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RfC: Should information about events leading up to the coup be added?

Should something about important political events in the year or so before the coup, (to be located in the 1950s section of the article) be added? Events such as the Siyeh-i Tir (or July 1952) uprising that strengthened Mosaddeq's position (the prime minister overthrown in the coup) by leading to him being granted emergency powers; the extension of Mosaddeq's emergency powers six months later; and details of the August 1953 referendum that dissolved parliament and granted a further extension of emergency powers to Mosaddeq, but something the "opposition capitalized" and was "more grist for the anti-Mossadegh mill" according to historians.

The current article skips from a year before the coup (spring/mid-1952) to a month before the coup (mid-1953) leaving out pivotal events, first of Mosaddeq's growing strength and then of his loss of allies. Supporter(s) of change (the writer of this request) argue that (below) that WP:Reliable Sources writing about the coup mention it, and that issues far less directly connected to the story of the coup lard the article in sections such as Nineteenth century, Early petroleum development, Post-World War I, World War II, Post-World War II. (Amongst other filler, detail about wars fought with Czarist Russia in 1802 and the 1907 sale of William D'arcy's shares in the AIOC to the Burmah Oil Company government, are included.)

Criticisms of the change (offered above) include an extended rewrite making the change even longer; the complaint that the change "has too many quotations, and it's full of half-truths and loaded factbits meant to twist and spin the events in question"; "stretches the topic of the article to encompass a vast part of Iranian history far beyond discussion of the coup proper".

Please excuse the duplication of text with the section above. No consensus, or even much comment, on the proposed changed was reached during a poll of (above), which is why we have this RfC. --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:00, 8 June 2011 (UTC)

Current version

While the National Front, which often supported Mosaddegh won handily in the big cities, there was no one to monitor voting in the rural areas. Violence broke out in Abadan and other parts of the country where elections were hotly contested. Faced with having to leave Iran for The Hague where Britain was suing for control of Iranian oil, Mossadegh's cabinet voted to postpone the remainder of the election until after the return of the Iranian delegation from The Hague.[1]

By mid-1953 a mass of resignations by Mossadegh's parliamentary supporters reduced parliament below its quorum. A referendum to dissolve parliament and give the prime minister power to make law was submitted to voters, and it passed with 99 percent approval, 2,043,300 votes to 1300 votes against.[2]

Proposed change

[changes in italics]

While the National Front, which often supported Mosaddegh won handily in the big cities, there was no one to monitor voting in the rural areas. Violence broke out in Abadan and other parts of the country where elections were hotly contested. Faced with having to leave Iran for The Hague where Britain was suing for control of Iranian oil, Mossadegh's cabinet voted to postpone the remainder of the election until after the return of the Iranian delegation from The Hague.[3]

In July 1952 Mosaddeq resigned after the Shah refused to accept his nomination for War Minister, a position traditionally filled by the Shah. Mosaddeq appealed to the general public for support and received an overwhelming response. After five days of mass demonstrations, 29 killed in Tehran, and "signs of dissension in the army," the Shah backed down and asked Mosaddeq to form a new government.[4][5] This was an enormous personal triumph for Mosaddeq vis-a-vis the Shah and Mosaddeq capitalized on it by asking the majlis (parliament) for "emergency powers for six months to decree any law he felt necessary for obtaining not only financial solvency, but also electoral, judicial, and educational reforms."[6]

Mosaddeq dealt his opponents "not only at the Shah and the military but also at the landed aristocracy and the two Houses of Parliament ... a rapid succession of blows." [7] In early 1953 Mosaddeq successfully pressed Parliament to extend his emergency powers for another 12 months. With these powers, he decreed a land reform law that established village councils and increased peasants' shares of production. [8]

By mid-1953 Mosaddeq's struggle with Parliament had resulted in a mass of resignation by his parliamentary supporters reducing parliament below its quorum, and a referendum to dissolve parliament and give the prime minister powers to legislate law. The referendum passed with 99% approval, 2,043,300 votes to 1300 votes against,[9] but was criticized by opponents for its placing of separate ballot boxes for yes or no ballots at different places[10] and a requirement that "each ballot must be clearly inscribed with the full name of the voter and the number and place of issue of his identity card."[11]

Reason for proposed change

Assuming it's that the material about the uprising and Mosaddeq's reforms are not particularly controversial I'll offer WP:RS for detail on the referendum being important, here are what some of authors of books on the coup and/or recent Iranian history have to say about the referendum and its importance and relevance:
"The transparent unfairness of this referendum was more grist for the anti-Mossadegh mill. Mid-August found Roosevelt and his team of Iranian agents in place and ready to strike." (Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, p.165)

”Dissolving the Majles through a referendum, justifiably described as Mosaddeq's political masterpiece, was an ingenious countermeasure adopted by him to deprive his opponents of a quasi-legal vehicle for his ouster. The opposition capitalized on the referendum, denouncing it as another blatant violation of the Constitution. ... Kashani declared it religiously impermissible and called on the faithful not to take part in it." (Azimi in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p.95)

"Mosaddeq's decision to conduct a controversial referendum to close Parliament gave the CIA's precoup propaganda campaign an easy target, probably helped persuade the shah to support the coup, and undoubtedly turned some Iranians against Mosaddeq." (Gasiorowski, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.266)

"To ensure victory at the polls, positive and negative ballot boxes were placed in different places. As expected, Mossadeq received an overwhelming vote of confidence ... Mossadeq, the constitutional lawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws against the shah, was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to the theory of the general will. The liberal aristocrat who had in the past appealed predominantly to the middle class was mobilizing the lower classes. The moderate reformer who had proposed to disenfranchize illiterates was seeking the acclaim of the national masses." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.274)

More generally the added factoids concern Mosaddeq's loss of (some) domestic support, which played a part in the coup according to Abrahamian and others: "The easy success of this coup can be explained by two factors, the widening gap between the traditional and middle classes within the National Front; and the increasing alienation of the whole officer corps from the civilian administration." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.273-4)

"The coup could not have succeeded without significant internal disaffection or indifference, but without outside aid it would not have occurred." (Keddie, Nikki R., Roots of Revolution, Yale University Press, 1981, p.140) --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:45, 8 June 2011 (UTC)

Responses

  • Support. ... for reasons given above. --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:45, 8 June 2011 (UTC)
  • Oppose for reasons iterated enough times on this talk page in enough discussions on this talk page, and pursuant to the lack of consensus ever found for such an expansion of the article. I still support restricting the article to the actual topic of the article, and feel too much "stuff" is already in it. Cheers. Collect (talk) 13:11, 8 June 2011 (UTC)
    • Granted you already responded to the earlier poll for this proposed change, and maybe the issue is starting to bore you, but what article in wikip about a major historical event doesn't try to give background on it? ... doesn't attempt to give expalanations for why the event happened? Another question, do you have any reply to Reasons for the proposed change --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:17, 8 June 2011 (UTC)
  • Talking in generalities material that gives the reader information about the political background to the coup and the responses that various groups or parties had to the event has to be a good thing. The exact amount of detail is harder to say, but I would have thought more recent events required more than distant events. To that end I would certainly condense the sections from "19th Century" to "Post World War I" (or even as far was WWII) down. The important points are surely that the oil was an important strategic resource for the British, the area lay between sphere's of influence of major powers. Now with that lot gone the couple of paragraphs suggested, provided they are accurate representations of what the reliable sources state, seems reasonable. GraemeLeggett (talk) 16:11, 8 June 2011 (UTC)
  • Support. By all means, the gaining of emergency powers must be in the article, as well as the criticism of the surreal 99.9% vote. Binksternet (talk) 17:04, 8 June 2011 (UTC)
  • Oppose per User:Collect. Some keep endlessly recycling the same arguments, again and again. Kurdo777 (talk) 03:53, 9 June 2011 (UTC)
    • Well you have probably heard some of the same arguements before, but you're hearing them again because you (or anyone) haven't answered them. In any case, dispute resolution requires going through the wikip process. While my arguements have appeared in these talk pages before they haven't been made in RfC. --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:16, 9 June 2011 (UTC)
  • Support - The material proposed for inclusion seems directly relevant to the main topic of the article. The proposal includes material such as:
- In early 1953 Mosaddeq successfully pressed Parliament to extend his emergency powers for another 12 months.
- In July 1952 Mosaddeq resigned after the Shah refused to accept his nomination for War Minister .... the Shah backed down and asked Mosaddeq to form a new government
- The referendum passed ... but was criticized by opponents for its placing of separate ballot boxes for yes or no ballots at different places
The Oppose comments imply there is no Verifiability or ReliableSource issues with this material, but instead claim that the material is not sufficiently relevant. However, as a reader who is not especially well-versed in Iranian history, I find the proposed material highly illuminating to the background of the coup. There are no shortage of bytes on the WP servers, so I see no reason to force the reader to refer to another WP article for this relevant background information. If the Oppose editors believe the material is too inflammatory, the best solution is to include additional clarifying information, not to eliminate it altogether. --Noleander (talk) 18:47, 9 June 2011 (UTC)
  • Support -- All historical articles require background information and context to fully understand the subject matter. User:Collect states that he supports "restricting the article to the actual topic of the article". When writing articles on historical events, the events that lead up to what the article is talking about are "the actual topic of the article". The large majority of historical articles (see for example, American Revolution or July 2009 Ürümqi riots) provide historical background for the reader, and I see no reason to make an exception here. This is actually something that should be integrated into policy -- we need to make it clear that when writing articles on historical events, that we should be careful to place the event in context. I don't know of a single serious historical work that doesn't try to give their readers background information, and I don't think Wikipedia should be the first to try this new approach to history. Anyhow, we certainly need to talk about events leading up to the coup in this article (perhaps not in the manner suggested above, but somehow). -- Jrtayloriv (talk) 18:51, 14 June 2011 (UTC)
  • Support -- I would strongly support including some carefully curated, impeccable and unquestionably sourced historical background, but only with the strict proviso that this background info is skillfully selected from and points back to a parent article like Mohammad Mosaddegh or History of Iran. It's important to include historical background to avoid the greater evil of a ridiculous content fork like "Events leading up to 1953 Iranian coup" but remember when you're including historical info--if you do it, do it right. --NickDupree (talk) 04:13, 15 June 2011 (UTC)
    • Do you have any comment on whether the proposed change measures up to your standards? --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:57, 15 June 2011 (UTC)
      • Indeed it's solid, high quality information. But, being a strong integrationalist Wikipedian (see Wikipedia:INT) who wants as much elegant coordination as possible with heavy linking/cross-referencing, I still think it needs to connect with, and point back to, parent article(s). --NickDupree (talk) 17:53, 15 June 2011 (UTC)
        • Not sure I understand. The proposal is for adding to a section in the article, not to create another article. --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:46, 19 June 2011 (UTC)
  • OPPOSE: While user BoogaLouie's proposal to expand the section is a good proposal by itself, his proposed changes are anything but, as they're selective and POV. I think others voting "support" should also be careful not give a blank cheqe support to the content of BoogaLouie's expansion, without having studied the topic in details, and knowing all the angles to it. --Aliwiki (talk) 07:23, 18 June 2011 (UTC)
  • Oppose There is a new alternative point of view which wants to make an excuse and rationalize the coup , although the dominant point of view look at the process as anti democratic coup . Expansion and focusing on the legal bases of referendum is a way of finding a legal explanation for the military intervention . But what's the need of ordinary readers of Wikipedia ? Legal argument or an overall view of whole story ? I think if User BoogaLouie think the legal argument is necessary , he can write a separate article as an expansion . --Alborz Fallah (talk) 14:56, 23 June 2011 (UTC)
I don't think the suggestion to is to in some way paint the US as doing the right thing by the Iranians, or to prove the pro-Shah elements acted legitimately. But to give background as to why some elements in Iran went along with the coup though they might be in ignorance of external involvement. And also the "hooks" the perpetrators and anti-Mossadegh elements could use for their propaganda. If pre-coup events are given neutrally then the reader is informed. I think concernms are that if they are misrepresented the reader is deceived. GraemeLeggett (talk) 15:10, 23 June 2011 (UTC)
The criteria for wikipedia is not whether it makes someone/something look good or bad, but whether it gives the facts about the subject of the article. We can't declare that the "dominant point of view look at the process as anti democratic coup", and then judge additions and deletions to the article according to whether they follow that point of view. The proposed changes are all based on sources that are quite supportive of Mosaddeq and critical of the coup, BUT they all include information about the less-than-democratic 1953 referendum, that if not explicitly critical does not put Mosaddeq in the best light. Who are we to judge that the "ordinary readers of Wikipedia" don't need to know about it, since it might provide a "legal explanation for the military intervention"??? --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:03, 23 June 2011 (UTC)
I did not say the readers may not know about legal arguments , but I said they can read about it in an especial page . That means including the huge and professional legal aspects with pro - and anti- points of views may prolong the article in such a way that ordinary reader prefers not to read at all ! --Alborz Fallah (talk) 07:36, 26 June 2011 (UTC)
I personally wouldn't say that a detailed article on the legal aspect is necessary - unless it's been a well studied aspect of the coup? If there was such an article, and it was germane to the coup background, it would still need a brief summary as part of this article. (WP:Summary).GraemeLeggett (talk) 09:25, 26 June 2011 (UTC)
Why a special page? So we can bury the fact that the referendum didn't use secret ballot in a "the huge and professional legal aspects with pro - and anti- points of views" (which I've never found in any book on the coup). To mention the lack of secret ballot and the criticism of it, is not to judge referendum illegal, and certainly not to judge the coup legal! It is to mention the historical fact leading up the coup ... the kind of thing wikipedia is supposed to be about. --BoogaLouie (talk) 01:16, 13 July 2011 (UTC)
  • Oppose Per Alborz. --Khodabandeh14 (talk) 18:04, 24 June 2011 (UTC)
  • Oppose The events should remain factual and all efforts should be made to avoid making this article into an explanation for the guilty party. This is an encyclopedia not the North Korean history class. Trying to rationalize as per personal point of view only happens in dictatorships. --182.185.107.175 (talk) 05:55, 20 August 2011 (UTC)

"Democratically elected" delete and rvt

SINCE WHEN IS >>>>SOURCED<<<< EDITING VANDALISM??? READ THE CITED SOURCES! WHERE pray tell me DOES IT SAY THAT IRAN EVER (I SAY EVER) HAD A DEMOCRATICAL ELECTION OF ANY SORT OR SHAPE in HISTORY?? QUIT CONVERTING WIKIPEDIA INTO A TRASH BIN with YOUR SILLY AND INFANTILE PRANKS! KISSING EACH OTHER'S REAR ENDS DOESN*T MAKE POV less POV93.203.251.228 (talk) 19:37, 21 June 2011 (UTC)

