Talk:Continuation War/Archive 12

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Swedish speaking minority

Did it play any role that Finland has a swedish speaking minority? Did relatives of these minority in Swede support Finland?

Yes, the Swedish-speaking part of population fought to defend Finland like the others. There were separate units for Swedish-speakers, where the language of command was Swedish. And a number of high Finnish commanders were Swedish speakers, most notably Mannerheim himself. 62.183.251.50 (talk) 07:46, 29 April 2010 (UTC)

I'd like to note that most Swedish-speaking Finns didn't have relatives in Sweden in 1940's. They have lived in Finland for 600–800 years. (In 1960's and 1970's, many Finns emigrated to Sweden, so nowadays, most Finns, regardless of language, have kin in Sweden.) --MPorciusCato (talk) 11:49, 1 May 2010 (UTC)

Well that depends on the distance from the border and position. For example in Torniojoki region the border has been (and still is) considered a minor nuisance and trafficking material over (both legally and illegally) was pretty common as families lived on both sides of the river. Same applies to the Swedish speaking coastal (fishing) communities along the Gulf of Bothnia. But that applies only to a small minority of the Swedish-speaking Finns. Most had relatively little contact with Sweden. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:08, 1 May 2010 (UTC)

Your right, Tornionjoki valley is a case sui generis. However, the population there is Finnish-speaking, mostly also on the Swedish side. (Nowadays, the Northwest-Finnish dialect spoken there is called meänkieli by the Swedes. In 1940's, it was considered a Finnish dialect by everyone.) --MPorciusCato (talk) 16:06, 2 May 2010 (UTC)

Many Finnish officers, for example Mannerheim, Hjalmar Siilasvuo, Erik Heinrichs, Harald Öhquist, were swedish-speking Finns. Maybe they communicated with swedish in private. There is no evidence or other indications, that Mannerheim or anyone else favoured the swedish-speaking people. There was some only swedish-speaking battalions, but their missions did not differ from finnish speaking brothers in arms. The offical army command language was always Finnish, so all offical conversations, notes and commands were in Finnish. Peltimikko (talk) 17:28, 2 May 2010 (UTC)

Stability!

It has now been nine days since the last cycle of reverts over the war's outcome. Shall we call the current version the stable version? --Killing Vector (talk) 00:38, 12 May 2010 (UTC)

I'd call it "Interim Peace." >_< --Illythr (talk) 02:01, 12 May 2010 (UTC)

Interim Peace was the time between Winter War and Continuation War.. Well, at least last time i checked. Regardless i posted earlier a suggestion that a separate section could be made into the article where the result could be properly handled. But so far no one has bothered to comment it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:42, 12 May 2010 (UTC)

Interim peace - as in a short period of calmness between constant revert wars. --Illythr (talk) 11:04, 12 May 2010 (UTC)

Are you absolutely sure we are not the same person? -Whiskey (talk) 14:04, 12 May 2010 (UTC)

I guess you could call it a interim peace if you wanted. However, Interim Peace (like you originally phrased it) generally refers to the peace between Winter War and Continuation War - Wanderer602 (talk) 10:29, 14 May 2010 (UTC)

Guess I wasn't clear enough. Notice that the topic creator refers to the state of the article - no wars for almost two weeks. My response to this was pessimistic - rather than a permanently stable version, it is in a state of "interim peace" - until the next nationalist wave comes crashing in.

Whiskey: The cruel checkusers pronounced their harsh verdict, alas. Although "unlikely" doesn't mean "absolutely not", mind you. Then again, there are people who'd absolutely mind me bring married and having kids right now, so it's probably okay the way it is, after all. ;-) --Illythr (talk) 21:22, 14 May 2010 (UTC)

Illythr, your abominable prostalinism make me ill. Russian anti-democtas like should never be allowed leave its on domaines. I hope FSB or the Russian history commision pays you good vodka money for keeping up this disgusting revisionism of history. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 90.237.162.131 (talk) 23:44, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

Not only that, they also supply me with blood of finest Finnish virgins so that I can whip up a wicked Bloody Lotta to accompany me on my Stalinist POV-pushing campaigns. --Illythr (talk) 14:58, 6 July 2010 (UTC)

Illythr,seriously, Have you ever added anything to this article of either sources or facts? Or is it just your POV pushing neo-russian nationalism that gives you the right censor this article. -"Ohh i guess a City can only be liberated if it ivolves Red army and rape". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.250.232.17 (talk) 15:38, 6 July 2010 (UTC)

"Liberation" would've made sense if Finland had retaken the city in the Winter war, before it signed the treaty which made Vyborg part of the USSR. Because of this, Vyborg was technically liberated by the Red Army in 1944. However, I prefer to avoid using such loaded terms with places that had changed hands frequently, so "recaptured" is the best fitting and neutral term available. Credit for the whole sentence goes to user:Colchicum, who had used it here. --Illythr (talk) 16:42, 6 July 2010 (UTC)

That requierd that Finland would have lost Viipuri during the winter war, witch was not the case they lost the city in the peace aggrement. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.250.234.124 (talk) 19:21, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Belligerents

That is the box 'Infobox military conflict' contents

Is there need to include 'Italy' and 'Swedish' volunteers (or to be honest event 'UK') to the list. That is Italy's main contribution to the Continuation War was the deployment of 4 MTBs (motor torpedoboats) to Ladoga, where they remained under German command without existing as an independent unit (as a naval unit under Luftwaffe command for some weird reason). Also Swedish volunteers which operated mostly as a part of Hanko Group manning their length of the static front lines - as neither side wanted to attack there - at a battalion strength at best. And then we have the UK 'contribution'. Which consisted of one (1) air raid to Petsamo carried out on 31 July 1941 long before they even declared war to Finland (6 December 1941). So... While all three are noteworthy contributions to the Continuation War is there real need to place them as 'belligerents' of the conflict? - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:08, 21 May 2010 (UTC)

No separate command, no belligerent. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 06:46, 22 May 2010 (UTC)

So that takes out the Italians. But what about the British? In sense of continuation war only direct military action UK (or commonwealth) took against Finland was a bombing of German occupied harbor of Petsamo when Finland and UK were still at peace. After war declaration there was nothing. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:55, 27 May 2010 (UTC)

The following states are signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Finland listed there as "the States which are at war with Finland and actively waged war against the European enemy states with substantial military forces" : The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union of South Africa. --Illythr (talk) 21:23, 27 May 2010 (UTC)

This speaks against the UK in the infobox as otherwise the rest of the signatories should be added, which would be unreasonable. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 23:24, 27 May 2010 (UTC)

On the other hand, UK participation in the infobox is justified by the fact that the Continuation War is commonly cited as an example against Democratic Peace Theory. --Whiskey (talk) 06:44, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

Indeed, an example of theoretical warfare, given the extent of the British aggression against Finland and the fact that Finland never even bothered to declare war on the UK. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 07:05, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

Ok. Lets keep the UK there then. - Wanderer602 (talk) 09:05, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

What I said was that Finland was actually not at war with the UK as no direct aggression took place and Finland never even declared war. For obvious reasons, the fact of UK declaring war on Finland has got much reference but that should not make us forget the general guidelines for the combatants section of the template:infobox military conflict: "This is most commonly the countries whose forces took part in the conflict", which the U.K. did not. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 00:12, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

Hmm... Its sorta problematic if you follow that guideline. The British Commonwealth (most of it at least) declared war at Finland but the declaration of war happened 4 months after the sole British attack against Finnish soil - which at the time was under Finnish civilian administration but simultaneously under German military administration (assuming i have understood how things worked in Lapland in 1941-44). If Finns had not loaned troops to the Germans it would have been easy to use the Finnish-German operational boundary as sort of guideline for defining the area or scope of the Continuation War and exclude the British raid from it but they did - as Germans found the unfamiliar arctic terrain to be too big of an obstacle in 1941 - there were some Finnish troops in the north as well (especially in 1941) however not as far as Petsamo though (as far as i know).

So did British attack Finland... Yes, though at peacetime. Was the British attack part of Continuation War... I would say no (did not happen at wartime and happened against German occupied port) but i cant really say i would be certain about it especially as the British Commonwealth appears as signatory of the peace treaty. - Wanderer602 (talk) 16:38, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

I moved UK from the combatant section of the infobox to notes section. Which is probably more closer to truth than leaving it to the combatant box. However UK was not alone in declaring the war (other British Commonwealth countries did the same). Should that be reflected in the infobox or just mentioned in the article? That is they did even less than UK which didn't really do anything. - 80.220.36.118 (talk) 12:13, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

I fully agree with the move of the UK. I don't really care about the formal declarations of war. Someone who cares is free to mention those in a note or somewhere in the text as long as they stay away from the infobox. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 12:23, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

What is with the actions of the No 151 Wing of the royal airforce, which is also mentioned in the article? There was not much British activity against the Finns, but is this a reason to remove them from the infobox? You said while quoting the general guidelines "This is most commonly the countries whose forces took part in the conflict", which the U.K. did not.. So we have a British carrier strike against a Finnish harbour and a British airwing operating together with the Soviets against the Finns, isnt this a participation of British forces in this war? This is not about the declaration of war, which dont matters in my opinion (which also make the other Commonwealth war declarations irrelevant for the infobox), this is about participation of British forces, which did happen? StoneProphet (talk) 00:57, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

Yes.. There was continued British presence in the Murmansk region throughout (well.. nearly) the World War II after the Operation Barbarossa had started. As for the airwing operating against Finns... That you would need to provide sources for. That is the military forces (for most parts, there were some loaned or separate units in the north) consisted of German AOK Norwegen and of its support units. In the end it seems to be similar issue as with Italian MTBs in the lake Ladoga.. Did British forces operate independently from Soviets or within Soviet command structure? In addition the participation of the 151 Wing lasted just for a month (September - October 1941) and after that operations consisted of (AFAIK) convoy support tasks carried out by outdated bombers. Also if you start splitting hairs then you can notice that port of Petsamo was under German military control at the time. In addition both the British carrier and the airwing carried out their tasks several months before UK declared war on Finland ie. before UK was 'officially involved' in the war between Finland and Russia.

In short.. UK had minor short term participation (within Soviet military structure - not sure of this) which happened (as per declaration of war by UK) out of scope of the Continuation War. Even the British declaration of war has later been deemed by some historians as political game or gamble (where UK had nothing to lose) to get Soviet Union to declare war against Japan in response. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:39, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

I dont want to split hairs, this is only about the infobox and why here is made an exception for Britain. ;) Whether those attacks were before or after the offical declaration dont matters, because the inclusion of participants in the infobox is not related whether there is/was a offical declaration of war or not. I am for adding GB back into the Infobox. There are lots of battle-articles which list participants with much smaller involvements, so there is no reason to hide it here or to make it different. But at the least the note to the UK below the infobox should be corrected, as there was probably more British forces involved as you admitted. StoneProphet (talk) 20:48, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

There is no attempt to hide UK participation - and you are free to add info of the 151 wing to the note if you deem it necessary. Point is the participation was extremely small - though i think the Italians on Lagoda accomplished even slightly less - and UK was certainly not a main or even a minor combatant/belligerent in the continuation war, marginal perhaps. Exception to leave a note about UK participation instead of handling it in the text was because the one sided declaration of war from UK is often offered as an example of democracies declaring war on other democracies. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:04, 10 August 2010 (UTC)

I added it to the note. StoneProphet (talk) 00:12, 12 August 2010 (UTC)

Manninen

What's the deal with the verification needed since February 2010 tag? An anonymous user just halved the casualties number, and I'm suddenly not sure what's the right one. --Illythr (talk) 12:43, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

"no hostilities ensued between the two parties"

Umm... --illythr (talk) 11:36, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

The raid happened five months before the UK's declaration of war and did not involve Finnish forces at all. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 11:56, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

It did occur on Finnish territory/inflict some minor infrastructural damage, though... --illythr (talk) 12:34, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

This article is a joke

Incredible Finnish bias. Look at the pictures! --62.240.91.27 (talk) 20:17, 5 October 2010 (UTC)

Hmmm, who started the Winter War? Was it perhaps the same nation that engaged in land grabs in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Poland, all BEFORE World War II? Maybe the Germans weren't the only brutal aggressors of the thirtie and forties. Read a history book and stop living in denial of Russian history.99.152.119.50 (talk) 04:28, 4 January 2011 (UTC)

Hmmm, who did the territory the Winter War was fought over belong before the Finnish attack in 1921? Danvolodar (talk) 01:23, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

Territory in Winter War? It was part of the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland which in effect meant that Finns were subjects to Czars but not to the Russians. So the answer is that territory belonged to the Grand Duchy of Finland. Also Finland - as a country or nation - did not attack Soviets in 1920s, please keep your facts rights.

Also regarding your recent changes to the article. Please go for example to Talk:Siege of Leningrad and search for "Finns 'November offensive of 1941'". Also if you read the section of the text i erased there were no excess (compared to 'normal' time of trench warfare) Finnish casualties for that time in the Karelian Isthmus. In short if some one - which is highly doubtful - attacked the Soviets it wasn't the Finns. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:31, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

In 1920 the Grand Duchy of Finland did not exist. The territory ceded to the Soviet Union after the Winter War belonged to the Republic of Finland since 1917. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 08:49, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

Ah true.. I was referring to whom the land belonged before it became property of the Republic of Finland - Wanderer602 (talk) 09:02, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

Oh, so, the Heimosodat was Finland conquering its own lands, then, I presume. Danvolodar (talk) 21:05, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

The pre-war Russian-Finnish border was determined by the Treaty of Tartu and the Heimosodat altered it in no way. The Winter War was fought entirely in the territory of the Republic of Finland according to the Treaty, so your accusations are in vain. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 06:57, 10 February 2011 (UTC)

Heimosodat - wars for kindred peoples - were fought outside of the area where Winter War was fought. Those were fought in Soviet side of the border (along the long stretch of border from lake Ladoga to Arctic Sea). Also there were no Finnish 'regulars' in those fights only Finnish volunteers - Finland as a nation did not participate in those though it provided support for the volunteers until the signing of the treaty of Tartu (Dorpat) in 1920. Only regular group that took part in those (AFAIK) was under Wallenius and mutinied at border-crossing and turned back. Later in 1918 and 1919 Finnish troops did move to parishes of Repola and Porajärvi but only after those parishes had themselves voted to be included to Finland - however troops returned from the parishes following the treaty of Tartu. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:23, 10 February 2011 (UTC)

If you have any public domain pictures depicting Soviet soldiers or tanks attacking or parading in captured cities, feel free to point them out. --Illythr (talk) 20:52, 5 October 2010 (UTC)

The pre-Great Patriotic War Red Army didn't necessarily make as much progress as hoped. I do have a "story" about Soviet submarine "heroics" against the evil Finns from a weekly radio program guide published in Riga. When I have that up online and translated I'll post a note. PЄTЄRS J VЄСRUМВА ►TALK 14:11, 4 January 2011 (UTC)

Where is the Russian point of view in this article. I agree it biased towards Soviet Union. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 147.153.237.132 (talk) 00:56, 30 March 2011 (UTC)

CW was asmall sideshow to Soviets/Russians so there has been extremely little research there on the issue. The most of that little research was done in Petrozavodsk University. I have tried to use Soviet/Russian sources when available, but there is very little available, and most of that has been published in Finnish, either by publishing previously unpublished works of Soviet/Russian researchers or co-operations between Finnish and Russian researchers. If you have any additiolnal sources, feel free to add them to the article.--Whiskey (talk) 12:24, 30 March 2011 (UTC)

Deployments section

Title is misleading. Much of the section is not about deployments, but rather military operations, conducted during the period Finland still claimed to be neutral.D2306 (talk) 20:10, 5 January 2011 (UTC)

Special treatment for the British?

Why not list them as a Soviet allied belligerent? They were engaged in military operations against Finnish forces and civilians, it wasn't a token declaration of war - and even if it were having it as an infobox spanning blurb at the bottom is still inappropriate. --NEMT (talk) 06:33, 28 January 2011 (UTC)

After UK declared war on Finland they didn't participate in military operations against Finland - and even when they did apart from one (1) carrier raid which accomplished very little the British unit (the squadron at Murmansk) operated under Soviet command. All that took place prior to the one-sided declaration of war and even then were limited to Northern Lapland which was already under German control (well Finnish civilian but German military). Worthy of a footnote but not much else. If it breaks infobox - then it could be changed into a note. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:31, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

There were a number of other countries that declared war on Finland like Canada and New Zealand and did scratch. This is all worth just a footnote. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 22:24, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

To clarify - you just said "Britain didn't participate in war against Finland, except when they did." Britain was at war with Finland and allied with the Soviets, their military actions during the war reflected this. They belong in the belligerents section of the infobox, full stop. --NEMT (talk) 21:25, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

No. Their military actions did not reflect this. British forces attacked German forced operating in Northern Lapland. What is far closer to the truth is that Britain declared war at Finland and was allied to the Soviets but their military actions did not reflect this. Unless you happened to miss the minor detail that British activities against Germans in Finnish Lapland ended long before UK - and the lot - declared war on Finland. Only real reason why UK is mentioned at all in the infobox is that the British declaration of war (regardless that no actions were taken) is often mentioned as an example of democracies declaring wars on other democracies. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:47, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

I guess it was too much to expect English Wikipedia wouldn't contain plenty of editors making it English Revisionist Wikipedia. What is your criteria for military actions against a country during a declared war to qualify as a belligerent in said war? Perhaps we should also remove Austria-Hungary from the Boxer Rebellion infobox? --NEMT (talk) 23:05, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

Given that UK didn't do military actions against Finland during the declared war i fail to see the relevance of your question. Also even UK did not apparently believe that the attack would have been a declaration of war as British government saw it fit to separately declare war on Finland 4 months after British raid at Petsamo. But if it matters so much to you toss it in there - however it does not change the fact that British (and the lot) were at very stretch only nominally belligerent in the Continuation War. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:19, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

It is hardly "English" revisionism to deny Britain was at war with Finland. From a British point of view, Finland was Germany’s ally from 1941 to 1944, and therefore an enemy; the only reason there was little or no military action was the lack of the means and the opportunity for it. But I would agree that in this article there is little point in cluttering up the infobox with flagicons of all the Allies, when most of them took no part in the action. Xyl 54 (talk) 06:55, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

The allies never even declared a war on Finland. Only some of them did. And of those that did only Soviet Union did take part to fighting during the declared state(s) of war. - Wanderer602 (talk) 11:34, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

Yes, why clutter the infobox with a country that allied with the Soviets and attacked Finland (nevermind that the infobox is far more "cluttered" by a special section derping about Britain at the bottom)? Do you guys even read what you type here before you save it? --NEMT (talk) 18:53, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

Attacked a German target in Finland... Reason was quite simply that due lack of participation in actually waging the war UK should not - my opinion - be mentioned as a belligerent in the conflict as it was only nominally such - and acted much more like bystander. However the example of UK declaring war on Finland is often mentioned as an example of democratic nation declaring war on some other democratic nation. So the declaration of the war by the UK is notable. But it did not really act as belligerent in the conflict. Any suggestions how to represent that with the infobox other than using the 'notes' section which is separately mentioned as being meant just for such additional 'exceptional' information? - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:18, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

I suppose British raids on Finnish (ie: not German) naval assets are further evidence of their lack of participation, right? Attempting to minimize Britain's belligerent actions in the war is intellectually dishonest and doesn't do anything to make the article better. --NEMT (talk) 01:09, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

Reading from the pdf linked to the main article handling the raid [1]:

Operation "E.F." was carried out with the object of making attacks by carrier-borne aircraft on German shipping in the waters adjacent to Kirkenes (Norway) and Petsamo (Finland)

As for the results... British carrier aircraft sunk one ship - small Norwegian freighter loaded with rum - and destroyed a section of the pier and the harbor's timber yard and damaged fish-flake factory and some warehouses as well as some oil tanks. Two German soldiers and one sailor died. Four finns were wounded - one of them severely. The raid was aimed at German resources. Also Finns did not have any naval assets in Petsamo. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:54, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

So to summarize: Britain attacked Finland during the Continuation War acting in support of the Soviet Union. I can see why they don't belong in the infobox, thanks. --NEMT (talk) 23:57, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

British raid targeted German shipping in Finnish waters. At the time when German and Britain were at war - while Finland and Britain were still at peace. First off the British participation was outside of the time frame of their war against Finland (ie. the Continuation War - UK declared war 4 months later). Second British participation was minimal at best (hundred of thousands of Finns and Germans, perhaps a million Soviets, less than a hundred British). Third British units attacked only areas under German military control targeting principally German targets. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:52, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

Then why list Finland as a belligerent in the infoboxes on pages specifically for Britain's actions that apparently were peacetime incidents unrelated to Finland or the Continuation War? --NEMT (talk) 18:12, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

As to why Finland is listed as belligerent in them... That i do not know. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:51, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

No. 151 Wing RAF had fought on USSR territory.--Germash19 (talk) 18:50, 5 May 2011 (UTC)

Civilian casualties

Discussion on this topic with Jaan Pärn: User talk:Jaan#Continuation War.

