Talk:Great Divergence/Archive 4

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Comparative graph of populations

Comparative populations (log scale) of China and Continental Europe between 1000 and 1975

Volunteer Marek, what do you mean by "sloppy (at best) graph"? I agree that it needs careful reading to appreciate the magnitude of the difference between the two (perhaps changing the scale might help), but it does show the population cycles and growth rates in both places. Kanguole 15:30, 27 August 2011 (UTC)

I don't know what discussion might previously have been had on this graph, and I don't have a copy of Feuerwerker, but:

• The borders of China have varied somewhat over the last thousand years. Is this a count of heads within today's borders, or within a variable area?
• What exactly is meant by "continental europe" here, and again is there any possibility of distortion due to shifting borders &c? (For instance anybody calculating the population of continental europe by adding up population estimates of constituent countries might find that colonial populations creep into some years totals but not others).
• Population estimates are much more reliable than they used to be. Displaying population as a simple line masks the massive uncertainties in earlier populations. Is it feasible to show some error bars?
• Log scales can be intrinsically misleading, and great care should be taken before presenting data on a log scale to a non-geeky audience; is it possible to use a linear scale?

bobrayner (talk) 16:24, 27 August 2011 (UTC)

The data is Feuerwerker's. I don't think he gives a precise delimitation of "China", but even if he omitted the additional areas now in the PRC from earlier figures it would make little difference, as their population then was tiny compared with the Chinese empire. On the other hand, "continental Europe" is a fairly clear geographical term. Error bars might be appropriate, but the source provides no data on which they could be based. The trouble with a linear scale for an exponential variable like population, especially over such a large timescale, is that recent high values overshadow everything else. A linear scale also obscures growth rates, which are central to this article. Kanguole 23:18, 28 August 2011 (UTC)

Regardless of how you define continental Europe and for any reasonable definition of China, it's just not the case that these two regions had comparable populations 1900-2000. Yet the graph makes it look like they're almost at parity today. And yes, I know what a logarithmic scale is. But graphed this way, the diagram *obfuscates* the tremendous differences, rather than highlighting it, as it should. If you think that the exponential graph would overshadow everything else (for China probably, for Europe maybe), it might be better for the purposes of this article to graph the ratio. And if you want to graph growth rates (the slopes of the above lines), then graph growth rates. Another possibility would be to have two (maybe side by side) graphs, one for the pre-industrial era (say, pre 1850) and one for the post. I got the pop data on China handy (by province, from the Chinese gov) for the post war period, but I do not have Feuerwerker's numbers. If you have it could you send it to me?Volunteer Marek (talk) 08:19, 1 September 2011 (UTC)

The graph clearly shows a significant difference in 1975 (it doesn't continue to the present). But that is peripheral – this article isn't about the 20th century. I don't see the point to any of your suggested alternatives: they would show less data, or data less relevant to the topic of this article. Feuerwerker's numbers are on the cited page of the source, but I'll repeat them here:

Year	Continental Europe	China
-200	26	42
1	31	53
200	36	63
400	31	53
600	26	50
800	29	50
1000	36	66
1100	44	105
1200	58	115
1300	79	96
1400	60	81
1500	81	110
1600	100	160
1650	105	140
1700	120	160
1750	140	225
1800	180	330
1850	265	450
1900	390	475
1950	515	590
1975	635	1000

Perhaps the difference in 1950 isn't what you think it should be, but a linear plot wouldn't change that. Kanguole 11:59, 1 September 2011 (UTC)

The graph clearly shows a significant difference in 1975 - yes if one looks at the very end of the graph. But right before it (1974?, 1950?) it looks like they're at parity. Also, these numbers don't have anywhere near the variance that would justify the use of the (more confusing) log scale. If we graph it in levels it looks just fine.

And I think my suggestions were good. In fact your claim that this article isn't about the 20th century supports that. If the article isn't about the 20th century then neither should be the graph. Just keep the stuff up to 1850 or so in there and that will make the graph much clearer. Likewise, using the ratio would present a more easily understood picture.

