Talk:Idealism/Archive 1

Archive 1

Ambigous "mistake?" question

Is the introduction mistaken!? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.134.44.83 (talk) 01:46, 11 August 2010 (UTC)

"Western" civilization

i must protest against the term that is used in first sentence. why "western" civilization? why would there be a need to differ between a western and an eastern civilisation while speaking about idealism which is meant to be universal?! idealism doesn't concern either west or east specificly. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.178.230.94 (talk) 01:44, 14 October 2008 (UTC)

Stove

Stove's terrible argument is held to "refute" Berkeley -- an utter failure to take a NPOV. GeneCallahan (talk) 22:17, 15 June 2010 (UTC)

Plato

I have removed this paragraph from the section on Plato (who shouldn't really be in here anyway):

"However, speaking in the realm of pure abstract theory, even if Plato doesn't share the specific concerns of modern philosophy, and of George Berkeley, in particular, Plato could still be a non-subjective idealist. Plato could believe that matter has no so-called independent existence, that ultimate reality (distinct from mere appearance) is known only in the world of ideas—should we care to speculate in purely hypothetical terms. Bernard Williams and Myles Burnyeat have surmised that Greek philosophers never conceived of so-called idealism as an option, because they lacked Descartes's conception of an independently existing mind. However, Plato could have held an idealism like Kant's, which argues from the nature of knowledge to the nature of the objects of knowledge; or he might have subscribed to a form of Absolute Idealism, which denies that matter is ultimately real—without perhaps (in either case) reducing so-called material objects to ideas in a mind or minds. Moreover, we conjecture, Plato's theory of the separation of soul and body could be seen as an earlier, primitive form of Cartesian dualism."

This passage is full of wild speculation by someone who sounds like they (at best) have a passing acquaintance with the Republic. That Plato believed matter had independent (if formless) existence is evidenced by the Timaeus. The notion that the Greeks (or Plato, anyway) had no concept of an independently existing mind is equally ill informed, as the separate existence of the soul/mind is essentially the thesis of the Phaedo (pace Williams). Plato could not have held an idealism like Kant's (the ontology of works like the Symposium, Republic and Timaeus is virtually the opposite of that of the Critique and Prolegomena); this should be obvious to anyone who's read their works. So far from being an Absolute Idealist, Plato is emphatically not an idealist of any kind, in fact he insists that the ιδεαι have being independent of both mind and matter (cf. Smp. 211b and Tim. 52a). Plato's soul-body ideas are certainly similar to Descartes, but Descartes isn't an idealist either. In all, the whole section on Plato needs a rewrite. T of Locri (talk) 05:04, 17 January 2010 (UTC)

Plato

Everything but the first sentence of this section has numerous problems, it seems not salvageable to me.

1) the second sentence says "some". who?

2) the whole rest of the section has not one single footnote. It reads like original research or the opinions of someone who holds a particular reading of Plato, which is opposed to the consensus of peer-reviewed publications.

3) it discusses some philospher as "anti-platonists" for the reading of Plato. This term has no meaning, except that the author appears to believe that anyone who disagrees with his/her reading is thereby against Plato. It is a pejorative, ad-hominem reasoning.

4) It gives a long list of what is required to understand Plato. Not relevant to the subject, not supported by references, and implying those who hold differing views from the author do so because of inadequate ability to read Plato- all apparently the unsupported opinion of the author.

5) it makes a conclusion in the last sentence of the first paragraph that is completely unsupported by reasoning, by references, etc. justified only by the term "it seems". Again, apparently the opinion of the author who seems to consider himself/herself an authority because, by implication, he/she satisfies the long list of attributes given in the previous two sentences.

6) it accuses some positions as being the result of working from translations rather than the original greek, without saying who or substantiating the claim.

7) it talks of the "so-called modern" etc. Charged, emotional, judgmental terminology.

This passage reads like it was written by a member of a religious group self-identified as "Platonist" with an idiosyncratic reading of Plato and opposed to the consensus or mainstream academic views. They may have injected their unsupported views throughout Wikipedia articles on Plato.

It appears to be the original research and or opinion of one person, the author. I is not at all verifiable.

This passage should be completely be re-written to fit the standards of Wikipedia. Meanwhile, if not mostly removed, I think it should at least be marked up to indicate missing references, pejorative terms, original research, specifying who is being talked about etc. Someone with the proper background should check through entries for Plato, Platonism, Plotinus, and Proclus for similar expressions of unverifiable sectarian opinion.

-Ricemilk 9/18/2010

How about saving criticism for the discussion page? All the [who?] and pointing out missing references gets in the way of the actual information. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 120.17.224.192 (talk) 07:05, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

Read this page: Wikipedia:Template messages/Cleanup. Marking the article with missing references and other violations of wikipedia style standard practice on wikipedia to speed cleanup of articles. The author should also read this page: Wikipedia:Neutral point of view and this page: Wikipedia:Citing sources.

from Citing sources: "When to cite sources: The policy on sourcing is Verifiability, which requires inline citations for any material challenged or likely to be challenged, and for all quotations. The policy is strictly applied to all material in the mainspace—articles, lists, captions, and sections of articles—without exception."

"To ensure that all Wikipedia content is verifiable, anyone may question an uncited claim by inserting a tag." (from wikihow)

There is only single citation here, and it is merely to a translation of a dialogue, not to support for the claim being made. Wikipedia policy is that articles should support all claims that are not common knowledge with inline citations. The standard for Wikipedia is not (someone's idea of) truth, but verifiability. Also, an article should represent all the main differing points of view in order to be NPOV.

RiceMilk (talk) 03:12, 23 October 2010 (UTC)

RiceMilk (talk) 03:12, 23 October 2010 (UTC)

Various

Dear Yorick, Thanks for your "attempt to clarify" Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel, in the "Idealism" article. You have brought out additional features of K's critique. I don't know if you realize that you erased the paragraph beginning "In fairness to Hegel...," which indicated how Hegel could respond to some of K's critiques. If this was intentional, I would suggest that "attempting to clarify" is hardly a sufficient justification for removing this material, which I have replaced. Best, Bob Wallace 17:03, 6 July 2007 (UTC)

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Please see comments at Talk:Materialism for comments regarding the contradiction between this article on idealism and the article on materialism. McDivitt Oct 03 2006

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To the distinguished authors of these comment pages. I would like to know: where can information on the so-called 'crisis of idealism' be found? I mean the one in the early 20th century. Karl Reinhardt alludes to something comparable in his famous essay 'die Sinneskrise bei Euripides', and there are useful thoughts in anne simon's (a little more recent) article 'proust ou la crise de l'idealisme'. as a little aspiring philologist i find it hard to gain decent access to those central issues, as they seem to me. so many obscure texts could be so much better understood, if only... tachelbel214@hotmail.com, if you please. Thank you and apologies for the intrusion. F.S.

F.S. Look at "Reason and Analysis", By Brand Blanshard. Im sure it will answer many of your concerns. -Alex

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New Intro Paragraph/Plato/Kant

I would welcome comments on what I've done with the Intro paragraph, as well as with the section on Plato. I agree with the editorial committee's comment that this topic is "Vital," and I hope that the article is beginning to move toward the level of clarity and sophistication that befit the topic. I would be very happy to see other people who care about the topic weighing in. One area that could particularly use help from a knowledgeable person is the two sections on Kant. Wikipedia's main article on Kant himself is admirable; could some of you Kantians put in a little work on this article? Bob Wallace 01:58, 1 July 2007 (UTC)

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To describe this page as grossly inadequate would be an understatement. --Daniel C. Boyer

Would you deign to explain why it is inadequate so that the inadequacy can be made adequate?

205.188.117.10 00:02, 16 September 2005 (UTC)Braithwaite Prendergast

The second sentence is incomplete. Minor, but it suggests sloppiness.

