sources edit
- Gilbar, Gad G. (1997). Population dilemmas in the Middle East: essays in political demography and economy. London: F. Cass. p. 8. ISBN 0-7146-4706-3.
The agreed population exchange, therefore, did not involve 1,7 million people, but a smaller number 543,000 people; it was not a voluntary exchange but a forced exchange; and. most importantly. it was an exchange that followed a bitter war between two countries and was a product of it. The million Greek refugees had expected a solution to their situation of distress with the signing of the armistice of 1922, but Ataturk adamantly refused to return them to their homes, and managed to obtain the support of the powers especially Britain for his position. The Greek government had no choice, in the situation, but to agree to the exchange. The motivation lot the evacuation of the Muslim Turkish population was purely to ease absorption and settlement arrangements for the Greek war refugees. What emerges, therefore, was that the Lausanne Agreement was not an agreement for a population exchange, but an agreement for the settlement of a million Greek refugees who had fled in the summer of 1922 from territories in Greece conquered by the Turkish army.
- Sofos, Spyros A.; Özkırımlı, Umut (2008). Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey. C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. pp. 116–117. ISBN 1-85065-899-4.
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- Hershlag, Zvi Yehuda (1997). Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East. Brill Academic Pub. p. 177. ISBN 90-04-06061-8.
- Crossing the Aegean: The Consequences of the 1923 Greek-Turkish Population Exchange (Studies in Forced Migration). Providence: Berghahn Books. 2003. ISBN 1-57181-562-7.
- Karpat, Kemal H. (2000). Ottoman past and today's Turkey. Leiden: Brill. p. 171. ISBN 90-04-11562-5.
- Shubert, Adrian; Hoerder, Dirk; Harzig, Christiane (2003). The historical practice of diversity: transcultural interactions from the early modern Mediterranean to the postcolonial world. Providence: Berghahn Books. p. 74. ISBN 1-57181-377-2.
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However, after the Ottoman catastrophe of the Balkan War in 1912/ 13, the liberal project was abandoned entirely in favor of a petit bourgeois populism that instrumentalized Muslim grievances at the expense of non-Muslim citizens) Consequently, already in the first half of 1914 about 100,000 Greeks were compelled to leave Aegean Anatolia for the nearby islands. Once World War I began, the forced transfer of Greek population continued, this time to places in the Anatolian interior. More comprehensive and radical measures were taken against the Armenians living in the eastern provinces.
- Hutchinson, John F.; Guibernau i Berdún, M. Montserrat (2001). Understanding nationalism. Cambridge, UK: Polity. p. 229. ISBN 0-7456-2402-2.
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In the case of the Armenian minority the ‘homeland’ state did not already exist. But ‘Uncle Russia’, Christian Europe’s and Turkey’s long-term enemy, was promising one, and Armenian nationaLists were seen as being in alliance with Russia. Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912—13 finally thrust Turkey back almost to the Bosphorus, destabilizing and radicalizing the state. A coup by Young Turk officers brought them to power in 1913. Power shifted towards organic Turkic nationalists and a more centralized statism. Led by embittered refugees from Europe and Russia, some favoured ‘removing’‘treacherous’ Christian minorities from the nation. There were large deportations of Grccks in 1913. Only a year later the eastern armies of this brand-new state were mauled by Russia in the First World War — aided, so regime radicals claimed, by Armenian nationalists. Forced deportations of Armenians turned quickly into murderous cleansing and genocide. Nazi-led genocides went down a not dissimilar path. Of course, the Jewish victims constituted no plausible ‘threat’ whatsoever to the German nation-state — unlike Armenians, Tutsis, Sudanese Christians etc., who might be conceivably so identified as threarening by their enemies. Nonetheless, it had been prefigured by the rising politicizalion and westward spread of anti-Semitic pogroms in the twentieth century. Yet the other main victims, Slays, were a more plausible threat — and actually more Slav civilians or disarmed prisoners of war were killed than Jews. The key to Nazi genocide, however, also concerns massive war defeat, imposed territorial and power losses, the overthrow of two German states (imperial and Weimar) and the radicalization of a third (the Nazi regime). These involved a turn from a klein- (small) to a grossdeutsch (big German) version of
- Huntington, Samuel P. (2002). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Free Press. p. 144. ISBN 0-7432-3149-X.
Kemal aimed to produce a homogenous nation state, expelling and killing Armenians and Greeks in the process.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1992). Nations and nationalism since 1780 programme, myth, reality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 133. ISBN 0-521-43961-2.
Such was and is the murderous reduction ad absurdum of nationalism in its territorial version, although this was not fully demonstrated until the 1940S. However, mass expulsion and even genocide began to make their appearance on the southern margins of Europe during and after World War I, as the Turks set about the mass extirpation of the Armenians in 1915 and, after the Greco Turkish war of 1911, expelled between 1.3 and i. millions of Greeks from Asia Minor, where they had lived since the days of Homer. Subsequently Adolph Hitler, who was in this respect a logical Wilsonian nationalist, arranged to transfer Germans not living on the territory of the fatherland, such as those of Italian South Tyrol, to Germany itself, as he also arranged for the permanent elimination of the Jews.