(He's talking about his deletion here and its rvt here. --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:15, 22 June 2011 (UTC)
I saw no sourcing stating that the Prime Minister was NOT democratically elected. Indeed, any such source is false. But then, I've read the official US Government report on the subject. So, we'll keep with the REPORTED, DOCUMENT, ESTABLISHED FACTS.Wzrd1 (talk) 01:38, 26 June 2011 (UTC)
Because we found a source making a claim does not mean we shouldn't analyze that claim and if others temper it, use our own heads and come to a consensus about the truth. Parliamentary vote is a much more accurate description, perhaps an explanation offering that distinction is in order, since most people read into that as a popular vote being taken. If you are saying every claim in every US gov't report should stand as an unchallengable fact, I have this bridge in Brooklyn, want to make an investment?
I find it preposterous that the kind of people usually critical of US gov't actions, particularly in regards to CIA activities overseas, refuse to question a word of the doctored story on this event they arrived at long after the fact. (psst! ahem! they were as full of it as ever, after Bay of Pigs and JFK's death, they were in dire need of good PR, The Shah and Iran were a huge success of ours in the region in the 60's, and didn't care if it bit them years later when the embassy fell)
In the end, define Democratically Elected. What if the Shah only took a vote... of himself?Batvette (talk) 21:45, 7 August 2011 (UTC)
It's all relative. Those who say that Mosaddegh was democratically elected compare the event to other Iranian government processes, not to British or American elections. However, editors who prefer "democratically elected" in the article appear happy to have this description remain unexamined and unexplained to the mass of expected readers who primarily speak English; many of whom it is safe to assume comprehend the description as meaning "like our elections" when it is not so. Historians who say he was not democratically elected are the ones who focus on the specific processes, context and timing. Binksternet (talk) 23:06, 7 August 2011 (UTC)
Does it mean that parliamentary elections are not democratic? I was under impression that UK is a democracy. No? UK has a monarch as well as a parliament elected by people. The parliament happens to elect the prime minister. Much the same way was in Iran. Parliament was elected by the people and prime minister by the monarch. The prime minister wanted to keep the monarch in check, CIA and MI6 jumped in and removed the prime minister. It is the story in a nutshell. God. It hurts to read the truth but it hurts even more when people try to muddy the truth in order to feel better that they are not as guilty as they are. Grow up. This thing happened, and even a secretary of state and a president have referred to it. Infact the president of United States referred to the government of Mossadeq as democratic. I guess he can be a reliable source. So if the guilty party (US government) has overcome it so should the editors here: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j8-a9Bpq471PDjYA2z6WazPmIZqw --182.185.107.175 (talk) 05:48, 20 August 2011 (UTC)

NPOV

Uhh... what is this source "CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORY: OVERTHROW OF PREMIER MOSSADEQ OF IRAN,"? Where is it? Is it reliable? That's a very strong claim that it is sourcing.Volunteer Marek (talk) 07:30, 19 August 2011 (UTC)

At least a half dozen scholarly books could be used in place of that source; all supporting the strong statement. However, there are other books which dispute parts of the standard history, especially the degree of British and American involvement, and whether the CIA's TPAJAX was still in force on 19 August, after it fizzled a few days earlier. Binksternet (talk) 13:19, 19 August 2011 (UTC)
I am removing the unjustified NPOV tag. This article is a very well researched one and during its edit history has been tagged NPOV but later it was found the tag was not justified. Just because one does not like it personally does not mean it should be tagged.--182.185.107.175 (talk) 05:22, 20 August 2011 (UTC)

Latest proposed change

Hi everyone! I'm back again.

RfC on changes so far

In case anyone's interested here are the RfC on proposed changes to the article I've initiiated. None of the changes were made as no consensus was reached.

Iranian support for the coup

Here is yet another proposed change (first just for the talk page then I will make a RfC) taken from a while back that got no response at the time: --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:39, 18 October 2011 (UTC)

Currently the article has no mention of the motivation of Iranians who opposed Mosaddeq. [Actually it has little mention of Iranian who opposed Mosaddeq at all except to say they were bribed by the CIA and included mobsters, "prostitutes and thugs."] I found this (below) in a book about "the quest for democracy in Iran" since the 1906 constitution, and thought it might be summarized and added.

"The opposition to Mosaddeq, led by the Shah, conservative politicians such as prime ministers Ahmad Qavam and General Ali Razamara .... and commanders of the military, most notably General Fazlollah Zahedi (d.1963), also believed that the British position was unjust and illegal. However, they thought that Mosaddeq's idealism had led to a Don Quixote foreign policy. ..."

"Regardless of the merits of Iran's position, it was unrealistic that the country would be able to win its case; in `charging the windmill,` Iran was more likely to jeopardize its national interests. Only five years after the Soviet attempt to separate Azerbaijan and Kurdistan from Iran, the monarchy and its allies believed that Iran's interests lay in close ties with the West to ward off the Soviet threat. Where as Mosaddeq saw Britain as the foreign devil, they saw Britain and its imperialism as the lesser evil. ..." (p.53, Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty, By Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Oxford University Press, 2006. --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:34, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

....

Proposed subsection

Iranian coup supporters

Iranian opponents of Mosaddeq have been described as including "religious leaders and preachers and their followers, as well as landlords and provincial magnates";[12] "conservative politicians such as prime ministers Ahmad Qavam and General Ali Razmara .... and commanders of the military, most notably General Fazlollah Zahedi ... led by the Shah."[13] They have been described as forces that would "have been crippled without substantial British and later U.S. support," [14] while authors Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr say "it would be mistaken to view the coup as entirely a foreign instigation with no support" in Iran.[15]

Observers differ on the opponents motivation for supporting the coup. Mark J. Gasiorowski describes them as "very ambitious and opportunistic."[16] Another author calls Mosaddeq's Iranian opponents elites "determined to retrieve their endangered interests and influence, and unconcerned with the lasting damage to Iranian patriotic sensibilities and democratic aspirations."[17] Money was involved with the US CIA paying out $150,000 after March 1953 to "journalists, editors, preachers, and opinion members", giving Zahedi $135,000 to "win additional friends", and paying members of the majlis $11,000 a week.[18]

Other authors (Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr) describe the opponents as agreeing with Mosaddeq that the "British position was unjust and illegal," but believing that after the 1946 attempt by the Soviets to separate Azerbaijan and Kurdistan from Iran, "Iran's interests lay in close ties with the West to ward off the Soviet threat."[13]

Footnotes

  1. ^ All the Shah's Men p. 136–37 2008 edition ISBN 978-0-470-18549-0
  2. ^ Abrahamian, Iran between 2 Revolutions, 1982, (p.274)
  3. ^ All the Shah's Men p. 136–37 2008 edition ISBN 978-0-470-18549-0
  4. ^ Abrahamian p.270
  5. ^ Mackey p.187-210
  6. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.273
  7. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.272
  8. ^ Abrahamian p.273
  9. ^ Abrahamian, Iran between 2 Revolutions, 1982, (p.274)
  10. ^ Abrahamian, Iran between 2 Revolutions, 1982, (p.274)
  11. ^ New York Times, July 28, 1953, p.6, "Mossadegh Voids Secret Balloting : Decrees `Yes` and `No` Booths for Iranian Plebiscite on Dissolution of Majlis" by Kennett Love
  12. ^ Gasiorowski, Mosaddeq, (chapter by Katouzian) p.20
  13. ^ a b (p.53, Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty, By Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Oxford University Press, 2006
  14. ^ Azimi, in Gasiorowski, Mosaddeq, p.29
  15. ^ Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty, By Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.54
  16. ^ Gasiorowski in Gasiorowski, Mosaddeq, p.243-4
  17. ^ Fakhreddin Azimi in Gasiorowski, Mosaddeq, p.89
  18. ^ Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq By Stephen Kinzer, Macmillan, 2007, p.123

--BoogaLouie (talk) 16:16, 18 October 2011 (UTC)

Responses

Comment : About the religious leaders and preachers , I know that a group of them were Mossadegh's supporters like Ayatollah Milani , and some of them were among his opponents like Kashani and the Navvab Safavi. Kashani's opposition was because he wanted to insert some his supporters as ministers in the cabinet of Dr.Mossadegh but he did not agreed, But Navab-e Safavi was a fanatic hardliner.Other religious persons were preachers like Sheikh Mohammad Taqi Falsafi (his page in Persian Wikipedia) , who was a professional preacher without political perspective.

I think a very important group that is missing in the proposed paragraph are the leftist opponents of the Dr Mossadegh . Tudeh Party of Iran and it's military network was perhaps the most powerful opponents of Dr.Mossadegh. Their silence was equal to coupe success .

Another important group has been the former supporters of Dr.Mossadegh that after his gaining of power had not the positions that they want in the Mossadegh's government like Mozzafar Baghai , Hussein Makki and Haerizadeh . Mozafar Baghaii was a very important and strange figure in the coup (and Islamic revolution) and his group with Zahedi killed the General Mahmoud Afshartous , head of the Iranian police force (Please look at assassination of the Mossadegh's head of police force during the coup ) --Alborz Fallah (talk) 09:50, 19 October 2011 (UTC)

Would you like me to try and dig up information on these individuals from English language sources and add it to the proposed subsection? I agree the subsection could be much longer. I do have to disagree with some of what you say about the Tudeh. They opposed him in true communist style before Siyeh-i Tir, but afterward supported him. From everything I've read their lack of presence in the street during the 19 August 1953 (28 Mordad) was not calculated to undermine him but a strategic error. They were simply unaware of the mobilization to overthrow Mossadegh. --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:00, 19 October 2011 (UTC)
If we reach the consensus to add the subsection , I think we can add that groups. About the reasons of Tudeh party , anyway the soviets were not ever glad about nationalist groups at all as after the coup , the soviets give back the Iranian gold ( 20 tons looted from Iran during the time of WWII ) to Zahedi , but they did not give it to Dr.Mossadegh . Another point is about the group that was called "Tudeh-Nafti" (Oil-Tudeh) , who were British agents among Tudeh party and opposed Mossadegh from the Tudeh point of view . It has been said that Kianori , former head of the Tudeh party , was among the Tudeh-Nafti's . --Alborz Fallah (talk) 15:57, 19 October 2011 (UTC)
I was thinking it would save a step to add it now because we won't have to work for another consensus after we have added it. But the question is distinguishing between opponents of Mosaddeq and participants in the overthrow. On the subject of the Tudeh, Do you think you can find an English language WP:RS that states they failed to mobilize on behalf of Mosaddeq due to their opposition to him? There are many problems with this claim. Do you agree that the Tudeh were strongly in favor of oil nationalization? and that they suffered terribly as a result of the coup - far worse than Moseddeq's National Front?
More importantly, there seems to be some question about the "fake" Tudeh demonstrators Kermit Roosevelt claims to have launched. Specifically, the Tudeh denies their existence. i.e. they say the anti-shah activities were real Tudeh not "fake" or "black" mobs. (from Iran and The CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited by Darioush Bayandor: )
"Tudeh leader, Noreddin Kianouri, is edifying. [42] For whatever it is worth, Kianouri flatly denies the existence of fake Tudeh crowds or infiltration by foreign agents in their midst. Reacting to an article by Professor Mark Gasiorowski in the International Journal of the Middle East Studies in 1987, Kianouri addressed the key questions ...

`After the failure of the 15 August [TPAJAX] coup and the Shah's flight the party leadership adopted the slogan of "Democratic Republic" and instructed the party members to celebrate this victory [the Shah's departure] in a militant fashion through widespread street demonstrations` [emphasis added] .... `Not only did we not sense the slightest trace of fake Tudeh in our demonstrations or have any report to that effect but, on the contrary, we learned of the presence of anti-Tudeh groups like Zahmatkeshan, the Pan-Iranists and Sumka which under the protection and with the help of the security forces physically assaulted the Tudeh cadres as reported by Kayhan.` [43]

"Clearly, if the dismantling of the Pahlavi statues in the main squares of Tehran" [and other acts] "attributed to the CIA Iranian agents had not been by the leadership, a modicum of suspicion would have been aroused, given the iron-clad discipline for which the Tudeh cadres and its leadership were known.” p.129 [44]
IOWs, I can't support including Tudeh in a sub-section called Iranian coup supporters --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:45, 19 October 2011 (UTC)
The official (and well expressed) position of Tudeh party was opposition to nationalization of Iranian oil industry . They officially wanted to nationalize south (English) Iranian oil but in north of Iran , giving a similar position to Soviets . For Tudeh nafties , there are many biographies and diaries from the former Tudei's expressing their idea against Kianori , but I don't know if there is English sources to show that --Alborz Fallah (talk) 18:25, 19 October 2011 (UTC)
Yes it opposed the nationalization of the Soviet owned oil fields, but how does that enter into the story of the coup? In all the books I've read on the coup and Iranian history at that time I've never read any mention of what happened in the northern oil fields. It's all in the south. There were strikes in the southern oil fields, a committee sent by the majlis to Khuzestan to take over the oil installations, sanctions against Iran by the UK, withdrawl of AIOC staff by UK from Khuzestan, .... If the Soviets did anything in their oil fields during that time it doesn't seem to have made the (English language) history books.
Nothing would surprise me less than former Tudei's expressing their idea against Kianouri! Look at what happened to the Tudeh after the coup! But in a party based on "Democratic centralism" discipline, the idea that members would be disobeying the leader! .... you'll need English language WP:RS clear proof. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:50, 19 October 2011 (UTC)
Political positions regarding North Iran are largely irrelevant to the coup. The Tudeh, just like almost everybody in Iran, supported Mosaddegh's Anglo-Iran nationalisation because it booted out the hated British. Binksternet (talk) 23:17, 19 October 2011 (UTC)
If we are going to dedicate a section to "Iranian coup supporters"; Tudeh party is an important side and it did not supported Mossadegh . Sure it did not actively participated in coup in the side of monarchists , but it silence during the coup and active confrontation with Mossadegh had a very important effect.--Alborz Fallah (talk) 18:11, 21 October 2011 (UTC)
Why was it not active? Here is what the one scholarly English language book (Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004) on the coup says: "... ambassador Henderson, who suddenly returned to Iran on August 17, told Mosaddeq on August 18 that the mobs had been assaulting American and said the would recommend that all Americans leave Iran if the security forces could not provide better protection. In a fateful decision Mosaddeq then telephoned the chief of police and ordered him to break up the mobs. The security forces, which had been confined to their barracks on the morning of August 17, attacked the `Tudeh` mobs in a `frenzy.` ... many of them joined the crowds that brought down Mosaddeq. Mosaddeq also told National Front leaders not to hold demonstrations ... [his] supporters therefore were not in the streets on August 19." (Gasiorowski, p.253)
"Finally, when the security forces attacked the Tudeh mobs, the Tudeh leadership ordered its cadres to withdraw. Tudeh forces there fore also were not in the streets on August 19." (Gasiorowski, p.253)--BoogaLouie (talk) 01:19, 26 October 2011 (UTC)
I myself think that is the exact thing that happened . But some contemporary political Iranian groups that are highly supporting Dr.Mossadegh think the Tudeh party did that by order of Moscow . They also mention the 20 tons of Iranian gold , that USSR gave them to Zahedi , but never give them to Dr.Mossadegh . At least I think the section can cover and report both points of views . Maybe giving more credit to the idea of Tudeh miscalculation is more reasonable , because it has better sources. --Alborz Fallah (talk) 08:15, 26 October 2011 (UTC)
If you have english language WP:RS saying so I'm sure no one will object to a short mention of it. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:14, 27 October 2011 (UTC)

Contradiction regarding Hossein Fatemi

This article: "... Hossein Fatemi, was executed by order of the Shah's military court. The order was carried out by firing squad on 29 October 1953."