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Change Platonism from "see also" list to mention in body? --Daniel C. Boyer

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I take issue with the following statement from the article:

Religion is, strictly speaking, idealist in nature, as would be any belief in the supernatural.

Belief in religion or the supernatural does not necessarily entail belief that the material world is somehow less real or less important. Within the history of Christianity, that view was put forth by some or all gnostics and was specifically rejected by mainstream Christianity. Orthodox Christianity specifically affirms the reality and goodness of the material world, especially in the Feast of the Nativity when Christ took on human flesh and a human nature, and the Feast of Theophany, when Christ blessed the physical water at his baptism. Orthodox Christianity affirms that Christ rose bodily from the dead, that Christ's human flesh remains part of him and therefore part of the Holy Trinity, and that we can all look forward to physical resurrection as well.

In short, if the current definition of idealism is correct, then the statement about religion needs to be narrowed so that it only covers those religions about which it is true. Wesley

Corrected this to some extent. I would appreciate it if you would do any further work you think is required. --Daniel C. Boyer

Thank you Daniel, you summarized my comments very well in the article. I made a small adjustment to steer further away from docetism, but it seems reasonably accurate now in that respect.

Wesley

Mr. Wesley

I respectfully disagree with your comment. I believe there is a misunderstanding. Please note that idealism versus materialism does not mean more real or, as you say:

“less real or less important.”

Idealism and materialism are two approaches to define reality, not measures of reality. In a very imperfect way we can say that Idealism states that our notion of reality lives in our mind and materialism states that things exist by their selves. We can say religion is based on idealist thought because we find the existence of god with our mind and not as an experienced outside object. I believe you might now agree that religion can be considered as idealistic. Actually there’s few people now days that still believe on a materialistic world where ideas exist independently of the mind. Have you ever seen perfect triangles?

Finally, you might disagree, and I find that fascinating, but if you come from a religious point of view, then that opinion belongs to a religious article.

I suggest we restore the paragraph, and add the different ideas that idealists like HUME or even Thomas Aquinas have said about religion. I’m intrigued about why all that material about religion is missing here.

-Alex

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Sorry, but this sentence still strikes me as funny:

All religion and belief in the supernatural is not, strictly speaking, materialist in nature

And I suspect that the problem is introducing religion at all in the argument. Maybe trying to characterize religion in terms of idealism versus materialism is like mixing metaphors. Maybe religion and philosophy are for the most part trying to answer different questions through different means?

I always thought Greek philosophy (whence we derive this opposition between idealism and materialism) started as an alternative to mythology and what we today call religion. I realize that much of theology is based on attempts to bring philosophy into religion -- thus there are neoplatonists like Philo and aristotleians like Maimonides; one could thus talk of idealist and materialist influences on theology. But even theology is not quite the same thing as religion. If I am wrong, I would expect there to be considerable scholarhip in the history of philosophy and the history of religion that addresses these issues. Since this is to be an encyclopedia article, I suggest cutting these broad general claims and using the space to inform the public of these debates among scholars. Whoever put in the stuff on religion -- couldn't you instead review the extant literature on the intersection between theology and philosophy and the influence of materialists and idealists on theology? Slrubenstein

Idealism clearly had a strong influence on at least two heresies I can think of: gnosticism and docetism. Many of the Church Fathers in the East were well educated, and were probably influenced more by Plato than by Aristotle. I honestly don't know how accurate it would be to call them neoplatonists though, especially since I'm not sufficiently familiar with platonism to know how much of it they accepted.

Now, I don't know how much of this needs to be in the article, or if any of it does. But replacing the generalities with more detailed specifics would almost certainly lead to a better article. Wesley

yes, this detail is very interest -- and it shows that at the very least Christianity has had a complex relationship with "idealism." I am glad you bring it up -- nevertheless, I think it is too tangential for this particular article.

I think it would be best to excise all or almost all reference to religion in this article, but to have a link to theology, and have a section in that article discussing the relationship between religion and philosophy in general, and debates over idealism and materialism within religion in particular. Slrubenstein

International Relations

This article leaves much to be desired. No reference is made to the term's use in the field of international relations. In this sense,"Idealism" is used interchangeably with the more common term "liberalism" -- one of the two main schools of theory in this field. Maybe a new section and a link is in order? I don't know how, or I'd do it myself. --TheBlindProphet 12:33, 6 Oct 2004 (UTC)

If you just type in the raw text, BP, we'll fix it up nice and format it as a section with links and such. --Gary D 20:33, Oct 6, 2004 (UTC)

I agree with TheBlindProphet. It's laughable that this article is identified within Wikipedia as "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism" without a parenthetical (Philosophy), though arguably the vast majority of the English speaking world defines "idealism" (lower case "i" intentional) in a far more general sense. It's fine and good that there's a disambiguation page, but there is simply no Wikipedia article that describes "idealism" in the sense it's usually meant: as the general idea that one's life should be guided by morals (ideals) rather than (possibly amoral) real-world practical strategies.

It's worth mentioning that the Wikipedia article about Idealism as a political movement says that Idealism is a blend of liberal and neoconservative goals and philosophies. TheBlindProphet refers to idealism as a conservative's insult used to demean liberals by accusing liberals of being somehow unrealistic, or less realistic than conservatives. TheBlindProphet's observation has only limited worth, since one could equally well describe an ultraconservative with unrealistic goals using the same insult but different proofs.

Let me play the devil's advocate. In a wildly hyperbolic example, imagine a 1944 Nazi general (koff-koff, clearly not a liberal) surrounded by 100 Allied troops with only 5 loyal German soldiers left to defend him. Imagine that he claims that the 5 soldiers are Aryan and full of German pride, and could therefore overwhelm the enemy with bare hands if they had to. ...Or imagnie the same fellow proclaiming that the world will magically volunteer to become a utopia (koff-koff) built on nazi ideals (koff-koff). We could say in this "devil's advocate" case that "idealism" as opposed to "realism", but is not in any sense interchangeable with the label "liberal".

In conclusion, I agree that this should not be the main article on "Idealism/idealism", or at least that Wikipedia should have an article on idealism in a more general, widely used sense. Such an article might make mention of "idealism" as an epithet sometimes used against people with whom we disagree, but for the sake of NPOV should not endorse the conservatives' "talking point" that liberals are somehow unrealistic.Sethnessatwikipedia (talk) 04:27, 16 May 2008 (UTC)

Disambiguation

The article on philosophical idealism needs expansion. This should involve removal of the unrelated meanings. So this page should commence with a disambiguation paragraph, with links to the religious and IR uses of idealism. Comments? Banno 22:13, Jun 12, 2005 (UTC)

No? done. Banno 01:46, Jun 14, 2005 (UTC)

Variations

The following is somewhat repetitious; moved to talk, usable bits to be re-inserted:

Idealism comes in various shapes and sizes. There are, in essence, three basic forms of idealism: transcendental idealism (Kant), subjective idealism (Berkeley), and absolute idealism (Hegel). Briefly, the distinctions can be summarised this way: transcendental idealism holds that there is a fundamental distinction between matter and ideas, with ideas holding supremacy. In this view, matter is the world of appearances and mind is the world of truth. Subjective idealism is often confused with a form of relativism because it argues that which is most real is that which is most immediate to experience, and the internal ideas which we use as a lens to see the world are the primary reality. In this view, objects of sense are indistinguishable from our ideas about them. Absolute idealism is fundamentally holistic, arguing that only ideas exist - matter is just another idea. It is distinguished from Berkeley's subjectivity because it includes an element in which there is in effect only one Perceiver of all that exists, and fundamentally speaking, all things in the universe are one with it. This standpoint is comparable to Advaita Hinduism, Zen, American Transcendentalism, and certain strains of western heterodox thinking such as the theology of Meister Eckhart and transpersonal psychology.