And yes, there is some discrepancy between these numbers and usually-accepted numbers from other sources, at least for 20th century post 1960 data.Volunteer Marek (talk) 02:57, 2 September 2011 (UTC)

Are you saying you have information that contradicts Feuerwerker's numbers for 1975, or is it his relatively close numbers for 1950 that are the problem? Kanguole 06:12, 2 September 2011 (UTC)

Yes, Feuerwerker's numbers are contradicted by standard numbers from international organizations for 1975, though this could be due to this whole "how are you defining China/Europe" thing. Anyway, unless you really think that in 1950 the two regions were at parity, that's not the main issue here. And to say it again, the log-scale here is just not useful.Volunteer Marek (talk) 07:28, 2 September 2011 (UTC)

Feuerwerker gives pairs of numbers for 1900 and 1950 (close together, whatever scale you use) and a pair of numbers for 1975 (significantly separated). These numbers seem to be at the root of your "almost at parity" complaint. Which of these 6 numbers are you challenging, and what's the basis for discounting Feuerwerker here? Kanguole 08:13, 2 September 2011 (UTC)

Forget about the numbers for a second. What I'm challenging is the graph. Like I said (what, 3? 4? times already?) it is not very helpful here. A different display of the data (assuming it's correct) would be much better.

More generally, what is the graph supposed to illustrate and why is it pertinent to this article?Volunteer Marek (talk) 09:39, 2 September 2011 (UTC)

BTW, the same numbers are in McEvedy and Jones Atlas of World Population History. I'm not sure which one is the "original" source, or as I suspect, both sources got their numbers from another source (for European pop I'm guessing it's from Josiah Russel, which is pretty outdated).Volunteer Marek (talk) 12:56, 2 September 2011 (UTC)

Comparative populations (linear scale) of China and Continental Europe between 1000 and 1975

Here's the linear plot of the same numbers. As before the populations are close in 1950 and significantly different in 1975, following the underlying data. The linear plot emphasizes the difference at the end, but that's about all it does, and that's somewhat peripheral here. The 20th century, like the period before 1400 or so, is useful context, but not central to an article on the Great Divergence. The log plot gives a more informative overview of the populations over the whole period, because in addition to showing the absolute values of the two populations over time it indicates rates of growth, and significant fluctuations in earlier periods are not flattened out to fit in the later exponential growth. Kanguole 00:15, 3 September 2011 (UTC)

Oy, I'm afraid this is going to come down to the aesthetics. Looking at the linear plot I find it a lot more informative than the log scale plot. Here are some specific reasons why:

1. Before the 20th century (actually 1950 or so) China's population was basically an upward shifted version of Europe's. Both graphs show this but the linear graph shows it more clearly.

2. Like you say, the 20th century is not the subject of this article. So why not just drop the observations for 1975 and 1950 (actually just dropping 1975 will do most of the work). Once you get rid of these two there's just no reason to use a log scale plot.

3. What is this "more information" that the log plot gives? The rate of growth? Not really unless a reader is mathematically trained enough to know to look at the slope of the graph. For the average reader that's not going to be true. And if you really want to show the growth rate, then, as I said, before, just make another graph with the growth rates.

4. The fact that fluctuations in earlier periods were of minor magnitude compared to the high growth that came later is itself an interesting piece of information and the linear graph shows it.

At the end of the day though, the questions to ask here are: "What does this graph illustrate about the Great Divergence?" and "Does it illustrate it adequately?".

The Great Divergence is about the differences in living standards that arose between China and Europe (and its offshoots) - population itself is only tangential. If we assume both China and Europe in the pre-industrial era were "Malthusian" then including data on population densities could be useful as in that case population growth proxies for the rate of technological innovation. This is what I think this graph is aiming at showing but it does so in a very unclear and sloppy way. But in that case, there's no reason to include numbers for the post-industrial era (essentially 1900, 1950, 1975... maybe 1950 should be kept). And once you get rid of these "high" numbers there's no reason to use a log scale.

So again, can you provide an explanation for why this graph (and the sentence accompanying it) is even here?Volunteer Marek (talk) 02:04, 3 September 2011 (UTC)

The graph provides background information on conditions in China (and Europe) in the period under discussion, as well as earlier and later periods for additional context. In a Malthusian setting, with incremental productivity increases being consumed by expansion of the population, the latter is directly relevant. It might be interesting to graph growth rates, densities or other variations, but I know of no sources on which we could base such graphs.

China's population history before 1950 was actually quite different from an upward shifted version of Europe's, though this is harder to see from the linear plot. Those earlier fluctuations were highly significant in proportion to the populations of the time, even if they are miniscule compared with modern populations.