However, in the Hossein Fatemi article: "Died November 10, 1954"

--Mewaqua (talk) 14:29, 23 November 2011 (UTC)

from Historical New York Times: EX-FOREIGN CHIEF OF IRAN EXECUTED: Hossein Fatemi, Found Guilty of Plotting Against Shah, Is Shot by Firing Squad Special to The New York Times.. [New York, N.Y] 11 Nov 1954
TEHERAN, Iran, Nov. 10 -- Dr. Hossein Fatemi, Foreign Minister under former Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, was shot at 6 A. M. today by an army firing squad. He had been convicted by a court-martial of rebellion against the monarchy in the days immediately before Dr. Mossadegh was overthrown by the Royalists. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:34, 1 December 2011 (UTC)

"Iranian support for the coup" RfC coming up

Since there was comment by only one editor on this issue I will make a Request for Comment Saturday 12-3 inshallah on the issue. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:55, 1 December 2011 (UTC)

Edits of November 12

November 12 my tag was reverted by Kurdo with the edit summary "if you removed the sources you claim do not support the citations, then why are you still adding this tag?" (i.e. ignoring my explanation above) and restoring the totally bogus cite (Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (John Wiley & Sons, 2003), p.166) which (as explained above) says not a word about Mosaddegh government being democratically elected, or that the intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom and the United States overthrew it. BoogaLouie (talk)

Sadly the problem with this article is that a lot of sources seem to be fake and not saying what they are supposed to be saying. This article is heavily biased. See my comment below. --Tondar1 (talk) 17:52, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

Adding subsection about Iranian support for the 1953 coup

Currently the 1953 coup in Iran article about the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddeq has no mention of the motivation of Iranians who opposed Mosaddeq. [Actually it has little mention of Iranians who opposed Mosaddeq at all except to say they were bribed by the CIA and included mobsters, "prostitutes and thugs."] Who were these Iranians and why did they oppose Mosaddeq? I found this (below) in a book about "the quest for democracy in Iran" since the 1906 constitution, and thought it might be summarized and added.

"The opposition to Mosaddeq, led by the Shah, conservative politicians such as prime ministers Ahmad Qavam and General Ali Razamara .... and commanders of the military, most notably General Fazlollah Zahedi (d.1963), also believed that the British position was unjust and illegal. However, they thought that Mosaddeq's idealism had led to a Don Quixote foreign policy. ..."

"Regardless of the merits of Iran's position, it was unrealistic that the country would be able to win its case; in `charging the windmill,` Iran was more likely to jeopardize its national interests. Only five years after the Soviet attempt to separate Azerbaijan and Kurdistan from Iran, the monarchy and its allies believed that Iran's interests lay in close ties with the West to ward off the Soviet threat. Where as Mosaddeq saw Britain as the foreign devil, they saw Britain and its imperialism as the lesser evil. ..." (p.53, Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty, By Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Oxford University Press, 2006.

--BoogaLouie (talk) 20:29, 3 December 2011 (UTC)


Proposed subsection

Iranian coup supporters

Iranian opponents of Mosaddeq have been described as including "religious leaders and preachers and their followers, as well as landlords and provincial magnates";[1] "conservative politicians such as prime ministers Ahmad Qavam and General Ali Razmara .... and commanders of the military, most notably General Fazlollah Zahedi ... led by the Shah."[2] They have been described as forces that would "have been crippled without substantial British and later U.S. support," [3] while authors Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr say "it would be mistaken to view the coup as entirely a foreign instigation with no support" in Iran.[4]

Observers differ on the opponents motivation for supporting the coup. Mark J. Gasiorowski describes them as "very ambitious and opportunistic."[5] Another author calls Mosaddeq's Iranian opponents elites "determined to retrieve their endangered interests and influence, and unconcerned with the lasting damage to Iranian patriotic sensibilities and democratic aspirations."[6] Money was involved with the US CIA paying out $150,000 after March 1953 to "journalists, editors, preachers, and opinion members", giving Zahedi $135,000 to "win additional friends", and paying members of the majlis $11,000 a week.[7]

Other authors (Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr) describe the opponents as agreeing with Mosaddeq that the "British position was unjust and illegal," but believing that after the 1946 attempt by the Soviets to separate Azerbaijan and Kurdistan from Iran, "Iran's interests lay in close ties with the West to ward off the Soviet threat."[2] --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:34, 3 December 2011 (UTC)

Footnotes

  1. ^ Gasiorowski, Mosaddeq, (chapter by Katouzian) p.20
  2. ^ a b (p.53, Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty, By Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Oxford University Press, 2006
  3. ^ Fakhreddin Azimi, in Mark Gasiorowski, Mosaddeq, p.29
  4. ^ Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty, By Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.54
  5. ^ Gasiorowski in Gasiorowski, Mosaddeq, p.243-4
  6. ^ Fakhreddin Azimi in Gasiorowski, Mosaddeq, p.89
  7. ^ Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq By Stephen Kinzer, Macmillan, 2007, p.123

Comments

  • Actually the article currently dismisses Iranian opposition/coup supporters as Nazis, Nazis, hard-core Nazis, mobsters, prostitutes and thugs. Yeah, a little balance is needed here. LoveUxoxo (talk) 22:55, 3 December 2011 (UTC)
    [moved this comment from above to put in comment section]
I agree completely with the comments of Rich and Noleander below. LoveUxoxo (talk) 01:04, 6 December 2011 (UTC)
  • There should be such a section, I think, and really the position of all major groups is worth documenting, as those that chose to stand to one side also had an effect on the outcome. Ideally these should be woven through the article, but as it stands a new section would be an substantial improvement over glossing the concepts completely. I do also note that the chronological flow of the article breaks up at the end of the post-war section and the beginning of the 1950s section. Rich Farmbrough, 22:02, 3 December 2011 (UTC).
  • Question: I'm not familiar with the subject, so regarding Gheissari and Nasr, how controversial are they? As far as random, anonymous "reviews" on teh internetz go, I thought this was quite interesting regarding the source material: LoveUxoxo (talk) 22:16, 3 December 2011 (UTC)

Must be read with a grain of salt, as it's written by two "democracy means the rise of the middle class" political scientists who cite Huntington and Fukuyama without irony. With that said, I have found no more comprehensive treatment of Iranian political economy over the course of the 20th century. Unfortunately, this is what Dabashi's new book should've been, minus Gheissari & Nasr's repugnant politics.[1]

  • Reply: Here are some reviews, or abstracts of reviews: (no mention of "repugnant politics" I could find.)
    • In the first instance, the authors identify both the heavy-handed developmentalist ideology of Reza Shah and his son, forever placing "order and progress" before any decentralization of power, and also the impact of Left thought on the Islamic and secular opposition to the Pahlavi monarchy, as sidetracking the intellectual milieu of two generations of Iranians away from democratic principles.
      review of Democracy in Iran by Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr. from Harris, Kevan. The Middle East Journal 64. 4 (Autumn 2010): 660-662.
    • This book treats the last century of Iranian history, organized around the theme of how the country "has responded to the challenge of balancing state-building with democracy-building." The point of departure is the era that brought into being the 1906 constitution and ended five years later with the Russian occupation and the reversal of reforms. This period of promise followed by setback serves to illustrate that Iran has long wrestled with issues of representation and constitutionalism, and it continues to do so today. At the same time, Iran has been caught up in the task of putting in place a modern and strong state. There were many more ups and downs in that search for a balance between strength and democracy through the time of the Pahlavis, ending in 1979, and thereafter during the Islamic Republic. This thematic framework for making sense of the complex interplay of rulers and ruled, ideologies and material interests, provides a perceptive interpretation of Iran's past century.
      review of Democracy in Iran by Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr. from Brown, L. Foreign Affairs, 86. 2 (Mar/Apr 2007): 178.
    • Iran's march toward building a democratic system is at least a century old. In fact, the country's constitutional revolution of 1906 represented the first modern efforts by the Iranian people to build a democratic society and hold leaders accountable for their actions. Although the goal of establishing democracy in Iran has yet to be achieved, political developments in the country have led to the creation of a complex set of social forces that may indeed turn the Iranian people's quest for liberty into reality. In this sophisticated yet accessible volume, two scholars of Iranian origin, Gheissari (history & political science. Univ. of San Diego; Iranian Intellectuals in the Twentieth Century) and Nasr (Middle East politics. Naval Postgraduate Sch.; The Shut Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future), trace the trials and tribulations of state building and democratization in Iran over the past century. Utilizing both Western and Persian-language sources, the authors place contemporary Iranian politics within a historical framework. The book's first part covers the period between 1906 and 1979, while the second part concentrates on the post-1979 period and the era of the Islamic Republic. The authors' explanations of elections as a vehicle for the distribution of power in Iranian politics and the continuing tension between state building and democratization are especially informative. Highly recommended for academic and especially public libraries.
      review of Democracy in Iran by Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr. from: Nadir Entossar, Sprint Hill Coll, Mobile, Al in Library Journal, 131. 11 (Jun 15, 2006): 87.

-- BoogaLouie (talk) 20:56, 4 December 2011 (UTC)

  • Yes, include motives - Yes, by all means the article should discuss the motives and goals of the opponents. I'm not much of an expert in Iran, so I cannot comment on the adequacy of the specific sources named above. Naturally, WP:NPOV requires that the motives be described in a balanced way, so make sure that sources from a variety of biases/viewpoints are incorporated. Also, consider identifying the source(s) in the article prose if the sources may be biased (see WP:ATTRIBUTEPOV). --Noleander (talk) 19:48, 5 December 2011 (UTC)
    • Comment. Why don't I throw in an excerpt from one of the books I've cited (Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty, Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr) to preempt the question of whether that source is too pro-Shah: "Economic development in Iran in the 1960s was largely based on Import Substitution Industrialization. ... it also resulted in political and economic challenges in the long run.... uneven development, rapid urbanization, and income inequality. ... bias in the ruling regime in favor of urbanization and industrialization, which prevented it from building a support base among the peasantry that had benefited from land reform ... " (p.62)
  • The article absolutely should include information about the Iranians who supported the Shah. They were not minor characters, or low numbers. Their various motivations are relevant material for this article. Binksternet (talk) 02:29, 6 December 2011 (UTC)
  • Opposed. The need for such sub-section is a matter of debate, which I'm open to. But the proposed changes, as they are, appear to be yet more WP:Cherry-picked quotes by BoogaLouie, to advance a certain POV that he strongly believes in, that would clearly violate WP:UNDUE. Kurdo777 (talk) 05:22, 8 December 2011 (UTC)
    • What do you mean? What are the cherry-picked quotes? What is the POV being advanced? What is UNDUE? Binksternet (talk) 05:40, 8 December 2011 (UTC)
    • Kurdo if the proposed changes are cherry picked, where are the non-cherrypicked quotes that prove that the changes "clearly violate WP:UNDUE"?? I've asked you this over and over to no reply. --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:21, 12 December 2011 (UTC)
  • Comment. Dear BoogaLouie. Improving article from different aspect is good. But I see a small problem in your proposal. The sources you mentioned are talking about Opposition to Musaddiq while I see your proposal presenting something else in the name of Iranian supporter of the coup; In my opinion, presenting sources' contents identical to their authors opinions and ideas is an important point missed in your suggestion. --Aliwiki (talk) 16:08, 12 December 2011 (UTC)
    • Not sure what you mean by "presenting sources' contents identical to their authors opinions and ideas is an important point missed in your suggestion", but if you mean that when the authors of the source (Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr) talk about opposing Mossadegh they don't necessarily mean they supported the coup, that's not true. The discussion of the opposition was in the context of the coup: Although the American CIA and the British MI6 were instrumental in the success of the coup, it would be mistaken to view the coup as entirely a foreign instigation with no support -- albeit tacit -- among various social and political groups in Iran. In many regards, the Iranian military was more important to the coup than was the monarchy.(from Democracy in Iran)
  • Comment. Perhaps the proposed text could be modified somewhat; I think that the long quotes aren't necessary, and that some of these statements and positions can be paraphrased in the interest of encyclopedic style. All that said, I think the text is quite important. It is no surprise that any coup, or this in particular, made use of and involved social and political divisions within Iran, even when we accept that the coup was planned, supported, and largely executed by foreign intelligence agencies. Documenting those layers of Iranian society who supported the Shah is important from the perspective of Wikipedia's encyclopedic project, and gives support neither to the coup, nor to those who opposed or oppose it. If this section is not created, I think that it would be worthwhile to incorporate the text into the article. -Darouet (talk) 04:53, 26 December 2011 (UTC)
    • I should note that BoogaLouie's proposal has no obvious political orientation, as far as I can tell, beyond describing a historical phenomenon. -Darouet (talk) 04:56, 26 December 2011 (UTC)
  • Weak Oppose . As I said before, current highlighting of a group among religious leaders and some nationalist's like Nasr , as the Iranian supporters of the coup , gives weight to a relatively unimportant section compared to very powerful forces like Tudeh party and other pro-Soviet groups that at least indirectly supported the coup.If the balance between forces is correctly mentioned in the section , I think the subsection would be of use in the article .--Alborz Fallah (talk) 09:06, 28 December 2011 (UTC)
Thanks for link to the previous discussion. It seems from that discussion, and this one, that consensus would entail describing the Tudeh Party's failure to mobilize against the coup, along with including BoogaLouie's material. -Darouet (talk) 20:47, 29 December 2011 (UTC)
  • Yes and this should be obvious. I've always posited that the story as told by some that Mossadegh had virtually unanimous support and his pro-Shah oppositions' motivation was being purchased for a pittance by CIA handled US dollars is really an insult to the Iranian people, portraying them as a nation who would see a treasonous minority upset the majority through cheap treachery. It's not balanced viewpioint and borders on the absurd. I understand Mossadegh himself later conceded it was his own disastrous policies that led to his downfall, surely as they unfolded the people would have been upset that they weren't going as well as they'd hoped. Batvette (talk) 02:04, 2 January 2012 (UTC)
Just to be clear, the proposed edits are neither blaming Mossadegh's policies nor justifying his overthrow; they are merely pointing out that certain sections of Iranian society, which was large and complex, supported the coup. This always happens when there's a coup, for better or worse. -Darouet (talk) 23:49, 5 January 2012 (UTC)
Fair enough, but to clarify my comment was not so much to blame Mossadegh as offer there would have been sound rationale for Iranians to oppose him, if it were seen that his policies were not the success story they believed they'd be. Batvette (talk) 00:57, 17 January 2012 (UTC)

Adding subsection about "Long-term Effects"

I'm proposing adding subsection about the "Long-term Effects" of the coup. Most historians and scholars who discuss the coup, also debate the long-term effects of the coup on Iranian civil life, Shah's militarization and radicalization of the Iranian society which led to the 1979 revolution, Shah's human rights abuses, the long-term effects on Iranians' push for democracy, as well as the unintended consequences for America in the region. This video sumps it all up. I propose a sub-section discussing those details. Kurdo777 (talk) 05:56, 8 December 2011 (UTC)