'Spirit' or 'Mind' can also be substituted for the word 'idea' in the view of many philosophers.

Banno 01:46, Jun 14, 2005 (UTC)

Idea had some specific meanings for various philosophers, including Descartes.

On the other hand, about the above topic, the notion that there are three basic kinds of idealism has been heavily debated. David Stove, I believe, denies it, and claims that objective idealism is really just subjective idealism.

On the other hand, I figure I can find at least two different definitions of the 'subjective' part of 'subjective idealism'. 1. That the natural world is a projection of our minds 2. that the mind that grounds reality is a subject, not a proto-subject (as it is in Hegel.)

In both cases, Hegel fails to be a subjective idealist.

Idealism as any view that grounds thought in something animate or mental has hundreds of varieties. In fact the history of philosophy is mostly a history of idealism, because most dualists are idealists, and there have been very few materialists who rejected both teleology and normativity in descriptions of the natural world.

You are wrong there, most idealists have been monists. Infact i can not name one idealist who had been a dualist. I am the writer who wrote all the different types of idealism on the article by the way it took me along time to find all those types of idealism but as you can see all of them are actually monistic theories. I have studied idealism for many years. 86.10.119.131 (talk) 21:04, 26 November 2010 (UTC)

Primacy

Before changing the first sentence of the article, I would like to ask other Wikipedians about their opinion. To say that idealism refers to the "primacy of mind, spirit, or language over matter" does not, to me, convey any information. "Primacy" means that something is more important than something else. What knowledge is communicated by saying that idealism is thought to be more important than realism? My emphasis would be that the concept of epistemological idealism relates to subjective ideas or mental representations in a mind. This is in contrast to realism, which refers to objects that are supposed to exist external to any observing mind. 152.163.100.203 13:07, 16 September 2005 (UTC)Toby Shandy

I still prefer that opening. To me, "idealism" in the broadest sense is indeed simply that: any doctrine that teaches that thought, spirit, or language has priority or superiority over a material world that may be only illusion, and at minimum cannot be known except as mediated through thought, spirit, or language. Smerdis of Tlön 17:15, 21 January 2006 (UTC)

Philosophy

In philosophy, idealism is any epistemological theory that proposes a difference between what is inside and outside of the mind. The ideal, in these systems, is the realm of mental ideas, words, or images. The several varieties of idealism affirm the actual existence of such a realm; and often give this realm absolute, or at least perceptual or logical, priority over any reality outside the mind. It is usually juxtaposed with realism in which the real is said to exist prior to and independently of our knowledge.

Not a bad try; but there is not a clear juxtaposition between the two definitions. That is, it appears to be entirely possible for a realist to hold that there is "a difference between what is inside and outside of the mind", yet also hold that "the real exists prior to and independently of our knowledge". Put another way, the definition confuses idealism and dualism. Banno 21:07, 22 September 2005 (UTC)

Questionable edits

There are three or four distinct sorts of idealism. The oldest and most venerable is the Theory of forms. The claim that Protagoras, at the lease, needs a supporting reference - who claims he was an idealist? Certainly he did not do s himself.

You are confusing Plato's ontological Platonic Ideals with the epistemological theory of idealism. The latter holds that idealism is subjective to man and that realism is an objective inference.

Lestrade 00:42, 24 September 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

I don't think so. The idea that the Forms alone are real is commonly called Platonic Idealism. As a variation on the Idealist theme, it deserves a place here. You are correct that there is a difference between epistemological idealism and ontological idealism, that perhaps needs to be made more explicit; a difficult task, but one that should be possible within the basically historical structure in the article. Banno 06:49, 24 September 2005 (UTC)

It is true that Protagoras never called himself an idealist. However, if "idealism" is understood to mean "direct knowledge only of ideas in the mind" then he was an idealist. He related all knowledge of external objects to the human mind's ability to know. This, however, is not a neutral point of view. It is my interpretation. Therefore, you are right to remove it.

Lestrade 01:55, 24 September 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

Cool. Banno

Descartes

Descartes is the supreme Dualist. The summary of his view given here is somewhat skewed. Unless it can be supported with some references, it should be deleted. Banno 23:04, 23 September 2005 (UTC)

How is it skewed? It is an exact statement of Descartes' assertion that the only thing that we know for certain is the idea or mental picture in our mind. that is epistemological idealism.

Lestrade 00:42, 24 September 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

From Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, Part I, § 7: "While we thus reject all of which we can entertain the smallest doubt, and even imagine that it is false, we easily indeed suppose that there is neither God, nor sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves even have neither hands nor feet, nor, finally, a body; but we cannot in the same way suppose that we are not while we doubt of the truth of these things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving that what thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks. Accordingly, the knowledge, I THINK, THEREFORE I AM, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophizes orderly."

From this you can understand that Descartes claimed that the only things that we know for certain are the ideas in our thinking, doubting, conscious mind. Even our own body is an external object that can be doubted. This is idealism.

I can see that the several various definitions of idealism are becoming mixed together and are resulting in confusion.

Lestrade 01:55, 24 September 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

I must say before we proceed that I think it problematic to ascribe Idealism to anyone before Kant, who in my understanding introduced the term in the late Eighteenth century. The exceptions would be anyone who describes themselves as an idealist, or those to whom the epithet is commonlyapplied, as with Plato. A third possibility would occur if some third party was to call someone an idealist, in which case a citation should be given; so for instance "Jimmie Bloggs called Descartes an idealist in his work On Dualism". I don't think that Descartes falls into any of these three, but I may be wrong.

Now to your argument from the quote above. I think that, as for Protagoras, you are interpreting Descartes, and so that the claim that he is an Idealist is not neutral. Remember that the argument of his that you cite is a part of an overall approach to philosophy, and that very soon thereafter he derives ontological realism, and hence the duality of mind and body. The line of scepticism lasts only far enough to reach the reality of the Sceptic, whereupon the entire edifice of reality is, as it were, reconstructed on a firm foundation. So I don't think it fair to claim, as you do, that Descartes thought "the only things that we know for certain are the ideas in our thinking, doubting, conscious mind"; for he derives the existence of the external world with (for him) certainty, from those very ideas. This is the task he set himself in Meditations. Banno

In response to The line of scepticism lasts only far enough to reach the reality of the Sceptic, whereupon the entire edifice of reality is, as it were, reconstructed on a firm foundation, please note the following. Descartes stated that the only things that he knew for certain were the ideas in his mind. Everything else, such as "the entire edifice of reality," was only inferred and thus known indirectly.

Lestrade 16:36, 24 September 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

"the entire edifice of reality (is) inferred and thus known indirectly". One might say the same thing about Hume. Do we include him as an idealist? The working definition of idealism being used here is surly far too broad. Banno 22:13, 24 September 2005 (UTC)

Indeed, on the argument you give, Spinoza and the other victims of continental rationalism would also be Idealists. That seems to me to be too broad a categorisation, and to involve a sort of idealist imperialism, or perhaps revisionism.

The broad categorization of Idealism might include Spinoza on the basis of three citations:

(1.)...the ideas, which we have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our own body rather than the nature of external bodies.(Ethics, II, Prop. XVI, Cor. II.)

(2.)The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body,(ibid., II, Prop. XXVI.)

(3.)The images of things are modifications of the human body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us; in other words, whereof the ideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature of external bodies as present. (ibid., III, Prop. XXVII, Proof.)

Would it be idealist imperialism or revisionism to include Spinoza as an idealist?

