turned off (for now, without any end date - semi-permanently, though this is always appealable or overridable by another administrator...). Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 05:21, 20 September 2008 (UTC)

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The case of India

With the implementation of the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement, India can now be regarded as a de-facto nuclear weapons state. So, shouldn't the article mention this development? --128.211.201.161 (talk) 07:07, 2 October 2008 (UTC)

Issues

Please update this article with regards to the Indo-US deal. And another thing is that there's contradictory information pertaining estimated number of warheads between the sections for various countries and the table. The most bizzare contradictions are for China and India. Please look into it. 60.50.79.177 (talk) 14:57, 2 October 2008 (UTC)`

India's stockpile

The table says 100-140, but the citation says 40-50. Another reference (not used here but cited in India and weapons of mass destruction) says 45-95. So it seems to me that we should change the table here to say 40-95, consistent with the references. NPguy (talk) 01:45, 7 November 2008 (UTC)

New Discussion

A discussion has been started at Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Countries/Lists of countries which could affect the inclusion criteria and title of this and other lists of countries. Editors are invited to participate. Pfainuk talk 11:59, 17 December 2008 (UTC)

Poland

Poland had also nuclear weapons (about 200 of nuclear missiles and 70 rocket launchers for them) delivered from Russia in early 60s. They were sent back to Russia at the end of 60s.

http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludowe_Wojsko_Polskie - Broń jądrowa na terytorium Polski —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.143.40.15 (talk) 23:00, 20 December 2008 (UTC)

You seem to be somewhat misrepresenting the source, which was http://www.dziennik.pl/polityka/article18599/Polska_miala_arsenal_broni_nuklearnej.html.

It says that there were three Russian weapons depots built in Poland, with weapons which would have been issued to Polish units to fire in case of a nuclear war with the west.

This is similar to the weapons sharing agreements that the US had with some NATO allies. But doesn't indicate that Poland ever actually had posession of any weapons. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 04:40, 21 December 2008 (UTC)

It depends on how you interpret the word "have". Nuclear weapons were the territory od Poland and in case of war with NATO Poland would use them. For me it means that Poland HAD nuclears weapons and it's worth mentioning in the article. My mistake is that I said the weapons were sent back to Russia at the end of 60s, I can't find when it was in this Dziennik article.--83.143.40.15 (talk) 01:34, 6 January 2009 (UTC)

Might it be worth expanding the weapons-sharing section? We currently only discuss NATO, without ever mentioning what Warsaw Pact variants on the theme there may have been. Shimgray | talk | 14:26, 1 January 2009 (UTC)