Proposed subsection

Long-term Effects

RfC Comments

  • Comments - Sure, that sounds like a good idea. It is common in articles on major events to have sections on "aftermath" or "impact" or "legacy" or "consequences" etc. For example, see the section 9/11_attacks#Long-term_effects. The key requirement, of course, is that you utilize WP:Reliable sources which specifically discuss the "long term effects". I suspect (though I'm no expert in the Middle East) that the long term effects include things like (a) impact to internal politics within Iran; (b) impact to relationships with other Middle Eastern countries; and (c) impact to relationship between US and Iran. If the effect/impact is in any way controversial, be sure to take extra efforts to keep it neutral, as required by the WP:NPOV policy. After you finish the draft text for the section (it looks like you will be doing so, above), notify me and I'll review it, if you want. --Noleander (talk) 21:17, 8 December 2011 (UTC)
Again agree with Noleander's comment above, maybe even more strongly: this section is critical. "Legacy" maybe the best title(?), and my American bias has (c) above as aspect I am most interested in - Americans know almost nothing of this (although Obama did directly acknowledge American involvement in the coup a few years back IIRC). However the current state of the article ensures that no American will learn more about these events from Wikipedia, because the article is totally unreadable. Don't let the page view stats fool you: as soon as any given reader sees that morbidly obese Lede and then an extended novella on background THEY TUNE OUT. LoveUxoxo (talk) 01:09, 10 December 2011 (UTC)
  • Comment I still suggest the article be restricted to the direct topic of the article. (see Archive 14, Archive 13, etc.) If we recognize the bloating of the lede, and the all-encompassing nature of accusations, it is clear the current article is non-utile. If one wishes articles coviring the "legacy" then by all means start such an article - bloating this one like a Macy's balloon does not help. My original proposal for the lede in April is at [2]. Note that it removed absolutely no content from the article. Collect (talk) 12:56, 10 December 2011 (UTC)
@Collect: The WP guidelines on sub-topic articles are WP:CONTENT FORK and WP:SUMMARY STYLE. The say that the top-level article is created first, and then - when it gets too large - the sub-topics are split out as new articles. They also suggest that a section remain in the top-level article after sub-topics are split out. So for this article we should (1) add Legacy section to this article; (2) when this article gets too large, create the Legacy article (but keep a Legacy section in this article). The size of this article is 42 kb (readable prose), which is in the mid range of the acceptable sizes posited by WP:ARTICLESIZE. It is not until 100 kb that an article must be split. --Noleander (talk) 13:29, 10 December 2011 (UTC)
  • Comment. Of course the article should discuss the aftereffects of the coup, which are many and varied. Binksternet (talk) 15:51, 10 December 2011 (UTC)
  • Support The article should cover all aspects of the coup. Darkness Shines (talk) 21:20, 11 December 2011 (UTC)
  • Support from high quality, ie: scholarly sources, that specifically cover the coup as their main object of inquiry, similarly journal articles titled along the lines, "Long term consequences of the 1953 coup" etc. Don't write it out of poor quality sources, and follow Collect's advice regarding splitting out areas that could be "over" covered into main articles of their own. Fifelfoo (talk) 21:38, 11 December 2011 (UTC)
  • Comment. The "Aftermath" section already contains Long-term as well as short term effects but they're not in chronological order. The problem is the article is (as LoveUxoxo says) totally unreadable and a total mess. Look at the Blowback sub-section. It comes before the Iran sub-section in the Aftermath section, but “Blowback” refers to the 1979 revolution (a long term effect), so chronologically it should come after almost everything in the Iran sub-section which talks about what happened before the 1979 revolution, ... except the last paragraph which duplicates Blowback! But the "Aftermath" section is just one of the sections that need a total overhaul.
    (I also agree with Noleander and disagree with Collect about restricting the article to the direct topic of the coup.)--BoogaLouie (talk) 17:46, 12 December 2011 (UTC)
  • Support--Alborz Fallah (talk) 12:54, 24 December 2011 (UTC)
  • Oppose: the already existent section Aftermath serves the purpose. I would also suggest to move the details of the influence on each event to the respective articles, leaving only the most general notes here. — Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 14:35, 1 January 2012 (UTC)
  • Comment I don't see a problem with the addition of the section but fear it will only open a hornet's nest of POV agenda pushing. Whose POV will prevail, will we focus on the human rights violations of the Shah's secret police and ignore the fact that during that era Iran saw cultural and societal freedoms unheard of in any other middle east nation? Will it portray its alliance with the United States as all negative and ignore all the Iranians educated here and forget such cultural exchanges are always beneficial to humanity? Will it become a speculative fantasy of portraying what could have been with an image of Iran developing into a model of perfect democracy under Mossadegh and ignore that the repercussions they were to experience through the precedent of seizing investments by outsiders would have stifled the economic development of many similar nations for decades to come? I'm not so sure the most relevant content of the section shouldn't be what ill effects your people will suffer when you are given the opportunity to blame all the problems of your faulty political system on the relatively minor influence of outsiders. The temptation to play victim rather than face accountability for ones own faults is strong in humans, unfortunately it only holds them down and retards their own personal achievements. Batvette (talk) 02:19, 2 January 2012 (UTC)
    • Good points. Two expert Iranian observers, Darioush Bayandor and Abbas Milani, have each written that Iranians have a higher tendency to blame foreigners, even after internal Iran-based fault or guilt is proven. Binksternet (talk) 03:50, 2 January 2012 (UTC)

Proposed cleanup of duplication, contradiction and bad chronology

(As usual) No consensus was reached on the last RfC, so for the last of my planned proposed changes I have tried to do some cleanup. The article has a lot of text that duplicates itself, some that contradicts itself and events that aren’t in chronological order. Below are examples and proposed changes to fix the problem. I've tried to incorporate Kurdo's complaint above.

Why this huge long exposition on all the sloppiness and terrible writing of the article instead of just cleaning up? Because the fight to give it the right political slant has totally overshadowed making a good, NPOV, balanced article, and paralyzed the process, as exampled here in the revert of a totally innocuous edit by myself. --BoogaLouie (talk) 01:04, 18 January 2012 (UTC)

change in format

At the suggestion of editor Dmitrij D. Czarkoff I've temporarily crossed out all but the first suggestion. After we are done with Post-coup management of Iran Oil Company, we can go on to the second suggestion (Eisenhower and the coup) and work down from there. --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:25, 23 January 2012 (UTC)


On the subject of:

Post-coup management of Iran Oil Company

(In Post World War II section you will find)

The U.S. State Department not only rejected Britain's demand that it continue to be the primary beneficiary of Iranian oil reserves but "U.S. international oil interests were among the beneficiaries of the concessionary arrangements that followed nationalization."

i.e. we were talking about what happened after the coup, long (13 paragraphs) before the section (Execution of Operation Ajax) about the coup itself, and 40 pages before section on what happened after the coup. (Note: the sentence doesn't say the concessionary arrangements were planned before the coup, and in fact they weren't.)

The "concessionary arrangements" are talked about in the Aftermath section here:

Shah agreed to replacing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with a consortium—British Petroleum and eight European and American oil companies; in result, oil revenues increased from $34 million in 1954–1955 to $181 million in 1956–1957, and continued increasing,[113] and the United States sent development aid and advisors.

Solution: move text to appropriate section

Proposed text to be in Aftermath section. (changed text in italics):

U.S. and European international oil companies were among the beneficiaries of the concessionary arrangements that followed nationalization. The Shah agreed to replace the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company monopoly with a consortium of five American petroleum companies, Royal Dutch Shell, and the Compagnie Française des Pétroles, and AIOC (now British Petroleum). Oil revenues increased from $34 million in 1954–1955 to $181 million in 1956–1957, and continued increasing,[113] and the United States sent development aid and advisors.

(note: includes text moved from Execution of Operation Ajax)

Eisenhower and the coup

(Also in Post World War II section)

U.S. reluctance to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1951, when he was elected, faded 28 months later when Dwight D. Eisenhower was in the White House and John Foster Dulles took the helm at the State Department. "Anglo-American cooperation on that occasion brought down the Iranian prime minister and reinstated a U.S.-backed shah."[36]

This happened in the 1950s and should be in the 1950s section (separate from Post World War II section) which, in fact, ends with a sentence about the same issue:

However, in 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower became president, the UK convinced him to a joint coup d'état.[30]

Solution: move text to appropriate section

Iran's precoup economy

(In 1950s section you will find)

This …
the Royal Navy's blockading its export markets to pressure Iran to not nationalize its petroleum. The Iranian revenues were greater, because the profits went to Iran's national treasury rather than to private, foreign oil companies.

which contradicts this:
In mid-1952, Britain's boycott of Iranian oil was devastatingly effective. ... "Iranians were becoming poorer and unhappier by the day" and Mosaddegh's political coalition was fraying.

and this:
The British blockade of Iranian seaports meant that Iran was left without access to markets where it could sell its oil. The embargo had the effect of causing Iran to spiral into bankruptcy.

in addition the two non-contradicting statements should be together, not separated by this paragraph (which talks about events just before the coup) :

By mid-1953 a mass of resignations by Mossadegh's parliamentary supporters reduced parliament below its quorum. A referendum to dissolve parliament and give the prime minister power to make law was submitted to voters, and it passed with 99.9 percent approval, 2,043,300 votes to 1300 votes against.[45]

Solution: get rid of untrue The Iranian revenues were greater ... text and move the non-contradicting statements together

Coup itself

(in Execution of Operation Ajax section is written)
As a condition for restoring the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the U.S. required removal of the AIOC's monopoly; five American petroleum companies, Royal Dutch Shell, and the Compagnie Française des Pétroles, were to draw Iran's petroleum after the successful coup d'état—Operation Ajax.[citation needed]

Not true. According to Stephen Kinzer (no fan of the US policy in Iran or the US oil industry) the consortium was formed after the coup. This is a paraphrasing of what he says on pages 195-6 of All the Shah's Men (2003):

With the new pro-Western Prime Minister, Fazlollah Zahedi, Iranian oil began flowing again and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which later changed its name to British Petroleum, tried to return to its old position. However, "public opinion was so opposed that the new government could not permit it." Instead, an international consortium under the nationalised name (National Iranian Oil Company) was created, with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company holding 40% of the shares. The consortium agreed to share profits on a 50-50 basis with Iran, "but not to open its books to Iranian auditors or to allow Iranians onto its board of directors."[1]

(from Anglo-Persian Oil Company#Consortium)

Solution: move text to appropriate section i.e. the Aftermath section. (see proposed text above)

Mossadegh after the coup

(in Execution of Operation Ajax section)

Gen. Zahedi replaced the deposed Prime Minister Mosaddegh, who was arrested, tried, and originally sentenced to death.[50][51] Mosaddegh's sentence was commuted to three years' solitary confinement in a military prison, followed by house arrest until his death.[52]

This happened after the coup was over. Why isn’t this in the Aftermath section?

Solution: move it

CIA documents about the coup

(The coup and CIA records section)

This long (approx. two pages) section, ostensibly devoted to telling what "heavily redacted" CIA document said about the coup (its the only section of the article devoted to just one source), is

  1. little mini-article on the coup, rehashing and often duplicating the rest of the article
  2. is mostly NOT devoted to CIA documents. Of the 19 footnotes in the section only 3 cite sources from, or talking about, CIA “notes” or “documents” (note 59, 61 and 62). The rest are about the coup in general.
  • Some of the duplication:
    • “The coup was carried out by the U.S. administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower in a covert action advocated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and implemented under the supervision of his brother Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence”

(we already know from 1950 section: “However, in 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower became president, the UK convinced him to a joint coup d'état.[31]”
and from Post World War II: “U.S. reluctance to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1951, when he was elected, faded 28 months later when Dwight D. Eisenhower was in the White House and John Foster Dulles took the helm at the State Department. "Anglo-American cooperation on that occasion brought down the Iranian prime minister and reinstated a U.S.-backed shah."[36])

    • "CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., the grandson of former President Theodore Roosevelt, carried out the operation planned by CIA agent Donald Wilber. One version of the CIA history, written by Wilber, referred to the operation as TPAJAX.[61][62]"

(we already know from Execution of Operation Ajax: “Operation Ajax's formal leader was senior CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., while career agent Donald Wilber was the operational leader, planner, and executor of the deposition of PM Mosaddegh.")

    • "During the coup, Roosevelt and Wilber, representatives of the Eisenhower administration, bribed Iranian government officials, reporters, and businessmen. They also bribed street thugs to support the Shah and oppose Mosaddegh.[63] The deposed Iranian leader, Mosaddegh, was taken to jail and Iranian General Fazlollah Zahedi named himself prime minister in the new, pro-western government."

(again should be in Execution of Operation Ajax, aside from the fact it was the shah who named Zahedi PM)


  • Some examples of the nothing-to-do-with-CIA-records citations:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-How_to_Overthrow_A_Government_Pt._1-62 leads to Steven Kinzer,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#cite_note-59 leads to "p.15, "Targeting Iran", by David Barsamian, Noam Chomsky, Ervand Abrahamian, and Nahid Mozaffar"

  • Lack of WP:RS in section:

This paragraph:
"Iranian fascists and Nazis played prominent roles in the coup regime. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, who had been arrested and imprisoned by the British during World War II for his attempt to establish a pro-Nazi government, was made Prime Minister on 19 August 1953. The CIA gave Zahedi about $100,000 before the coup and an additional $5 million the day after the coup to help consolidate support for the coup. Bahram Shahrokh, a trainee of Joseph Goebbels and Berlin Radio's Persian-language program announcer during the Nazi rule, became director of propaganda. Mr. Sharif-Emami, who also had spent some time in jail for his pro-Nazi activities in the 1940s, assumed several positions after 1953 coup, including Secretary General of the Oil Industry, President of the Senate, and Prime Minister (twice).”
is word for word from a short article called "The Day Democracy Died:The 50th Anniversary of the CIA Coup in Iran [2003]" which takes you to a homemade website of Dr. Masoud Kazemzadeh, i.e. not peer-reviewed and while it has footnotes they don’t provide sources for most of the assertions.

Also from the above source is this sentence in the section: “Masoud Kazemzadeh, associate professor of political science at the Sam Houston State University, wrote that Pahlavi was directed by the CIA and MI6, and assisted by high-ranking Shia clerics.[68] He wrote that the coup employed mercenaries including "prostitutes and thugs" from Tehran's red light district.”
It’s a paraphrasing this sentence in the source (Masoud Kazemzadeh's homemade website):

“Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, under the direction of CIA and MI6, and with the help of high-ranking Shia clerics, [1] anti-democratic military officers, and paid mercenary mobs composed of prostitutes and thugs from Shahr-e Nou (Tehran's red light district) attacked our democratic government and replaced it with a brutal tyranny.”
(The footnote provides backing for connections between clergy and the coup and the shah, but says nothing about mercenaries, thugs, and the red light district.)

Then, in an entirely different section (Blowback), there’s a paragraph (actually two paragraphs) on the CIA report:

“On 16 June 2000, The New York Times published the secret CIA report, "Clandestine Service History, Overthrow Of Premier Mossadeq Of Iran, November 1952 – August 1953," partly explaining the coup from CIA agent Wilber's perspective. In a related story, The New York Times reporter James Risen penned a story revealing that Wilber's report, hidden for nearly five decades, had recently come to light.” … which doesn’t have much to do with blowback anyway.