Lestrade 16:38, 24 September 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

Yes, indeed, I think it would be. If idealism is the belief that perceptions are mediated by our bodies, then who is not an idealist, and what purpose does the notion hold? Banno 22:13, 24 September 2005 (UTC)

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So, I would be pleased for you to re-insert Descartes, but on the condition that you provide some further citations for your particular interpretation. Banno 07:33, 24 September 2005 (UTC)

In the philosophical journal Mind, Vol. 4, Number 14, Professor Henry Sidgwick wrote the following about the philosopher Thomas Reid:"...he could not fail to find the source of the Idealism of Berkeley and the pulverizing scepticism of Hume in Locke’s assumption that the immediate object of the mind in external perception is its own ideas: and that finding this view equally in Malebranche, he could not fail to trace it to Descartes." (http://fair-use.org/mind/1895/04/) As you can see by this quotation, Professor Sidgwick defines Idealism as the notion that the only things that the mind knows directly are its own ideas. (By the way, he does not define Idealism as knowledge of the existence of perfect, excellent objects.) Also, he claims that Idealism can be traced back to Descartes, who claimed that the only thing that we know for certain is that our minds contain ideas.

Lestrade 13:07, 28 September 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

Actually, the quote seems to say that the immediate object of the mind in external perception is its own ideas leads to both idealism and scepticism, rather than defining idealism in the terms you suggest. But more to the point, how would you use this in the article? Banno 21:28, 28 September 2005 (UTC)

Berkeley's Idealism was based on the judgment that all that the mind can know directly, immediately, and for certain is its own ideas or images, derived from sensations. This is exactly what Descartes stated. Hume agreed, and concluded that nothing can be known for certain about any world of objects that are external to the mind, or even of the composition of the mind itself, as well as of any "soul" or "spirit.". This is his scepticism about any statements to that effect.

Descartes is important in the study of Idealism and, therefore, should be included in this article. As the philosopher Schopenhauer wrote about Descartes: "...he [Descartes] was the first to bring to our consciousness the problem whereon all philosophizing has since mainly turned, namely that of the ideal and the real. This is the question concerning what in our knowledge is objective and what is subjective, and hence what eventually is to be ascribed by us to things different from us and what is to be attributed to ourselves. ... This is the problem and in consequence thereof the main endeavor of philosophers for the last two hundred years has been clearly to separate by a line of cleavage correctly drawn the ideal, in other words, what belongs to our knowledge solely and as such, from the real, that is to say, what exists independently of our knowledge, and thus to determine the relation of the two to each other." (Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. I, "Sketch of a History of the Doctrine of the Ideal and the Real", p.1)

Lestrade 17:56, 29 September 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

Well done. Descartes should be included as an influence on idealism, not as an idealist. I suggest that if the definition of idealism indeed leads to Hume being counted as one, that there is a problem with that definition. Banno 20:07, 29 September 2005 (UTC)

Friedrich Albert Lange, in his Geschichte des Materialismus (History of Materialism) wrote: "...the Cartesian system, if consistently carried out from his fundamental principles, must have led to an Idealism in which the whole external world appears as mere phenomenon and only the ego has any real existence." (Book I, Section 2, Ch. III) This is a citation that clearly associates Descartes with epistemological idealism, but as a precursor. It may be valuable to include such eminent predecessors to the article. Lestrade 19:41, 17 October 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

The problem is, Cartesianism is the most extreme form of substance dualism. The chief exponents of Cartesianism were Descartes and Malebranche, and so it seems confusing to place them with ontological Idealists. Most philosophical Materialists are representationalists in one form or another. Some form of epistemological idealism would be accepted by many representationalists. So, we could end up lumping together many materialists and substance dualists under the word "idealist". Also, Malebranche's occasionalism doesn't make him an idealist, though it could have led others toward an idealist conclusion. Qeem 00:27, 3 September 2006 (UTC)

Leibniz

Leibniz claimed that the ideal and the real are two different parallel worlds. The ideas in a mind and the objects that were external to the mind were exactly coordinated through a harmony that had been pre-established by God. There is no physical influence or causation between the two parallel realms because they are separate and distinct. The internal mental images and the external objects are perfectly synchronized but cannot affect each other.

Again, he is a rationalist rather than an idealist, and again he is an influence on idealism rather than an advocate. Banno 19:11, 30 September 2005 (UTC)

Transcendental Idealism

In the Kant section, the name Transcendental Idealism is called counter-intuitive. Why? See Wikipedia's Transcendental Idealism (not Transcendental idealism) to understand why it is transcendental and why it is idealism. Lestrade 01:53, 2 October 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

"Idealism in religious thought"

Someone explain the following quote for me:

More accurately, Idealism is based on the root word "Ideal," meaning a perfect form of, and is most accurately described as a belief in perfect forms of virtue, truth, and the absolute. Idea-ism may be a more appropriate term for the definitions listed above. There is a clear distinction between an idea and an ideal (i.e. Websters Dictionary says "conforming exactly to an ideal, law, or standard: perfect."). idealism in comparison to pragmatism.

I'm not sure what the writer of this paragraph was trying to get at -- the term 'idealism' encompasses the concepts this paragraph is critiquing. At least it always has in my philosophy education, insofar as that goes. Further, is that really the right section for a discussion of what is and isn't actually "idealism"? I also think the last sentence should probably be a full sentence. Lastly, the linguistic analysis is sloppy; "Idealism" is a noun form derived from "ideal", which is an adjective form of "idea". If this is an argument for a distinction between idealism and "idea-ism", it's a pretty poor one. --M.C. ArZeCh 01:45, 29 December 2005 (UTC)

The Unsigned Editor wrote: "Idealism is based on the root word 'Ideal,' meaning a perfect form of." This is incorrect. "Idealism" comes from the Greek "eidos" which means merely "form," without the word "perfect" as modifier. A correct definition would be "existing only in the mind as an image." Plato appropriated this word and popularized it so that it came to mean an original form from which faulty copies were made.Lestrade 13:03, 18 January 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Idealism vs Phenomenalism

Can someone explain to me the difference between the two? This question has come up over at Mind-body problem. Should the three main views be: "dualism, materialism, idealism", or should they be "dualism, physicalism, phenomenalism", or something else?

-Alecmconroy 06:31, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

About the three positions, I believe the answer is that, roughly: it depends. Karl Marx treats everything that is not materialism as idealism, and that still is a common way of speaking. If this article is to define idealism as the negative of Materialism, it will need to be narrower than it is, and stick to immaterialist thinking as its topic.

Meanwhile, almost all dualists are actually idealists. - That is a false statement, idealism is monistic it completly opposes dualism. Consider:

Versions of idealism that accept non-ideal entities but which identify reality ultimately with mind are often called Realistic Idealism (because they don't deny Realism, the thesis that the world exists independently of our thoughts about it). Plato is a realistic idealist inasmuch as he has a world of perfect forms and downgrades the world of particulars into imitations of those (mental) universals. The mental is ultimately real, but the world of particulars is still independent of our thoughts about it.

Other versions of realistic idealism posit a mind as the origin of the material world, either as a person (personalism or personalistic idealism) or as an impersonal life force (Elan Vital, Will to Power, Will to Live, Nous, Ego, Absolute, etc). Descartes's dualism posits a world of bodies independent of our thoughts about it. These entities also have independence, we might as well suppose, from God's thoughts about them. Thus, a great deal of realism is granted here. But if Descartes holds that ultimately the mind of God is the source of the material world, or that the material world seeks to conform itself to God's mind, or that God's mind is the ultimate reality, the ens realissimum, then Descartes is a personalistic idealist. Not in the sense that he denies materialistm, but in the sense that he posits a self-conscious mind as the ultimate reality, thus denying materialism and naturalism, but not realism.

The thesis that thoughts cause actions, sometimes called psychological idealism, also denies naturalism, but not realism, because it introduces the mental into the fundamental level of physical analysis, while naturalism denies that the mental is fundamental.

Regarding your other topic: phenomenalism is the view that perception or experience or knowledge is of phenomena, or of ideas, or of mental or noetic objects. It is a view about perception or knowledge etc.