Victim`s siege of Leningrad is result of Finland and Germany actions. City had bombed by Germany, so I write down only dead from hunger.--Germash19 (talk) 17:45, 6 May 2011 (UTC)

As you are familiar with the no original research policy, I'm sure you realize that you have to provide academic sources attributing these casualties to the Continuation war (or Finnish participation in the Siege of Leningrad). --illythr (talk) 18:02, 6 May 2011 (UTC)

Original research is a statement that Finland did not participated in the Siege of Leningrad. Sources in article Siege of Leningrad.--Germash19 (talk) 20:58, 6 May 2011 (UTC)

Original research is an interpretation of primary sources to support a point that is not explicitly stated in them. The (heavily sourced) section Finnish participation doesn't help you either (However, the Finnish forces halted their advance at the pre-Winter War Soviet border on the Karelian Isthmus.[29] The Finnish army did little or nothing to contribute to the battle for Leningrad for the next three years.[30] Their headquarters rejected German pleas for aerial attacks against Leningrad[31] ... etc). I do believe that the text should be amended as it is currently factually incorrect (see section below), but your change equates Finnish participation with the German one, which results in a bigger slant in the opposite direction. --illythr (talk) 22:02, 6 May 2011 (UTC)

Severed supply lines and participation in the siege of Leningrad

Finland refused to actively participate in the siege of Leningrad...

The activities of the Naval Detachment K are in direct opposition to this statement. This should probably be clarified to "refused to conduct a large-scale offensive against the city of Leningrad, limiting its activities to the harassment of Soviet supply lines." Or perhaps to "A two and a half year standstill followed, during which the sides engaged only in small-scale harassment operations." --illythr (talk) 18:17, 6 May 2011 (UTC)

Other than single and small assault of Naval Detachment K, did Finland actually made any large or small scale assaults? Did the Finns even harass Soviet supply lines? I have not found any. Actually, Mannerheim was very cautions as it became clear to him as early as in 1942 that Finland had to detach itself from the war. The Soviets invited the Finns in October 1942 to negotiate for peace, but the Finns refused as the result of Stalingrad battle was unclear. In February 1943, the Mannerheim, Ryti and "inner circle" held a meeting purpose to end the war by negotiating the peace with the Soviets. Peltimikko (talk) 10:23, 7 May 2011 (UTC)

Even a single counterexample ("did once") refutes the general statement ("did not"). Raids on the Road of Life certainly do count as harassment operations, especially considering how critical it was to the continued survival of the city. As for the other supply lines (I mean here the cut/not cut railroads issue), this needs a source either way. --illythr (talk) 10:42, 7 May 2011 (UTC)

Finnish contribution to the Naval Detachment K and Einsatzstab Fähre Ost consisted from total of 1 obsolete Finnish motor torpedo boat (of WWI vintage - Sisu class motor torpedo boat) which was in too bad condition to launch its torpedoes. And providing harbor/base facilities. Also though Naval Detachment K was nominally under Finnish command (4 Italian MBTs and 4 German minelaying boats) the Luftwaffe's naval unit Einsatzstab Fähre Ost was not - it operated directly under German command. What is certainly true is that Finns did not attempt to hinder the 'international' naval operations on the Lake Ladoga however what is also true is that Finnish contribution to them was negligible. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:49, 11 May 2011 (UTC)

You can't make a general statement when a specific one flatly contradicts it. --illythr (talk) 19:35, 11 May 2011 (UTC)

True, though the statement is wrong if and only if you can find evidence that Finnish units actively participated to the operations against the supply lines. Only evidence i have seen have been rather unsuccessul torpedo runs made by Italian MBTs and German raids against some convoys and to torch a lighthouse. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:27, 12 May 2011 (UTC)

They were under Finnish command, launched from Finnish occupied territories. "Some convoys", indeed. --illythr (talk) 19:29, 12 May 2011 (UTC)

With 'some convoys' i was not referring to the amount of traffic or anything - just to the rarity of the attacks. It took until July of 1942 for the first operation to start due bad maintenance and lack of supplies. Lack of air cover limited operations even further as Germans refused to operate without it. And only Naval Detachment K was under nominal Finnish command. EFO was completely German command. Some information [2] - Wanderer602 (talk) 10:52, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

This is quite simple - as Finland participated in some operations, it is impossible to say it did not participate at all. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 10:57, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Finns indeed operated in Ladoga - however not all operations in Ladoga were related to the 'road of life' nor were they related to either of Naval Detachment K or EFO. Only Naval Detachment K and EFO took part in those operations and neither had any serviceable/operational Finnish ships. Only Finnish 'participation' was to nominal operational command however actual mission tasking came from Luftflotte I. - Wanderer602 (talk) 12:01, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Care to cite your sources? --Jaan Pärn (talk) 14:17, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Something on the organization [3], more on the actual composition of the naval units in Ladoga [4], on pages 188 - 192 (Chapter 'Merisotatoimet Laatokalla vuosina 1941-44' (Naval warfare in Lagoda on 1941-44), section 'Leningrading saarto' (Siege of Leningrad)) and appendix 14 (Joint naval operations on Ladoga 1942) & more importantly 15 (Table of organization of naval forces on Ladoga in summer 1942) in Kalervo Kijanen's book Suomen Laivasto 1918-1968, II, published 1968 by Meriupseeriyhdistys/Otava in Helsinki.

All those agree on that commands to do something went through the Finnish Naval Detachment K (which technically consisted only of HQ and 1917 vintage motor torpedo boat Sisu - though without torpedoes). However none indicate that Finnish forces would have participated to any the raids. Calling that 'Finnish forces' would have raided the convoys is therefore false (as there were none). As to how to put it shortly that the Italian & German units operating under Finnish operational command (while also under direct command (for EFO) or tasking of Luftflotte I) did that is another thing for which i don't have ideas. - Wanderer602 (talk) 17:50, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

To put it short, "Finland aided the German siege of Leningrad by blockading the city from the north and harassing Soviet supply lines on lake Ladoga". This way, Finnish contribution is not equated with the German one, yet is succinctly presented. --illythr (talk) 18:28, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

I guess that will work - though harassment lasted only from August to October of 1942 and was not repeated later on and was accomplished solely by using Italian and German assets. But that wouldnt fit to that particular section of the text so i suppose that will have to do. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:09, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Could be expanded to "Finland aided the German siege of Leningrad by blockading the city from the north and staging several harassment operations against Soviet supply lines on lake Ladoga", to demonstrate that it wasn't a constant effort. --illythr (talk) 19:55, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Rather "Finland aided the German siege of Leningrad by blockading the city from the north." And maybe a mention of a harrasment operation, where general Paavo Talvela was the "primus motor". BTW. There is a recent Finnish tv-document of this harrasment operation [5] (video streaming available only in Finland), and a short reference in Finnish [6] (hint: google translator). According to tv-document, after the war Talvela was very afraid of Soviet-led Commission in Helsinki that it would find him as a war criminal because of this 1942 harrassment operation. Peltimikko (talk) 21:56, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

There was more than one raid. As this is a dead end branch, it's probably best to add further comments below. --illythr (talk) 22:13, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

This section which was removed from the the text "and refused to cut the rerouted [[Murmansk railway]].<ref name="Vehvilainen2002-95"></ref>" - Referred to the fact that though Finns had cut the original Murmansk trail during the autumn of 1941 they refused to continue to the rerouted Murmansk railroad which according to Finnish sources as well as for example this ru::Кировская_железная_дорога run from Murmansk to Sorokka and from there to east to link up with Arkhangelsk railroad. Since the cutting of the first rail was not really that significant event as most WWII era texts (including texts about Western pressure to the Finns) about Murmansk railroad refer to this second, rerouted, Murmansk rail. Towards which Finns refused to advance. Which is the reason i consider it rather important part of the text. Either, please, give some better, more suitable, wording which fits to the text better or i'll toss that text block back in. - Wanderer602 (talk) 19:09, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

You see, there's that "though" in your statement that was not in the article lead. Without that complement, that piece looks like a case of Suspiciously Specific Denial, which I'm certain is not helping anyone. The important fact here is the general one - that the Finnish armies did not advance further, and not the specific actions they were unable to do because of that. This much is already implied in the current wording and, indeed, should be in the one I suggested above. Let me amend it a bit more... --illythr (talk) 19:55, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

"Then however, due to depleted resources, fear of Soviet retaliation and Western reaction,[11] the Finnish offensive was halted. Until 1943, Finland aided the German siege of Leningrad by blockading the city from the north and staging several harassment operations against Soviet supply lines on lake Ladoga. The Soviet air forces conducted bombings of Helsinki during this period." --illythr (talk) 20:17, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Main Soviet bombings (the ones usually remembered though occasional bombings happened also before) happened in early 1944 and that phrasing leads to understand that bombings would have happened already in 1943.

"Then however, due to depleted resources, fear of Soviet retaliation and Western reaction,[11] the Finnish offensive was halted. Until 1943, Finland aided the German siege of Leningrad by blockading the city from the north and staged several naval harassment operations against Soviet supply lines on lake Ladoga. The Soviet air forces conducted bombings of Helsinki."

Just links and removal of the 'during this period', added 'naval' there just to make sure no mix ups with the 'road of life' that run over the ice are made. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:17, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

The Road of Life was not only the ice road. Water way also 'Road of Life'.--Germash19 (talk) 21:52, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

To Germash19: That's kind of the idea of Wanderer's addition.

To Wanderer602: This last sentence is weird that way - the other events around it are given a time frame, whereas that one looks like a random offhand remark ("oh yeah, and the Soviets bombed Helsinki"). As I'm not sure how to fix it properly and it's still there anyhow, I guess we can add it in and maybe ask a native speaker to tidy it later. Would anyone else provide any further improvement suggestions? --illythr (talk) 22:13, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Reparations

There is constant talk that the Finns forced the Soviets to lower the "impossible" reparations to a more acceptable amount. This is contradicted by the following:

The reparations were set at $300,000,000, to be paid in goods over a 5-year period. The reduction from the earlier demand for $600,000,000 was probably in part brought about in spring of 1944 by a Finnish propaganda effort that had used the opinions of Swedish economists to demonstrate to world opinion that the first demand could not be met and in part by a concession to American and British objections in principle to reparations. The Finns later maintained that the Soviet Union had only given the appearance of relenting. By insisting on using the year 1938 as the price base and restricting the quantity of wood products it would accept, it nearly doubled the actual value of the reparations. The Soviet "take" was further increased at the 1945 Potsdam Conference by $60,000,000 as compensation for German property in Finland and property removed from the territory ceded to the Soviet Union. Later the reparations burden was eased somewhat, partly through British intercession, by extension of the payment period, first to six years and then to eight.

Stalingrad to Berlin. The German Defeat in the East by Ziemke (p. 390)

-YMB29 (talk) 05:36, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

Finns complained - that is hardly surprising - they were the ones who ended up paying it. But there is still not a single shred of evidence that the $600 million wouldnt have been in 1938 currency as well. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:15, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

There is no evidence that it would have been. You need to provide evidence for the claim and not insist that it is true only because there is no evidence against it...

Also here it clearly says that the Finns thought that the 1938 prices were used to make up the $300 million reduction. -YMB29 (talk) 04:12, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

You would need to have evidence or proof that the $600 million wouldn't have been in 1938 currency. So far i have only seen comments that Finns thought that the currency issue was used to make up the difference - however that does not prove a single thing on what currency the $600 million would have been in. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:47, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

It is up to you to prove your claim. So when you find evidence that it would have been based on 1938 prices, let me know... -YMB29 (talk) 19:52, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

Actually i have all the time said that there have been no record of that. Not in the Finnish side. The $300 million and $600 million were reported in exact same manner. For you to claim that the $600 million would not have been in 1938 currency you need to find evidence of that. Since even the $300 million were set as 1938 without any such notations in the ceasefire agreements after the ceasefire had already been agreed to. Unless you can find clear notation that the higher amount would have been on some certain currency notation the $300 million and $600 million must be handled in the same manner. So far only 'evidence' you have are Finnish opinions that 1938 currency was used to make up the difference which proves nothing. 1938 currency was pretty much the last truly valid currency notation since the war kicked the inflations in nearly all warring countries into the high gear already in 1939. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:55, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

In fact Enckell asked Molotov about the issue at spring 1944. Molotov refused to give exact reply but stated vaguely about something about what it is worth of... Also, Soviet negotiators several times explained how this 300m (in '38 currency) was only fraction of real Soviet costs, and when it is known how SU was entitled to 50% of all costs as reparations from Finland in Tehran conference, it really strongly hints that also the 600m were to be presented in '38 dollars after the signing... But there is no archival evidence available to one way or another.--Whiskey (talk) 23:11, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

There is no evidence that the $600 million would have been in 1938 currency. So again claiming that it would have been is OR, unless you can find a source. -YMB29 (talk) 16:35, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

Claiming that it would not have been is OR - please read what Whiskey wrote. Either prove that it was not in 1938 currency or your claim remains OR. Circumstancial evidence suggests the both sums would have been in 1938 currency but unless there are solid evidence either way then claiming one way or the other remains OR. Lack of evidence on one side is not abundance of evidence for the other. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:26, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

"Circumstantial evidence" is your OR. I quoted a source for the 1938 prices and $300 million, while you don't have any sources for your claim... -YMB29 (talk) 04:26, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

There is no evidence either way so claiming that the $600 million would not have been in 1938 currency is OR. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:03, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

Going by that logic, there is no evidence either that you are someone's sock or that you are not, so saying that you are not is just as unfounded as saying that you are... -YMB29 (talk) 23:10, 2 July 2011 (UTC)

So you are not required to provide sources like you demand that others should? That is quite a novel attitude. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:49, 3 July 2011 (UTC)

Again, the burden of proof is on the person making the claim. -YMB29 (talk) 18:58, 5 July 2011 (UTC)

So glad we agree. So if you claim the $600 million was not in 1938 currency you need to provide a source for it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:06, 5 July 2011 (UTC)

Ok and you prove that you are not a sock puppet... -YMB29 (talk) 04:24, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

Again, you need to provide sources or evidence also for that. Feel free to try to find any because there is none. - Wanderer602 (talk) 10:03, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

Ok but why don't you follow your own advice? -YMB29 (talk) 14:20, 11 July 2011 (UTC)

You wanted to state that $600 million would not have been in 1938 currency - please provide sources for it, if you have any. Its not my place to find evidence (or contradictory evidence) for something you claimed without any evidence. - Wanderer602 (talk) 17:54, 11 July 2011 (UTC)

The claim is yours, that the $600 million would have been in 1938 prices like the $300 million. So let's see some proof, otherwise drop the claim. -YMB29 (talk) 04:31, 12 July 2011 (UTC)

I have stated that there is no proof either way. However if you want to state that the $600 million would not have been in 1938 currency then you need to find sources proving it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:16, 12 July 2011 (UTC)

Ok just like you have to prove that you are not a sock... I mean there is no evidence either way... -YMB29 (talk) 05:24, 13 July 2011 (UTC)

Not actually. If you state that $600 would not have been in 1938 currency you are making a claim, just the as same when stating that it would have been in 1938 currency, in either case you need to provide evidence for the statement. As for the sock issue i only told you to prove it, if you are right and i am a sock then it should be trivial for you to find evidence, happy hunting. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:46, 13 July 2011 (UTC)

According to your logic the burden of proof on you (to prove that you are not a sock) is the same as on me (to prove that you are). -YMB29 (talk) 04:43, 14 July 2011 (UTC)

You are missing something kinda critical - first i never claimed that i would or would not be a sock, i left the claim and the gathering of the evidence for the case totally for you. Second in the article going either way with the claims requires evidence supporting the claim. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:04, 14 July 2011 (UTC)

Well again when you make a claim you got to prove it and not ask others to prove that it is false.

So you are not saying that you are not a sock? -YMB29 (talk) 16:13, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

All i was saying is that to prove that $600 million would or would not have been in 1938 currency requires evidence or proof either way - lack of evidence for one side does not mean wealth of evidence on the other. As for the sock issue i just wish you happy hunting for the evidence. - Wanderer602 (talk) 16:57, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

Ok I am just saying that the same logic can be applied for you being a sock... -YMB29 (talk) 05:32, 19 July 2011 (UTC)

Pre-war Soviet war games

Quote from the article: "The Soviet Union's war against Germany did not go as well as pre-war Soviet war games had envisioned"

It suggests Soviet war games assumed war with Germany will go well. I made a quick check - found a source in Russian (here) which gives factual details on the last pre-war Soviet games that happened in January 1941 (see in Russian couple of paragraphs following "Из двух военных учений, проведенных в течение двух первых недель января, ...").

Briefly, those war games modelled German attack: first one - from the West (via Belorussia and Baltics), second one - from south-east. First (January 2-6) resulted in "blue" (Germans) deeply penetrating "red" (Soviet) defenses, with "red" side being unable to push back. Second one (January 8-11) resulted in slightly better situation, but again "red" side was unable to push back. Results deeply worried Stalin, who on January 13 replaced Chief of Staff Meretskov (with Zhukov).

Author concludes that, under the impression from those war games, USSR launched urgent mobilization and army redeployment to its western borders (Russian: "Эта новая директива, созданная под впечатлением военных учений, последовавших вскоре, привела к срочной мобилизации и развертыванию армии на западном фронте накануне войны").

Bottom line is, I guess, that pre-war Soviet games in January 1941 did go bad enough to justify urgent corrective measures from the Soviet government. Given this, a phrase "did not go as well as pre-war Soviet war games had envisioned" I think misinforms the reader about what actually happened.--Alex1709 (talk) 22:36, 24 July 2011 (UTC)

Yes and it is also not sourced, so it can be removed. There are a lot of inaccurate statements like this in the article. -YMB29 (talk) 04:34, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Soviet offensive

The main objective of the offensives was to force Finland from the war by defeating the Finnish Army and reaching at least the Kymi river.