As for truncation, to omit the 1975 levels (or the 1975 and 1950 levels), would give the misleading impression that Chinese and European populations were converging, which was your original complaint. Omitting levels after 1850 would give the equally misleading impression that the high rate of growth to that point was sustained (an issue directly relevant to the Great Divergence). Kanguole 13:32, 4 September 2011 (UTC)

The growth rates can be calculated from this data. In fact, that's what the log-scale graph essentially shows.Volunteer Marek (talk) 23:39, 4 September 2011 (UTC)

And if the graph of the levels before 1950 shows that the populations were converging (not really) then that IS in fact relevant here.Volunteer Marek (talk) 23:41, 4 September 2011 (UTC)

Error bars

Population estimates are much more reliable than they used to be. Displaying population as a simple line masks the massive uncertainties in earlier populations. Is it feasible to show some error bars? - this is generally not going to be possible (bad data means not just unknown level, but also unknown measurement error), particularly since I'm guessing a lot of this "line" is linear extrapolation. I don't know what form these data take but if they are high enough frequency and NOT just filled in with linear extrapolation then you could do a moving average or some other filtering and hope the measurement error is just noise which will average out. But it doesn't look like it - there's a lot of smoothness there already.

More generally, best data on historical populations is from England. And even there the quality stuff goes back only to 16th century. Semi-reliable data goes back, sporadically, to the 13th. But even rest of Europe has very very very sketchy data for population, with a lot of these numbers you see out there basically just pulled out of thin air. China's probably even worse in that respect (at least in terms of what is accessible to Western researchers). One thing that could be noted is the singular years when standardized coordinated censuses began to be taken. 1841 for England (though that one was sketchy, the first decent one was 1851) and only the end of the 19th century for rest of Europe. China - I don't know off the top off my head.Volunteer Marek (talk) 08:31, 1 September 2011 (UTC)

A small but significant piece of pedantry: The 1841 census covered the United Kingdom (more or less), not just England. Let's be careful with demonyms :-) bobrayner (talk) 08:38, 1 September 2011 (UTC)

Lol, yes. But the Wales and Scotland ones are even less reliable than the English one so often times demographers just use the 1841 English one.Volunteer Marek (talk) 08:43, 1 September 2011 (UTC)

Nice Reasons

I find it interesting that all the reasons provided for European dominance essentially fall into two categories a) European innovation and Asian contentment with the status quo b) superior natural resources in Europe. Why isn't the slave trade, the theft of New World gold and silver and subsequent imperialism an explanation for why European GDP arose so much since the 19th century. Aarandir (talk) 10:59, 23 June 2015 (UTC)

I'm sure no one would really mind if you were to expand the "New World" section which does currently cover, though in short the "high profits earned from the colonies and the slave trade", and the "profits through selling New World goods to Asia, especially silver to China". I'm sure imperialism could be expanded upon as its only glanced upon in the "Trade" Section. In reality most of these likely factor in, and the matter of debate is to what degree, which if anything would be the main weakness of the article. In general the article mentions all these things, but in a very short form. 86.136.96.136 (talk) 23:39, 11 July 2015 (UTC)

The Role of Colonialism and the British Raj

The Role of Colonialism has been substantially downplayed in the article, even though it was certainly a major factor. Under British rule, India's GDP fell from roughly 25% of the global GDP in 1700 to a meagre 4% in 1950. British economic policies systematically de-industrialized India and turned it from a propsperous to an impoverished nation. These policies involved restrictions and higher taxation on native products, excessive taxation on farmers that lead to several devastating famines, forcing bonded farmers to plant cash crops like indigo instead of rice (which also contributed to hunger and famine), and using revenues, raw materials and labour from India to fund and fuel the industrial revolution in Britain. Britain became rich and prosperous at the cost of her colonies, and none was looted and plundered more severely than the country that was aptly called the jewel in the crown of the British Empire. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.159.113.40 (talk) 19:25, 28 August 2015 (UTC)

Counter-progressive Polish state

I can't find any reference to that in the text of Guns, Germs and Steel. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2605:E000:EFC0:A9:D48A:1435:4787:5BB5 (talk) 04:50, 5 July 2015 (UTC)

Neither can I. Moreover, the reference to a "counter-progressive Polish state" surprises me, as Poland–Lithuania (which is evidently meant) is actually widely considered to have been fairly progressive for its day, certainly more so than the Russian Empire, for example. I have tagged the relevant passage – I note that no page number is given, either, which would have been helpful. The user who originally contributed the passage is, unfortunately, not active on Wikipedia anymore. --Florian Blaschke (talk) 01:19, 29 July 2015 (UTC)