This is often confused with epistemological idealism which holds that all objects other than minds are exclusively noetic, meaning that they have no reality other than being perceived or thought by minds. This is an ontological view about what kinds of things there are.

Phenomenalism does not deny realism. Epistemological idealism does.

Hope this helps.

With love,

Dr. B.

Remove: Jonathan Edwards

I don't see why this sub-section should be included. Unless his notebook became the journal, Mind, then this fellow -- while almost certainly interesting in his own right -- is irrelevant to the topic. JTBurman 10:08, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

What about idealism vs. pragmatism?

It seems that the common usage of the word "idealist" is far off the philosophical concept of idealism. I'm far more interested in the former. Whether one has romantic expectations, demanding comfort zones or ambitous goals seems largely independent of whether one thinks ideas or matter to be the source of human experience. Non of the disambiguations seem to apply. What am I looking for?

From Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) [web1913]:

 Idealist \I*de"al*ist\, n. [Cf. F. id['e]aliste.]
    1. One who idealizes; one who forms picturesque fancies; one
       given to romantic expectations.
 
    2. One who holds the doctrine of idealism.

Yeah, I'm with you. That's what most people think when they call someone an 'idealist'... and none of the disambiguations DO seem to apply to that.

Why don't we just create a separate page or at least a section on this other form of idealism. I don't know what it should be called, but it should definitely be given proper treatment as one of the philosophical "ism"s. Frankly, idealism in the common sense is actually far more logical to be bound to the name. Idealism in the old philosophical sense should probably have a different name. Medevilenemy 23:18, 10 December 2006 (UTC)

Why don't we use the democratic method and put it to a vote? If "most people think" that Idealism is forming picturesque fancies and having romantic expectations, then that should be the only accepted meaning. Then we could also vote on begging the question. Does the majority think that it means "raising the question" or does it think that it means "presupposing what you are trying to prove"? How about the words color, flavor, and spin? Voting would get rid of the ambiguities of the word "Idealism" as well as of all other words and phrases that designate more than one concept.Lestrade 17:33, 14 September 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Let's be a little sympathetic to the uninitiated. There is a lot in common between what most people would call "Idealism" and what philosophers call "idealism," and what people typically think can actually help them get a grasp on what we're up to. When we call somebody an "idealist" we typically mean that that person believes in a way that things "ought" to be--a fantasy, a better world, utopia, or "romantic expectations." Even coming at this from a scholarly angle we have some stuff to work with--it's hardly an accident that Romanticism (the literary movement, esp. as it flourished in Germany around the same time as these philosophies were) and utopianism (Marx) are bound up with Kant, Hegel, Schelling, and Fichte. But in a simpler sense, we can point to a similarity here: for the idealist--especially Kant, but perhaps more clearly Hegel--something BEYOND the immediate world is the driving force that works IN the immediate world. And it is because we are aware of that transcendent "ideal" that we handle the "real" as we do. Thus many an idealist emphasizes how this "ought"--an "ideal"--works to change the real (through us, through morality, through consciousness, through history, through revolution, etc.). To cash this out, someone whom nonphilosophers would call an idealist does that sort of thing very explicitly: they focus on something beyond the world as it is given and get their meaning there; they aren't satisfied with things as they are.

I would stay away from contrasting idealism with "pragmatism"--it's a whole 'nother philosophical ball of wax. And in the above respects at least, pragmatism is very similar to idealism.

Mentalistic Monism

Would this not be a better title for this article? --Who123 13:07, 19 May 2006 (UTC)

If someone wanted information on idealism, why would they look up mentalistic monism? What has monism to do with idealism?Lestrade 00:52, 13 September 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

TOC

Shouldn't the TOC be on the left? --SECurtisTX | talk 16:32, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

I agree and change it.—Red Baron 19:08, 18 April 2007 (UTC)

I like the page

I don't know if my 2 cents belong here, but I have to say that I like the page. Whatever its merits, it's a great portal to all the other wiki info on philosophical idealism. And, thanks to Kant, idealism is today the orthodox view in metaphysics.

That would have been true 100 years ago, but materialism rules today, among those philosophers who still go in for metaphsyics

Even scientific materialists buy into the idea that the experienced world - stones, trees, cats, etc. - is a mental construct.

into the idea that it is a re-construction, a mental model, perhaps. But that is not idealism..1Z 14:00, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

(perhaps that's the statement of the subject's importance that the earlier flag, that said the page was going to be deleted, was calling for.) I agree with the idea of having a disambiguation page, for those interested in other senses of 'Idealism'; and perhaps retitling this one 'Philosophical idealism'. georgedance04@yahoo.ca

??? Is it normal practice here to edit others' comments on the discussion page? Why, when one can simply add one's own comments as a new edit? I'm a bit surprised that this person's got me contradicting myself. georgedance04@yahoo.ca, 26 Feb. 07

Opening is worthless

The opening sentences are hopeless:

Idealism is a class of positions in ontology and epistemology. (maybe, but why a class of positions?)

Idealism as an epistemological position asserts that everything we experience is of a mental nature. (isn't that metaphysics?)

That is, we can only have direct, immediate knowledge of the contents of our mind. (that is phenomenalism)

We can never directly know or experience an external object itself (again, phenomenalism).

As an ontological position Idealism asserts either that only minds and the objects of mind exist, or that everything is composed of mental realities (e.g., thoughts, feelings, perceptions, ideas, or will). (Sounds like epistemological idealism again)

Actually, epistemological idealism is a position in ontology. It says that all objects except for minds are exclusively noetic. It does not discuss experience, and need not. Not2plato 16:57, 9 February 2007 (UTC) —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Not2plato (talk • contribs) 16:56, 9 February 2007 (UTC).

Refutation of idealism

I found this whole section very confusing as well, it goes staright from a refutation of kantian idealism to berkeley's "dogmatic idealism" without specifically mentioning that, for example the nietzschean critique is aimed at a different sort of idealism than moore's. This is very confusing, I think it is important to stress in the article the large difference between the largely refuted Berkeleian form of Idealims, and the Kantian form, which as someone else has mentioned is regularly used in metaphysical arguments —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 82.26.68.202 (talk) 13:48, 2 April 2007 (UTC).

Jewellery?

What is a GEM? They are cited constantly, without it ever being explained what they are. —vivacissamamente 06:15, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

The concept "GEM" appears as a mystery in the article. It seems to be David Stove's name for the following process: from the tautology that nothing can be thought of without its being a thought, a conclusion can be reached that nothing can exist without its being a thought.Lestrade 15:31, 13 June 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

The Harm of Hegel

Dear Lestrade, I appreciate your desire to avoid unclear adjectives in the Idealism article, specifically "real" in the first sentence. However I don't think that "as we experience it" makes the point. "Real" is a technical term for Hegel, as the section of the Idealism article that deals with Hegel brings out. Hegel distinguishes between "existing" and being "real"; hence the two parts of the clause that you edited ("a world of material objects containing no thought either could not exist, or would not be fully 'real'"). And Hegel doesn't in any way appeal to the "world as we experience it": for him, that would not be a philosophical argument. I realize that the clause as I drafted it won't be crystal clear to a reader who's not yet familiar with Hegel's distinction. But I think it's important to register the distinction, because it's important not to give readers the mistaken impression that all idealists deny the possible "existence" of a world containing no thought. Hegel, in particular, doesn't deny it. I'd be grateful for any thoughts you have about this issue. best, Bob Wallace Bob Wallace 18:30, 4 July 2007 (UTC) philosop@execpc.com

The expression "exists in the way that it is experienced," instead of "exists," clarifies the concept of Idealism. If you want to remove it and emphasize Hegel's Absolute Idealism, which talks about ideas in the mind of the Absolute (God), then I will not edit the article further. The reason that Idealism is misunderstood and not taken seriously is that people like Hegel have damaged the concept beyond all repair.Lestrade 22:31, 4 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Exist How?