However, it was a strategic stalemate as it failed to reach the strategic goals and to push Finland out of the war immediately.

I ask again, please provide quotes from the Finnish source you are using for these statements, so we can make sure that this is not your OR. Specifically, that reaching the Kymi river was a main strategic goal and that the offensive failed to reach its strategic goals. -YMB29 (talk) 18:02, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Finnish literature rarely separates strategic goal into its own group. In "Kun hyökkääjän tie pysäytettiin" (p. 82) text describing the Stavka level (strategic) plan of operation goes like this:

Ensimmäisinä lähtisivät hyökkäykseen Leningrading rintaman oikean sivustan joukot, vahvennettuina ylijohdon ja rintaman joukoilla. Ne hyökkäisivät pääpiirtein suunnassa Vanha-Valkeasaari-Viipuri-Lappeenranta ja tuhoaisivat suomalaisten päävoimat Kannaksella. Tätä hyökkäystä tukisivat 13. Ilma-armeija ja Itämeren laivaston ilmavoimat.

Kun hyökkäys Kannaksella alkaisi vaikuttaa, siirtäisivät suomalaiset joukkoja Syväriltä ja Maaselän kannakselta Karjalan kannakselle. Tällöin alkaisi Karjalan rintaman vasemman sivustan hyökkäys, jota tukisivat 7. Ilma-armeija ja Laatokan sekö Äänisen lippueet. Karjalan armeijan joukot etenisivät nopeasti pitkin Laatokan rannikkoa kohti Sortavalaa, katkaisten Petroskoin alueella olevien joukkojen vetäytymistiet. Samanaikaisesti siirtyisivät hyökkäykseen Maaselän kannaksella olevat neuvostojoukot. Suomalaisten Auniksen ryhmä saarrettaisiin ja tuhottaisiin.

Leningradin rintaman joukot jatkaisivat tässä vaiheessa hyökkäystä Viipurin ohi kohti Lappeenrantaa ja Käkisalmea. Kun Lappeenranta olisi saavutettu, pääosa rintaman joukoista suunnattaisiin länteen, tavoitteena Kymijoki Kotkan-Kouvolan tasalla. Samanaikaisesti tuhottaisiin yhteistoiminnassa Karjalan rintaman joukkojen kanssa Laatokan luoteispuolella sinne vetäytyneet suomalaisjoukot

In short 1. Leningrad front to Viborg, 2. Karelian front to Sortavala, 3. Leningrad front to Kymiriver while LF and KF crush remnants of the Finnish Army at the northwestern shore of Lake Ladoga. Following section would have described the Soviet offensive in the Lapland after German's in Lapland would have reinforced the Finns.

Same book, page 154.

Neuvostohistorijoitsija eversti Morozov toteaa Leningradin rintaman taisteluista Kannaksella Viipurin valtauksen jälkeen seuraavaa: "Tällä tavoin kesäkuun 21. päivästä heinäkuun puoliväliin, yli kolmen viikon hyökkäystoiminnan tuloksena Leningradin rintaman oikean siiven joukot eivät kyenneet täyttämään niitä tehtäviä, jotka niille oli asetettu Korkeimman ylijohdon stavkan toimintaohjeella 21. kesäkuuta 1941. Rintaman joukot eivät onnistuneet etenemään valtakunnan rajalle ja puhdistamaan Karjalan kannsasta vihollisista. Siirtämällä riittävästi joukkoja Suomen sotajohto esti neuvostojoukkojen hyökkäyksen syvälle Suomeen"

Describing how Leningrad front failed to reach its given goals. Morozov who is referred is apparently (from books references: Morozov, V. P., "Razgrom vraga na Karelskom pereseike (jun-jul 1944)", in work "Bitva za Leningrad").

Further on same page:

Stalinin suuri Suomen-offensiivi ei saanut täyttymystään: Suomea ei murskattu sotilaallisesti. Itse asiassa Neuvostoliitto epäonnistui sotilasstrategisesti, mikä johtui siitä, ettei kumpikaan offensiiviin osallistunut rintama kyennyt täyttämään omia operaiivis-strategisia tehtäviään. Karjalan kannaksella Leningradin rintaman oikean siiven joukkojen hyökkäys kulminoitui kesä-heinäkuun vaihteessa, ja Itä-Karjalan Karjalan rintaman vasemman siiven hyökkäys heinäkuun puolivälin paikkeilla.

Which quite blunty states that Stalin's great offensive against Finns failed to reach its conclusion: Finland was not defeated militarily. In fact from military strategic view point the offensive was Soviet Union's failure, which was caused by the fact that neither of the fronts participating to the offensive managed to accomplish their respective operational/strategic missions... - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:52, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

So the literature rarely separates strategic goals, and you take it upon yourself to separate them and decide which goals are the main ones? Clear case of OR...

Your quotes say nothing about the Kymi river being a main strategic goal, just like I thought. So I will remove that, unless you can find evidence of this.

Hard to tell what the source actually means, but if it means to say that the offensive was a strategic failure (so then what strategic goals were not accomplished?) then this is contradicted by other sources. One source says that the result was strategically important and then another claims that it was a strategic failure. I will rephrase it tomorrow. -YMB29 (talk) 19:58, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

What i referred to was that text generally expect the 'level' of a goal for the offensive to be obvious for the reader. For example goals set at STAVKA are pretty much presumed to be strategic goals - unless of course if in your opinion that Soviet Supreme Command Stavka was involved in tactical level decisions. Kymijoki == Kymi river (from the first quote).

Forces of the Leningrad Front would at this phase (ie. after LF had taken Viborg and KF had taken advantage of Finnish reorganization) continue attacking past Viborg towards Lappeenranta and Käkisalmi (Kexholm). When Lappeenranta has been reached bulk of the forces available for the front would be directed to west with goals set to Kymi River at Kotka-Kouvola level. Simultaneously the withdrawing Finns on the north-western shore of Lake Ladoha would be destroyed in co-operation with forces of the Karelian Front. (still by Soviet Supreme Command Stavka - so strategic level goals)

Source is referring to the strategic goals set for the offensive in planning stage. Which it failed to reach. Which it then uses as basis for saying that since the neither of the fronts participating to the offensive manage to reach their respective strategic goals the whole offensive was - in the end - a Soviet failure when viewed from military strategic point of view. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:01, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes a Soviet strategic failure that made the Finns ask for peace and pay reparations...

Please learn the difference between strategic goals and tactical goals... And don't try to present the endpoint of an offensive to be the main strategic goal.

Are you putting forcing Finland out of the war on the same level as reaching the Kymi river?

So for you every decision and order the Stavka made was strategic?

What is obvious to you may not be so for others; again this is your OR. -YMB29 (talk) 22:04, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes, a Soviet military strategic failure as the set strategic goals for the operations were not achieved by either of the fronts participating in the offensive. As said that is exactly as stated in the source and your differing opinion is OR (by definition) unless you have opposing sources. Finns were all the time (apart from time the offensive took place due Ryti pledge) willing to negotiate - had been since 1943. The more successful the Soviet offensive was the more strongly it managed to bind Finland and Germany together - far more strongly than ever before or after as proven by Ryti-Ribbentropp agreement. Stopped Soviet offensive and Soviet willingness to discuss instead of dictating/demanding however made way for peace. Reaching Kymi river was set as a strategic goal for the Leningrad Front, so yes, from military strategic point of view, Leningrad Fronts inability to reach its designated goal with equal lacking performance from Karelian Front represents the failure of the Soviet offensive. I doubt every decision made by Soviet Supreme stavka was strategic - but since that was the planning stage before even any of the fronts participating to the offensive were involved it could not be counted as tactical decision. For more 'tactical level' the book also has several Soviet POWs captured during the offensive having been quoted as stating that (tactical) goals were much further into the Finland than at Kymi river (ie. Helsinki was repeatedly mentioned). - Wanderer602 (talk) 23:03, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

You are just continuing with your OR over and over...

You still have not bothered to understand what a strategic goal is.

Your claims that the offensive was a strategic failure and that it did not lead to Finland asking for peace are contradictory to both logic and reliable sources. -YMB29 (talk) 00:29, 14 May 2011 (UTC)

I only posted information which was based on a published book - so not OR by any definition. The offensive hardly 'lead' Finland to ask for peace since it had been doing so since 1943. Only concrete thing on political level the offensive accomplished was to force Ryti to make Ryti–Ribbentrop Agreement. Last Finnish offer for negotiations with Soviets was sent June 22 1944 - Soviet reply with demand for surrender came in June 23. Ryti–Ribbentrop Agreement was agreed on June 25 1944. What other reason than Soviet unwillingess to negotiate can you perceive for such timing? Soviet offensive (which had shrinked from being strategic scale to a desperate push by 2 understrength divisions to reach 1940 border) was stopped by the end of July and in August only the last remnant of it was driven back at Battle of Ilomantsi. Ryti resigned on end of July - again only after Soviet offensive had already been blunted. Since the offensive hardly had any effect on Finnish willingess to negotiate (which had existed all the time) and it failed to accomplish its set goals how would you define it in other way than as a 'failure'? - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:57, 14 May 2011 (UTC)

Why did Ryti resign, just to take a break? If Finland was always ready to negotiate why did it take until late August for Finnish officials to try to contact the Soviets, especially if Finland was so successful on the battlefield?

Yes Finland wanted to negotiate before but it would always reject Soviet terms and break off the negotiations. The success of the offensive forced Finland to ask for negotiations again.

Failed to accomplish its goals? So then Vyborg and Petrozavodsk were not liberated? Finland did not exit the war and agree to pay? You could have maybe said that it failed if the objective would have been to conquer Finland, but that is a fringe view that I don't think you agree with by now. -YMB29 (talk) 05:24, 15 May 2011 (UTC)

Ryti had no choice. Finns had been intending to achieve a negotiated settlement but Soviet offensive forced him to ally himself with Germans (luckily through technicalities it only aflicted him and not whole of Finland). Only after Soviet forces had been stopped (excluding Ilomantsi which was not exactly a Soviet success) did Ryti resign to make sure there would be no legal obstacles for negotiations. However only reason for those obstacles in the first place had been the Soviet offensive.

Finland rejected previous Soviet terms since it was blatantly obviously that Finns could not have fullfilled them. Which in turn would have renegated the whole agreement and terminated cease fire. In short Ryti (and Finns) refused to sign an agreement which they knew would fall apart and possibly lead to renewed hostilities and occupation. Before the offensive Soviet terms were impossible to fulfill (as agreed by Western Allies). After the Soviet offensive had been blunted and Ryti had sacrificed himself Soviet agreed to amend the terms in accordance to what Finns had asked (and why they had rejected the terms in spring 1944) in spring 1944. Quite a coincidence don't you think?

Offensive failed to reach its goals. I did not say anything of how the peace settlement turned out - and as is known from spring 1944 negotiations Finns had been ready for peace (and agree to pay) already back then, just not as much as Soviets demanded. However that is just besides the point - i only stated that the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 against Finns failed to reach its intended goals. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:21, 15 May 2011 (UTC)

And again what were those goals that they failed to reach? The Kymi river? Conquest of Finland? Again this is laughable...

The Soviets let Finland pay less probably due to Western pressure and not any Finnish success on the battlefield (there is a source for this if you want). And I don't think Finland was willing to pay $300 million before...

Ryti could still have been president and Finland could have continued fighting if it was so successful, instead of quickly seeking negotiations...

The quotes from reliable sources below contradict everything you have been saying. -YMB29 (talk) 18:21, 15 May 2011 (UTC)

States goals were (I) LF front to breakthrough Finnish resistance on main defense lines and capture Viborg by June 20 (which they did), (II) KF to take advange of Finnish moving forces from Olonets / Kriv to Karelian Isthmus and capture the East Karelia and proceed to Sortavala and reach main Finnish transport network (which they partially did, all except for reaching the Sortavala & Finnish transport hubs), (III) LF to advance from Viborg towards Lappeenranta and Käkisalmi and with KF crush retreating Finns on the NW shore of Ladoga (tried for a month but failed), (IV) LF to advance further to Kymi River line to Kotka-Kouvola level (never reached this), (V) take advantage if Germans moving troops (according to Soviet estimate 2 - 3 divisions) to reinforce Finns from Lappland and start offensive in Lappland (most likely refers to Petsamo-Kirknes op. - which eventually was launched when during Lapland War Finns advanced and occupied ~2 div. or Germans).

Western pressure afaik affected the decision to allow Finns to have separate peace agreement from Germany. There is no doubt Western pressure affected Soviet decisions especially after the offensive - however the pre-offensive terms were deemed even by Western Allies as impossible for the Finns to fulfill. Also before the offensive Soviets did not negotiate, they dictated terms (including the impossible demand for 600 million dollar reparations). After the offensive that amount was cut in half and time allowed to for making the payment was extended which made it actually possible to agree with unlike preceding Soviet 'proposals'.

Finns had lost faith in Germans being victorious in 1943 if not before. Ryti being part of political/military leadership must have been aware of that - which means he knowlingly sacrificed himself to secure German support. Finns had no illusions that should SU concentrate on Finland alone - with Finns being without any foreign support - Finnish resistance would be crushed (pretty much in repeat of the last phase of the Winter War). As said for the Nth time Finns had been searching for negotiated solution since 1943 so the offensive changed absolutely nothing within that regard. - Wanderer602 (talk) 21:22, 15 May 2011 (UTC)

Once again accomplishing absolutely all of the tactical goals is not what determines the success of an offensive.

Finland was searching for peace but not always willing to negotiate the Soviet terms. The offensive forced them to seek negotiations again, and this time they were in a much worse bargaining position. Western pressure helped the Finns by softening the terms (I can add a quote for that).

I am not going to go in circles with you. Those quotes below speak for themselves. If you ignore them and keep saying the same things then that is not my problem. What goes into an article is determined by reliable sources. -YMB29 (talk) 01:45, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

So let me get this straight.. According to you a military operation with clearly defined goals that it equally clearly fails to reach is a glowing success? Finns hardly had a choice with agreeing the previous Soviet offers since those were impossible to fulfill. Sources i used are equally reliable so i fail to see what you are after that one. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:38, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

You keep sticking to some secondary tactical goals that were not achieved and ignore the fact that most goals were achieved, including the main strategic ones. What are your sources? I only saw some Finnish source that supposedly says that the offensive failed. -YMB29 (talk) 14:57, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

I have checked the references, and apparently the American and Russian sources ignore the draft proposal for "The unconditional surrender of Finland" and the occupation of the country from the archive of the Russian Ministry of Defence, dated to June 1944. That puts things into a different perspective. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 17:57, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

The demand for unconditional surrender was a misinterpretation by the Finns. This was discussed before on the other talk page. [7]

And what archival evidence of intend of occupation are you talking about? -YMB29 (talk) 18:10, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Ok I see that you mean that draft document. I think it was created in 1943 before the Tehran Conference where Stalin promised not to occupy Finland. This can't be used as proof that the offensive's goals were occupation and unconditional surrender. -YMB29 (talk) 19:30, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

You think? Well, Dr. Turtola does not think so. Where is your source? This interpretation is not mine but his, which is a reliable secondary source. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 20:00, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Well what does he say? Does he relate the draft to the offensive? If not then that is your OR.

I got a bunch of sources here clearly indicating the main goals of the offensive.

You think you discovered a new world? If that document meant anything the Finnish users here would have inserted the part about surrender and occupation years ago without you... I know you are enthusiastic about editing here but you have to think before inserting something major like this, and not just rush it. -YMB29 (talk) 02:21, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes, on page 168, Dr. Turtola discusses the objectives of the 1944 Karelian offensive and he explicitly says that the Soviet objectives are stated in the draft terms for unconditional surrender.

Regarding the "bunch of sources", we apparently have a case of new evidence on an old matter, and the previous works simply lack that material. The fact that Soviet historiography presents only documents that are favourable for its cause, is nothing new. Western researchers are generally restricted to the Russian archives, or allowed access only to very limited parts. Therefore its a fortune that this document was discovered.

The Finnish Wiki-users are irrelevant here. However, we should review how the recent literature regards this document. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 09:20, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

So find more about this instead of jumping to conclusions based on some source you found that you think changes everything. Can you quote what Turtola says about the offensive? The document was found a long time ago, in 1993. The books that I quoted have editions that are more recent so if the document was that important it would have been reflected in the new editions. The document is only a draft that was written in 1943, so what relation does it have to the offensive? It is contradicted not only by the sources I quoted, but also by Stalin's promise about Finland and the fact that negotiations with Finland were held before the offensive.

Since you made the changes in the other article, let's continue this there. I will post some quotes from sources there. -YMB29 (talk) 16:20, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

I rather doubt a promise by Stalin is/was reputable regarding anything. "More recent" does not trump "earlier" simply by being more recent. There is recent scholarship that is better and more informed than earlier, there is also recent scholarship which is people liking to see their pontifications and skewed POVs in print. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 16:49, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

I don't have Dr. Turtola's book at hand. He was brief but convinced that this document shows the real Soviet intentions.

There can be several reasons why some of the authors do not know/want to know/have access to the document etc. I have cited one that does on the offensive's talk page. The works that ignore the draft without critical commentary do not contradict anything.

Dr. Turtola and Dr. Tiihonen date the draft to 28 June 1944.

Stalin promised the U.S. free elections in the Baltic States in 1944. So what?

Finland terminated the negotiations in April 1944. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 17:45, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

I will reply on the other page. -YMB29 (talk) 18:13, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

Let's see what Platonov writes in Bitva za Leningrad about the reaching the YMB29 defined (as sourced by one paragraph presentations of the issue) strategic goal: "...Regardless of the defeat of it's Army Finland continued the war. Soviet army had to reach new victories in South Karelia, Bealorussia, Baltic and other directions of the German-Soviet front to force Finnish reactionary government to accept conditions of the Soviet government and separate from the war from the side of the Hitler's Germany."

So, Soviet Union failed to reach the strategic goal of forcing Finland out of war with V-P offensive. --Whiskey (talk) 19:00, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

Quotes

Here are some quotes:

1)
The Soviet General Staff then recommended that the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts launch an offensive against Finnish forces in the sector from Leningrad to Petrozavodsk. The strategic objective of the offensive was to defeat the Finnish Army and force Finland from the war. On 10 June 1944, the Red Army began the offensive against Finnish forces north of Leningrad and quickly captured Vyborg, thereby threatening the capital, Helsinki. As soon as the Finnish military command transferred forces from southern Karelia to meet this threat, Soviet forces of the Karelian Front, under Army General K. A. Meretskov, attacked northward and westward out of Soviet Karelia and quickly advanced through the area between Lakes Ladoga and Onega. This offensive, known as the Svir-Petrozavodsk Operation, continued until 9 August and was strategically significant in that it led to the reopening of bilateral negotiations between Finland and the U.S.S.R. on 25 August. On 4 September, the two sides signed an armistice that required Finland to expel or disarm all German troops still on its soil by 15 September.

Leavenworth Papers # 17 - The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944, by Gebhardt [8]

2)
The overall plan for the Vyborg operation consisted of the penetration of the Finnish defense by forces located on the Karelian Isthmus (the 21st and 23d Armies), the development of the offensive in the general direction of Vyborg, the destruction of the Finnish I and IV Army Corps' main forces (deployed south of the Mannerheim Line), and the capture of Vyborg - a strategically important point and the main communications' center on the Karelian Isthmus. Three of the 21st Army's corps delivered the main attack along the Vyborg Highway and the coastal rail line.