The entire section on "State prohibition of new technology" seems unreferenced. Anyway, in Poland there was no prohibition of new technology, just the economy was focused on the agricultural sector rather than manufcatures. See also Vistula trade for context. --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here} 08:48, 12 October 2015 (UTC)

Translations

Note: This might be translated into further languages, especially Chinese, French, German, Japanese, Arabic. Cheers, Horst-schlaemma (talk) 01:10, 4 November 2015 (UTC)

Ricardo Duchesne material and references removed

Ricardo Duchesne material and references have recently been removed, see diff. Jonpatterns (talk) 16:55, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

Long article

The article is presently flagged as a long article (since November 2016). With one exception, this doesn't strike me as an article in need of drastic remedy (amputation by threshing machine / trash compactor / borg wedding).

On my scan, only the section "Culture" has the immediate appearance of being an inaccessible wall of text. I don't see how it justifies a sub-article. Perhaps sub headings? — MaxEnt 04:21, 31 December 2016 (UTC)

I agree. The article isn't particularly long. The Culture section does get a bit fuzzy in the last two paragraphs, though. Kanguole 13:11, 31 December 2016 (UTC)

False and misleading edits

Recent edits are mostly in conflict with mainstream research by a a number of leading authorities.Phmoreno (talk) 17:00, 19 August 2017 (UTC)

Could you clarify which edits? It's difficult to check the sourcing in the recent edits, which mostly cover the Ottoman Empire and India. Snooganssnoogans (talk) 17:15, 19 August 2017 (UTC)

I looked over some of the recent edits, which yes, were problematic. I made some changes to the text in the main body. I also re-wrote the lede. What do you think? Snooganssnoogans (talk) 20:11, 19 August 2017 (UTC)

The "mainstream research" you're referring to is outdated. Recent scholarship points to per-capita income in China and India being on-par with Europe prior to the Industrial Revolution. Maestro2016 (talk) 19:53, 19 August 2017 (UTC)

The "older" and "recent" scholarship should be the other way around. According to Broadberry, the older "traditionalist" position is that Europe had an income lead before the Industrial Revolution, while the recent "revisionist" position is that China and/or India were either on-par with, or had an income lead, before the Industrial Revolution. Scholars such as Broadberry and Maddison support the older "traditionalist" position, while scholars such as Pomeranz, Parthasarathi and Bairoch support the recent "revisionist" position. Maestro2016 (talk) 20:20, 19 August 2017 (UTC)

I added the slew of recent articles and papers showing that the Great Divergence occurred earlier. These are the most recent estimates in the economic history as far as I know, and as certainly far newer than Pomeranz 2000 and Bairoch 1993 (Hobson is not an economist historian, and this is not his expertise). The "recent" / "older" descriptions are therefore reasonable. Snooganssnoogans (talk) 20:30, 19 August 2017 (UTC)

Two of those references are Broadberry, who himself acknowledges in recent papers that his position is the "traditional view", whereas the position of those he opposes (e.g. Pomeranz, Parthasarathi, Hanley, etc.) are the "revisionist view". And it's also worth noting that the "revisionist view" scholars have published responses to the "traditional view" scholars challenging them, such as Parthasarathi's critical response to Broadberry. It's an on-going debate, with scholars from both schools going back-and-forth. I believe it would be better to characterize the debate in terms of how Broadberry characterizes it, the "traditional view" and the "revisionist view". Maestro2016 (talk) 21:17, 19 August 2017 (UTC)

The terms "traditional" and "revisionist" do seem accurate, and there does seem to be an active debate between those two schools. However, I encourage you to find more up-to-date sources. I will edit again. Snooganssnoogans (talk) 22:11, 19 August 2017 (UTC)

Some more recent sources generally supporting a 19th-century Great Divergence viewpoint:

• Parthasarathi, Prasannan (2011), Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600–1850, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-1-139-49889-0
• Andre Gunder Frank, Robert A. Denemark (2015). Reorienting the 19th Century: Global Economy in the Continuing Asian Age. Routledge.
• Kenneth Pomeranz (2011), Ten Years After: Responses and Reconsiderations
• Sashi Sivramkrishna (2009), Ascertaining Living Standards in Erstwhile Mysore, Southern India, from Francis Buchanan's Journey of 1800-01: An Empirical Contribution to the Great Divergence Debate
• Leonid Grinin, Andrey Korotayev (2015), Great Divergence and Great Convergence: A Global Perspective
• Andrey Korotayev, Jonas J. Nazimoff Shaende, Jack A. Goldstone (2014), Global Population Dynamics Drive the Phases of the Great Divergence and Convergence{{citation}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