In its introductory definition of Idealism, the article claims that this philosophy makes the following assertion: a world of material objects containing no thought either could not exist, or would not be fully "real." I disagreed with the use of the word "exist" without the addition of further characteristics. In order to avoid the common misunderstanding of Idealism, I edited the sentence as follows: a world of material objects containing no thought could not exist in the way that it is experienced. In this way, a world of material objects is an observed world that appears in the mind of an individual observing subject. It is not a world of material objects that appears without appearing in the mind of an observing subject, which is an absurdity. User:Bob Wallace removed my edit. He compared my edit to Hegel's Absolute Idealism and concluded that "… Hegel doesn't in any way appeal to the 'world as we experience it': for him, that would not be a philosophical argument." In opposition to User:Bob Wallace's reference to Hegel's Absolute Idealism, I would like to quote Schopenhauer's description of Kant's Transcendental Idealism. In Kant's philosophy, "…the objective world as we know it does not belong to the true being of things–in–themselves, but is its mere phenomenon, conditioned by those very forms that lie a priori in the human intellect (i.e., the brain)… " (The World as Will and Representation, vol. I, Appendix). It is of crucial importance to note that Schopenhauer adds the phrase "as we know it" after the words "the objective world." In this way, he is talking about the existence of the world as we know it, or, in the way that it is experienced. This is the only meaningful way to discuss the existence of the world: as an observed object relative to an individual observing subject. To assume the truth of Hegel's theological Absolute Idealism, in which the world is the thought of an observed object in the consciousness of the Absolute Spirit or Mind (God), is inappropriate in a definition of Idealism.Lestrade 14:47, 14 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Apology and Rationale

There are reasons why I object to the article's definition of idealism. My objections have led me to replace the article's wording with my own. As a result, my edits have, in turn, been replaced. This should not result in an unpleasant battle. The article has the following definition: " Idealism is the doctrine that ideas, or thought, make up either the whole or an indispensable aspect of any full reality, so that a world of material objects containing no thought either could not exist, or would not be fully 'real.' " First of all, this sentence begins by confusing the mental activities of ideas with thought. Ideas are mental images. Thought consists of abstract concepts. Similarly, the article mentions "a world of material objects containing no thought." This should read "a world of material objects that is not perceived." Then, the word "exist" is used by itself. But, according to the most famous Idealist, George Berkeley, to exist is to be perceived. He wrote: "…being is to be perceived or known… ."(The Principles of Human Knowledge, § 6) Therefore, "exist" should not be used by itself. That word should be amplified by saying "exist as we know it" or "exist in the way that it is perceived." Berkeley cannot be refuted because he makes the tautological assertion that a perceived world exists as it is perceived by a perceiver. It is not true that Idealism makes dogmatic assertions about the world, as it exists or doesn't exist, other than as it is perceived. Also, in reference to the contrast between Idealism and Materialism, it could be said that Materialism is based on the absurd assertion that a perceived world exists as it is perceived, but without a perceiver. My contention is that the article's definition of Idealism was incorrect for a general article on Idealism. Possible there should not be a general article on Idealism. The general article results in confusion. Instead, there should be separate articles on the different specific kinds of Idealism, such as, Platonic Idealism, Epistemological Idealism, Ontological Idealism, Subjective Idealism, Transcendental Idealism, Absolute Idealism, etc.Lestrade 16:58, 15 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Noble Goal (one meaning of Idealism)

The following is a response to 1Z.

You distinction between ideas and thought is not common usage.

The English word idea originally came from the Greek word ideîn, which means to see. The Wikipedia article Idea reflects this meaning in its primary definition. But idea has been a word that has been used to designate many different concepts. As eídos, it "…was a well–established and fairly sophisticated term long before its canonization by Plato. Its first meaning, and the usage is current in Homer, is 'what one sees,' 'appearance,' 'shape,' normally of the body, and pre–Socratic philosophy continued to use it in this sense." (Greek Philosophical Terms, F.E. Peters, NYU Press, 1967) The amalgamation of idea with ideal has had nothing but unfortunate results. This confusion mostly results from Plato's misappropriation of these words to designate his supersensible realm of eternal patterns. It is to be hoped that the many editors of Wikipedia can finally resolve these ambiguities through their combined efforts without sinking into fruitless rancor. Thought is another ambiguous word. I used it as meaning "mentally processing abstract, non-perceptual concepts." But this, word also requires an army of Wikipedians to undo the many centuries of confusion and misuse of language.

You may think there have been centuries of confusion, but unless you can find realiable sources to support that,it doesn't go into the article. That is the way wikipedia works, I am afraid. 1Z 13:17, 16 July 2007 (UTC)

The lead can use "exist" in a general sense, leaving any specific idealistic senses to be introduced later.

Everything here depends on the precise and clear definition of the word exist. If it is used in a general, indefinite, or vague manner, then the article will confuse its readers.

My point stands. The meaning of "Exists" can be clarified further on.1Z 13:17, 16 July 2007 (UTC)

"Berkeley cannot be refuted because he makes the tautological assertion that a perceived world exists as it is perceived by a perceiver. " You can not refute Berkeley

I meant to emphasize that a perceived object logically requires a perceiving subject or observer. Also, what you call "something perceived in error" has its actual existence as a perception. As an illusion, it has an existence. But, as an illusion, it has no correspondence and cohesion to many other perceptions. For example, the bent pencil in a glass of water actually exists as a perception of a bent pencil for the observer. But, it does not correspond to many other perceptions, views, and perspectives of the pencil when it is out of water. A human would say that the perceived pencil out of water exists as a straight object. But a bacillus, if it had a humanoid nervous system, might say that the pencil out of water exists as a perceived object with enormous bumps and crevices. What the pencil out of water is as it exists in itself, that is, apart from being a perceived object for a perceiver, cannot be known by a perceiver.

None of that is necessarily so. Realists would differ. 1Z 13:17, 16 July 2007 (UTC)

"Materialism is based on the absurd assertion that a perceived world exists as it is perceived, but without a perceiver". More like a perceivable world could exist without a perceiver. There is no requirement in materialism that things are as they are perceived.

A perceivable world is an abstraction. It is a world that is able to be perceived. It is only the possibility of an object being perceived by a subject or observer. The actual world is seen from the perspective of an observer and, as such, appears as an image in the observer's mind. What it is other than that cannot be known by the observer. It might be a projection in a cinema, or it may be a chaos of Quarks and Leptons. Materialism incorrectly assumes that a perceived object has no perceiving subject or observer.

"A perceivable world is an abstraction"

That does not make it absurd.

"The actual world is seen from the perspective of an observer and, as such, appears as an image in the observer's mind"

How do you know?

"Materialism incorrectly assumes that a perceived object has no perceiving subject or observer".

That is false as I have shown. 1Z 13:17, 16 July 2007 (UTC)

You reverted my definition of Idealism as the doctrine that "…a world of material objects which is not perceived could not exist as a perceived world of material objects." In doing so, you labeled it an "idiosyncratic edit." Yet, in Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, Idealism is defined as the "…theory that objects of perception are actually ideas of the perceiving mind." It follows from this that an unperceived world could not be an object of perception. Hence, it could not exist as a perceived world. If there is any other way that it could exist, such as a swarm of invisible atoms or Strings, the perceiver or observer would not have any awareness of it, would not be able to speak about it, and "…Of what we cannot speak, we must be silent." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 7) What could anyone possibly know or say about a world that exists in itself, that is, other than as an appearance in the mind of an observer?