The offensive began on 10 June 1944. The forces of the Karelian Front (the 32nd and 7th Armies) were assigned the mission to defeat the Finnish forces defending along the Svir' and Petrozavodsk axes, liberate the Svir' River and Massel'skaia-Petrozavodsk-Lodeinoe Pole rail line from the enemy, and capture the towns of Medvezhegorsk, Petrozavodsk, Olonets, and Sortovala. The arrival of the Karelian Front's forces in the Sortovala region created favorable conditions for an offensive into the depth of Finland...

As a result of this blow, our forces penetrated the Finns' powerful permanent defense on the Karelian Isthmus in the Medvezhegorsk region and captured Vyborg and Petrozavodsk, and liberated a large part of the Karelian-Finnish Soviet Republic. The strategic significance of these operations (especially the Vyborg operation) was the pinning down in Finland of the enemy forces closest to Belarussia, and the securing of the front's right flank near the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland.

The Battle for L'vov, July 1944: the Soviet General Staff Study, edited by Glantz and Orenstein [9]

3)
The Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive Operation of 1944, although small in scope and conducted by a portion of the forces of the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts as well as the Baltic Fleet, ended with a major defeat for the enemy troops on the Karelian Isthmus and in Southern Karelia. The enemy was thrown back to the Soviet-Finnish frontier virtually along its entire extent and this accelerated the pulling out of Finland from the war.

Military History Journal - On the Question of Strategic Operations in the Great Patriotic War, by Gurkin and Golovnin [10]

4)
Soviet troops liberated the territory of the Karelo-Finnish ASSR, the northern regions of the Leningrad oblast, and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Finnish Army. Successful actions of this operation significantly changed the situation in the northern sector of the Soviet-German front, predetermined the withdrawal of Finland from the war, and created conditions for the liberation of the Soviet Arctic and northern regions of Norway.

The Stamp of Secrecy Is Removed: Soviet Armed Forces Losses in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts, by Krivosheev

5)
The Karelian operations of 1944, the first phase of the summer campaign, were designed to drive Finland from the war, divert attention from Soviet offensive preparations further south, and embarrass the Germans by driving one of their allies from the war. The Stavka ordered the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts to secure the Karelo-Finnish isthmus and the expanse of Karelia north and northwest of Leningrad. Govorov's front, supported by the Baltic Fleet, was ordered to attack on 10 June 1944 to secure Vyborg within 10 days and Meretskov's front was to strike north of Lake Ladoga beginning on 21 June. The Soviets commanders well recalled the difficulties they had experienced penetrating the Mannerheim Line in 1939/40. To avoid replicating the earlier four month struggle, planning was careful, and the Soviets built up a sizable force superiority prior to the offensive. Govorov's offensive unfolded virtually as planned. By 21 June, the left flank of his 21st Army had secured Vyborg despite intense and sordid negotiations between the Finns and Germans over the possible dispatch of German assistance. Govorov then reinforced his forward forces at Vyborg with units of 59th Army, which were transported by ship to the Finnish city. The same day Meretskov's 7th Army commenced operations into Central Karelia from its positions along the Svir River. The combined Soviet operations north and south of Lake Ladoga ultimately forced the Finns to sue for peace in September, and although token German assistance finally did arrive, the die was already cast for the Finns. Soon events elsewhere rendered the Karelian operations a distinct sideshow to the main military effort taking place to the south of Belorussia. For their efforts against the Finns, both Govorov and Meretskov were promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. The Finnish campaign had the added bonus of keeping German attention focused away from Army Group Center. In fact, an organized strategic deception campaign portrayed major Soviet offensives on the northern and southern flanks, with only limited attacks on Army Group Center expected later in the summer.

When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, by Glantz

6)
The Finnish army continued to occupy this former Finnish area until the major Soviet offensive of June 1944. Confined in the losing Axis coalition, the Finns had to retreat for a second time, and they escaped total Soviet invasion and occupation only by entering into a separate agreement that obligated them to military action against the retreating German armies.

Finland: A Country Study, edited by Solsten and Meditz [11]

7)
The General Staff plan envisaged the summer offensive being opened with the Leningrad Front attack, timed for the beginning of June and aimed at Vyborg, to be supplemented by the Karelian Front striking out for Svirsk—Petrozavodsk to knock Finland right out of the war.

The moment to tighten the screw on Finland had finally come; the first June attacks, though ultimately contained, virtually exhausted Finnish reserves (so Marshal Mannerheim reported to Hitler), and after another month of ceaseless hammering the situation had grown desperate. The Finns struggled furiously to seal up every path and passage from the defile between the two great lakes but it was, as Meretskov observed, a losing battle. Soviet troops bored on with Finnish resistance stiffening nearer to the frontier; roads were mined and barricaded, bridges blown, stretches of open country mined. The Red Army pounded the Finns into asking for an armistice and into repudiating the Waffenbrudenchaft with Germany. Already on 28 July President Ryti appeared at Finnish Headquarters to inform Mannerheim of his decision to lay down his office and begged the Marshal to assume the presidency. President Ryti resigned on 1 August and Mannerheim took up his new post, intent on leading Finland out of the war.

The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany, by Erickson [12] [13]

-YMB29 (talk) 05:24, 15 May 2011 (UTC)

section break

This is really going in circles: more OR from Wanderer. Sad. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 06:56, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

So YMB29 and Jaan Pärn are somehow allowed to lay heavy criticism on sources other people post but if any source criticism is landed on the sources they believe in it must be OR or worse? - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:50, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Everyone is allowed to present sources that critisize other sources. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 08:56, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

1) Mostly true, however Finland started negotiating only after Soviet offensive had been blunted. Soviet demand of surrender that was made during the offensive was rejected. Nor did Red Army manage to defeat the Finnish Army - though Soviet offensive forced Finns to retreat Finnish military strength and capability only increased during the Soviet offensive. Its interesting that Gebhardt states that offensive lead to bilateral negotiations when only the end of the offensive (and related move by Ryti) made the negotiations possible. However this still does not say in any section that the offensive itself would have been succesful. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:38, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

What does "strategically important" mean? He could not have said that if it failed, but I am sure you know better than him... -YMB29 (talk) 14:57, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

I don't know better than him - just pointed out that offensive itself just to shutting out bilateral negotiations via Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement. Since Ryti did not resign until the offensive had been stopped i fail to see how the offensive would have caused the negotiations to be reopened. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:58, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

You failing to see is your problem. -YMB29 (talk) 16:20, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

Answer to this then. Ryti resigned only after the offensive was (even Soviet/Russian sources (according to Moisala/Alanen's book) do not consider Ilomantsi being part of strategic offensive anymore) had been stopped before. As the offensive was already over then how come did Ryti resign and negotiations began because of the offensive especially if we keep in mind that Soviet June 23 'proposal' had been declined (hint, Soviet POV requires circular reasoning)? - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:25, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

The offensive forced the Finns to ask for peace after Vyborg fell, but they thought that they were told to unconditionally surrender... They then were trying to find a way to negotiate again and eventually accepted Soviet terms (why did not they try to negotiate in May or early June?). By August Finland did not have vast areas of occupied land that could be used to bargain and the casualties were heavy, all because of the offensive. So Finland was in a desperate position because of the offensive and wanted out fast. -YMB29 (talk) 16:54, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

I understood that Soviet leadership (Molotov) had made it clear that Soviet terms were as low as they could go in the spring 1944. Since Finns saw no possible way to fulfill the terms they cut off the negotiations with Soviets as it made no sense to make a deal which you would have been forced to default. However they tried to work via western powers (US embassy was still active until June 27) in the meanwhile. Besides Soviets had already in spring 1944 quite openly showed that the Eastern Karelia had no real value as a bargaining chip - as they demanded the 1940 border. Situation was indeed bad but Finnish army had been considerably strenghtened during the offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:22, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Then why did not that strengthened army fight?

Having the occupied territory and all army units intact in the Spring, of course Finland did not think the Soviet demands were fair and broke off negotiations. -YMB29 (talk) 19:47, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

They did fight - until the ceasefire was agreed. Finnish division commanders actually wanted to retake the land Soviet captured in June/July but HQ held them back. Finns did not think that peace terms were fair at any point. Spring 1944 terms had been impossible to agree with since those could not be fulfilled by the Finns. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:36, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

So if $300 million was offered in the Spring, they would have accepted the terms?

Why did the Finnish leaders hold this fearsome army back and give up? -YMB29 (talk) 23:03, 20 May 2011 (UTC)

That is speculation but if the war reparations, their payment schedule, and timetable for German withdrawal had been agreed then that could have happened. As the actual decisions depended on people who are already deceased it is impossible to know for sure. Mannerheim (and main HQ) held back the division commanders as they did not want to make the cease fire negotiations any more difficult than what they already were. Besides they were also perfectly aware that with Germans being pushed back and without western aid Finns could not hope to stand indefinitely against the Soviets (same reason why negotiations started in 1943). - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:44, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

In the Spring of 1944 both the Germans and the Finns were not in as bad of a position as they were by August so it is unlikely that the Finns would have accepted the final terms in the Spring. Maybe it is speculation but there are probably sources that mention this. Anyway this is going too much into details. -YMB29 (talk) 02:42, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

2) Finnish I and IV AC survived intact with bulk of their forces. However Viborg was indeed captured. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:38, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Even if that is true, does it matter when those "surviving intact corps" were running for their lives? -YMB29 (talk) 14:57, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Provide evidence that those troops would have been "running for their lives". Finnish forces reached VKT line still intact while Soviets had been unable run them down which should have been easy should they have been 'running for their lives' since they only withdrew average of 10 km per day. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:58, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

I won't provide anything to you since you will ignore it as always. -YMB29 (talk) 16:20, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

Without sources your claim is rather hollow. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:25, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Look who is talking... -YMB29 (talk) 16:54, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Reading from Moisala & Alanen's book - At very best 21st Army advanced 25 km per day. Given that it was heavily supported and contained several mechanized/armored units that is not exactly impressive as most of the time they advanced much, much less. Best word to describe 23rd Army was an 'utter failure' (which is the likely reason why its commander got replaced). Even though 21st Army was able to keep up with timetable set by stavka it failed to prevent Finnish withdrawal and refortifying at VKT-line. Even the Finnish 10th Division (which was at the breach point suffered the worst at June 9-10) reached VKT in orderly fashion. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:22, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

So I guess the Finnish units were running away too fast for the Soviets to catch them... -YMB29 (talk) 19:47, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

At 25km per day? Soviet tanks must then have been quite slow then going at 1 km/h in a pinch on the road - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:36, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Bad terrain, blown bridges, fuel... -YMB29 (talk) 23:03, 20 May 2011 (UTC)

Or perhaps the fact that enemy was not running and instead effectively delaying Soviet advance? - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:44, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

Some were running, some were delaying, but it is still a mass retreat and defeat on the battlefield. -YMB29 (talk) 02:42, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Again retreat/withdrawal itself was not a defeat in the battlefield. Soviet forces did inflict localized defeats to defending Finns. First when breaking through the 'main'-line at Valkeasaari and second when breaking through the 'VT'-line at Kuuterselkä. In similar manner Finns defeated Soviet offensives locally, for example at Siiranmäki and later on along the Äyräpää ridgeline. On a whole Finns withdrew due to main HQ ordering them to do so as Finns had no intention to commit their troops to a battle in which they would be defeated or, worse still, surrounded. - Wanderer602 (talk) 12:34, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

You would only admit that the Finnish army suffered a defeat if every soldier and officer was killed or captured, so no point in arguing this with you... -YMB29 (talk) 16:16, 24 May 2011 (UTC)

By same logic as you have been using the Red Army was defeated in 1941 by Finns.

In similar manner as Finns inclicted a defeat on Soviet forces in Karelia in 1941 did the Soviet inflict a defeat on Finnish forces defending Karelia in 1944. That is all true - even if Finnish success in 1941 was undeniably larger (if slower) than Soviet success in 1944. But in neither case was the Red Army or the Finnish Army defeated. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:36, 25 May 2011 (UTC)

Finnish success in 1941 undeniably larger... Keep telling yourself that... But you can say that the Soviets were defeated in 1941. -YMB29 (talk) 03:56, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

In 1941 Finns managed to surround most of the defending Soviet forces of Viborg and defeat them in the Isthmus - something Red Army failed to do in 1944. By the time Finns reached the 1939 border Soviet forces were not ready for defence having lost most of heavy equipment and part of their forces being forced to retreat to Koivisto islands instead of Leningrad - while in 1944 after Soviet breakthroughs at Valkeasaari & Kuuterselkä Finns still managed to withdraw orderly to VKT-line. Many sources state that had Finns not stopped at the border by the order of Mannerheim it is doubtful that the remaining Soviet forces would have been able to resist them. And still i don't think i can say that Soviets were defeated in 1941. That is it is ok in my opinion to state that 'Soviet forces tasked with defending the Karelian Isthmus were defeated in 1941' - however stating that 'Soviets were defeated in 1941' is not (only a portion of the Soviet forces was defeated). - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:57, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

Playing with the word defeated again? The Finns were defeated in 1944 and in the war, and had to sign an embarrassing peace treaty. Sorry but this is history. Nothing against Finland, but you have to stop making excuses. In 1941 the Soviets had more important things to worry about than the Finns, and the Finns stopped not because they were so kind but because they were taking casualties they could not take for much longer. -YMB29 (talk) 05:42, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

Not playing with it. Just noting that if a small portion of an army is defeated it does not mean the whole army would have been defeated. Just as 1941 Soviets had other issues than Finns, Finns had 1944 other issues to worry than just the Soviet offensive. Finns were given their objectives, they reached the objectives and stopped - you are probably correct on why they were stopped by the HQ, however Soviet resistance did not stop them before they had reached their objectives. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:06, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

I can make the same excuse and say that the events on the German front stopped the Soviets from completing all of their tactical objectives against Finland.

How many times must I tell you that defeat is not about the whole army... -YMB29 (talk) 06:15, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

You could and you are probably quite close to the truth there. The Red Army was hard pressed in fighting Germans (op. Bagration) and could hardly afford sending necessary reinforcements to make sure offensive against Finns would succeed in its full planned extent. However that does not change the fact that Soviet forces failed to reach their goals despite of repeated attempts and were eventually called off by Soviet High Command.

If you state that 'the Finnish Army was defeated' then you are explictly stating that the whole of the Finnish army would have been defeated. Something either along lines 'Finnish Army suffered a defeat' or explictily stating which troops were defeated however do not carry with them the same meaning. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:14, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

Again your idea of defeat is close to destruction, which is wrong. Saying that the Finns were defeated is not saying that most were captured or killed. By your logic the Finns never defeated the Soviets in a battle since most of their forces were somewhere else.

The Soviets did not achieve some tactical goals, while the Finns failed both tactically and strategically. -YMB29 (talk) 02:33, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

Your usage of the term is highly misleading and should be avoided if possible. By the same logic you are using the Finns defeated the Red Army (Tali-Ihantala, Ilomantsi). So it would be proper according to your logic to state that "the defeated Red Army agreed to make peace with the Finnish Army"...

Finns did indeed lose some ground (some of which had intended from the start to be a bufferzone). However Finns held their ground and stopped Soviets dead on their tracks in the critical areas. They stopped the Sovet offensive & achieved Finns main strategic goal (never actually stated anywhere but perceived to be such in several sources) to retain indepence - hardly a strategic failure. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:53, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes make up a strategic goal to try to not look like a loser... So Finland was fighting for independence when it allied with the nazis and invaded Soviet land...

After a series of defeats and mass retreat the Finns managed to hold ground. Ok good for them, but they still lost the war.

You can say that the Finns defeated the Soviets in some battles in 1944, although those battles were local (the defeats were not along the whole front) and had little or no impact on the outcome of the war. -YMB29 (talk) 20:59, 5 June 2011 (UTC)

Finland was pushed into Nazis arms by Soviets by their actions preceding the Continuation War. After when both Soviet and German forces were already on the Finnish soil there hardly was an option to 'stay out of it'. Finns however chose not to do what Germans told them and followed their own military leadership and their own goals for the war (not allied). The battles where Finns defeated Soviets in 1944 were actually larger and more numerous than the ones where Soviets defeated Finns in 1944 - and they were spread around far greater section of the front than the Soviet attacks. In similar manner as Ilomantsi and Tali-Ihantala were a local battles so were the Valkeasaari and Kuuterselkä. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:21, 6 June 2011 (UTC)

Don't know what war you are talking about... but obviously it is not the one that took place in the real world...

Poor Finland had to fight for its independence near Leningrad...

Finland was far from neutral on 22 June 1941 as we discussed before, so stop with the excuses (well I know you won't actually stop). -YMB29 (talk) 03:29, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

It is true that Finland was not neutral (though not allied in traditional sense either - co-belligerent is about the closest or then 'brotherhood in arms') on 22 June 1941. However no one should disregard why Finns choose to take up arms then. Winter War and post Winter War Soviet aggressive policies towards Finns including interfering with Finnish internal politics, shooting down passenger plane, demanding troop transit rights, demanding demilitarization of Åland, etc. etc. All which were seen as unfriendly actions by Finns which forced them to look for some one to support them. As it happened only Germany was available and willing. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:14, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

Ok you can use those reasons but don't say that Finland's independence was threatened by the USSR in 1941. -YMB29 (talk) 18:32, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Not perhaps in the summer of 1941 but Finns felt that Finland's independence was seriously threatened by the Soviet Union in the autumn/winter of 1940 when the decisions which eventually led to the war were made. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:59, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Well that can be debated but it is a bit off topic. -YMB29 (talk) 03:29, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

I wasn't the one who drew the reasons for the Finnish entry to the war into this discussion. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:37, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

Yes you did, by claiming that Finnish independence was in danger and that it was pushed into war. -YMB29 (talk) 05:29, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

So i guess you never stated "So Finland was fighting for independence when it allied with the nazis and invaded Soviet land..."? - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:15, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

And you never wrote: They stopped the Sovet offensive & achieved Finns main strategic goal (never actually stated anywhere but perceived to be such in several sources) to retain indepence - hardly a strategic failure. -YMB29 (talk) 04:12, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

I mentioned it since there were no declared strategic goals for Finland in the war. None. I mentioned since you seem to demand that there must have been. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:09, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

So Finland went to war with no strategic goals? They just wanted to go and have fun... You never stop amusing me... -YMB29 (talk) 19:47, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

Finns took part to the Winter War also without any declared strategic goals. There is nothing special there. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:32, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

Well I don't even know how to respond to that... Makes me think about who I am arguing with... -YMB29 (talk) 16:35, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

Just trying to state it to you in some form that you would accept. Finns did not have any declared strategic goals for the war. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:26, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

Yes keep telling yourself that... -YMB29 (talk) 04:26, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

Then prove me wrong. Please cite a source that states the Finnish goal. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:03, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

So you can make excuses and complain how the source is wrong again. How can a nation go to war without any goals? Do you even read what you write? -YMB29 (talk) 23:10, 2 July 2011 (UTC)

Why would nation go to war without any declared goals is not the point of the discussion. If you have sources that state Finnish goals please provide them - otherwise do not do OR. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:49, 3 July 2011 (UTC)

You keep on denying the obvious... Go read Jokipii's book if you want a source. -YMB29 (talk) 18:58, 5 July 2011 (UTC)

I have read Jokipii's book. I asked you to provide sources - like you yourself stated one who makes the claim carries the proof of burden. You stated that Finns had goals, so you need to prove sources to prove it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:06, 5 July 2011 (UTC)

Do I have to prove to you that Finland had an army and a government too? I am not wasting my time explaining the obvious to you. If you can convince yourself that a nation goes to war without any goals, that is your problem... -YMB29 (talk) 04:24, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

You can easily find proof of the both things (government or army) you mentioned, for example from Finnish Constitution. Unless you can find sources suopporting your statement all you have are suppositions and guesses, or just OR. - Wanderer602 (talk) 10:03, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

I guess I can play that game too. Give me solid proof that Finland exists, otherwise it is your OR... -YMB29 (talk) 14:20, 11 July 2011 (UTC)

You can easily find evidence that Finland exists (for example [14] if you are unable to find any yourself) - acting like an idiot is hardly a good reason for not presenting evidence and/or sources behind your claims of the Finnish goals. If you have some evidence of the goals then please post it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 17:54, 11 July 2011 (UTC)

This is not a forum for educating you... Not a good idea for you to start with insults.