Also, there doesn't seem to be any "consensus view" at this point. It should be referred to as the "traditional view", as Broadberry himself describes it. Also, there are "economic historians" and "world historians" in both camps, so I think it would make more sense to refer to both camps as simply scholars or historians. Maestro2016 (talk) 11:39, 20 August 2017 (UTC)

Per my reading of the sources, the sources seem to distinguish between economic historians and world historians when it comes to timing the Great Divergence. If you can find reliable sources that contradict that, I'd of course reconsider. Snooganssnoogans (talk) 11:52, 20 August 2017 (UTC)

Some sources that specifically refer to the "California School" as "economic historians":

• Niv Horesh (2009), What Time Is the "Great Divergence"? And Why Economic Historians Think It Matters
• Bertram Schefold [in German] (2016), Great Economic Thinkers from Antiquity to the Historical School: Translations from the Series Klassiker Der Nationalökonomie, Routledge, p. 13
• A 2013 paper from Broadberry ("Accounting for the great divergence") which states: "This chimed with the work of Frank (1998) and other economic historians working in California, and became known as the California School."

Maestro2016 (talk) 12:20, 20 August 2017 (UTC)

Not relevant to the divergence

This type of information does not contribute to the article.

While steam power had been experimented with in Ottoman Egypt by engineer Taqi ad-Din Muhammad ibn Ma'ruf in 1551, when he invented a steam jack driven by a rudimentary steam turbine, it was under Muhammad Ali of Egypt

The mechanics of the period had no technology to produce a practical piston engine and certainly not an industrial turbine. One only needs to read Watt's account of the trouble he had getting a cylinder bored. Regardless, Egypt never produced practical steam engines before Newcomen.Phmoreno (talk) 15:35, 20 August 2017 (UTC)

References

Origin of the term?

Several sources cite "Huntington 1996" as the origin of the phrase. The only work Huntington seems to have written in that year is the Clash of civilizations, and the term does not appear in that book. Can anyone track down another reference to Huntington? Otherwise, this article and the book that its cites appear to be wrong. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Xenomorphologist (talk • contribs) 17:08, 9 August 2017 (UTC)

Gunder Frank gives no reference; I could find no reliable source, other than blogs, which may well be sourced from this article, and like Xenomorphologist could find "great divergence" in neither Huntington's 1993 article or 1997 Clash of Civilizations here. Therefore, since the phrase was at the very least popularized by Pomweranz and very likely coined by him, I changed the lead sentence to reflect this.ch (talk) 05:23, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

California school statements need to be challenged

I have not read the California school material, except for an abstract of the Gladstone source. I doubt Pomerez agrees with the statement, but Gladstone is clearly wrong. Parts of China, such as the Yangtze delta were not as far behind Europe by the 18th century, but they were clearly not equal to Europe economically. We know this from the first hand accounts of Europeans. They had no trading empire and the people lived in shanties, having barely enough to eat. China benefited by new crops such as corn and sweet potatoes; however, this resulted in a population explosion, which was a contributing cause to the Taiping Rebellion which resulted in the deaths of 40 million.Phmoreno (talk) 21:50, 27 August 2017 (UTC)

After reading Gladstone's abstract again I noticed that his paper said 1780, so it did not match the 19th century claim. Obviously that was an error, because the Industrial Revolution was in the 18th C, so I corrected the statement.Phmoreno (talk) 22:04, 27 August 2017 (UTC)

According to Paul Bairoch, first-hand accounts of Jesuits in 18th-century China were almost just as enthusiastic about the "marvels of the East" as Marco Polo was in the 13th century. Bairoch also pointed to a late 17th-century travel account from Jean Chardin who said that even the peasants in Persia had higher living standards than the peasants in the most fertile parts of Europe. While Bairoch acknowledges that there are also some negative descriptions, he notes that they are greatly outnumbered by the positive descriptions, and that overall, traveller accounts generally point to better (rather than worse) living standards in the East up until the 18th century. Maestro2016 (talk) 13:20, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