WP is based on reliable sources. Definitions of materialism and idealism should have some authtority and currency. You paraphrase of the definition of idealism and your derivation of a definition of materialism from it, are original research. 1Z 13:17, 16 July 2007 (UTC)

I sincerely hope that Idealism can be properly described in Wikipedia for the sake of many people who come to this web site for information and education. If old errors are merely repeated, then ignorance, incomprehension, and disinterest will be perpetuated.Lestrade 23:40, 15 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Proper according to whom? 1Z 13:17, 16 July 2007 (UTC)

This question leads me to assume that this dialogue has deteriorated into a personal quarrel. I am not interested in personal quarrels. I am only interested in clarifying the topic of Idealism, which is mired in confusion, obscurity, mysticism, and ambiguity. It now seems to me that this topic will never be made clear and distinct, due to its history of having multiple meanings.Lestrade 11:45, 17 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Perfect Form

The following claim is made in the "Idealism in religious thought" section. Idealism is based on the root word "Ideal," meaning a perfect form of, and is also described as a belief in perfect forms of virtue, truth, and the absolute. (i.e., Webster's Dictionary says "conforming exactly to an ideal, law, or standard: perfect."). idealism in comparison to pragmatism This is another example of the extreme ambiguity of the word "Ideal." The Wikipedia article on Idealism contains many different concepts that are designated by the one name of Idealism. In this way, the article is very misleading and confusing.71.125.134.122 01:07, 16 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

hi

Better definition.

Materialism and Idealism are the two major strands in philosophy.

Idealsim says that the world is produced by something beyond itself, for example God, or Plato's forms (e.g. the ideal form of beauty to which all artists approxiamate) or the Buddhist True Harmony, hidden by the viel of Maya or illusion, or order, reason or any one of a number of pure ideas. An idealsit would say that the perfect statue was hidden in the stone until revealed by the artit. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Savre (talk • contribs) 01:57, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Reference to Thomas Hobbes

I have removed the reference to Thomas Hobbes from the Introductory paragraph of this article. The reference was in such a way that it didn't have any bearing to the discussion prior, and was rather obscure. I'm sure someone could write it in such a manner that the reference makes sense and is properly linked. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 149.171.42.145 (talk) 11:46, 11 October 2008 (UTC)

Finite qualities and Hegel

For the Hegel section, the term 'finite qualities' needs to be provided for more fully than it is at the moment. Based on the article as it stands, it appears that finite qualities are the physical attributes of objects, or attributes that are otherwise not metaphysical. Anyway, there is nothing so inherently self-descriptive in the phrase 'finite qualities' to warrant this particular kind of use. A google search doesn't appear to offer a good answer either.

Frankly, this is the trouble with the wiki-treatment of philosophy in general... there is an obvious and ubiquitous tendency to assume serious familiarity with the subject on the part of the reader. But I digress. So HELP! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.137.90.223 (talk) 21:51, 10 May 2009 (UTC)

Plato

see my remarks under the heading Plato above.

—Preceding unsigned comment added by RiceMilk (talk • contribs) 20:12, 18 September 2010 (UTC) 

Kant

"An argument that has a necessarily true premise cannot make any synthetic a priori statements, because (qua Kant) the synthetic cannot be necessarily true." - should this read 'only necessarily true premises'? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 122.148.39.124 (talk) 00:29, 16 October 2010 (UTC)

Quantum Physics supports idealism

The 1925 discovery of quantum mechanics solved the problem of the Universe's nature. Becuase of this a number of bright physicists believed that the universe is mental. According to Sir James Jeans: "the stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality; the Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine. Mind no longer appears to be an accidental intruder into the realm of matter... we ought rather hail it as the creator and governor of the realm of matter."

Should a section be added to the article regarding idealism and quantum physics?

86.10.119.131 (talk) 12:15, 17 December 2010 (UTC)

Somebody has messed up the idealism page

Somebody has messed up the idealism article by copying a whole section 2 times and removing tags obviously a vandal has done this. I delete the duplicated section, then some chap says im going to get blocked? for what? Block the vandal.. not me. I was trying to help. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.10.119.131 (talk) 02:09, 6 January 2011 (UTC)

Sorry about this and thanks for your help. I'm the one who reverted your edits, as you didn't leave an edit summary, so it looked like you were simply deleting content without any explanation. I'll go ahead and roll those back now. Next time, please explain what you're doing in the edit summary so we know why you're making the changes you're making. Thanks and welcome to Wikipedia. Let me know if I can answer any more questions. Zachlipton (talk) 02:11, 6 January 2011 (UTC)

Somebody said 'Idealism is "gay"'

Some anonymous fool edited the page, I reverted their stupid edit. 60.240.111.206 (talk) 02:25, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

Current changes

User:Machine Elf 1735 - the present article has previously been edited with a view to confining this article to a general account of absolute and monist idealist philosophy according to an editorial point of view. To achieve this, properly-cited definitions are being removed, broken up, annotated and downgraded. so are references to ordinary language, aesthetic, moral and Platonic idealism - you even added "citation needed" to cited material. I am deliberately using highly notable and readily available general sources, so please examine them.

The article has failed to fulfil its central function as a general introduction to a large number of pages on various phases of idealism. It makes no reference to related articles like that on German idealism and fails to summarise, and often contradicts, the hopelessly POV-split sub-articles on various forms of idealism. It needs properly-cited material, arranged from the general to the particular, from past to present or in any logical order, and must refer to, and agree with, all the related articles that point to it. Redheylin (talk) 18:14, 30 July 2011 (UTC)

User:Redheylin - thank you for explaining what you're trying to accomplish. Yes, some of what you've said was fairly apparent. I'm glad you've repopulated the lede with philosophers and it now addresses the primary topic in the first paragraphs. I'm sure the minor edits I've made have in no way hindered you from improving the article. You can add that Idealism constrasts with realism (in modern philosophy) anywhere in the lede you like, but please state it clearly and simply. It is, of course, in no way WP:POV or WP:UNDUE and it's orthogonal per se to any bickering among so-called idealists. It's just a label, not a "phase"...

“you even added "citation needed" to cited material. I am deliberately using highly notable and readily available general sources, so please examine them.”

It's perfectly obvious I did examine it: I named the ref Britannica and reused it myself to cite the "contrasts with realism" statement which I re-added. You're response was to move the second paragraph (non-philosophical) to a new #Definition section, and to remove my humble "contrasts with realism" statement once again, replacing it with the very statement I had challenged from the 3rd paragraph.

The Britannica source is only a two paragraph summary. Presumably, you mistakenly believe I overlooked the first sentence. I did not—I challenged your statement because it does not verify. You've neglected that the concept must be central and you've embellished it with a quasi-platonic notion of "realm". Thus, it's vague: much too restrictive if realm is taken "literally" and much too broad if not.

I've corrected it and moved the awkward Anaxagoras anecdote down to the section currently called #Platonism and neoplatonism. As I've said, please add a "contrasts with realism" statement to the lede as you see fit.

“broken up, annotated and downgraded. so are references to ordinary language”.

I don't know what all this is an excuse for, sloppy editing I'd have to imagine, but I didn't ask for an explanation... Thanks all the same, please do edit more (chrono)logically—the constant reshuffling makes it difficult to follow your diffs.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 19:23, 31 July 2011 (UTC)

I notice the data-size has reduced by about 25% without any apparent loss of content. I think this is due to merging the philosophers and the deprecated criticism section into the main topics - the types and schools of idealism. It is not possible to restructure without a little mess, particularly if I have to watch for edit conflicts. Topics can be arranged roughly to give a progress from religious and ancient idealism through to the moderns, and there can be a rough progress within each topic too, but the emphasis has to remain on types of idealism per se, linking to all the more specialised sub-articles because this is a category head article. I think it has been a mistake to insist upon a modern narrow definition of the subject while still trying to manage a neutral chronology of it - the POV is created by anachronism, subjecting history to a sense of inevitable progress towards a "modern" form. This is why I am introducing the most general sources with the widest view of the subject, from which more a more nuanced overview may proceed.