By the way, that map does not prove anything... -YMB29 (talk) 04:31, 12 July 2011 (UTC)

So far you have not shown a single shred of evidence supporting your opinion. That is all what i have asked. Demanding proof that Finland (or its government or its army) exists is hardly reasonable behaviour nor is it in any way relevant to the question at hand which were the Finnish goals for the war. Please provide the sources which state the Finnish goals. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:16, 12 July 2011 (UTC)

Well saying that Finland had no goals for the war is ridiculous too... -YMB29 (talk) 05:24, 13 July 2011 (UTC)

Provide sources which state the Finnish goals then - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:46, 13 July 2011 (UTC)

But you did not provide sources that Finland exists... I will provide sources for the goals when I edit that part of the article. -YMB29 (talk) 04:43, 14 July 2011 (UTC)

I did post the link to CIA world factbook which does say Finland exists. So far you have provided nothing. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:04, 14 July 2011 (UTC)

That does not prove anything... -YMB29 (talk) 16:13, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

At least it proves CIA believes Finland exists - something which you have failed to prove with Finnish goals. - Wanderer602 (talk) 16:57, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

The CIA is not a reliable source for this... -YMB29 (talk) 05:32, 19 July 2011 (UTC)

Then how about the constitution of Finland [15] [16], again much more than what you have to show for - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:02, 19 July 2011 (UTC)

This discussion starts to get so off-topic, so do you mind if I move this thread to Talk:Existentialism?

I don't really care, unlike someone else here... -YMB29 (talk) 14:40, 21 July 2011 (UTC)

Sorry but I can't read that. -YMB29 (talk) 14:40, 21 July 2011 (UTC)

another section break

Let's take a look to Platonov's Bitva za Leningrad and what it says about this destruction/defeat thing: In chapter "Decisions and plans of the Soviet High Command in the direction of Karelian Isthmus", the task of the 21st Army was "...to destroy opposing forces of the enemy III and IV Corps..." and "...beat opposing forces of the IV Corps and Finnish operational reserves and prevent their retreat to the third defensive positions..." (emphasis mine) and "According to the order, the First task of the 21st Army was to attack along the Vyborg highway and coastal railroad, breach the first defensive position of the enemy, destroy opposing forces of the 10th division, cross quickly River Sestra and reach within two days level Termola-Hiirelä-Jäppilä-Kellomäki. In case, if enemy reserves managed to form defensive positions along River Sestra, the preparation task was given to the army for breaching these positions." and "23rd army should destroy opposing enemy, prevent it's retreat to the third defensive positions and reach Vuoksi-Suvanto-Äyräpäänjärvi-line."

So, Platonov (in fact Morozov had written this part of the book) makes it clear that Finnish forces shouldn't be allowed to retreat, so the correct interpretation of "destroy" is really destroy and not merely defeat. He repeatedly states this non-allowed retreat theme in his text, and also the preparation task of the 21st army indicates the same: Finnish 10th division should exist no more, so it would be the task of Finnish reserves to occupy River Sestra-line.

In fact, as some historians has pointed out, the Soviet plan was great, but it assumed Finns would act like Germans: Hold to the positions to the last possible moment, when it was typically too late to retreat next positions. Finns acted totally different: If there was a threat of encirclement, even intact positions would be abandoned without a fight to prevent encirclements. --Whiskey (talk) 22:03, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

Another fact that alleviates this kind of Finnish behavior is that Finns lost only 3,000 men as POW during this operation. At 1941 Red Army lost 64,000... --Whiskey (talk) 22:41, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

So the Finns chose to retreat rather than try to fight; this is still a defeat on the battlefield.

I don't have that book so I don't know what it says exactly in Russian. -YMB29 (talk) 20:59, 5 June 2011 (UTC)

No, it is not. Finns chose to withdraw to positions where the Soviet advance could (and would) be held - holding the initial positions would have been fools errand. Withdrawing to fight in a better position is not a defeat. Quite like in 1941 when Soviet commander(s) in Viborg wanted to withdraw to roughly to the Mannerheim line since they saw that holding the city was foolish however Soviet command chose not to allow the withdrawal in time and instead of getting those forces intact to defend Leningrad they ended up in Porlampi motti - something Finns tried to avoid. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:56, 6 June 2011 (UTC)

Leaving the battlefield, huge stretches of land to the enemy is a defeat... It could be seen as less of a defeat if it is done temporarily to regroup and regain the land later, but in this case... -YMB29 (talk) 03:29, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

Not a defeat. A loss of territory. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:14, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

We are not talking about a loss of a farm here... -YMB29 (talk) 18:32, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

No we are not. Soviet land gains were considerable. However those land gains do not constititute a defeat for the opposing side. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:59, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Only according to you... -YMB29 (talk) 03:29, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

There exists several examples of such in history, repositioning - even withdrawing - forces has never been considered to be a defeat even when it lead to a loss of land. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:37, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

Again that might be true only if the retreating forces win the war at the end... -YMB29 (talk) 05:29, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

The retreating forces won the battles after the withdrawal. Attacker lost them. What ever was the end result of the war the offensive ended up being blunted by just those withdrawing troops once they had reached favourable terrain. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:15, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

According to patriotic Finnish historiography, where Finland has never lost a battle... -YMB29 (talk) 04:12, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

Never said they didn't lose a battle. Valkeasaari and Kuuterselkä, as well as events at Kestenga (Kiestinki) in late 1941 were such. I said they didn't lose a battle after the withdrawal, Tali-Ihantala, Bay of Viborg, Vuosalmi, events at U-line, Ilomantsi, none of which were any kind of Finnish losses. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:09, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

You call any battle in which the Finns did not completely retreat a major Finnish victory... -YMB29 (talk) 19:47, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

Soviets were the attackers, so if the Finns held their ground and Soviets fail to push them away, yes that would make them victories. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:32, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

The Finns did not always hold their ground in those battles. Well I guess compared to the battles in the beginning of the offensive any battle where the Finns did not completely retreat looks like a major victory... -YMB29 (talk) 16:35, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

Please tell me then which of the engagements fought after the fall of Viborg were Soviet successes on Karelian Isthmus? Or what were the Soviet triumpfs against Finnish U-line and/or Ilomantsi region? And how well did actually the Soviet forces at Rukajärvi fare failing to nudge Finnish 14th D at all? - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:26, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

Well in most of the battles you mentioned the Finns lost ground but did not run like at Vyborg, so I guess for you those are major victories... The Finns were not collapsing but cracking, hence the decision to seek peace. -YMB29 (talk) 04:26, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

If defender holds off the attacker from reaching his goal then defender has won a victory has it not? Soviets failed to breach VKT line at Tali-Ihantala, it bent but it did not break, Soviet crossing of Bay of Viborg failed, at Vuosalmi Soviet bridgehead (or beachhead) was contained, at Nietjärvi same happened, at Ilomantsi Soviets fled to east. Finnish Army had not collapsed and what ever cracking there might have been in June 9-20 had stopped with the loss of Viborg. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:03, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

No the Finns were collapsing at first, then cracking. Their leaders understood that it was just a matter of time...

Also, capturing islands in the Bay of Vyborg is a failure? -YMB29 (talk) 23:10, 2 July 2011 (UTC)

Goal of the 59th Army was not to conquer few islands from the Bay of Viborg. It was to land three divisions worth of troops to the northern shore of the bay. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:49, 3 July 2011 (UTC)

You can't say that it was a complete failure since the Finnish army failed to hold the islands. -YMB29 (talk) 18:58, 5 July 2011 (UTC)

If the Soviet goal was to land the troops on the northern shore of the Bay of Viborg to break the stalemate at Tali-Ihantala (as it has been stated as being) - then the Soviet attack failed. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:06, 5 July 2011 (UTC)

It was not a total failure and a great Finnish victory like you think it is. -YMB29 (talk) 04:24, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

If the goal was to make a landing to the north shore of the bay (as it was) the Soviet operation in Bay of Viborg was a failure. - Wanderer602 (talk) 10:03, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

I am sure Finland would have been happy keeping those islands, so it was partially successful. -YMB29 (talk) 14:20, 11 July 2011 (UTC)

And? That is fairly analoguous stating that Third Reich was happy with op. Seelöwe after all they captured the Channel Islands from the British. Soviet goal at Bay of Viborg was to get the Leningrad Front's stalled offensive back running and that failed miserably. - Wanderer602 (talk) 17:54, 11 July 2011 (UTC)

Losing the islands was not an immediate disaster but it did worsen the situation Finland was in; another piece of territory lost that could be used by the Soviets to launch a major attack. -YMB29 (talk) 04:31, 12 July 2011 (UTC)

Soviets did launch that attack, however it failed. That had been the whole purpose of the Viborg bay operation and yet even when it failed to gain any land on the opposing shore (let alone break the stalemate at Tali-Ihantala) you state that it was a partial Soviet success? - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:16, 12 July 2011 (UTC)

Actually Soviet/Russian sources say that the main goal was to take the islands, so it was a success. I know patriotic Finnish historiography portrays it differently... -YMB29 (talk) 05:24, 13 July 2011 (UTC)

Again Juri Kilin (using Soviet archives in 'Jatkosodan Torjuntataisteluja 1942-44', p. 194): "Leningrad Front's and the 59th Army headquarters tasked with the crossing mission plan called for 1 infantry division to capture islands of Uuras (Высо́цк / У́урас) and from there continue attack to north shore of Viborg Bay. From there the attack would have been continued with single infantry army corps to the rear of Finnish forces at Tienhaara (Селезнёво ?). Initially the attacking army corps was to be 109th AC. Later it was decided to transfer Major-General (finnish translation) Anatoly J. Andrejev's 43rd AC from Narva front.

By Henrik Lunde (Finland's war of choice) (p.307): "...commander of Soviet 59th Army, Lt. General L. Korovnikov, was ordered to cross the Bay of Viipuri with two divisions, one armored brigade, and one naval infantry brigade." and "The initial objective of the ambhibious operation, after securing a beachhead, was to capture the town of Tienhaara. The obvious goal of the Soviets was thereby threaten the right flank of the IV Corps." and "The defensive operations y the Finns and Germans in the Bay of Viipuri became a victory...".

It appears Soviet archival sources do think that target was to cross the bay and attack town/village of Tienhaara just north of Viipuri. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:46, 13 July 2011 (UTC)

Don't try to interpret the main goals from Soviet military orders again, as you have shown that you are incapable of using them correctly...

Reaching the shore might have been one of the goals, or a follow up goal... But this is off topic and I will deal with this when it is time to edit that part of the article. -YMB29 (talk) 04:43, 14 July 2011 (UTC)

I'm not interpreting nothing, I just posted what several books state was the Soviet goal. And it appears that Soviet goal was to make a crossing not to capture some islands. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:04, 14 July 2011 (UTC)

Both were goals. -YMB29 (talk) 16:13, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

Taking the islands was not a goal in the operation. It was to cross the bay and to force the Finns to take action that would help 21st army to break the stalemate at Tali-Ihantala. And it failed. - Wanderer602 (talk) 16:57, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

Well maybe according to patriotic Finnish historiography... -YMB29 (talk) 05:32, 19 July 2011 (UTC)

Actually its according to Soviet histography as well as according to Finnish histography. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:02, 19 July 2011 (UTC)

Well actually, no... -YMB29 (talk) 14:40, 21 July 2011 (UTC)

It does - at least Russian/Soviet archival data does, however Russian patriotic histography might not. For example the foreword (p.4) of Jatkosodan torjuntataisteluja 1942-44 (Raunio, Ari; Juri Kilin; ISBN: 978-951-593-070-5) separately mentions that information provided by prof. Kilin is researched directly from official Soviet archives (not from 'official histographies'). On p.204 (by Juri Kilin): 59th Army did not accomplish the tasks assigned for it and its units suffered severe losses. - Wanderer602 (talk) 12:40, 22 July 2011 (UTC)

This looks very similar to the way you kept misquoting Platonov... -YMB29 (talk) 04:01, 24 July 2011 (UTC)

And how exactly would that be? Other than it disagrees with you? - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:53, 24 July 2011 (UTC)

No you take a short quote out of context to try to prove your patriotic biased view. -YMB29 (talk) 05:29, 25 July 2011 (UTC)

Lets post more then... (Starting from page 203 and ending to page 205)

German 122nd Infantry Division forced Soviet 59th Army last attack back on Bay of Viborg on July 9. Finnish and Germany artillery played a key role.

224th ID which had suffered heavy casulties at Uuras 'archipelago' was able to muster only a battalions worth of troops for the landing. Half of the landing crafts were destroyed from Finnish and German artillery enroute. Only one ship reached the beach. Of the 30 men aboard some were killed and rest captured. Attacking battalion suffered 150 men losses.

Sizeable landing part which consisted of infantry regiment moved from Teikari towards Niemilautta and neighbouring islands. Artillery fire support was provided by 62 artillery pieces as well as naval artillery. Red Flag Baltic Fleet aircraft bombed the targets with 120 sorties.

Parts of the troops moving from Teikari managed to land troops on two of the third landing sites. Niemilautta landing craft was sunk from direct hit before reaching shore. Also other landing craft were destroyed from Finnish and German artillery fire.

Only one target, Koivusaari, was captured. Detachment headed for Essaari was destroyed. During the day the assault part suffered total of 70% losses.

224th ID having shrunk to one third of initial strength was ordered to defense at Uuras on July 10 and 124th ID - which had suffered 10% casualties was ordered to Teikari and to neighbouring islands.

Five days later all Leningrad Front forces on the Karelian Isthmus were ordered to static defense. Trench warfare started on Bay of Viborg and it continued until the end of war.

59th Army did not accomplish the tasks assigned for it and its units suffered severe losses. 224th ID lost 30.6.-9.7.1944 at Bay of Viborg according to HQ's reports 2623 menm of which 1280 KIA, 1167 WIA and 176 MIA. Total losses were roughly one half of divisions strength which had been 5331 on 25.6.1944. Combat strength shrunk during battles so that on July 2 division had 2161 infantry, July 6 only 929 infantry and when fighting ended it had 814 infantry. Division had shrunk to a regiment strength.

124th ID strength at the start of the battle was 5041 men and on July 9 only 4626 men. Hardest losses took 406th IR. HQ reports indicate that it lost 3.7.-12.7. 473 men, 191 KIA, 13 MIA, 269 WIA

- Wanderer602 (talk) 08:32, 25 July 2011 (UTC)

Thank you for confirming what I said... You are still unable to use quotes... -YMB29 (talk) 04:34, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Source explicitly states that 59th Army failed. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:10, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

And I explicitly say that you are unable to follow what is going on... -YMB29 (talk) 17:32, 30 July 2011 (UTC)

If its separately mentioned that goal of the attack was to cross the bay and even more explicitly stated that it failed (by Russian historian) then how come you end up with deduction that it succeeded? - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:04, 30 July 2011 (UTC)

You don't even read what I write. That is one of your major problems... -YMB29 (talk) 03:25, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

Karelian Front never reached even outskirts of Sortavala or reach the transportation junctions next to Sortavala. So how exactly an offensive that was stopped cold at U-line would have created conditions for offensive into the depth of Finland remains a mystery to me. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:38, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Well if the Soviets would have broken the last defensive line then they could have proceeded into Finland. -YMB29 (talk) 14:57, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Emphasis on the if. It never happened unlike what the source claims. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:58, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

Unlike before the offensive, they were close to the border, and if they really wanted it to happen it would. -YMB29 (talk) 16:20, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

They were at pretty much same foxholes as which had been in use during the Winter War. Which was still far from 1940 border (actually it pretty much halfway from pre 1939 border to 1940 border). So you are back claiming that Soviets did not really wanted it to happen which is interesting claim given how many Guards units and STAVKA reserves were used in the offensive - surely fresh veteran/elite reserves are wasted in meaningless engagements... And how even line troopers had been told of their goals deep beyond 1940 borders (from Moisala/Alanen's book). In short Soviets did want to see it happen but did not manage to do it as their lines were getting too thin already. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:25, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

If they wanted to occupy Finland or if the Finns did not surrender, they would have broken into Finland, and were in a much better position to do so than before the offensive. Finland was a secondary enemy and the main goal was to force it out of the war on Soviet terms. The successes of the offensive were enough to accomplish this. -YMB29 (talk) 16:54, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Societ successes were still far from the intended targets of the offensive. Its not "if they wanted"... They had wanted to, they tried and either failed or died. Cracking the Finnish lines - especially since Finns had still one heavily fortified line Salpalinja would have required considerably more resources than what Soviet leadership could afford. Finnish army was after the invasion far better equipped than ever before. All what was gained in the offensive could have been negotiated over a table in the first place so the what the offensive actually gained was very little - it might have diverted German attention but wasting several Army Corps (including full Guards Corps) seems like a hefty price for diverting one German Division and less than a hundred aircraft. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:22, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

The Finns broke off negotiations, not the Soviets, and so something had to be done to get them to talk again.

They were not too far from the planned endpoints. Finnish occupation was only considered if Finland would not surrender, but it did. -YMB29 (talk) 19:47, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

In spring 1944 Soviets had not been negotiating - they had been dictating terms and insisting that their proposition was the lowest SU could go - however as it turned out SU was able to go quite a bit lower. For LF... considering the whole LF part of the offensive they barely reached 1/3rd of the distance for their goals. KF got closer (5/6th) to their sole goal but failed to grasp it at all. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:36, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Don't know how you count the distances, but here is a map: [17]

Well in the Spring we don't know how much the Soviets could have lowered it. The Finnish officials could have continued trying to find a diplomatic solution but they did not. -YMB29 (talk) 23:03, 20 May 2011 (UTC)

That is indeed a map - what relevance it for Soviet goals i can't really see since they were deeper in Finland than what map shows. Quite good map infact - shows how where the Soviet offensive was stopped and on a glance even includes all the armies that took to the offensive, including the 59th Army which Krivosheyev missed. One apparent 'error' in it (didn't check what its labels said) is the amount of Finnish defensive lines which is completely out of proportions. Finns had tried to negotiate in spring 1944 but instead Soviets dictated terms which were impossible to fulfill. Can you describe how were the Finns supposed to reach a diplomatic solution when Soviet terms were impossible to fulfill and Soviets refused to lower - or even negotiate of lowering - them? - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:44, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

Why do you say that the Soviets completely refused? Negotiations could have still continued if Finland really wanted to.