Likewise for India, the account of Francis Buchanan in the Kingdom of Mysore (South India) around 1800 point to it having higher living standards than in Europe (according to economic historians Sashi Sivramkrishna and Prasannan Parthasarathi). Maestro2016 (talk) 13:46, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

There is no question that parts of Europe were very impoverished at the time of the Industrial Revolution; however, parts of Great Britain, Holland and The United States had high living standards.Phmoreno (talk) 17:26, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

And if you are speaking of peasants you have to consider the feudal areas of Europe, such as France and what is now Germany, Poland and Russia. The remnants of the feudal system were swept away by the French Revolution. Russia had a revolution over 100 years later, but of course with a different outcome.Phmoreno (talk) 17:30, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

Very doubtful statements.

To say the least:

"This is what set Europe apart from the technologically advanced, large unitary empires such as China and India. China had both a printing press and movable type, and India had similar levels scientific and technological achievement as Europe in 1700, yet the industrial revolution would occur in Europe, not China or India."

(in the "Political fragmentation" part)

First, India has generally been rather divided despite short periods during which a dominant power rose (and fell), such as the Mughal empire which fell at the beginning of the 18th century (India was largely divided during the 18th century). Presenting India as an consistently united empire is totally absurd.

Second, it's rather disturbing to place in 1700 (!) China/India at the exact same level of Europe in terms of scientific achievement. There is no end to the numbers of mathematicians and scientists in Europe through the 16th and the 17th centuries. Scientific articles on wikipedia during those centuries are almost only filled by Europeans. Just realize that in China it was believed that Earth was flat until they accepted the foreign idea of a sphere in the 17th century. Meanwhile elsewhere, Newton created equations that will be used to calculate gravity until the 20th century. Technology is maybe a more debatable field (though I still believe that overall, Europe was obviously ahead at this point), but in terms of pure "science" I'm quite shocked by the absurd comparison. In terms of accumulated knowledge, India and China didn't have the same arms as Europe to begin an industrial revolution. Of course, it doesn't change the fact that they were more advanced than Europe in some very particular fields, which doesn't change the point. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.240.72.102 (talk) 18:41, 27 August 2017 (UTC)

This is reliably sourced. Snooganssnoogans (talk) 19:50, 27 August 2017 (UTC)

The paragraph in question is cited to Mokyr (2016), with no page numbers given. However, it seems Mokyr makes the point about unity only in reference to China as contrasted with Europe. And on page 164 he attacks Parthasarati's claim that "as late as 1700, there was no discernible difference between the scientific and technological achievement of Britain and India" after dealing with similar claims about Europe and China. Kanguole 20:20, 27 August 2017 (UTC)

What is very well known is that China and India had been surpassed by Europe by 1700, which happened at least a couple of centuries earlier. We know that from accounts by scholarly Jesuit missionaries who had access to the Emperor's court where they discussed astronomy. European thinkers were influenced by Greek logic which the Chinese did not adopt. Though the Chinese had movable type printing they had too many characters. The Chinese press was run by the government so only government approved material got published. When movable type started being used in Europe it immediately resulted in a huge increase in the number of titles published. Europe was well ahead with mechanical, mining and chemical technology by the time De re metallica was published. De re Metallica had a good chapter on chemistry and was the standard text for the next 170 years. Printed technical manuals were available in China, but only to scholars. Some copies of De re metallica were available to the public in churches, where they were attached to a chain. Calculus had already been invented by 1700 and Newton Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, which has no equal anywhere in Chinese or Indian science.Phmoreno (talk)

Hello (I'm the person who created the thread). As pointed out by the person before me (and it's only a few examples), things were rather obvious in the 16th and in the 17th centuries. Here's a wiki article about the scientific revolution, which began in the 16th century and ended in the 18th: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_revolution A section of another wiki article about the history of mathematics in general, I selected the 17th century (the 16th century is just above) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_mathematics#Mathematics_during_the_Scientific_Revolution I have a hard time accepting "This is reliably sourced" as a final reply. The particular field of science was overwhelming. Also, Kangole above seems to have checked the "source" and pointed out how it was inaccurately quoted anyway.