After that is a long blockquote from historian Abrahamian on how sanitized the leaked CIA report is.

Solution: Why not just have a paragraph or two talking about the records and merge the rest of the section (what Eisenhower did, who Fazlollah Zahedi was, how much money the CIA gave Zahedi, etc) with the rest of the article?

  • Lack of relevance to the article or section

This blockquote:

"A historian who was a member of the C.I.A. staff in 1992 and 1993 said in an interview today that the records were obliterated by 'a culture of destruction' at the agency. The historian, Nick Cullather, said he believed that records on other major cold war covert operations had been burned, including those on secret missions in Indonesia in the 1950s and a successful C.I.A.-sponsored coup in Guyana in the early 1960s. 'Iran—there's nothing', Mr. Cullather said. 'Indonesia—very little. Guyana—that was burned.'"[73]

… seems fine for a wikipedia article on the CIA, but Guyana? Indonesia? What’s that got to do with the 1953 coup?

Solution: move to CIA article.

This blockquote:

"In early August, the C.I.A. stepped up the pressure. Iranian operatives pretending to be Communists threatened Muslim leaders with savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh, seeking to stir anti-Communist sentiment in the religious community. In addition, the secret history says, the house of at least one prominent Muslim was bombed by C.I.A. agents posing as Communists. It does not say whether anyone was hurt in this attack. The agency was also intensifying its propaganda campaign. A leading newspaper owner was granted a personal loan of about $45,000, in the belief that this would make his organ amenable to our purposes. But the shah remained intransigent. In an Aug. 1 meeting with General Norman Schwarzkopf, he refused to sign the C.I.A.-written decrees firing Mr. Mossadegh and appointing General Zahedi. He said he doubted that the army would support him in a showdown."

tells what happened before and during the coup. Why isn’t it in the US role section?

Solution: move it to US Role section

Motivation for the coup

(in U.S. motives section)

Section contains large chunks of verbage having nothing to do with why the US did what it did in the coup.

Example is this paragraph:

“Tirman points out that agricultural land owners were politically dominant in Iran, well into the 1960s and the monarch, Reza Pahlevi's aggressive land expropriation policies—to the benefit of himself and his supporters—resulted in the Iranian government being Iran's largest land owner. "The landlords and oil producers had new backing, moreover, as American interests were for the first time exerted in Iran. The Cold War was starting, and Soviet challenges were seen in every leftist movement. But the reformers were at root nationalists, not communists, and the issue that galvanized them above all others was the control of oil."[79]

Who’s Tirman? (This is the first and only time Tirman is mentioned in the article.) What do “aggressive land expropriation policies” have to do with why the US organized a coup? That the “reformers were at root nationalists, not communists, and the issue that galvanized them ... was the control of oil," was not disputed by the US administration or CIA.

In addition The paragraph interrupts two paragraphs that giving contrasting explanations for US involvement (by Ervand Abrahamian and Mark Gasiorowski) by scholars who’ve spent much time on the issue of the coup.

solution: delete it

Another example of text having little or nothing to do with the US motivation is:

“The two main winners of World War II who had been Allies during the war became superpowers and competitors as soon as the war ended, each with their own spheres of influence and client states. After the 1953 coup, Iran became one of the client states of the United States. In his earlier book, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran Gasiorowski identifies the client states of the United States and of the Soviet Union between 1954–1977. Gasiorowski identified Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Cambodia, Iran, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan as strong client states of the United States and identified those that were moderately important to the U.S. as Greece, Turkey, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay, Liberia, Zaire, Israel, Jordan, Tunisia, Pakistan and Thailand. He identified Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ethiopia and Japan as "weak" client states of the United States.[85]

“Gasiorowski identified Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Cuba, Mongolia and North Vietnam as "strong client states" of the Soviet Union, and he identified Guinea, Somalia, Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan and North Korea as moderately important client states. Mali and South Yemen were classified as weak client states of the Soviet Union.”

So what?

Solution: delete it.

What happened after the coup

(Blowback and Iran sub-sections of Aftermath )

The Blowback sub-section comes before the Iran sub-section in the Aftermath section. But “Blowback” refers to the 1979 revolution, so chronologically it should come after almost everything in the Iran sub-section which talks about what happened before the 1979 revolution,… except the last paragraph which duplicates Blowback:


Jacob G. Hornberger, founder and president, of The Future of Freedom Foundation, said, "U.S. officials, not surprisingly, considered the operation one of their greatest foreign policy successes—until, that is, the enormous convulsion that rocked Iranian society with the violent ouster of the Shah and the installation of a virulently anti-American Islamic regime in 1979".[115] According to him, "the coup, in essence, paved the way for the rise to power of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and all the rest that's happened right up to 9/11 and beyond".[115]

Distorted:

“In 2000, Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, said that intervention by the U.S. in the internal affairs of Iran was a setback for democratic government.[98][99] The coup d'état was "a critical event in post-war world history" that destroyed Iran's secular parliamentary democracy, by re-installing the monarchy of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as an authoritarian ruler.[“(source: BuzzFlash Reader Commentary http://www.buzzflash.com/contributors/03/08/25_shah.html WP:RS?)

Albright didn’t say anything about destroying Iran’s democracy but the quote is duplicated with what Albright actually said in the Internationally section:

“The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. ... But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.”

---BoogaLouie (talk) 01:04, 18 January 2012 (UTC)


Comments

  • support - Gee! What a great idea! --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:17, 19 January 2012 (UTC)
  • Shorten by 50% or more first. Too many flowery verbs and descriptions just for a start. Dulles "took the helm"? Nope - he became Secretary of State -- etc. Collect (talk) 22:37, 19 January 2012 (UTC)
    • Collect, your suggestion to shorten has been made before in these polls and received no support. Do you have any comment on the proposed changes? --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:08, 20 January 2012 (UTC)
      • You asked for a comment - I gave it. My comments therefore are that the changes do not shorten the article sufficiently. Excessive length does not make any article better at all. Collect (talk) 20:13, 20 January 2012 (UTC)
  • Comment: Some good suggestions there, some not-so-great ones. Which is why the editors should be commenting on the proposed cuts/deletions/changes in a case by case manner under each sub-section, as oppose to doing it in a "either or" and "take it or leave" fashion, which is what the proposal looks like. So I'd recommend creating a comment section under each sub-section above, to discuss the changes in an organized case-by-case manner. Kurdo777 (talk) 02:27, 20 January 2012 (UTC)
    • I think Wikipedia policy is that new comments should always come at the end of the talk page. I suppose I could have made thses suggestions one by one but they are primarily about good writing not so much content so I put them all together. Anyone is free to to make a comment saying "I like this but not that" about the changes. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:24, 20 January 2012 (UTC)
  • Comment: I would suggest incremental implementation with discussion. That is: implemented #1, discussed #1, (reverted #1 if disapproved), implemented #2. it takes more time, but is less trouble some. If we start discussing all the changes here, it will be an unintelligible mess soon. — Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 07:56, 20 January 2012 (UTC)
    • OK, I have crossed out all but the first suggestion. Any reply to the first suggestion? --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:27, 20 January 2012 (UTC)
      • I like it, though it needs to be properly merged to the target section. — Dmitrij D. Czarkoff (talk) 22:24, 20 January 2012 (UTC)
        • Wrote new text for target section. Now how do you like it? --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:25, 23 January 2012 (UTC)
  • Comment. "US international oil interests" gives undue emphasis on the "US" part since it is clear that the change was far more towards making the arrangements "international" that such wording implies. The main change was expanding from being primarily British to being multi-national with the US favouring multi-national companies. Any wording therefore should not emphasize the "US" part at all. Not to assert that the rest has no problems, but this is a big one. Collect (talk) 15:42, 23 January 2012 (UTC)
    • US oil companies were a big beneficiary but I have changed the text to accomodate Collect's complaint:
    • U.S. and European international oil companies were among the beneficiaries of the concessionary arrangements that followed nationalization. The Shah agreed to replace the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company monopoly with a consortium of five American petroleum companies, Royal Dutch Shell, and the Compagnie Française des Pétroles, and AIOC (now British Petroleum).

--BoogaLouie (talk) 19:38, 25 January 2012 (UTC)

  • Support I like the text. When it says "Oil revenues increased..." I am assuming that is the the total for all the oil companies listed previously. Regarding Collect's concern about emphasis on US vs. other European companies, you group together the 5 US companies before the French, Dutch and British. I guess listing them in order of share of Iranian oil production would be ideal, though that would involve listed all 7 individually. Last sentence is a bit clunky. So, dunno something like this?

U.S. and European international oil companies were among the beneficiaries of the concessionary arrangements that followed nationalization. The Shah agreed to replace the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company monopoly with a consortium of eight petroleum companies including five American, one British, French and one Dutch. Revenues from Iranian oil production jumped from $34 million in 1954–1955 to $181 million in 1956–1957, and continued to increase. The United States sent development aid and advisors.

References

  1. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), pp.195-6

Biased article

Dear friends,

I have not read this article throughly, but it is very biased. The other side of the story is never shown and not written about, not even a one sentence has been written about the other side of the story. But this article has many problems. Let me take up some examples.

"overthrow of the democratically elected" Mossadegh was never democratically elected, but appointed by the Shah using the consitution of 1906.

"orchestrated by the intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom and the United States under the name TPAJAX Project" There are a lot of discussion regarding this. There are two sides, those who say this happened (based on a CIA source, which should be written more clearly) and those who do not agree. Of people who do not agree are those who had part in this whole revolt. We will get back to this.

"one who relied heavily on United States support" There is no source for this. I am looking forward to see how USA supported the Shah. Using many and real sources. Is this support good or bad support? Was it food support? money support? Either don't put it in, or when you do precise it.

All of that above is just from the beginning containing of a few sentences. I do not have the time to go through the article right now. But it is biased. The other side of the story has to be taken up as well.

Why do you guys think CIA is a trustworthy source? All those who have written books etc. have gotten their source from CIA as well.



Some things I would like to see on this article:

There are many interesting things here to note, for example: "My father never had any meetings with any CIA agents. One operative has claimed that he spoke to my father in German, ostensibly during secret meetings. The fact is that the only foreign languages my father ever spoke was Russian and Turkish, not German or English." - and there we see a huge "plot hole" in CIAs documents.

  • Richard Helms, long time CIA director, told a BBC television program that the agency did not counter rumours of in Iran because the Iranian episode looked like a success. At the time, of course, agency needed some success, especially to counter fiascos as the Bay of Pigs.
  • Even Donald Wilber, the CIA operative whose secret report has been given top billing by the New York Times makes it clear that whatever he and his CIA colleagues were up to in Tehran at the time simply failed.
  • Wilbert writes: headquarters spent a day featured by depression and despair… The message sent to Tehran on the night of August 18 said that the operation has been tried and failed and that contrary operations against Mussadeq should be discontinued.
  • Barry Rubin writes “It cannot be said that the United States overthrew Mussadeq and replaced him with the Shah… Overthrowing Mussadeq was like pushing an open door.”
  • Mossadegh himself never blamed the Americans for his downfall. He was intelligent enough to know why his political career led into an impasse.
  • Three years ago the CIA announced that almost all of its documents pertaining to the August 1953 events in Iran had been destroyed in a fire. Was someone trying to cover up the CIA’s most dramatic success story? Or did the documents burn because the good ambiance created by the Iranian myth that had been fabricated by a few individuals with a lot of imagination and very little of scruples?
  • Loy Henderson , the US ambassador to Tehran at the time, makes it abundantly clear in his dispatches to the State Department that Mussadeq was overthrown by a popular uprising which started from the poorest districts of the Iranian capital. HendersonÃf(TM)s reports have been published in a book of more than 100 pages, translated into Persian and published in Iran.

There are a lot more. But I am don't have time to go into this anymore today. By posting this I hope I can start a little debate and soon change this article a little bit to make it more neutral and allow the other side to express their opinion too. That would be the best, and let the reader judge.

Take care everyone --Tondar1 (talk) 17:38, 6 March 2012 (UTC)


I've seen it posited that what really happened here is that the CIA's activities had little to no effect on the fall of Mossadegh, it was inevitable as his policies were being revealed to have disastrous results. In the early '60's with the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation and their suspected involvement in the death of JFK, the CIA's head was on the congressional chopping block and they were in real danger of being shut down. At that time Iran and the Shah were seen as a shining success of US foreign policy, so the CIA purportedly doctored all their records and started circulating a story that they were singlehandedly responsible for the Shah's return to power, despite an amazingly small amount of resources. In any event I've tried to introduce Ardeshir Zahedi's account into this article in the past and had it ignored. I think in the interest of a fair and balanced presentation it should be included in some way. It was in fact a direct rebuttal to the NY Times piece most of this story is now dependent upon. I believe the story as it's long been promoted does the people of Iran a disservice by portraying them as weak and able to be bought for a pittance by outsiders. That is not an accurate representation of any of the expatriated Iranians I have known. Batvette (talk) 03:49, 10 March 2012 (UTC)