And that map shows how far the Soviet advance was and that they could have launched an attack into Finland from those positions. -YMB29 (talk) 02:42, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Soviets dictated the terms in spring 1944. Finnish attempts to negotiate them were refused repeatedly. As the dictated terms were impossible to fulfill and the Soviets refused to negotiate of amending the terms Finns saw no point in continuing negotiations. The map shows the line where Soviet offensive was stopped regardless of repeated Soviet efforts to force the line to bend or to break - and they tried that for a month but failed. - Wanderer602 (talk) 12:34, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Stopped after pushing the Finns back all that distance.

So you know for sure that the Soviets absolutely refused to lower the $600 million? Of course Finland saw no point given their position at that point... -YMB29 (talk) 16:16, 24 May 2011 (UTC)

Lets see... In Karelian Isthmus front lines become rather stable at 21 June and Soviet offensive ended in mid July. So roughly a month of repeated Soviet failures to advance. Not exactly 'pushing the Finns back all that distance' since the lines were rather static at that point. Had there been true negotiations then who knows what might have happened as it was SU dictated terms and then asked for Finnish response (even Sweden which had heavily campaigned for peace agreed on that). Finland had been acutely aware of the situation since 1943 and tried to get to negotiated solution even when SU had informed that areas beyond the borders of 1940 were non-negotiable. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:29, 24 May 2011 (UTC)

Some terms were non-negotiable but many were negotiable, and there was some progress made in the Spring, but Finland decided to stop talking.

The map speaks for itself... If you want to ignore the major Soviet gains in the first part of the offensive, that is your choice. -YMB29 (talk) 02:54, 25 May 2011 (UTC)

From Finnish sources it is said that in spring 1944 negotiations ended when Soviet final terms were impossible to fulfill and there are some sources which postulate if Stalin's demands were intentionally set beyond Finns capabilities (ie. building 'case' for the summer 1944 offensive for western allies) - Linkomies (prime minister) is noted as saying that Mannerheim regarded the war reparations as the largest obstacle for reaching an a agreement and Ryti regarded reparations as impossible to fulfill. And I was not ignoring the territory gains. Just pointing out that map does not indicate that Soviets could have attacked Finland from there positions. Nor does it indicate that Soviets stopped (unlike Finns in 1941) - as it were Soviets were stopped by the Finns. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:36, 25 May 2011 (UTC)

You see only what you want to see. The Finns were never defeated, were never stopped... Patriotic "war experts" amuse me...

And again, there is no reason to say that those Spring terms were final, and of course they were not. -YMB29 (talk) 03:56, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

Then state where did Soviets stop Finns? We know it wasn't in the Isthmus since Mannerheims order to stop the advance at 'straightened border line' is known. Medvezhyegorsk & Povonets were assigned as target for Finns a month before the Finns stopped after capturing those. At Rukajärvi Finns stopped after capturing it stopping in front of fortified Soviet positions. Further in the north the Soviets however did manage to stop German forces (and the Finnish forces supporting them) from reaching their goals.

If Soviets refused to discuss the terms i would say that makes them final. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:57, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

The Finns refused to negotiate further.

So again why did the Finns stop? You ever think about that? Mannerheim's order to stop... Well there was a Stavka order to stop also... -YMB29 (talk) 05:42, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

According to sources Jaan Pärn and Whiskey brought up it seems even more that Finns were willing to negotiate but Soviets (Molotov) refused to even discuss them. Finns were given objectives and were ordered to stop after reaching them, they reached the objectives and stopped. Soviets were given objectives, they failed to reach them and were eventually ordered to stop. Seems like in Finnish process the effect (stopping) follows the cause (order) and in Soviet process it was vice versa. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:06, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes sure, it all makes sense only for Finland... The Finns were stopped from advancing to Leningrad. Mounting casualties and desertions made it impossible to try to continue. Don't pretend that you don't know this...

Well Finnish sources blame the Soviets, while Soviet/Russian sources blame the Finns for the failed negotiations... But it is clear that the Finns were insulted and wanted a better deal.[18] -YMB29 (talk) 06:15, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

Desertion was actually rare in Finnish army - even in those troops that had refused to advance. Disobidience (fin. niskurointi) however was not. Casulties from the operations in Karelian Isthmus were actually quite low - most of the Finnish 1941 casualties were suffered in the East Karelia. So neither the mounting casualties nor desertions could have been the cause for the order to stop. Finns blame for Soviets for not allowing treaty terms to be discussed and Soviets blame Finns for refusing the terms. I don't know if Finns were insulted of the terms but they found the treaty terms to be impossible to fulfill. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:14, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

One thing is refusing the terms, another is breaking off negotiations. Actually when the Finns agreed to terms they knew they were going to pay 600 million anyway because the Soviets added the condition that the amount will be based on 1938 prices, so any talk of Finland forcing the Soviets to reduce the payment is irrelevant...

I was not talking about only the isthmus. If you want to ignore desertions and casualties, then you tell me what were the reasons to stop? Mannerheim's love for Leningrad/St. Petersburg? -YMB29 (talk) 02:33, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

You are assuming without any basis or proof that Soviets wouldn't have demanded the original 600 million dollars in 1938 currency as well. More likely just common sense - population of Leningrad rivaled that of the whole of Finland - Finns would have had no means what so ever to support such a population nor control it in any manner. Also Finns expected 'some form' of Russia to remain after Western powers would have taken out Germany (Finnish belief of how war would turn out) so antagonizing it needlessly should be avoided. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:53, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

Well of course when the Finns saw that the war was not going as planned they had second thoughts, but you can't ignore the problems with casualties and moral in the Finnish army caused by a strong Soviet defense near the city.

The $600 million payment was discussed in detail in Moscow so if it was demanded in 1938 prices, the Finnish delegation would have known about it. -YMB29 (talk) 20:59, 5 June 2011 (UTC)

In 1st of September 1941 when Finns reached the 1939 border there was no strong defense near the city. Neither was the war going particularly badly - Hitler's follies had not yet started. Majority of moral issues came from crossing the border of 1939 - not from Soviet resistance. The 'strong defense' consisted of what remained of the beaten Soviet formations that had defended against Finnish offensive. Unlike majority of Finnish units in 1944 those Soviet formations in 1941 had fought and been defeated. Many historians believe that had Finns continued the advance the Soviets north of Leningrad would not have been able to stop it. The $600 million was discussed in exact same detail as was the $300 million - there is no proof that it wouldn't have been in 1938 currency. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:56, 6 June 2011 (UTC)

And there is no proof that it would have been... Mannerheim writes that he was unpleasantly surprised when he was given the details, so this means that it was not discussed in detail before, like the $600 million payment in the Spring.

With an almost undefeated army Finland decided to spare Leningrad and later gave away land and hundreds of millions of dollars as donations... Good topic for a patriotic book for children... -YMB29 (talk) 03:29, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

There is not any in either way so claiming that $600 million wouldnt have been in 1938 currency is equally unfounded. It was represented to Finns in precise the same way as the later $300 million. As discussed earlier Finns had predicted by this time that Germans would lose. Finns had no intentions of being dragged down with them. Soviet offensive againts Finns did not really achieve that (at least not alone) - since only negotiation proposal given during the offensive was rejected and only after the offensive had been blunted did negotiations start anew with Soviets making less harsh demands than before the offensive - however the destruction of the German Army Group Center in op. Bagration was a clear signal of where the war was heading and Finns wanted to quit while agreeable terms could be negoatiated. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:14, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

Well again reliable sources disagree with you about the offensive and say that it did force Finland to make peace. Of course other factors helped too.

As for making the terms less harsh, that is very questionable. The 1938 prices condition is only mentioned in regard to when Finland was given the peace terms in September of 1944, not before. -YMB29 (talk) 18:32, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Many sources state that it was the general state of the war - mainly the German collapse (starting from Stalingrad) which contributed to the Finnish decisions. Not the offensive against the Finns alone. Stating that the offensive would have achieved its goals by forcing Finns from war (ie. that offensive alone) would therefore be missleading since we know that Finnish rejected Soviet 'proposal' during the offensive ignoring it even after Soviets tried to make it appear as something else that demand of unconditional surrender and started negotiating only after Soviet offensive had been stopped (also supported by sources). 1938 prices were not mentioned when the ceasefire was agreed. Soviet Union interpreted the agreement so that 1938 prices were selected after the ceasefire had been agreed. On the paper the $300 million was stated in exact same manner as $600 million had previously been presented. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:59, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Well I don't know if you can make the claim that the Soviets really demanded over a billion dollars before. At the same time there is a source (Stalingrad to Berlin. The German Defeat in the East by Ziemke) which mentions that the reparations were lowered to please the allies, while in reality forcing the Finns to pay the same amount.

Like I said, the offensive might not have been the only reason, but it was the major reason according to the sources. Whether the offensive was stopped or not is irrelevant, since Finland could not hold on for much longer thanks to the offensive. Or are you going to ignore the huge loss of territory and casualties Finland suffered as a result of the offensive? -YMB29 (talk) 03:29, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

Never said they were. Soviets demanded the use of 1938 currency only after the ceasefire had been agreed. Just like they ended up agreeing with $300 M in the end they had demanded $600 M. There are no evidence to support the claim that Soviets would not have demanded the use of 1938 currency even with the $600 million. Since Finns had been attempting to make a peace since 1943 and main reason why spring 1944 attempt failed was that it was perceived to be impossible to fulfill the Soviet terms - exactly the ones that Soviets softened for the autumn 1944 peace proposal - it seems very odd logic to claim that the offensive would have been the main reason that forced Finns to peace (even Mannerheim in his memoairs (pt. II, p. 484) states that overal situation - German collapse - demanded peace, not the offensive or the state of army). After all they had been trying to accomplish peace long before the offensive. Finnish casualties of 1941 far exceeded the casualties of 1944 that hadn't been enough to end the war so how would far smaller casualties cause that? - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:37, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

Well don't be selective in your reading. Read where he says that Finland would be able to hold out three months at most. Mannerheim also tells the Germans that the casualties are too much.

Finland wound up paying the "impossible" $600 million anyway, or even more. Again, unlike with what you are saying, there is evidence that the Soviets only softened the payment for US and Britain to see and used the 1938 prices to make Finland pay the same amount. I will add the source in a new section. -YMB29 (talk) 05:29, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

Mannerheim was trying to squeeze more support and units from the Germans so he could have been exagerrating a bit when writing to them. After all he did request 6 divisions though in the end even the 1 (122nd) that got through ended up being mostly sidelined. The stated 3 months were the estimate had Soviet offensive continued at its full strength - something that not even the Red Army could have afforded to - as it was in the memoiars that comment of 3 months was already contradicted/countered in the following sentence. Again you are stating as if you had absolute knowledge that Soviets would not have used 1938 currency for the initial $600 million, do you have any sources to support that claim or is that just your original research? As far as i know there is no evidence either way so it can not be claimed that the $600 million would not have been in 1938 currency. Both $300 million and $600 million were represented to Finns (and to Allies) in exactly the same way. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:15, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

This is your original research. Unlike you I use sources to back up what I say. See below and continue the discussion about this there.

The three month estimate was given to Mannerheim and then he listens to counter arguments about the Soviets needing more troops that were needed elsewhere. However, then he writes that it would not take much time for the Soviets to add new troops against Finland, so it is only a matter of time before another major Soviet attack.

Mannerheim by that time was not trying to get German help but wanted to end the war. He wrote: The Russians' great assaults in June exhausted our reserves. We cannot expose ourselves to another bloodletting without the whole future of the small Finnish nation being jeopardized.[19] -YMB29 (talk) 04:12, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

Three months were given should Soviet operations continue at full strength. Which they did not. You are referring to a letter written to Nazis with whom Ryti had essentially allied himself in June 1944 and topic is basically 'severing the ties'. Do you really expect Mannerheim to honestly tell Hitler how strong Finnish units still are and not making excuses for Finland's withdrawal from the war - and you represent it was a concrete proof of the state of the Finninsh Army, right... Please do read (and understand) what was the actual purpose of that letter and then try to fit it into context. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:09, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

No you should read. Only the last part is from the letter to Hitler. The three month estimate was given by general Airo to Mannerheim. Then Mannerheim states that the Soviets, within two weeks, could easily position new troops for a major attack on Finland.

Also if the Finnish army was so strong why would Mannerheim be making excuses to end the war? -YMB29 (talk) 19:47, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

The three months referred to a case should the intensity of fighting stay at the peak levels of the Soviet offensive, however like the next comment reveals the Soviet offensive by that time had already been stopped and intensity had dropped down. Simple, Finns did not agree to ceasefire because the Finnish Army would have been defeated or in bad shape. They agreed because the overall situation required it. Any and every excuse which could have prevented German reprisals for Finnish action were needed. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:32, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

So why did the overall situation require it? Finland signed the ceasefire because its army would not be able to fight off a major attack, and it would not take much for the Soviets to start one. Stop trying to go around this. -YMB29 (talk) 16:35, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

Why did overall situation demand it? Lets see... Operation Bagration had destroyed German Army Group Mitte & Operation Overlord had landed on Normandy, Soviet forces had practically reached Baltic Sea and were now for the first time since 1941 truly able to interdict the sea lanes vital for Finland, Germans (and Estonian volunteers) did not seem to be able to keep south shore of the Gulf of Finland out of Soviet hands for much longer. Finnish army would still have been able to fight off another major Soviet attack for another three months as described by Airo. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:26, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

Three months was the most optimistic period. The situation went from bad to worse but that only added pressure on the Finns. The real damage to Finland was done by the offensive as Mannerheim writes. And don't forget that the Soviet territorial gains in the northwest were possible because of this offensive. So it is a strategic success anyway you put it. -YMB29 (talk) 04:26, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

Mannerheim also stated that the Finnish Army was still standing strong having stopped the Soviets on all fronts and that it was not the offensive but overall situation that made the move towards peace more urgent that what it had been. Northwest? Referring to what exactly? - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:03, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

Northwest parts of the USSR - Belarus and the Baltic countries.

Standing strong army that could have lasted for no more than three months... Again why did the overall situation change? Don't pretend that Finnish casualties and territorial losses had nothing to do with this, and blame it all on the Germans. -YMB29 (talk) 23:10, 2 July 2011 (UTC)

Of course they had something to do with the change in overall situation. But claiming that the offensive was the sole cause of Finnish decisions is not supported by the sources discussed. As discussed previously - however apparently ignored by you - there were several reasons why the overall situation had changed (see post on 18:26, 27 June 2011 (UTC)). - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:49, 3 July 2011 (UTC)

Do you even read what I write? I did not say that it was the sole cause but the most important one, which is supported by Glantz and other sources. Can we just talk about the result below, instead of at three places? -YMB29 (talk) 18:58, 5 July 2011 (UTC)

Hmmm... According to Paasikivi all Soviet terms were non-negotiable, when he visited Moscow...--Whiskey (talk) 08:37, 25 May 2011 (UTC)

Yeah well... They did have two representatives travelling to Moscow (Paasitikivi, Enckel) and they spending a few days there. Besides before the trip to Moscow Finns had been informed that some of the terms would be non-negotiable, other terms might be negotiable (however i didn't find list of which terms were still 'open' though). - Wanderer602 (talk) 11:26, 25 May 2011 (UTC)

Dr. Tiihonen in his thesis quotes the negotiations in Moscow 27-31 March as follows. Molotov regarded the question, whether Finland would cut her relations with Germany, as the main one. Paasikivi: "Could we discuss other points?" Molotov: "Hardly, an unnatural situation would rise." --Jaan Pärn (talk) 12:15, 25 May 2011 (UTC)

section break 2

4) Krivosheyev's accuracy when related to the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 is rather dubious but... I just wonder how exactly Finnish Army suffered 'a crushing defeat'. Not a single formation was lost, surrounded or captured. Soviet offensive did indeed succeed in breaking through the forward defense lines (which included the main defense line) but it was only a defeat if measured in land area lost so Soviets. Given that Krivosheyev 'conveniently' forgets that LF continued its offensive after June 20 in his writings makes his claim of 'successful actions' rather dubious. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:38, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes Krivosheev is a nobody compared to you... Retreating for hundreds of kilometers is not a crushing defeat? -YMB29 (talk) 14:57, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

No, i have respect for Krivosheyev for his work on collecting the data on Soviet operations throughout the war. Just pointed out that in his work there are several immediately apparent errors with regards to the Soviet offensive against the Finns - LF front operations after June 20 are totally ignored, one full army (the 59th) is missing from his data, his data for Soviet formations gives result of ~15 inf. divisions & 1 arm. brigade while other Soviet/Russian sources (Victory.mil.ru, Juri Kilin) give 25 inf. div, 1 arm. bge., 15 arm. regiments and plenty of supporting formations. Losing ground (alone) has never been a considered to be a defeat of any level - especially when withdrawing towards another line of defence. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:58, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

You mean it is not considered a defeat for Finland only... -YMB29 (talk) 16:20, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

Giving ground while delaying is not considered a defeat in any parlance. A defeat requires a battle to happen. Say something like Battle of Nietjärvi where Meretskov's offensive was blocked. And you still not answer to the inaccuracies found from Krivosheyev's data. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:25, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

I don't see how the supposed unit data inaccuracies in Krivosheev's book has anything to do with what we are talking about...

Yes I guess holding some village is a great victory while losing major cities and retreating for hundreds of kilometers is not a defeat... Only according to patriotic "war experts"... -YMB29 (talk) 16:54, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Since the source you used was Krivosheyev's book i found the inaccuracies from Krivosheyev's book to be relevant to the discussion. You fail to make distinction that for a defeat there needs to have been a fight or a battle or equivalent. Finns only turned and fought near Ilomantsi - before that they had been giving ground and delaying the Soviets. Gaining the ground was indeed a Soviet success however it does not make it a victory. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:22, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

I am not even going to discuss your absurd definitions, just laugh at them... -YMB29 (talk) 19:47, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Do as you will however withdrawing towards more defensible positions has never been considered to be a defeat. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:36, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Even if those positions are hundreds of kilometers away... -YMB29 (talk) 23:03, 20 May 2011 (UTC)

Even then. That does not diminish Soviet success in getting Eastern Karelia in any way though. But you still have not said anything about the errors from Krivosheyev's book. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:44, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

Again what do those supposed errors have to do with the subject? -YMB29 (talk) 02:42, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

They do raise a question of Krivosheyev's accuracy and reliability on the questions related to the offensive against the Finns - Wanderer602 (talk) 12:34, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

You are quick to jump to conclusions. Well of course anyone writing that the Finns were defeated will have his accuracy and reliability questioned by you... -YMB29 (talk) 16:16, 24 May 2011 (UTC)

I also question the accuracy of the Finnish writers when i see apparent errors in their texts. Krivosheyev has several major errors in his book regarding the Soviet offensive against Finns which leads me to doubt his conclusions regarding the offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:29, 24 May 2011 (UTC)

Krivosheev has errors, Glantz has errors... I understand that you are a better expert than them... -YMB29 (talk) 02:54, 25 May 2011 (UTC)

Certainly not. I used several different - more or less independent - sources and noticed that Krivosheyev's data deviated clearly from the rest (sources based on Soviet/Russian data). And i was not the first one to notice that. And same with certain points from Glantz. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:36, 25 May 2011 (UTC)

Again, you decide what is right or wrong based on your POV. -YMB29 (talk) 03:57, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

If there are a half a dozen books and only of them (Krivosheyev's) has markedly different values than the others it does raise some questions of that source. For example we know of the 59th Army in the Isthmus (all other sources, incl. Soviet & Finnish sources), we also know that Krivosheyev omits this from his data, which leads to questioning the accuracy of Krivosheyev's data - if in his book he missed a whole army from his lists then what else did he miss? - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:21, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes let's remove his book from all the articles, because you say he has serious errors... -YMB29 (talk) 05:43, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

Didn't say either of those. Just saing that certain amount of source critizism is warranted if the source is known to contain errors related to the subject at hand. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:06, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

The errors you say he has have nothing to do with what we are talking about... -YMB29 (talk) 06:16, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

The errors were in the entries which handled the Soviet offensive of 1944 against Finns which makes them relevant. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:14, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

No we are not talking about the strength of the Soviet forces. -YMB29 (talk) 02:33, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

So you want to choose just the pieces of information which agree with your preconception while ignoring that fact that entries which handle that particular event have errors? - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:53, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

Again if those supposed errors had anything to do with what we are talking about, you would make sense... -YMB29 (talk) 20:59, 5 June 2011 (UTC)

Errors are in the section handling the Soviet offensive of 1944. Number of formations is clearly different (almost 1/2) of what is reported in other (Soviet archive data based) sources. According to Krivosheyev Leningrad Front stopped attacking on June 20. Both are major errors regarding the offensive which cast considerable doubt on the values and conclusions he ended up with. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:56, 6 June 2011 (UTC)

The book differs in what it regards as the end of the offensive, but this does not put the description of the result into question. You are really stretching it... Maybe you should question the book's description as to who won WWII... -YMB29 (talk) 03:29, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

section break 2.5

5) Negotiations between Finns and Germans (ie Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement) started only after June 22. 59th Army never went Viborg - instead it attempted crossing the Bay of Viborg but failed. Again same interesting claim that Soviet offensive which had already been stopped would have been crucial for 'forcing Finns to sue for peace' - especially since Finns had 'sued for peace' all the time since 1943. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:38, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

You can write Glantz a letter explaining his incompetence. I guess when Mannerheim said that Finland could not hold out much longer after the casualties it suffered he obviously did not know what he was talking about.... -YMB29 (talk) 14:57, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Mannerheim was referring to the war in it self. Germans were already beaten (or rather Mannerheim believed that they would eventually lose), and Mannerheim saw no reason to fight to the end if an acceptable negotiated solution could be found. Before and during the offensive Soviet demands had been impossible to fulfill - after the offensive Soviets made their demands more lenient. Must have been really succesful offensive if after it has been blocked and even last grasp for glory ended in embarrasement the leadership ends up amending the agreement in favor of the defender... - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:25, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

The Soviets were really embarrassed to receive that $300 million reparation...