The tag is to draw your attention to a rather large number of quotes from primary sources, and the way to avoid it is to replace these with paraphrases from general and critical works. Please remember that these themselves should be paraphrased to avoid copyright infringements.Redheylin (talk) 00:23, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

“without any apparent loss of content”… Some kind of miracle is it? Pathetic how you parrot back criticisms I've provided for you.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 01:41, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

Idealismos

Idealism comes directly from greek ιδεαλισμός wrong . Top greek dictionary(G.Babiniotis) says it is a foreign hellenogenous (ελληνογενής) term,german Idealismus which comes from greek ιδέα — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.66.173.173 (talk) 18:41, 20 August 2011 (UTC)

d'Espagnat not an idealist

Bernard d'Espagnat is not really an idealist -- he is more of a dualist. Taking his view that what we call reality is just a state of mind, the operative phrase is "what we call". He's not saying there is no reality, independent of observers. He's merely saying that whatever that reality is, "electrons" and "planets" and so forth aren't it. Those "things" -- "electrons" "planets" etc -- are indeed just states of mind, in the same way that an old-style projected movie is simply light impinging on a movie screen. In that analogy, we -- consciousnesses -- are the screen, what we normally refer to as reality -- matter, energy -- are the movie. But there's still a projector -- actual reality -- "out there". We just can't know very much about it; it is "veiled".

Given this, I'd propose removing the reference to d'Espagnat completely. It's not really relevant to this article. Any thoughts on that?

You're claiming that dualism isn't idealism. But it is idealistic for sure. I just can tell you that in Germany there exist two kinds of "idealism": First of all the philosophic idealism which is describead in this article, and second all other idealistic stuff like dualism, nationalism, marxism, even capitalism. So in everyday life many people may use the word "idealism" for many topics not being strict philosophical realism. By the way the opposite of philosophical idealism is philosophical realism (often errournessly called materialism), while the opposite of political idealism is supposed to be political realism (but since political realists may still be idealistic, this kind of definition is very limited and shouldn't be used in everyday life, it rather describes the behaviour of politicans than their way of thinking). So what? Well, as in the Wiki page about realism, there should be a similar page about idealism, listing and describing all different meanings and topics like "idealism (common sense)", "idealism (philosophy)", "idealism (politology)", aso. 178.197.233.89 (talk) 01:40, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

Restructuring of article

Might I suggest a new way of organizing the article? Let me know what you think of this hierarchy and sequence of sections, and feel free to criticize my understanding of the terms involved:

1. Asian idealism
   1. Yogācāra
2. Early European idealism
   1. Neoplatonism
3. Modern European idealism
   1. Subjective idealism: Reality is a cluster of different minds' immediate experiences, which aren't necessarily unified in any absolute mind, nor do they exist prior to anyone becoming aware of them.
      1. Phenomenalism: Reality is nothing but our own experiences, and the possibility of such experiences.
   2. Transcendental idealism: Mind-independent reality exists but is unknowable, because our experience is generated by our cognitive apparatus.
   3. Objective idealism: There is an objectively knowable universe 'out there' in some strong sense, which exists before we come to perceive it; but this universe is inextricably bound up with objectively existent mental or spiritual structure.
      1. Absolute idealism: There is some singular, all-encompassing mental entity of which all individual minds are merely aspects.
      2. Pluralistic idealism and panpsychism: There is a fundamentally and constitutively mental dimension to a plurality of distinct and discrete mind-independent objects.
4. Idealism in the philosophy of science

Am I missing anything? Conflating or divorcing anything overmuch? -Silence (talk) 06:37, 23 November 2011 (UTC)

Berkeley

Berkeley was not a subjective idealist. That idea has been refuted many, many times. GeneCallahan (talk) 00:09, 8 February 2012 (UTC)

Berkeley was a subjective idealist you obviously may be confused on this issue, refuted many, many times? Are you joking? I have read 100s of books about Berkeley, see the works on Berkeley by A. A. Luce. Luce spent most of his life studying the philosophy of Berkeley and even Luce classified him as a subjective idealist. GreenUniverse (talk) 15:35, 17 February 2012 (UTC)

Yogacara Buddhism

I found the inclusion of Yogacara Buddhism in the lede to be intriguing, and I wanted to ask if anyone had a source on comparing it Idealism. The interesting point here is that Yogacara was a major influence on Zen Buddhism, where I think there may be an even stronger comparison to be made. Right now, the sentence places Yogacara in contrast to other religious idealism, and I would like to discuss whether that is wholly accurate as well. Anyone interested in a comparative discussion here? —Zujine|talk 14:14, 21 May 2012 (UTC)

Alternative Phrasing

Would it not be more appropriate to rephrase? :

Note that this contrast between idealism and materialism is approximately as to whether the substance of the world is at base mental or physical — it has nothing to do with thinking that things should be idealized, or with coveting goods.)

As:

Note that this contrast between idealism and materialism is approximately as to whether the substance of the world is at base meta-physical or physical — it has nothing to do with thinking that things should be idealized, or with coveting goods.)
-
I don't see why that change from "mental" to "meta-physical" is useful. "Meta-physical" carries a lot more connotations than does "mental". Why do you think the change is needed? 67.79.7.18 (talk) 21:18, 19 December 2012 (UTC)

90.245.0.125 uncited discussion of Bertrand Russell moved here

User 90.245.0.125 has reversed the current meaning of the section on Bertrand Russell's discussion of idealism, but with no citations given to support this view and it reads as a personal diatribe. I have reverted these changes and copied them here- if anyone has references to an analysis of a similar viewpoint, then such a discussion could be added as a *separate* paragraph. 121.45.223.217 (talk) 21:56, 24 February 2013 (UTC)

Added text follows (first paragraph only- see history for additional paragraphs)" Bertrand Russell's popular book The Problems of Philosophy highlights how philosophers of the second rank commonly misunderstand Berkeley and his reasoning. Russell claims, "If we say that the things known must be in the mind, we are either un-duly limiting the mind's power of knowing, or we are uttering a mere tautology. We are uttering a mere tautology if we mean by 'in the mind' the same as by 'before the mind', i.e. if we mean merely being apprehended by the mind. But if we mean this, we shall have to admit that what, in this sense, is in the mind, may nevertheless be not mental. Thus when we realize the nature of knowledge, Berkeley's argument is seen to be wrong in substance as well as in form, and his grounds for supposing that 'idea'-i.e. the objects apprehended-must be mental, are found to have no validity whatever. Hence his grounds in favour of the idealism may be dismissed."

Harshly what?

I don't understand this sentence!!! The Australian philosopher David Stove harshly, arguing that it rests on what he called "the worst argument in the world" Harshly what? Katiehawks (talk) 13:49, 9 September 2015 (UTC)

Good catch. I fixed it. An anonymous editor removed the words "criticized philosophical idealism" from that sentence without explanation last May. --Pfhorrest (talk) 17:55, 9 September 2015 (UTC)

New SEP article

There's a recent-ish Stanford Encyclopedia Article of Philosophy article on Idealism: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/

I thought this might be a good resource for further work.68.80.219.115 (talk) 21:32, 8 October 2015 (UTC)

Mind vs Consciousness

The current introductory paragraphs make the common mistake of equating the Western Philosophy concept of "mind" (e.g. "mental") with the Eastern Religion concept of "consciousness".

To clarify, to someone like Descartes, "mind" refers to thoughts and sense perceptions. However, in Eastern Religion, when there are no thoughts and no sense perceptions, there is still "consciousness" (aka "awareness").

Just FYI. 162.205.217.211 (talk) 00:33, 13 March 2016 (UTC)