Yes, this theory of CIA self-promotion and fabrication should be given a place of greater prominence in the article. Not only Ardeshir Zahedi but Darioush Bayandor and Abbas Milani have given due consideration to this version of events, Bayandor in Iran and the CIA and Milani in The Shah; both books published by Macmillan in the last two years, representing the latest scholarship. Binksternet (talk) 04:51, 10 March 2012 (UTC)
Thanks for your replies. Glad to see that I am not the only one here. I also took a look at the past discussions on this talk page and noticed that a lot of people mentioned this without progress. Those two books were interesting, I did not know about them. You can see some parts of it through Amazon website and it looks good.
Hopefully soon some changes can start happening. It is much better to start an discussion about this on the talk page before making any changes.
I also looked up Wikipedia:NPOV dispute and Wikipedia:Neutral point of view. Therefore I might add the neutrality dispute tag to this article after a while. But first I would prefer some discussion regarding this, especially by those who regulary update this article and made the most edits.
Take care, --Tondar1 (talk) 23:09, 10 March 2012 (UTC)
A little background on the article, Tondar. This article does not read the way it does because there is a consensus about it or satisfaction with it but because of aggressive protection of its POV, principally editor Kurdo777. However in the past Kurdo and others who like the article have not engaged in much discussion until you attempt to rewrite something, and even then all you may get is an edit summary in their revert. So A) do not think that a consensus of those discussing on the talk page means your edit will not be promptly reverted by someone with strong familiarity with wikipedia regulations. B) be prepared for some work and some exercise of patience if you want to change the article (as I am attempting to do). Good Luck, --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:27, 11 March 2012 (UTC)
Thanks for letting me know. I am aware of that it will not be easy to change this article. I am not completely new to wiki. I have been on wikipedia for a long time even though I haven't had an account. I have also seen how hard it is to change some articles. Since I am mostly interested in the Iran articles; I have especially seen how hard it is to change those, mostly because the of 'the winners write history'.
Hopefully people will join this discussion. If they do not, they will have to blame themselves. By letting some time go from this discussion, if anything happens, this is a good thing to have. For example they can not accuse me of vandalizing or not trying to solve this by debates etc.
I wonder though: What is the best way to publish this? A new section? Bake it into the text? Any ideas?
Thanks again. I am going to wait for a bit and let time pass before making any changes to let everyone see this page. If you guys want, perhaps we can do something together. If so, we could get more people to join us, for example by writing in Iran portal pages and so on. I really hope you guys want to work together so we can create something good. --Tondar1 (talk) 22:20, 12 March 2012 (UTC)
EDIT: It is quite sad that the foundation of this article is solely based on CIA sources. Basically, those who orginally wrote this article accepted everything that CIA said without any kind of source criticism. Apparently CIA is the most trustworthy organization in the whole world by those who believe this really happened. --Tondar1 (talk) 22:49, 12 March 2012 (UTC)
Any interested editor can:
  • Change this article directly per WP:BRD.
  • Propose article changes on this talk page and work to gain consensus before going 'live' with it.
  • Compose a sandbox version of the article—or a section of it—in their own userspace, such as at User:Tondar1/1953Iran or wherever, then return to this talk page and point others to the sandbox with a link. Binksternet (talk) 23:17, 12 March 2012 (UTC)
Hey. Yeah. I was thinking about creating a sandbox. I have a question whoever. I do not have much experience. But apparently as you can see here there are two sides. Right now the article is only taking up one side (It can be discussed if it can be called two sides really, because only one can be right, no?).. either way, if I want to start writing about the "other side" - this will mean that the whole article will break, unless I create a section in this article, and creating a little section is stupid because that will indirectly mean as if the other parts of the article based on CIA sources are more trustworthy. Do you have any ideas? In the end it will probably be editwars, unless the article is built in a way that both stories are given the same amount of room. --Tondar1 (talk) 17:53, 13 March 2012 (UTC)
Tondar, I'm sure you have observed, as I have, that most of the general public and media sources who accept and promote the CIA account without question, strangely hold them in great contempt and distrust regarding any other historical event they might be involved with. Would the NY Times have published their story in 1976? Batvette (talk) 10:11, 13 March 2012 (UTC)
Very true. --Tondar1 (talk) 17:53, 13 March 2012 (UTC)
Regarding how to write this article, you must abandon the idea that there is one truth. We cannot know what that truth is, so what we do instead is hew to the Wikipedia:Neutral point of view#Balance guideline, and we state both sides when describing disputed points, with clear attribution in the article text. For instance, we would say that Mark Gasiorowski wrote one thing, Stephen Kinzer wrote another, and Abbas Milani wrote something else. If the best reliable sources agree on a certain point then it is acceptable to describe it as "truth" without attribution, though you would still cite the fact at the end of the sentence or paragraph. Binksternet (talk) 19:44, 13 March 2012 (UTC)

I have created User:Tondar1/sandbox/1953 where I will be slowly working on changing the article to have both versions there. Anyone who wants to edit and help is welcome. Again, the goal of the changing is to make both versions easily available and not only one (which is very disputed) to be there. Basically both will be baked in. See more at the talk page --Tondar1 (talk) 16:42, 14 March 2012 (UTC)

have added (and deleted) to it --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:13, 16 March 2012 (UTC)
Anyway , the current article shows the dominant opinion of the involved historians . I know that is possible for all of them to be incorrect , but in Wikipedia we are not in the place to prove it first : let the majority of sources say that was not a coup and CIA-MI6 was not so involved , then we will change the article ! (WP:ORIGINAL)--Alborz Fallah (talk) 11:34, 15 March 2012 (UTC)
Per WP:NPOV, other opinions should also be represented in the article - and as new voices are heard, the article should be changed in accord with them. AFAICT, the "other opinions" are decidedly not "fringe" and excluding them is quite improper under Wikipedia policy. Meanwhile, this article remains far too mired in details, many of which are currently disputed in reliable sources. Again I suggest a substantial removal of trivia from the article entirely. Collect (talk) 11:53, 15 March 2012 (UTC)
Exactly, thank you for a well written response Collect! First and foremost I must say that any help, like what Collect wrote above about NPOV, is very much appreciated. I am new to wikipedia editing and therefore I have no experience and little knowledge about how it works around here.
Secondly regarding what Alborz Fallah said: "let the majority of sources say that was not a coup and CIA-MI6 was not so involved" ... Please keep in mind that the original and only source are CIA documents. This CIA document is the ONLY MAIN SOURCE. All books, articles etc. are based on this. Also there are a lot of people today who say that this was not the case. If you look above there are 2 books and 2 articles mentioned and that only after little research (atleast by my side).
Also dominant opinion does not mean the correct opinion. Have you never heard of "winners write history" ? --Tondar (talk) 16:37, 16 March 2012 (UTC)
Abbas Milani's book, The Shah, discusses Donald Wilber's CIA Clandestine Service History, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953", written by Wilber in March 1954 and supposedly "leaked" (Milani's scare quotes) to The New York Times in 2000 by James Risen. Milani is disdainful of this "official history" (Milani's scare quotes) and he lays out the various ways that it conflicts with contemporary accounts of CIA agents and those who came into contact with them before and during the coup. Milani identifies 13 advocates of the CIA version, people who believe it to be true, unlike himself.
Darioush Bayandor's book, Iran and the CIA: the fall of Mosaddeq revisited, argues against the CIA "official history", describing instead how the CIA had given up by August 18 after their utter failure on August 17, and that the coup on August 19 was a complete surprise to them. Both books are from Palgrave Macmillan, a respected imprint. Both men interviewed Ardeshir Zahedi, and performed intensive primary research. Both men are reliable sources, with Milani counted more neutral because he is a Hoover Institution scholar and the Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University. Binksternet (talk) 17:26, 16 March 2012 (UTC)
Back to how "the current article shows the dominant opinion of the involved historians". The problem is not that the current article doesn't show less dominant opinions, it's that the current article does not show the "dominant opinion of the involved historians". What it shows what agressive editors with a simplicitic "good v. evil" mindset have been able to cram into the article. When balanced view of historians is added its attacked as "cherry picking" and deleted. --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:11, 16 March 2012 (UTC)
Accusing other editors to be aggressive and having simplistic view is not the way that is supposed to be in Wikipedia editing . All of us what to make a good article , that's all ! and about the sentence of Tondar : "Also dominant opinion does not mean the correct opinion. Have you never heard of "winners write history" ? " , That is so true , but here in Wikipedia we do not search for correct opinion , but we only want to present the points of view : simply we don't judge , but only getter the information . --Alborz Fallah (talk) 04:04, 17 March 2012 (UTC)

Someone like User:Tondar1, who says and I quote, "Operation Ajax never happened"[3] and that "The name of the article should be first and foremost be changed to something else not containing the name coup. Perhaps 1953 Iranian event or anything better."[4] believing that this article is biased, is actually testimony to the neutrality of the article, given his extreme fringe views points. Just because a bunch of like-minded right-wing partisans have gathered here, echoing each other like a choir, does not mean that Wikipedia's core polices on WP:Fringe and WP:Undue will be bent and ignored to accommodate a vocal activist fringe minority led by User:BoogaLouie, who wish to create an illusion that they speak for the majority here, in order to re-write the academically recognized historiography of this event, using questionable non-independent fringe sources, to make extreme fringe claims that there was never a coup to begin with, and that this was some sort of a "popular revolution". In any case, this is a controversial topic, so if anyone wishes to make any major changes, such changes need to be discussed one by one, and a consensus reached on every issue. And by that, I don't mean recycling/copy-pasting arguments and proposals that have already been discussed and rejected, hoping for a different result, which by the way is a violation of Wikipedia rules. Kurdo777 (talk) 20:19, 17 March 2012 (UTC)

Wow, you managed to attack and insult everybody here except Alborz, then you speak of others violating Wikipedia rules. What happened to WP:NPA?
Regarding your arguments, there is a more complex and nuanced position that lies between "it was a coup" and "it was a popular uprising". The coup instigation by British and American agents did happen, but then it failed on August 17. This instigation continued, though, in the form of a popular uprising. This is the view of Abbas Milani, Hoover Institute scholar and Stanford professor who you will not be able to call "extreme fringe". Binksternet (talk) 21:01, 17 March 2012 (UTC)
Who is everybody? Why are you putting words in my mouth? There are many valued editors here who have valid concerns about this article, in good faith. So I wasn't talking about "everybody", I was specifically taking about User:BoogaLouie, and his ideological allies like you, who have been trying for years to white-wash this article, and make the coup look like a "revolution" and the best thing that happened to humanity since sliced bread. Also, you seem to have selective amnesia when it comes to WP:NPA, since your friend User:BoogaLouie was making snide comments about other editors before me, and you didn't seem to have a problem with it. If me calling it WP:Spade is "insulting" and breaches WP:NPA, then User:BoogaLouie's comments were also a violation of WP:NPA. As for the content, saying that the coup was a "popular uprising" is a fringe theory, and it doesn't matter what individual or individuals claim it, the vast majority of academic sources and scholars are crystal clear that this was a foreign-engineered coup d'état. That's a established fact. There is no white-washing/denying such an academically-recognized fact. Let me add that I just find it rich, that a "new user", who seems suspiciously familiar, I mean expert-level familiar, with Wikipedia, and whose user name is Tondar (obviously named after and possibly affiliated with Tondar pro-Shah organization, which is a conflict of interest by itself), pops up here out of nowhere, right after "joining Wikipedia", to complain about the neutrality of this particular article, and his solution is to remove the word "coup d'état" from the article title. This is all so outrageously fringe and also very suspicious, to say the least. That's all I have to say for now. I'm away from home, and therefore have limited internet access for a few days, but I'll follow up with this next week. Kurdo777 (talk) 22:57, 17 March 2012 (UTC)
All of my friends think of me as leftist/centrist, so I am amused that you think I am right-wing. I have never wanted to whitewash this article or say that retaining the Shah, overthrowing Mosaddegh, was a good thing for Iran, or for anybody else. Iran was screwed by Shah before and after 1953, and some world statesmen at the time thought he was a terrible burden on the country. All I want from this article is for it to tell the reader all the versions of the event that have been published, but you have planted your feet; you want it to tell only one story—the one you favor. My friend, there are many stories about the coup, many conflicting ones. Our best sources give us several of them, and we should follow these best sources and tell the reader the differences between the versions.
I notice that you have chosen not to respond to Abbas Milani who is the most recent scholar to write about the coup. Milani will be the turning point for this article, changing it from the sort that ignores some of the reliable sources to the sort that tells the reader various versions, discussing as well the historiography of the event, how the telling of the coup changed over time. Binksternet (talk) 00:14, 18 March 2012 (UTC)

I agree with Alborz Fallah. Plus we should adhere to WP:Undue and the consensus of independent academics and scholars. Tondar himself has proclaimed that he is after the "truth", which is a violation of Wikipedia polices, and makes the whole unbiased accusation interesting to say the least. In any case, any changes, even minor need to be proposed first on the talk page, for discussion and consensus-building.--Aliwiki (talk) 16:46, 18 March 2012 (UTC)

Regarding UNDUE, your notion of scholarly consensus, and the need for changes to be proposed here first: No, No and No. UNDUE says, "Neutrality requires that each article... fairly represents all significant viewpoints that have been published by reliable sources, in proportion to the prominence of each viewpoint." The prominence of Abbas Milani is high; his viewpoint is significant, but the article does not cover it yet. Regarding scholarly consensus, Milani disagrees with earlier scholars in certain significant ways—there is no consensus. Regarding the need to propose text before putting it in the article, that is not required by any Wikipedia guideline. To quote myself earlier in this thread, any interested editor can:
  • Change this article directly per WP:BRD.
  • Propose article changes on this talk page and work to gain consensus before going 'live' with it.
  • Compose a sandbox version of the article. Binksternet (talk) 17:02, 18 March 2012 (UTC)
"Operation Ajax never happened" I think, Kurdo, you're taking his comment out of context to portray him as holding a fringe position and marginalize him as an editor. He states on that same page (sources say)Operation Ajax failed, so it can't be both, obviously "it happened", if you are positing left to writing it himself he would leave out any mention of it I'm officially ROFLMAOing at you. One could easily portray as fringe the idea anyone could walk into a sovereign country with $10,000, purchase the services of some prostitutes, circus performers and thieves, and overpower the political will of 20 million people, who supposely wanted something far different than what developed. The question of course is what influence the CIA really did have over events that had other factors driving them as well. The version you would have written is preposterous in its own right, that Iranians would embrace throwing out BP and causing an embargo that was destroying them economically due to strong feelings of nationalism- yet $10,000 offered by foreigners was able to purchase the political power to derail this. It reads like satire, a lampooning of the Iranian people as cartoonishly weak and corruptible. I'm sure Langley's professional writers were having a good laugh over it while they were doctoring the accounts. As for accusations of him being with Todar, a pro-Shah group, and conflict of interest, last time I checked there were Republicans editing articles on Republican candidates, and Democrats editing articles on Democrat candidates, so let's not patronize anyone with feigning absolute neutrality in editing. If people weren't interested in the topic for some reason they'd have never clicked on it in the first place- we shouldn't take the ability to successfully lie that one has neutrality, to assume they really are.Batvette (talk) 21:25, 18 March 2012 (UTC)
Tondar himself has proclaimed that he is after the "truth", which is a violation of Wikipedia polices, I don't think that is directly stated anywhere. Batvette (talk) 21:34, 18 March 2012 (UTC)
Yes it is. WP:OR. Poyani (talk) 18:49, 20 March 2012 (UTC)
No, nothing at Wikipedia:No original research says that seeking the truth is a violation of policy. However, it is too difficult, probably impossible, and what we do instead is follow WP:NPOV by telling the reader each serious version of what happened. Binksternet (talk) 19:16, 20 March 2012 (UTC)
NOR says that we should not seek to engage in original research. Research, by definition is the systematic investigation into what constitutes truth. The problem with what you said is what constitutes "serious" research. A fringe theory held by one respected scholar, in direct contradiction of the rest, can be viewed as serious, but it should not be included. Just because one respected doctor, with a degree in medicine claims that Yoga can cure cancer (as is the case), it doesn't follow that this point of view should be presented in the cancer page. Poyani (talk) 19:42, 20 March 2012 (UTC)

Tondar

Just because there are two-sides to a story doesn't mean both sides are to be presented. There are two sides to the species of the British Royal Family. Most people believe they are human. But there are some people who actually believe they are a reptilian alien species (I'm not kidding). The wikipedia page for them does not present the second side because of WP:FRINGE.
All the issues you have raised have been discussed to death a million times. Note that your argument that Mossadeq was not democratically elected because he was appointed by the Shah is total nonsense. Democratic governments in Canada, UK, Australia and many other places are elected the exact same way. Poyani (talk) 18:49, 20 March 2012 (UTC)

Your FRINGE complaint falls down in the face of Ardeshir Zahedi, Darioush Bayandor, and Abbas Milani. Nothing these three agree upon could be remotely considered fringe. These are two ambassadors and one highly respected scholar. Binksternet (talk) 19:16, 20 March 2012 (UTC)
The two ambassadors have a clear conflict of interest. You are right that there is one respected scholar. The problem is that his theory (if it is as you present it) is directly contradicting the view of all the rest of the scholars on this field, as well as declassified documents, as well as official government admissions. That is the very definition of a Fringe Theory.Poyani (talk) 19:37, 20 March 2012 (UTC)
I am looking through the guideline WP:FRINGE but I cannot find any sense that the ideas in the books by Milani and Bayandor should be described to the reader as fringe ideas. Can you quote the section of the guideline you are referring to? Binksternet (talk) 20:10, 20 March 2012 (UTC)
Refer to WP:UNDUE.