You can thank international pressure on the USSR for the terms being a little more lenient.

And Mannerheim was talking about Finland. -YMB29 (talk) 16:54, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

I did not say Soviets would have been embarrased to receive that $300 million. Just that Battle of Ilomantsi ended embarrasingly for the Soviets (especially since they had reported stavka of first reaching the border and then ended up running back to east for their lives). I never said Mannerheim wasn't talking about Finland - just noted that he was talking of the whole war and not just of the events of 1944 - after all Finnish losses of 1941 had been heavier than those of 1944. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:22, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

How come Mannerheim was not talking about this before the offensive?

So the Soviets were embarrassingly defeated because they ran back from some village called Ilomantsi, but when the Finns ran from the city of Vyborg they were not defeated... Solid logic there... -YMB29 (talk) 19:47, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

I did not say Finns defending the Viborg wouldnt have been defeated. 'Defence of Viipuri' by Finnish 20th Brigade is one of the most debated (ie. who was guilty of that defeat and debacle) issue related to Soviet offensive - 20th Brigade absolutely folded under Soviet attack, for example Finnish HQ was informed that Soviets had taken Viborg by intercepting Soviet tank communications when they wondered on the streets of deserted Viborg as 20th was effectively routed and out of contact. However as clearly as Finnish 20th Brigade had been defeated (though it managed to escape intact and later fought with distinction elsewhere) in Viborg were the Soviet divisions attacking towards Ilomantsi defeated - why i called it embarrasing is that the attacking Soviet forces were forced to retreat through wilderness and abandon all their heavy equipment for the Finns. Wanderer602 (talk) 20:36, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

So what is the difference between retreating through wilderness and non-wilderness? And the Finns left a bunch of stuff in Vyborg also... -YMB29 (talk) 23:03, 20 May 2011 (UTC)

Finns left stuff in Viborg (and quite bit to the south of it) but the difference in this was that Soviet divisions were surrounded and forced to escape. Finns when withdrawing were able to take most of the stuff with them as they retreated on the roads leading to north. Soviet troops in Ilomantsi region when being forced to escape from the encirclement (motti) to the east were forced to retreat through thick forests and were not able to take any heavy equipment with them (vehicles, tanks, guns, mortars, all had to be abandonded). Besides its not so unexpected for the defender be forced to leave something behind when superior enemy is following on your heels but its quite another thing for that to happen to the attacker. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:44, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

You are making special excuses for Finland again... -YMB29 (talk) 02:42, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Where exactly? - Wanderer602 (talk) 12:34, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Every sentence... -YMB29 (talk) 16:16, 24 May 2011 (UTC)

Loss of Viborg was embarrasing for the Finns and events at Ilomantsi were embarrasing to Soviets. What exactly was wrong in there? - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:36, 25 May 2011 (UTC)

You won't see anything wrong in there... You, and Finnish historiography in general, greatly overstate the significance of Illomantsi. -YMB29 (talk) 03:57, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

Ilomantsi was the last real battle of the war. That alone raises its importance. It also represents the sole moment after 1941 when Soviet forces reached the border of 1944 - even if only temporarily. Going just by the numbers (ignoring the cultural & moral implications of losing Viborg) at Viborg Soviets routed a Finnish brigade - at Ilomantsi Finns routed two Soviet divisions. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:21, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

Most of the Finnish forces defending the isthmus were routed and ran... But yes you just proved my point about Finnish historiography and Illomantsi. -YMB29 (talk) 05:43, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

Finnish forces that were routed in the Isthmus in 1944 were 20th Brigade (at Viborg), JR 1 (1st Infantry Regiment) (at Valkeasaari, 3 battallions faced 36 Soviet infantry battalions and 12 armor battalions), II/JR 53 (2nd battalion of 53rd Infantry Regiment) (at Kuuterselkä). Which are by not by any standards 'most of the Finnish forces defending the Isthmus'. Ilomantsi was a larger engagement than some of the usually more notable events of the offensive (capture of Viborg & landing at Tuloksa for example). And as the last major battle of the war it marked the point where Soviet offensive truly ended and also the high-water mark of Soviet gains. If we ignore Ilomantsi we can just as well ignore events at Viborg, Tuloksa, Björkö as well. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:06, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

Illomantsi, the mother of all battles...

So the Finns lost Vyborg just because of one brigade, one regiment, and a battalion... We went through this over a year ago. I quoted a source about the Finns being routed and you, as usual, started making excuses... So I am not going to repeat myself over and over. -YMB29 (talk) 06:16, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

Ilomantsi (with just one 'L') was far from mother of all battles. It was far from even being the most significant battle of the 1944 in the Finnish front. Besides it did succeed as well as it was intended from the Finnish perspetive since the once encircled Soviet divisions still managed to flee to the east instead of being destroyed in mottis.

Finns lost Viborg because of just one brigade (the 20th) failed to make a stand. Reasons - and related discussions on what exactly happened and whose fault it was - why it happened warrant whole another discussion and are not relevant to this discussion - same goes for breakthroughs at main and VT-lines. I posted the list of the Finnish units that are known to have routed in the Isthmus in 1944 as counter argument to your claim. Most of the forces in the Isthmus still managed to make an orderly withdrawal (retreat) to VKT-line. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:14, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

If the whole defense breaks because of one battalion then it is not just the fault of that battalion... -YMB29 (talk) 02:33, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

A (Assuming you were talking of Kuuterselkä) Soviet breakthrough does not mean that all Finnish troops along the whole line would have been routed. Finns did not like the idea of leaving their units cut off. Soviet breakthrough threatened the remaining Finnish forces in the line with encirclement and as the breakthrough could not be contained HQ rather withdrew the forces from the whole of the line than leave them there to die in vain. Reasons to why main and VT lines lines fell are numerous however. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:53, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

So again if all of the forces were forced to withdraw you can't blame it on one unit... -YMB29 (talk) 20:59, 5 June 2011 (UTC)

Not forced to withdraw. Ordered to withdraw by GHQ - unlike Germans or Soviets who seemed to prefer to lose vast amounts of men by ordering them to withdraw usually far too late if at all Finns opted to make sure the army stayed intact. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:56, 6 June 2011 (UTC)

So the HQ was not forced to make the decision to withdraw?

What you are saying is that the defense collapsed because of one unit (what kind of a defense is that?) and all the units on the front had to retreat to avoid a total disaster. If that is so then that is a pathetic organization and performance by the Finnish army... -YMB29 (talk) 03:29, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

The HQ was not forced to make such a decision. Germand and Soviet commands usually chose not to pull out their exposed troops - which led to high number of POWs and casualties. It was a command decision. And yes, the defense lines were abandoned after Soviet spearhead managed to make an uncontainable breakthrough. As to why it happaned - Soviets had at best ~ 18-fold superiority in men alone at breakthrough sector, but there is no denying that Finnish front commanders made abysmal decisions and showed utterly horrible disregard of their defenses after being lulled into false sense of security by 3 years of trench warfare - despite of the warnings given by GHQ. Finns had no intentions of letting the troops to be surrounded. Given that the withdrawal from the defense lines was successful i fail to see how this would indicate that Finnish Army had patheric organization and performance. Finnish GHQ perferred to pull the troops into less exposed and more easily defendable position. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:14, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

And lose all that territory... Again if the defense falls apart because one unit was defeated then it is pathetic... Well at least now you are starting to blame the Finnish front commanders too, not just one unit... -YMB29 (talk) 18:32, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Defense did not fall apart. Finns withdrew as per orders from GHQ to other positions to avoid being encircled. Unlike Germans or Soviets in general Finns chose to fight somewhere where they could win (ie. negate Soviet advantage of armor) instead of wasting troops in vainly defending a stick in the mud. And yes, i do set some blame on Finnish commanders on the preparations - or rather lack of preparations - they had made in case Soviets would attack. Commanders failings do not change the fact that only the units at Soviet breakthrough sectors broke - compared to Red Army Finnish units had high operational freedom so failings of the commanders had less effect. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:59, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Well if you are in danger of being encircled then your defense did collapse, and if that happened because of one unit then your defense is terrible... -YMB29 (talk) 03:29, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

No, Soviet pushed their attacks in very narrow areas instead of wide fronts attempting to generate a breakthrough to the Finnish lines and then enveloping the rest of the line. When this happened (in some cases Finns faced well over 10-fold number of Soviets) and the resulting breakthrough by Soviet armor could not be contained Finns pulled their forces back from the defense line as there was neither value nor point to hold it any longer. Finnish line collapsed only at the location where Soviets managed to generate a breakthrough - rest of line withdrew orderly after being told to do so by GHQ. As Red Army did not do wide front attacks instead relying on attacks on very narrow sections of the front line how could there have been more than one (or few) defending units receiving it? - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:37, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

So why did not the other units help them fight the breakthroughs, instead of running or "orderly retreating"? -YMB29 (talk) 05:29, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

That is a good question. Theoretically a division should have deployed 2 regiments at front and kept 1 in reserve just to block and contain such breakthroughs. However Finnish GHQ made huge blunder (personal opinion) when they reorganized the divisions during the 1942 partial demobilization. They went from 3 regiments + light battalion to 2 regiments + 1 battalion. Essentially robbing the divisional commanders the reserve they might have otherwise had. Second blunder in that regards comes from the army corps commander who had absolute faith (despite GHQ & Germans stating otherwise) that his fortified but thin lines would hold. Though to say that other units wouldnt have helped at all is somewhat missleading since especially at Kuuterselkä there were supporting units - Finnish Jäger Brigade supported with other units made a strong counter attack there however though it did push Soviet spearhead back from Kuuterselkä village and retook even the 'secondary line' it failed to dislodge them from VT-line. Soviet superiority (ie. reinforcements) forced the Jäger Brigade to withdraw however. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:15, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

So it is not as simple as one unit being defeated... -YMB29 (talk) 04:12, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

Where the line broke, just one unit was defeated. Never said there wouldnt have been reasons why it happened. However unlike what you claim the troops along the length of the line were not defeated. Most of them did not take any part in the fighting at breakthrough locations and were only made to withdraw under GHQ's orders. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:09, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

So again in that case it was a paper thin defense... -YMB29 (talk) 19:47, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

What about it? I fail to see what you are after. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:32, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

Red Army had such a numerical superiority that there was no hope Finns could have managed to close the breaches early in the offensive. For example at Valkeasaari Soviets pushed two corps through the breach, while Finns had two corps to defend the whole Isthmus. Finns had no other option but to retreat and deplete attacking forces as much as possible. Even as late as in Tali, Finns were trying to close breach with one Brigade - against four Soviet divisions. Finns managed to narrow the breach down to less than 1km, but failed to close that final gap. It was only at Ihantala where Finns were strong enough to push back those Soviet units which had managed to breach Finnish positions.

But this was one of the greatest differences how Finns fought the war compared to Soviets and Germans: Save the army so it can fight another day vs. Lose the army in an effort to inflict marginally more losses to the enemy. --Whiskey (talk) 22:59, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

Well for Finland it was much harder to replace casualties and equipment losses, but there is only so much land you can retreat from and give up to the enemy.

The Finns should have expected such an offensive and what happened can't be blamed on one or two units being overwhelmed... -YMB29 (talk) 16:35, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

All true, however Finnish equipment grew in both quality as in quantity during the Soviet Offensive - despite the losses. Also as Finns had demobilized part of the army in 1942 there was some untapped manpower left as well. And with the 'should have expected' you kinda hit the nail in the head since that topic has been discussed in awful lot of detail in Finland. In short Finnish front line commanders refused to take heed what GHQ's (lower ranked) official told them. And later even refused to accept that the offensive was truly happening - ie. had grown far too comfy with their 'bungalows' in the forests. Regardless of those it was the Finnish GHQ that chose to pull back the forces all along the lines instead of risking losing any of them after the line had been breached. Also there is the little thing that since the negotiations in spring 1944 had ended with nearly acceptable terms (for most parts) Finns at some level expected Soviets to continue negotiations, not to attack. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:26, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

Hard to continue negotiations if they are broken off...

Again, there was manpower left but not enough for a long fight. -YMB29 (talk) 04:26, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

Negotations had broken off before and started anew. Finnish losses of 1944 were not actually that high - though losses per day were higher than before the overal amount of losses were much higher in 1941 as well as in Winter War than in the summer 1944. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:03, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

So yes at that casualty rate Finland would have had trouble filling its army soon. -YMB29 (talk) 23:10, 2 July 2011 (UTC)

True, however Soviets themselves had no strength available against the Finns to keep up the offensive at such a tempo that Finnish casualty rate would have remained that high. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:49, 3 July 2011 (UTC)

Again, it would not take much for them to amass such a strength. -YMB29 (talk) 18:58, 5 July 2011 (UTC)

That is rather doubtful since the Soviet forces reserved for the initial offensive lasted only for a month and a half. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:06, 5 July 2011 (UTC)

Mannerheim thought otherwise. -YMB29 (talk) 04:24, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

You missunderstand me, i ment the Soviets hardly had enough resources to waste another 20 or so divisions on secondary front regardless of their goals. - Wanderer602 (talk) 10:03, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

It is not like they wasted all of their divisions... I guess you know better than the Finnish leadership did... -YMB29 (talk) 14:20, 11 July 2011 (UTC)

Very few if any of the Soviet divisions facing Finns were combat ready after the offensive. Some had pretty much melted away - helped by Soviet war time practice of trying to use up all the men in line units before the change to fresh troops. If Finns would have been able (as per Airo and Mannerheim) offer yet 3 more months (instead of 1 or 1&1/2 months as in VP-offensive) of high intensity fighting Soviet losses would have been heavy and most their divisions (as per VP-offensive) participating to the operation would have been left in dire need of R&R - ie. effetively preventing from participating to other operations in near future. Therefore assuming the Soviet main goal was to defeat Nazi Germany and capture Berlin then any of the troops lost or tied up in fighting against the Finns would have been effectively wasted - there was nothing for the Soviets to gain in Finland that would have been of any use against the Germany. - Wanderer602 (talk) 17:54, 11 July 2011 (UTC)

So then Mannerheim was incompetent to not know that the Soviets needed half their army to finish off Finland... If only you could have been the commander in chief instead of him... -YMB29 (talk) 04:31, 12 July 2011 (UTC)

Never said anything like that. Nor do i actually understand what you are after. Mannerheim understood that Soviet goal was to take down the Third Reich. Offensive against the Finns never made much sense (which is part of the reason why it was such a surprise). - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:16, 12 July 2011 (UTC)

You think you are an expert to decide what makes sense or not... Why did Mannerheim think that a new major Soviet offensive was very possible and decided to surrender? -YMB29 (talk) 05:24, 13 July 2011 (UTC)

In late summer 1944 it appeared (to Finns and most likely to many others as well) that Germany would fall before the Christmas after ops Bagration and Overlord. Once Germany would have been defeated there would have been nearly endless (from Finnish perspective) Soviet forces available for a renewed offensive against the Finns. Finns had been trying to reach negotiation since 1943 - offensive hardly changed that in any respect. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:46, 13 July 2011 (UTC)

No that is your OR again. The offensive made the Finns more willing to listen and accept the terms. -YMB29 (talk) 04:43, 14 July 2011 (UTC)

Offensive contributed to it. However Soviets did offer less harsh terms after the offensive than before it which would be counterintuitive should the offensive have had much effect in it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:04, 14 July 2011 (UTC)

You contradict yourself... Anyway we discussed this many times; no need to go in circles. -YMB29 (talk) 16:13, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

Thank you, so we agree, offensive contributed but did not cause the causefire on its own. - Wanderer602 (talk) 16:57, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

Again it does not matter whether it was on its own or not. And it did more than just make a simple contribution... -YMB29 (talk) 05:32, 19 July 2011 (UTC)

That may be so but the offensive did not achieve it purely on its own merits. Instead it required more than just the offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:02, 19 July 2011 (UTC)

And so what? -YMB29 (talk) 14:40, 21 July 2011 (UTC)

Well that has been the point in this discussion. Did the attack cause the ceasefire on its own or did it 'merely' contribute to it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:22, 21 July 2011 (UTC)

No, "on its own" was made up by you to make it look like a failure. -YMB29 (talk) 04:01, 24 July 2011 (UTC)

It only does so if one tries to represent the offensive as accomplishing that task alone. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:53, 24 July 2011 (UTC)

No one was saying that it did it completely alone... -YMB29 (talk) 05:29, 25 July 2011 (UTC)

Then it should be made sure that is not implied in the article like it used to. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:32, 25 July 2011 (UTC)

The only thing that used to be implied is that it failed... -YMB29 (talk) 04:34, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

The offensive was intended to cause Finland to crumble. It did not achieve that on its own. There seems to be ample reason to read that as 'failure'. - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:10, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Only according to your twisted logic... -YMB29 (talk) 17:32, 30 July 2011 (UTC)

If the offensives goal was to force the ceasefire (or force Finland out from the war) it pretty much states that it was the intention that offensive alone would have achieved that. However as discussed that does not appear to have been the case - offensive did not accomplish that on its own. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:04, 30 July 2011 (UTC)

Yes keep presenting your OR based on twisted logic as fact. That is all you can do I guess... -YMB29 (talk) 03:25, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

So again if something disagrees with your opinion its OR even when it has sources backing it? - Wanderer602 (talk) 03:53, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

I would love to see your source for "did not do it on its own = failure". -YMB29 (talk) 21:01, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

I don't really need to do that. Its enough that someone claims that the goal of the operation was to force Finland out of war. As per previous discussions and even comminique from Glantz (which contradicts you and you immediately rejected it) offensive failed to achieve that on its own. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:42, 3 August 2011 (UTC)

Like I thought, you can't find a source for that ridiculous claim... Keep believing in that if it makes you feel better. Also Glantz told me that the offensive crushed Finland... -YMB29 (talk) 17:48, 4 August 2011 (UTC)

Please forward the emails or by whatever means you communicated with him then just like Whiskey did. So far it appears that Glantz did not mean that offensive would have achieved that on its own. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:25, 4 August 2011 (UTC)

Well I can make some stuff up and post it too, but I am not going to do that... -YMB29 (talk) 03:26, 7 August 2011 (UTC)

So now you are claiming that other wikipedia editors are lying? - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:47, 7 August 2011 (UTC)

It does not even matter; emails can't be used as sources. You still don't understand this? -YMB29 (talk) 16:29, 9 August 2011 (UTC)

section break 2.8

7) Again funny comment coming from Meretskov since his front never managed to penetrate Finnish defence of U-line. Since Soviet offensive was the only reason that caused Finns to link up with Germans more closely (or Ryti to link up...) its interesting to find a claim that offensive would have caused the 'brotherhood in arms' to be repudiated since all documentary evidence (Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement) says that it only lead to 'near-allied' state between Germans and Finns. And again, by July 28 Soviet offensive was in tatters and stopped at all areas with sole exception being the last desperate grasp for glory (far from strategic scale) being made into Soviet embarrasment in Ilomantsi in early August 1944. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:38, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Well maybe it was an embarrassment but it is hard to tell since most information about it comes from Finnish histiography, and judging it based on what you say, it is not always accurate... Even if true, it still does not change the outcome of the offensive and war.