I personally think we should keep only the reference to China regarding the "big empire vs fragmented europe" part. Regarding science and technology, we should add "Mokyr claims that" since it's his very personal view on the matter. Personally I would even remove "science" to keep only "technology" but I guess it's probably a bit much. What do you think we should do? If Kangole is right, we can't let it as it is right? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A01:CB00:8169:9700:B968:D730:20C1:4365 (talk) 20:50, 29 August 2017 (UTC)

As I was saying, Mokyr isn't claiming parity in 1700, rather the reverse: he's arguing against others who do claim it. Kanguole 23:13, 29 August 2017 (UTC)

I'm sorry, I don't understand how I read that wrong. Even if I'm not a native speaker it was clear, I apologize again. Any suggestion about the change to make in thta part of the article? I don't want to take an isolated initiative.

Since there was no further reply, I took the liberty to change it for: "This is what set Europe apart from technologically advanced, large unitary empires such as China. China had both a printing press and movable type, yet the industrial revolution would occur in Europe." As you can see, I actually just removed what was related to India (including this comparison with 1700's Europe).

Productivity

This section contains errors and omissions, and is generally misleading. It should be removed unless someone who has an understanding of the subject can rewrite it.Phmoreno (talk) 13:10, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

Indian Subcontinent

Was the trade deficit between India and Great Britain and Holland really due to the fact that India was self sufficient or was it because that by 1760 wages in Lancashire were six times higher than India? And what about the fact that Western Europe had so much gold and silver flow in from the Spanish colonies in the Americas that there was a large inflation in Europe. The intellectuals in Europe became aware that gold and silver weren't wealth. Anyway, statements in this section do not accurately describe the situation.Phmoreno (talk) 13:23, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

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Very Doubtful Indeed

Other users comments on this page are indeed accurate regarding when the great divergence occurred and the level of achievement Europe had made. Before my edits the page leaned somewhat in the direction that Europe, even western Europe was poorer than much of Asia as late as 1750-1820.

This view was popularized in the mid 20th century and was a kind of rebuke to the views of 18th and 19th century thinkers. The page presented this work as a kind of final word or new consensus view, it's not. Recent research has strongly challenged this and gone back closer to the old classical view. Bairoch and Pomeranz are heavily cited here, and I'm not going to remove them. But, Angus Maddison who is a major source here as well, was a major critic of Bairoch who he believed was using highly speculative "guesstimates" to assess world development. Maddison was strongly in favor of the view that Europe declined and stagnated from the fall of West Rome until about 1000 Ad. Then from 1200-1500 forged a small lead via a number of institutional and cultural shifts(scientific revolution, reformation, nations states forming, capital accumulation, renaissance banking and finance). Robert C. Allen, probably one of the leading economic historians alive, is a fairly strong believer that northwest Europe's wealth lead to the industrial revolution, not the other way around. Luckily, the section on "Conditions in pre-Great Divergence cores" mentions an excellent study pointing to Europe's mini take off.

This page says that Pomeranz claims "Life expectancy in China and Japan for adult males were 39.6 and 41.1 respectively, compared with 34 for England, between 27.5 and 30 for France, and 24.7 for Prussia". But no exact date is specified. Using Our World in Data's excellent life expectancy database I found that the earliest information they had on life expectancy for the total population in Japan was in 1855 and it was about 36. In China reliable data wasn't found until l930 when life expectancy was around 32. Most of Europe where data is available were better off.

Overall, this is a very good page. But there a number of things that stand out as wrong. People are trying too hard to prove that parts of Asia were better off than Europe when the evidence is clear they were in decline. The Ottoman Empire could not rival West Europe as late as 1800. It had been in a long protracted decline for a while, thats why they lost at Vienna in 1683 and had been getting pushed back the entire time. Japan was xenophobic and needed to import and copy Western cannons and weapons in the 1840's and 50's. The Mughal state was in a period of decline before company rule in 1757. I don't want to get overly political but there seems to be a lingering anti-Western bias here that seeks to delegitimize European development. Its probably not a coincidence that much of the revisionist data came about during the mid 20th century during the rise of the "new left" when people like Bairoch were very insistent that the poor Europeans owed their success entirely to colonial exploitation.