Neutrality requires that each article or other page in the mainspace fairly represents all significant viewpoints that have been published by reliable sources, in proportion to the prominence of each viewpoint. Giving due weight and avoiding giving undue weight means that articles should not give minority views as much of or as detailed a description as more widely held views. Generally, the views of tiny minorities should not be included at all. Poyani (talk) 02:30, 21 March 2012 (UTC)

Dear friends, I am sorry for being away for a while. In the nextcoming weeks I will not be as active here because I have other more. important things to take of.
"That is so true , but here in Wikipedia we do not search for correct opinion , but we only want to present the points of view : simply we don't judge , but only getter the information"
I do not agree with you. Wikipedia is a place of information and as User:Collect has mentioned, other stories shoulda also be presented.


Kurdo777:
First and foremost, if you read the same link you quoted - I also say that others say it happened but failed. There are different stories, and what I am trying to say we should see which one has more credibility to even write about that, instead of having one USA/CIA-biased story.
"make the coup look like a "revolution" and the best thing that happened to humanity since sliced bread"
And you say I am biased? You seem to have some kind of personal agenda here. With all respect, but I have seen signs by you that you have a personal hate against Iran, Iranians and the Shah.
"and whose user name is Tondar (obviously named after and possibly affiliated with Tondar pro-Shah organization, which is a conflict of interest by itself"
I feel sad for you. Do you even know what Tondar means in persian? It means Thunder, and is a common name. Tondar the organization is a fake organization. I feel sad that you have to go so low and that proves that you have a personal agenda. You are trying to silence everyone. If we are going to that low I can mention that your name probably indicates you are a Kurd that of course hates the Shah and Iran and Iranians.
I am not new user. I have used Wikipedia since ages and been on these articles for ages.


And it's pretty stupid that you people go after what I say. I am just a guy who wants to change this article because I believe it does not follow Wikipedia policies. What does it matter what I say? Look and judge me by the changes I make! This goes to both you Kurdo and Aliwiki.
Poyani:
"believe they are a reptilian alien species (I'm not kidding). The wikipedia page for them does not present the second side because of WP:FRINGE." That is a big difference from what we are discussing here. That was not a good comparasion.
--Tondar (talk) 21:39, 10 April 2012 (UTC)

Promotion of Fringe Theories

There seems to be an attempt emerging here to alter the 1953 coup page in include some fringe theories. These include the notion that Zahedi had to contact with American or British agents or that Mossadeq wasn't elected, or the fact that no coup even took place. Please note that just because two sides and two sets of source exist for a story doesn't mean both must be presented. Some sources, such as Zahedi's son's personal website claiming his father did not meet agents should not have the same weight of others, say the NYT's summary of a classified US report on the coup.Poyani (talk) 19:04, 20 March 2012 (UTC)

You should read The Shah by Abbas Milani and Iran and the CIA by Darioush Bayandor. They interview Zahedi's son and they separate the excitable words from the real meat of his claims. They assess his claims in relation to established facts and with regard to other accounts. They give the proper weight to Ardeshir Zahedi, such that they do not believe everything he said was an accurate, objective description of what happened. The two books give Ardeshir Zahedi's account of the coup more importance than any previous scholars, but they do not rely on it for everything. Binksternet (talk) 19:16, 20 March 2012 (UTC)
I don't know if we need to take Bayandor too seriously. His book was marginal and as a former employee of the Shah's regime he clearly has a conflict of interest in presenting the story. I placed an order for Milani's book over at Amazon. I'll read it to see what it has to say on the subject matter, but it should be noted that this is a book which presents the Shah's entire legacy. The 1953 affair is just one chapter in the book. Furthermore, for every one author claiming there was no coup there are about 1000 claiming the opposite. There are even US government admissions to the coup against Mossadeq. That is why IMO any claim that it didn't happen should be considered a Fringe Theory.Poyani (talk) 19:33, 20 March 2012 (UTC)
Obama said in his speech that they "played a role in the overthrow... "[5] but that could be realpolitik. GraemeLeggett (talk) 20:01, 20 March 2012 (UTC)
Bayandor is a serious source. He is critical of the Shah's regime, and he gives Mosaddegh proper respect for the good things he accomplished. The book is not a rant by a kook, it is a scholarly work from a respected publisher of important books. As I said, you should read it. Only Wikipedia editors can have a WP:Conflict of interest that would prevent their work being cited, not authors who are not Wikipedia editors. We do not require our reliable authors to be neutral.
You misapply the guideline WP:FRINGE. There is no sense of fringe theory about what Milani and Bayandor wrote. You appear to be shooting from the hip, saying you don't like two books because of what you think is inside them. Read them and know. Binksternet (talk) 20:05, 20 March 2012 (UTC)
As I said I will read Milani's book. Bayandor was a former employee of the Shah's regime. His book is as reliable on the subject matter as the writings of a current Iranian ambassador would be to Khamenei's legacy. There is an obvious conflict of interest there. I am not refering to wikipedia's COI but pointing out that Bayandor is not exactly a reliable source. Poyani (talk) 02:30, 21 March 2012 (UTC)
Really?! Take your concern to WP:RSN. They will tell you Bayandor's book will be perfectly okay to use with attribution, as I have suggested. Binksternet (talk) 03:05, 21 March 2012 (UTC)
I am not very familiar with Wikipedia policies. However, if those sources are not very reliable Poyani, are CIA sources reliable them? Clearly that is the biggest conflict of interest. --Tondar (talk) 21:44, 10 April 2012 (UTC)

Other issues with the article

Bear in mind you can oppose adding anything to the article saying Mossadeq wasn't elected, or that what everybody calls a coup was really a coup, and still find the article in miserable shape. Issues I've been trying to deal with in RfC and talk page are:

  • important events that lead up to the coup http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#RfC:_Should_information_about_events_leading_up_to_the_coup_be_added.3F 8 June 2011 (Events: Siyeh-i Tir (or July 1952) uprising that strengthened Prime Minister Mosaddeq's position (the PM overthrown in the coup) by leading to him being granted emergency powers; the extension of Mosaddeq's emergency powers six months later; and details of the August 1953 referendum that dissolved parliament and granted a further extension of emergency powers to Mosaddeq, but something the "opposition capitalized" and was "more grist for the anti-Mossadegh mill" according to historians.)

--BoogaLouie (talk) 00:25, 21 March 2012 (UTC)

Well , the procedure tends to include suggestions rather than cursing the article . For the accessory group that think the whole event was not a military coup , please suggest a sentence to be included in the article , but with the label of "some of the historians have an alternative theory ( or point of view ) that ... " . For other topics that is mentioned above , let's do the same : suggest the solution , then we will talk and include the result . --Alborz Fallah (talk) 11:53, 23 March 2012 (UTC)

But that's giving undue weight to a very fringe theory. This notion that the coup never happened, is not only opposite the vast majority of scholarship on the subject, but is actually contradicted by the documentary record and government admissions. It is as reasonable to include this no-coup conspiracy theory, as it is change the Watergate page to include the conspiracy theory that the Watergate break-ins didn't happen.Poyani (talk) 19:46, 23 March 2012 (UTC)
You are jumping to conclusions. There was a coup. Zahedi, Milani and Bayandor agree that the coup happened, it just happened in a manner that is not described in the article. The CIA failed on August 17 and they did not have an emergency plan—instead they prepared to leave Iran. Zahedi, Milani and Bayandor agree that a military coup removed Mosaddegh, but it was an ad hoc plan put together by Iranian military, political and clerical men, and it enjoyed popular support from the people in the street who were riding on the emotions of the CIA/MI6 propaganda augmented by clerical encouragement. Binksternet (talk) 23:43, 23 March 2012 (UTC)
We have to reach a conclusion anyway ! Very fringe theories also can get a paragraph , but only if they have proper coverage . In this case , the new position of monarchists (including Zahedi , Bayandor and Shaaban bi mokh (Brainless shaaban , one of the thugs leaders ) , is that the coup was not entirely based on CIA and MI6 ,[When the monarchists were in power they claimed that the regime change was completely based on the people], so we may include a party's view in this article and by mentioning that is not the mainstream view of historians , solve that undue weight problem . Anyway , at present version of article , we do have a section under title of Historical viewpoint in the Islamic Republic , that is as weird and unacceptable as monarchist's point of view . When Abol-Ghasem Kashani as leader of the nationalization movement can have a paragraph , then why not giving Shaaban bi Mokh a paragraph as the public opinion of Iranian nation ?! :)--Alborz Fallah (talk) 05:26, 24 March 2012 (UTC)
I am frigheten that people like you Alborz Fallah decide what shouldb e in this article. When you call monarchists and mention "Shaban Bimokh" whos name is in reality Shaban Jafari and then translate into English as well in order to try and insult our opinion, and then give a section just for him? There are much more important things, but obiviously since you are so biased you don't want the important things to be there but instead ridiculous things....It's just sad.
Well done BoogaLouie. I keep wanting to try and do some changes, but sadly I have been busy for a while and frankly I don't know where to start and how to start. I do not have much Wikipedia experience.
Poyani, as Binksternet said, you are jumping to conclusions. What I said in the beginning was not "this is how it should be!" - no, it was an attempt to start a discussion about the other side of the story. Clearly, it's very obivious that there are two sides to this. And both sides are "big" to say, none of them are small theories. Sure, the CIA-based side that they did the coup is huge and the other side that the people revolted against Mossadegh (which they had every reason to do) is huge.
Apparently some people are trying to use Wikipedia only to spread their own opinion. I always thought Wikipedia should be the place of information? Even according to Wikipedia policies other sides of stories should be presented under certain circumstances which all are met
Given this other side of story "a few paragraphs" or trying to hide it in the article is just very dumb. The other side of the story has as much as weight as the theory the article writes about today right now. --Tondar (talk) 21:51, 10 April 2012 (UTC)
Every editor participates in talk page to decide what should be in the article and what should not.If you are new to Wikipedia , let me explain that we try to be polite and using such words as dumb is prohibited. Personal attacks are not allowed . In process of compromising someone like me tries to find a solution which meets the legitimate interests of both parties and that is a known process in Wiki . And yes , you are right about people who try to use Wiki as a tool to spread their opinion , but I think when the ordinary and common opinion of main stream thoughts is challenged , that tool-effect is more pronounced.I think no one claims that the opinion of "That was not a coup" is the dominant idea , and that is natural to give a proper weight to a new theory that contradicts the conventional point of views ...--Alborz Fallah (talk) 21:08, 11 April 2012 (UTC)

I admire those editors who still try to reduce the obvious POV of this article. I participated in this discussion three years ago but gave up because of a few editors who are determined to push their own views.

There are three main issues that need to be fixed as I see it:

  • The discussion of whether the CIA exaggerated its own role.
  • The fact that the refendum that gave Mosaddeq right to rule by decree was rigged.
    • "The referendum was rigged which caused a great public outcry against Mosaddeq" Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), pp. 261-286 [6]. Accessed 2009-06-06. Archived 2009-06-08
    • "There were separate ballot boxes for yes and no votes, and the announced result was over 99% in favor of throwing out the Majlis. The transparent unfairness of this referendum was more grist for the anti-Mossadegh mill. Mid-August found Roosevelt and his team of Iranian agents in place and ready to strike." Kinzer, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, p. 165 [7]</ref>
  • The irregularities of the 1951 parliamentary election.
    • "Realizing that the opposition would take the vast majority of the provincial seats, Mossadeq stopped the voting as soon as 79 deputies - just enough to form a parliamentary quorum - had been elected." Kinzer (2003), All the Shah's Men p. 137

I will not participate in this discussion further but I hope others have the time and motivation to bring this article to NPOV status. Jacob Lundberg (talk) 19:24, 2 May 2012 (UTC)

I am very open to the idea of incorporating some of the changes listed (though with some minor modifications to style and wording). We can have a section at the end, where the fringe theories of monarchists and the right-wing are mentioned in their proper context. As a model I am looking at the section currently discussing the the Islamic Republic's fringe-theory (describing Mossadeq as allied with the British and the CIA trying to overthrow Kashani). It uses inline attribution and clearly implies that this is in fact a fringe theory, held by people with a specific viewpoint. Poyani (talk) 13:02, 10 May 2012 (UTC)

A section at the end would be unsatisfactory. Scholarship is divided; the whole article should reflect that at every step. Nothing should be presented as fact except very basic things everybody agrees upon. Binksternet (talk) 13:15, 10 May 2012 (UTC)
Our main disagreement is about the sentence of "Scholarship is divided" . Other than writer's like Zahedi ( that was himself an involving party ) or Bayandour ( his father took part in assassination of the Mossadegh's chief of police force ) or Shabaan Jafari ( in his book ) , how many [real] neutral scholar editors also think the conventional view of coup is invalid ? And does their number and weight can meet the Wiki standards ? I think if we show there is valid sources that believe the scholarship's opinion has changed , then we can add a "Criticism" section to the article .--Alborz Fallah (talk) 05:37, 13 May 2012 (UTC)

ng

I see you have left out Milani... he's the can opener to break this article apart. You know, I have seen no published opinions saying that Bayandor is not a reliable source, so I will continue to assume Palgrave Macmillan knows what they are doing in publishing his book. Even Zahedi can be taken in measured doses. Binksternet (talk) 06:22, 13 May 2012 (UTC)
Does any of them has peer review?--Alborz Fallah (talk) 17:32, 13 May 2012 (UTC)
The phrase "scholarship is divided" is dubious. There are literally thousands of scholars on one side and a hand-ful on the other side. In other words, scholarship is as divided as it is over the claim that cigarettes cause cancer. It is ridiculous to even have this discussion. Poyani (talk) 18:57, 30 May 2012 (UTC)
I love your cigarette smoking analogy. At one time the great majority of doctors dismissed the possibility of cancer from cigarettes—only a few said that cigarettes were killing people. Research and facts eventually changed the situation to what we have now. You can think of Abbas Milani as the new and highly respected researcher whose work has completely changed the game and will soon alter the slower scholars' attitude about the coup. Binksternet (talk) 19:25, 30 May 2012 (UTC)
In the analogy example , we are not going to discover the truth in the Wikipedia , but we are going to present , classify , summarize and connect the information in this site . So we have to give the wrong information about the cigarette smoking in that period and only change it when the main stream scholar view changes it's opinion . Please read Wikipedia:Truth--Alborz Fallah (talk) 19:45, 30 May 2012 (UTC)

The return of "democratically elected"

Over at Talk:Mohammad Mosaddegh#"Democratically elected" there is a discussion underway that has relevance to a longstanding dispute here at this article. We have been arguing about "democratically elected" for eight years. The issue should be settled for good. Binksternet (talk) 20:43, 24 July 2012 (UTC)

It seems pretty settled to me. We have many reliable sources stating that Mossadeq was democratically elected and not one reliable source which states that he was "not democratically elected". What is left outstanding in your opinion? Poyani (talk) 20:23, 29 October 2012 (UTC)

Was Mosaddegh democratically elected, or appointed prime minister?