Meretskov could sense that the Finns would not be able to hold much longer, if there was another serious push. He was proven right by the Finnish plea for peace... -YMB29 (talk) 14:57, 16 May 2011 (UTC)

Since Finns had been trying to negotiate since 1943 it doesnt really require much perception to see that they would have done so again. When reading Meretskov's comments its good to remember (sour grapes) that stavka & Stalin had been very displeased with his KF's progress during the offensive. After all (IIRC, haven't got reference with me) he even authorized a book(let) to be made for Stalin/stavka with intention of proving how difficult the advance had been. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:58, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

I am sure he was very disappointed that he had been promoted to Marshal after his "failure" against Finland... -YMB29 (talk) 16:20, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

He was not promoted to Marshal after his operation against Finland. That promotion followed the far more successful Petsamo-Kirknes operation. Only Govorov got his accolades from the operation against the Finns. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:25, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

And Govorov got his June 18, when the offensive was still going on as planned.--Whiskey (talk) 08:30, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

So Stalin did not slap it off of him when the "great failure" against Finland happened? -YMB29 (talk) 16:54, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

First of all failure of the offensive against the Finns was not solely on the two front commanders involved - after all it was strategic operation run and coordinated in the end by stavka. Merestkov failed to receive his accolades and had to wait until Petsamo-Kirknes for it. As Govorov on the other hand had succesfully completed the first phase of the offensive and captured Viborg within the set timelimit, sacking or demoting the front commander proclaimed as a Marshal a month or two after his promotion and subsequent 'Viborg liberation' festivities might have been a bad idea. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:22, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

But does not that colossal failure deserve sacking and execution by firing squad?

It clearly says above that they both got promoted for their "failures" against the Finns. Again, if you think that is wrong, write to Glantz. -YMB29 (talk) 19:47, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

As you yourself have stated repeatedly - Finland was hardly the main enemy for the Soviet Union. And yes i saw what Glantz wrote but you can easily check the dates Govorov and Merestkov were promoted to Marshals and see if Glantz had it right or not. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:36, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

The dates don't prove him wrong. If the dates were before the offensive... The point is if the offensive was a great failure like you say, they would not have gotten the promotion or would not have kept it by August. -YMB29 (talk) 23:03, 20 May 2011 (UTC)

I doubt Soviets could afford to first celebrating a commander and then bashing him a month later - besides the 'lack' of forces available was stavkas fault, not individual commanders. Leonid Govorov was promoted June 18 when offensive was still at full swing and had broken through the Finnish fortified lines in southern Karelian Isthmus. Kirill Meretskov was promoted October 26 when Petsamo operation was just about concluded - well over month since cease fire was in effect with Finns and about 3 months after the offensive against Finns had been stopped. In Finnish literature it is mentioned that of the front commanders who took part to the strategic offensives Meretskov has the dubious honor of being the sole exception as he was the only one who was not promoted on the 'first attempt'. - Wanderer602 (talk) 04:44, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

Finnish literature probably suggests that this was because of his great "failure" against Finland... It does not matter when he got promoted. It is obvious that this offensive was a major reason for that; he could not have gotten it just for Petsamo... -YMB29 (talk) 02:42, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Rokossovsky - promoted June 29 1944 - just couple of weeks after Bagration had begun. Malinovsky & Tolbukhin - September 10-12 1944 - just after Jassy–Kishinev operation had succeeded. Konev - promoted February 1944 - just after Korsun battle and surrounding campaign had been concluded. Vasilevsky - in Feb 1944 - after successful encirclements at upper Don. Given how most (if not all) promotions to Marshal in the Red Army immediately followed a successful campaign the lack of being given one speaks volumes of what stavka thought of Meretskov's merits in the offensive. He clearly redeemed himself with success at Petsamo region and gained his accolades from that. - Wanderer602 (talk) 12:34, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Redeemed himself with success at Petsamo... You wish... -YMB29 (talk) 16:16, 24 May 2011 (UTC)

Be that as it may but Merestkov's lack of promotion following the offensive against the Finns - while Govorov gained his already during the offensive - and given the fact that promotion for Merestkov was eventually given only when Petsamo operation had pretty much been concluded does imply of a failure of sorts in the earlier offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 22:29, 24 May 2011 (UTC)

Again just some wishful speculation by you. -YMB29 (talk) 02:54, 25 May 2011 (UTC)

Those aren't my conclusions - there are sources for those just as well. To be fair on Merestkov he feared that the offensive would not succeed at the rapid pace demanded by stavka and that it would fall short of its goals - which turned out to be true on both counts (source again Moisala/Alanen, referencing Na sluzbe narodu by Meretskov, K. A. - Moscow 1969). Seems like there are online sources supporting it as well... [20] [21] [22] - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:36, 25 May 2011 (UTC)

So what do those prove? If anything they tell of his success against Finland. Maybe I will use them in the article, thanks... -YMB29 (talk) 03:57, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

They all state more or less directly that Meretskov gained his promotion from the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:21, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

After it, not only because of it. -YMB29 (talk) 05:43, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

Most of the other commanders on the front who were promoted to Marshals in the Red Army were promoted either during or immediately after a successful operation. Then there are the Stavka 'issues' (Ставка ВГК. 1944-1945 гг. Том 16 (5-4); swf doc) - numbers 122, 182 - which blame Karelian Front (ie. Merestkov's armies) of lack of speed in their advance, lack or organization, bad leadership and management, various other command issues... (all which are command level decisions) - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:06, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

This is just a continuation of your wishful speculation... -YMB29 (talk) 06:16, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

Stavka was clearly displased and disappointed with Merestkov's progress. What else do you need? - Wanderer602 (talk) 08:14, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

That is about separate stages of the offensive, not the whole offensive. And it says nothing about Meretskov. -YMB29 (talk) 02:33, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

Criticism was directed at the Karelian Front as a whole - and making sure that entity would have been able to accomplish its goals was Merestkov's job. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:53, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

Well there is a difference between completely failing and not completely going as planned... -YMB29 (talk) 20:59, 5 June 2011 (UTC)

Source critisism

What is interesting, is what everyone of these books or articles handle primarily something different than Vyborg-Petrozavodsk offensive, and V-P is just a side note in them, ranging from one paragraph to less than a page. Not a single source devoted to the V-P offensive or the battles fought then. Has there been any specific research on the subject in Soviet Union/Russia since Platonov's Bitva za Leningrad??? --Whiskey (talk) 08:30, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes let's throw these sources that don't primarily cover the offensive and are not in line with Finnish POV into the garbage... -YMB29 (talk) 16:54, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Well there is slight difference in reading it from a single page of an encyclopedic book or from book which handles solely the event in question. OTOH books like Moisala & Alanen's book - not best example but still, some 280 pages of background, descriptions, results, conclusions of the offensive (including some 80 pages of psychological and very mild statistical analysis of Finnish soldiers) using several Soviet/Russian sources in addition to Finnish sources - give slightly more expanded view to the offensive. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:22, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

We should make a rule that only "detailed and unbiased" Finnish sources can be used in Continuation War related articles... -YMB29 (talk) 19:47, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

That was not what Whiskey and me were after. What we were interested was if there had been some research done on the subject after Platonov's Bitva ze Leningrad - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:36, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

If I find a Russian source that is only about the topic, you will still find a reason to dismiss it if it is not in agreement with your POV. -YMB29 (talk) 23:07, 20 May 2011 (UTC)

Also, professor Juri Kilin from Petrozavodsk University has done some very extensive research about the issue, unfortunately so far concentrating more to the smaller scale fighting. I hope he sometime in future writes complete Russian history of the Continuation War.--Whiskey (talk) 22:16, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

@YMB29, the plain fact is that Soviet sources (and all derivative Russian sources) portray what they want to portray based on their propagandic history-serves-politics perspective with regard to strategic and tactical as well as Soviet and enemy losses. That has nothing to do with "POV", merely accuracy and trustworthiness. Soviet sources, for example, dismiss the Courland pocket as insignificant when in fact Stalin sent in division after division to be slaughtered at the hands of the Latvians and Germans in a fruitless attempt to take the last bit of Baltic territory holding out against the Red Army. Only one account can reflect reality in that situation. And it's not the Soviet one. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 22:20, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes it is only the German-Latvian-Finnish one... -YMB29 (talk) 21:20, 5 June 2011 (UTC)

I have found that Soviet/Russian sources generally do have the facts they represent correctly. There has been occasions where Soviet sources have really increased my understanding on the issues at hand, that those have had facts and interpretations I haven't found in any works in any other language. The major problems I have with Soviet sources are omissions of certain facts and some interpretations which are not supported by the given facts or facts found in other sources.

And YMB29, if the source is properly based on facts, it is impossible to dismiss it. And it is the base of the scientific work that other people could, would and should critisize it, try to tear it apart, try to find inaccuracies, omissions, partialities etc. in it. If it survives that, it's all the stronger. If not, it's only a fit fate to it.

This is not an ideological or national question. This is not a conspiracy against Russians. This is just pushing Russian sources through similar scientific examination process as Western/Finnish sources has been pushed and is still being pushed. All the time new archives are opened and new researchers are presenting their interpretations of the events, sometimes increased distance in time and space provides new views to the issue, all the existing works are continuosly checked against this new information. And it is extremely important that also Russians participate in this process. --Whiskey (talk) 10:08, 7 June 2011 (UTC)

You are still separating Soviet/Russian sources from others. As though all sources are examined and verified, except the Soviet/Russian ones. I can claim the same thing about Finnish or other sources. I can also say that Finnish sources omit some facts and give interpretations that are not supported by facts and other sources...

Most of the sources above are not even Soviet/Russian. -YMB29 (talk) 03:32, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

There is a certain reason for that. Due to the cold war, history research in Europe had to deal with both right-wing and left-wing interpretations, which forced more deep research on the sources. This was especially true in Finland, where was strong Communist party and lots of young leftist historians late 60s and 70s. During that time all available sources were digged out and lot of new interpretations were presented, so they were discussed and argumented on both sides already decades. In Soviet Union such discussion was impossible. Only during the last two decades there has been opening of discussion and the entry of the new generation of historians, which really take a critical look to the existing history writing. In any case, I do put much more credibility to the book specifically written on the issue, containing hundreds of pages of writing on the issue at hand (that is Platonov's Bitva za Leningrad), than articles or books where the whole issue is handled by a single paragraph or less than a page at most. --Whiskey (talk) 18:46, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

So that book disagrees with the other books I quoted?

Over twenty years of discussion and heavy criticism is more than enough... Also politically motivated discussion and criticism does not always lead to an objective and more truthful view, as evidenced by what many Finns say about the war... -YMB29 (talk) 18:35, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Yes, it disagrees. Also David Glantz writes in The Battle for Leningrad: "...Althogh the capture of Vyborg and the Red Army advance to the Vuoksi River line essentially ended the Vyborg operation, it did not satisfy the STAVKA's strategic aims." and "By 14 July it was clear to Soviet and Finn alike that Govorov's offensive into Southern Finland had failed."

So, now I have two books, specifically written of the operations on the area, which support my interpretation. You still have paragraphs from the books/articles written about something else. --Whiskey (talk) 21:24, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Don't be so sure... Glantz is talking about mid-July, and at that time Finland had not surrendered yet so of course the main strategic goal was not accomplished...

Also I think you are doing a very selective reading of Bitva za Leningrad. What does it say that disagrees with the above sources (besides that frequently quoted paragraph that talks about tactical objectives)? -YMB29 (talk) 03:29, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

How much do those books handle the war with Finland? The usual single paragraph entry perhaps? They do not exactly compare against whole books written on the topic. - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:37, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

You are just looking for reasons to dismiss the sources you don't like... Again, those two books don't contradict what is in those sources. -YMB29 (talk) 05:36, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

Actually its more like secondary sources (full books handling the topic) disagreeing with unsupported (ie. no real secondary sources) tertiary sources (books handling the topic in single paragraph or sentence) - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:15, 17 June 2011 (UTC)

Those sources are not tertiary. And how do the two "full books" disagree with those sources? -YMB29 (talk) 04:12, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

Platonov (copy Whiskey's posting for your convenience):

Let's see what Platonov writes in Bitva za Leningrad about the reaching the YMB29 defined (as sourced by one paragraph presentations of the issue) strategic goal: "...Regardless of the defeat of it's Army Finland continued the war. Soviet army had to reach new victories in South Karelia, Bealorussia, Baltic and other directions of the German-Soviet front to force Finnish reactionary government to accept conditions of the Soviet government and separate from the war from the side of the Hitler's Germany."

So, Soviet Union failed to reach the strategic goal of forcing Finland out of war with V-P offensive. --Whiskey (talk) 19:00, 9 June 2011 (UTC)

Moisala & Alanen (copy of my own posting for your convenience):

Which quite bluntly states that Stalin's great offensive against Finns failed to reach its conclusion: Finland was not defeated militarily. In fact from military strategic view point the offensive was Soviet Union's failure, which was caused by the fact that neither of the fronts participating to the offensive managed to accomplish their respective operational/strategic missions... - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:52, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Both state the same thing. The offensive failed strategically. - Wanderer602 (talk) 05:17, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

The second quote reflects the patriotic Finnish historiography, with claims that you like to repeat. Finland was not defeated militarily... you wish... The source is contradicted by many non-Finnish sources. And I thought you meant Glantz's Battle for Leningrad, not this book.

Platonov's book just says that the successes on other fronts, many of which were made possible by the offensive against Finland, played their part in forcing Finland from the war. However, it clearly says that the offensive was a defeat for Finland. -YMB29 (talk) 19:52, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

Platonov's entry also very clearly explains that the Offensive achieved nothing on its own but instead required several Soviet successes in fights against Germans. In that respect claiming that ceasefire would have been result of the offensive is false since offensive alone (according to Platonov) failed to achieve it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:32, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

It is not false since at the very least the offensive was the major reason. Platonov's book does not say that the offensive achieved nothing. Stop misusing sources. -YMB29 (talk) 16:35, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

Platonov states it clearly that the offensive failed to force Finns to ceasefire and instead Soviet army needed to win victories elsewhere (ie. exactly the 'overal situation' Mannerheim refers to). Also i did not say offensive gained nothing, i said it gained nothing on its own, which is exactly what Platonov wrote. Which also means that deduction that the offensive would have been the (sole) cause of the ceasefire is false according to Platonov. - Wanderer602 (talk) 18:26, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

Don't attribute to Platonov what he has not said... Again all it says is that other victories helped too, which does not diminish the strategic impact of the offensive. -YMB29 (talk) 04:26, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

Platonov is saying that the offensive alone achieved nothing. - Wanderer602 (talk) 07:03, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

No he is not... This is your OR. -YMB29 (talk) 23:10, 2 July 2011 (UTC)

Please explain then what exactly does he mean?

"Soviet army had to reach new victories in South Karelia, Bealorussia, Baltic and other directions of the German-Soviet front to force Finnish reactionary government to accept conditions of the Soviet government and separate from the war from the side of the Hitler's Germany."

It does appear that he is stating the offensive alone did not reach or gain its intended strategic goals. Instead Soviets were forced to win battles elsewhere (ie. change the overall situation). - Wanderer602 (talk) 06:49, 3 July 2011 (UTC)

It says reach new victories to seal the success. From this you can't jump to conclude that he meant the offensive was a failure. This is an obvious case of OR and misuse of a source. -YMB29 (talk) 18:58, 5 July 2011 (UTC)

It does not state 'to seal the success' (or anything such) anywhere but states very clearly that offensive alone was insufficient. IF the goal of the offensive was to force Finland from the war and the offensive failed to accomplish this how come did the offensive not fail? - Wanderer602 (talk) 20:06, 5 July 2011 (UTC)

No Finland was eventually forced out of the war largely because of the offensive. That is some faulty logic... "Sealing the success" describes what Platonov means much better than what you are saying. It is better to keep the discussion about this on the offensive's talk page. -YMB29 (talk) 04:24, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

Regardless of your opinion the sources state the result and the aftermath of the offensive quite plainly. It failed and it failed (on its own) to force Finns to ceasefire. - Wanderer602 (talk) 10:03, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

Again who said that it had to be the only reason for it to be successful? The only one relying on opinions here is you. -YMB29 (talk) 14:20, 11 July 2011 (UTC)

Stating that "offensive forced Finns to ceasefire" essentially states that the offensive alone on its own forced Finns to ceasefire. Stating that "offensive was one of the factors that drove Finns to ceasefire" would however not carry such connotation with it. - Wanderer602 (talk) 17:54, 11 July 2011 (UTC)

And then what? -YMB29 (talk) 04:31, 12 July 2011 (UTC)

More quotes

It appeared that as in the Winter War, although the Soviet Union could claim a victory, its offensive had failed, largely for the same reasons - underestimation of the Finnish capacity to resist and rigid, unimaginative Soviet tactical leadership. -Earl F. Ziemke, German Northern Theatre Of Operations 1940-45, p.288

--Whiskey (talk) 20:45, 18 August 2011 (UTC)

Well I am glad you posted this. This is from Ziemke's older book and he obviously made a mistake since in his newer book he corrected this sentence:

It appeared that as in the Winter War of 1939-40, although the Soviet Union could claim a victory, its offensive fell short of the success it ought to have had, largely for the same reasons — underestimation of the Finnish capacity to resist and rigid, unimaginative Soviet tactical leadership.

-Stalingrad to Berlin. The German Defeat in the East, by Earl Ziemke (p. 388)

-YMB29 (talk) 04:06, 21 August 2011 (UTC)