Hopefully, I've helped balance this page more fairly. EconomicHisorianinTraining (talk) 06:08, 23 January 2019 (UTC)

• "Then from 1200-1500 forged a small lead via a number of institutional and cultural shifts(scientific revolution, reformation, nations states forming, capital accumulation, renaissance banking and finance)." You view the Renaissance of the 12th century and the rise of the Italian city-states as irrelevant to the economic changes in Europe?
• "The Ottoman Empire could not rival West Europe as late as 1800. It had been in a long protracted decline for a while, thats why they lost at Vienna in 1683" They lost the Battle of Vienna (1683) because they could not face the combined fores of the Holy Roman Empire and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Part of the Empire's later problems had to do with the near-constant Russo-Turkish wars and the war at its eastern borders with the Safavid dynasty contributing to the weakening of both rivals.
• "Japan was xenophobic and needed to import and copy Western cannons and weapons in the 1840's and 50's." Partly irrelevant. The main problem for Japan was the so-called Sakoku foreign policy (c. 1633-1853) enforced by the Tokugawa shogunate. It restricted trade and cultural contact with foreign powers, but they did maintain one port open to Chinese and Dutch traders: Nagasaki. The Japanese did import medical texts and other books into their country. They didn't bother updating the military technology and their best gunpowder weapon was the Tanegashima-type arquebus. Cutting-edge technology in the 16th century, outdated in the 19th century.
• "The Mughal state was in a period of decline before company rule in 1757." The Mughal Empire was facing secession movements and foreign invasions for much of the 18th century. Nader Shah's invasion of the Mughal Empire (1738-1740) signified the Empire's decline and encouraged other powers into challenging its control. Dimadick (talk) 11:00, 23 January 2019 (UTC)

No, I don't consider the Renaissance unimportant, thats why I mentioned it as part of the early changes that lead to European success.

According to our own page on The Battle of Vienna the Ottomans had a force of about 140,000 which was larger than the combined forces of their opponents which is estimated at 90,000. I'm not sure how important wars with Russia and Persia were. Our own Wiki page listing conflicts involving Ottoman Turkey show that it was constantly at war throughout its existence. I don't think it's obvious that those conflicts were much more significant than previous ones. By WW1 they were receiving modernization aid from Germany so I think the issue had more to do with West and Central Europe pulling ahead and having greater capacity to defend themselves.

I would say that the Sakoku policy was emblematic of the xenophobic nature of Japanese society. Most of what I've read on Japan suggest that the Tokugawa period was one in which they basically copied and tried to beat the West at their own game after The United States very forceful and threatening diplomatic approach.

Mughal India was severely weakened by 1700. Those secessionist movements were in part a response to and cause of the decline. The Maratha Empire controlled far more land by 1760 and a number of other independent nations had emerged in the subcontinent. From that perspective I see the British as just another political force vying for control, the Mughals were themselves not native to the area. I think the Shah's invasion was important as well but most of the conquered land was given back so it was important in that it signaled weakness. However, as early as about 1500, Portugal was able to circumnavigate Africa, dominate the Indian Ocean, and then establish its presence there. To pull that off, at least to me, suggests parts of Europe had pulled ahead in some regards.

Thank you for the thoughtful and interesting statements, in their own way they helped me better understand each historical event. I'm not capable of responding to each as thoroughly as they deserve, the nuance and size of each issue is enormous. Given the nature of history, I'm also unsure if we'll be able to totally agree on the significance and role of each event. But, I hope this helps clarify my views and to some degree answers your questions. EconomicHisorianinTraining (talk) 16:52, 23 January 2019 (UTC)

References

Commons files used on this page have been nominated for deletion

The following Wikimedia Commons files used on this page have been nominated for deletion:

• 1 AD to 2003 AD Historical Trends in global distribution of GDP China India Western Europe USA Middle East.png (discussion)
• Maddison GDP per capita 1500-1950.svg (discussion)

Participate in the deletion discussions at the nomination pages linked above. —Community Tech bot (talk) 16:07, 3 July 2019 (UTC)

Recently added graph

Share of global GDP

I have reverted the addition of the graph at right, because it does not depict divergence, i.e. things starting off near each other and then moving apart.

The graph depicts the change in share of global GDP over time. This is a secondary effect of the real change, namely the expansion of world GDP in the 19th century due to the economic growth of western countries in this period. Kanguole 13:19, 18 July 2019 (UTC)

There should be more on the role of fossil fuels

I'm not familiar with the term "Great Divergence", but I feel that more attention should be devoted to the burning of fossil fuels.

Of course, the Enlightenment begot the Scientific Revolution which begot the Industrial Revolution, but, as tempting as it is, it is probably wrong to ascribe this chain only to the inevitable progress of the human mind.

Without coal, allowing to build more machines to mine more iron to build more machines to mine more coal, there is no Industrial Revolution and, hence, probably no Great Divergence. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Noliscient (talk • contribs) 16:11, 13 April 2020 (UTC)