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.


Should the article say Mohammad Mosaddegh was appointed to the position of prime minister or should it say he was "democratically elected"?

Please see recent discussion at Talk:Mohammad Mosaddegh#"Democratically elected". Binksternet (talk) 06:40, 26 July 2012 (UTC)

Discussion

  • Appointed. There are many sources that say Mosaddegh was "democratically elected" to the position of prime minister of Iran, and many that say he was appointed, or named, or chosen, or selected. Here are some of the best sources saying his government was "democratically elected":
    • Stephen Kinzer (who also describes the appointment process of the Iranian prime minister on page 66 of All the Shah's Men: "The Shah... won from the Majlis a change in the way prime ministers were appointed. Under the constitution, the Majlis chose them and the Shah gave his consent. Now the system would work the other way, with the Shah choosing and the Majlis voting afterwards to confirm or reject the nominee.")
    • Professor Joe L. Kincheloe, in The Miseducation of the West, pages 59, 67.
    • Writer Robert Bryce in Cronies: Oil, The Bushes, and the Rise of Texas, America's Superstate, page 116
    • Political Science Professor Glenn P. Hastedt, in Spies, Wiretaps, and Secret Operations.
    • U.S. Department of State, in Background Notes: Mideast, March, 2011.
    • Foreign policy expert William R. Polk, in Understanding Iran.
    • Anthropology professor Pardis Mahdavi, in Passionate Uprisings: Iran's Sexual Revolution, page 15.
      Here are some of the best sources saying Mosaddegh was nominated, appointed, named, chosen, approved, became, assumed, or came to power:
    • Yearbook of the Encyclopedia Americana, 1952: "named".
    • American University, 1964: "appoint"
    • Parviz Kambin: "appointed"
    • Ambassador Henry F. Grady: "chosen"
    • Ambassador John W. Limbert: "became", "named"
    • Diplomat and scholar George Lenczowski: "appoint"
    • Néstor Rivero Silva: "assumed"
    • Francisco R. Parra: "became"
    • Mohammad Gholi Majd: "became"
    • Manucher and Roxane Farmanfarmaian: "named"
    • Hellmut Braun: "appointed"
    • CIA analyst Stephen C. Pelletière: "appointment"
    • Historian Fakhreddin Azimi: "approval"
    • Historian Abbas Milani: "appoint"
    • Political scientist Marc J. O'Reilly: "came to power"
    • Mark Gasiorowski: "nominated"
    • Historian Gholam R. Afkhami: "appointed"
    • Historian and Iranologist Elton L. Daniel: "appoint"
    • Sociologist and Middle East expert Misagh Parsa: "appointed", "re-appoint"
    • Law professor William Michael Reisman: "appoint"
    • Professor Bahman Baktiari: "appoint"
    • Professor Santosh C. Saha: "appointment"
    • Professor Richard Crockatt: "appointed"
    • Dr. Zhand Shakibi: "appointed"
    • Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: "appointed"
    • Historian Stephen E. Ambrose: "appointed"
      All of the sources saying "appoint" are in direct contradiction to the ones saying "elect"—an election gives the voter a choice between two or more candidates while an appointment is always about one candidate. An appointment is often subject to approval by vote, and this was the case for Mosaddegh. He was not elected—he did not run against another man. He was nominated by Jamal Emami, then approved by a yes or no vote of the parliament, then he was officially appointed by the shah. Several of the "appointed" sources go into great detail about the appointment process. None of the "democratically elected" sources give any detail at all. It's clear to me that the phrase "democratically elected" is an inaccurate construct expressing sympathy for Mosaddegh; sympathy arguably deserved because his government was accepted as legitimate, but the term itself is imprecise and misleading because it gives the wrong impression. Mosaddegh was not actually elected; he was nominated, approved, and appointed. Binksternet (talk) 06:40, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
    • Historian Abbas Milani describes the historiography of the coup in his very fine work, The Shah. He says that there are two versions told of the coup: one in which the Shah became more powerful even though he had a "marginal role" in the coup, and the other in which the "democratically elected nationalist government" of Mosaddegh was overthrown. Milani sets up the second version as the sympathy grab, using words such as "infamy", "motley", "dastardly" and "democratically elected" to show that this version of the coup is full of overwrought emotions. Milani goes on to discuss in great detail the appointment process of the Prime Minister of Iran, including the time in 1944 when the Shah told Mosaddegh he wanted to appoint him premier, but Mosaddegh declined because the British would not have allowed it to happen. Binksternet (talk) 07:24, 26 July 2012 (UIC)

I do not see what would be wrong with just saying was appointed to the position of prime minister instead because that is calling it what it was. Even if he was democratically elected, this wording is actually more precise and helpful for the reader this way. 88.104.208.74 (talk)

  • Opposed - Binksternet's list is misleading and incomplete. Misleading, because there is no contradiction between "named" and "democratically elected". Many of the sources who use the term "named" etc, do not question the fact that his government was democratically-elected, which is what Binksternet is trying to do. Incomplete because the vast majority of the academic sources, thousands to be exact, use the term "democratically elected". So the widely-accepted position of the vast majority of academics, is that Mossadegh and his government were democratically elected regardless of the various technicalities like having a parliamentary system that elected the prime minster, of the ceremonial signature of the Shah like that of the Queen in England ("appointment") etc, which Binksternet is using, in an WP:OR-laden fashion, to refute the explicit position of the academics that Mossadegh was the democratically-elected prime minster of Iran. It should also be noted that Binksternet and another user named BoogaLouie, have been for years trying to essentially present the 1953 coup as a "popular revolution" that overthrew an "unpopular dictator", and this appears to be a part of the same pattern of revisionist fringe theories sugar-coating the coup. Kurdo777 (talk) 09:46, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
Alternatively, Binksternet may be looking for a wording that is clear to readers unversed in the forms of parliamentary democracies and the many flavours of constitutional monarchies that accurately and unambiguously describes the situation without reference to other articles. GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:37, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
  • Opposed - See reasons listed below:

First, regarding semantics (which should not even be relevant since it is Original Research, but seem to keep coming up by the crowd opposed to "democratically elected":

Please note that "democratically elected" and "appointed by parliament" with the consent of the monarch are not actually contradictory statements. The Prime Ministers of Canada, UK, Israel, etc are all appointed by parliament in the exact same manner as Mossadeq, by being appointed by an elected parliament and signed off by a Queen (UK), Governer General (Canada) or President (Israel). Even the US system has similar mechanisms. Each state elect what are called "electoral colleges" which then appoint the president. The scholarly work on this issue is not divided.

Second, regarding reliable sources:

Please also note that at best, the notion that Mossadeq was not democratically elected is a fringe theory within a political community, not represented in peer reviewed scholarly work. Even the sources cited by those opposed to the wording "democratically elected", do not actually contradict the statement. They state (correctly) that Mossadeq was appointed by parliament. This is not a contradiction (as noted above). The Prime Minister of Canada is democratically elected by being appointed by parliament. Same as the UK. Same as Israel. All are appointed by parliament. All are democratically elected.

Third, regarding notability:

Please note that reviewing discussions of Mossadeq today in scholarly sources and news organization reveals that he is only relevant and notable today for being Iran's (and possibly the entire Middle East's) one and only democratically elected head of state, whose overthrow has produced significant consequences. This fact is relevant today because it has serious implications regarding the theories as to why western governments interfere in the middle east (benevolent intervention vs opportunism). I assume that this is why many editors have such a sticking point to purging the factually correct and relevant description of "democratically elected" from the article. But as noted above, that would deny the article of one of the most fundamental reasons why it is even notable in the first place and subject of discussion. Hence removing this reference to "democratically elected" may actually be a very negative and destructive decision, reflecting very poorly on the article.

In addition to everything I listed above, please also note that the idea that Mossadeq is not democratically elected requires belief in a conspiracy which goes up all the way to the president of the United States.

In the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically-elected Iranian government.

EDIT: where does it say that they played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Prime Minister. IT DOES NOT. it says the overthrown GOVERNMENT was democratically elected. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.126.146.130 (talk) 22:45, 13 April 2013 (UTC)

To sum up, for the reasons noted above, removing "democratically elected" from the article is against the fundamental principles used for editing Wikipedia including but not limited to WP:NOR WP:RS, WP:NN and WP:NPOV. Furthermore, it will significantly reduce the value of the article and is factually incorrect. I hope this ends the issue once and for all Poyani (talk) 13:20, 26 July 2012 (UTC)

Nobody questions whether Mosaddegh ran a government that was legitimate and authorized—he did. Nobody doubts that the parliament was properly elected. However, the parliament that nominated and approved Mosaddegh as prime minister did not "elect" him; there was no other candidate, just like every time before. After the shah signed the document that made Mosaddegh prime minister, Mosaddegh selected the members of his cabinet. Each of these men was also confirmed/approved by the parliament. The whole sequence was part of the democratic process, so we can certainly say that Mosaddegh's government was the result of a working democracy. However, none of the specific steps bringing Mosaddegh and his cabinet to power included an election. "Democratically empowered" is more accurate, "duly appointed" is a commonly used phrase that fits this situation. Respected scholar Abbas Milani describes the "democratically elected" version of events as part of the mystique that arose around Mosaddegh because of the decades of terror under the Shah's authoritarian regime, not because of how the events unfolded at the time. Milani describes this narrative as being first promoted by Mosaddegh himself, then strengthened by the self-serving "leaked" "official history" of the CIA (Milani uses scare quotes here.) Milani notes that Madeleine Albright has expressed the wording of this narrative, and we know that other politicians have used it. Politicians speaking to crowds do not erase scholarly research. What we have is one popular but inaccurate narrative that lionizes Mosaddegh, and we have another which describes the situation in more accurate and more balanced terms, one that is based on scholarly research and multiple scholarly sources. Binksternet (talk) 15:43, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
You are missing the point. What you describe is precisely what it means to be democratically elected. Look up the article on Barack Obama. It states that "He became the first African American to be elected president". This is despite the fact that Barack Obama was appointed president by the Electoral College. What makes Mossadeq notable is precisely the fact that he was the only democratically elected head of state in Iranian history. If Milani is actually arguing that Mossadeq was not elected basedon your "appointment" argument (which I am not sure he is) then he is making a very serious yet basic error. That is how Prime Ministers are elected in every single democracy that has the position. In Canada, an election was held last year where members of parliament were elected to the House of Commons. The House met and appointed Stephan Harper the Prime Minister. They also appointed his cabinet. That means that Stephan Harper is the democratically elected Prime Minister of Canada. Poyani (talk) 17:44, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
The point is clear: the US president is elected from a pool of candidates. The office is filled after tallying the votes of the electoral college and seeing who got the most votes. In no way at all is the US electoral college "appointing" the president. An appointment is when only one candidate is put forward for approval. The concept is not that difficult to wrap your head around. Binksternet (talk) 19:58, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
I am perfectly familiar with the concept. You are just unfamiliar with parliamentary democracy. In Canada, there is also one candidate for the position of Prime Minister after parliamentary elections. That person gets a vote of confidence from parliament (like Mossadeq's 79-12) and gets the post. The same basic formula is used in every single parliamentary democracy in the world. Your argument is absurd and you keep citing Milani, but so far I have not seen a single statement in Milani's book which specifically states that Mossadeq was not democratically elected. Milani, so far, seems smart enough to avoid making such a ridiculous statement. Poyani (talk) 19:10, 30 July 2012 (UTC)
  • Appointed Democratically elected implies he was chosen through election. an election is defined as "a formal decision-making process by which a population chooses an individual to hold public office", this is not the case here. Appointed is clearer and unambiguous. IRWolfie- (talk) 16:00, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
"Democratically elected" does not imply that "he was chosen through election". It does not mean that in any country in the world. Canada's democratically elected Prime Minister is appointed by its elected parliament (using the exact same process as Mossadeq). Same as the UK. Same as Israel. Same as every other country which has the position.Poyani (talk) 17:50, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
  • Democratically elected Binksternet's view seems to be that only someone elected by direct vote can be considered democratically elected, which means that no PMs or US presidents are democratically elected. However, that is not normal understanding and not what the sources say. My understanding of the definition of a "non-democratically elected" PM would be someone selected at the discretion of the Shah, like Shapour Bakhtiar. TFD (talk) 16:28, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
  • Comment I strongly urge editors to read this article to understand what it means to be "democratically elected" in a government. Note that Mossadeq was elected using the third method listed.Poyani (talk) 17:58, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
    • That is an interesting article, but you'll note that it does not have any references, especially references applying the term to Iran. Balraj Puri, writing about India, says, "In a conspicuous departure from the democratic principle, the constitution prescribes indirect election and nomination respectively for the Leadership Council and the Council of Guardians." He is saying that indirect election is not very democratic. If Iran had held an indirect election to make Mosaddegh the prime minister in 1951 we might apply Puri's observation and say that such an election would not have been very democratic. However, we don't have to worry about the question because we know that Iran's prime minister was appointed twice, according to sociologist and Middle East expert Misagh Parsa. Parsa says the second time was in July 1952, so when Mosaddegh was brought down a year later, that was the government toppled; one in which the Shah had appointed Mosaddegh, and Mosaddegh then selected his cabinet, all of these men being subject to parliament's approval.
      A search for "indirect election" in relation to Iran brings up one prominent example: the 1949 change to the constitution, a change creating a Senate with half of its members indirectly elected. There is no reliable source which identifies the premiership as being indirectly elected... not for Mosaddegh and not for any other prime minister of Iran. Binksternet (talk) 19:50, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
It does not have references because it is truism. Please actually read the article instead of just running a search for "Iran". It notes that being appointed by an elected body is a form of democratic election. It is how most democracies in the world elect their head of state. It included the UK, Canada, Israel, US, Australia, ... Mossadeq was elected using the exact same system as these states' leadersPoyani (talk) 14:00, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
  • By the term democraticaly elected regarding the national leader, I would equate that to democracy which Mossadeg certainly wasn't. Why not just say parlimentry elected or apointed. This is more precise and accurate even if he was democraticaly elected. Stumink (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 19:26, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
  • Appointed. Poyani has gone off topic and expressed a strong POV with claims that the leaders of Israel, Turkey, and Iraq are not elected, but Mossadegh was ("possibly the entire Middle East's....one and only democratically elected head of state"); attacks on "Western" foreign policy generally; Google Books searches; and statements suggesting that political speeches should be treated as undisputed truth (doubting that "requires belief in a conspiracy which goes up all the way to the president of the United States"). Since nobody challenges Binksternet's central point--that Mossadegh was the only candidate--this dispute is really about what wording best conveys that fact to the reader. And the answer seems self-evident to me.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 21:02, 26 July 2012 (UTC)
I did not claim that the leaders of Israel/Turkey are not elected. I argued the opposite. In fact, the leader of Israel is elected using the exact same mechanism used to elect Mossadeq. Please note that all the arguments used here to claim Mossadeq was appointed apply equally to Netanyahu and every other Israeli PM in history. Netanyahu was elected when the elected Knesset appointed him Prime Minister. He was as much appointed as Mossadeq. Their election to the role of Prime Minister was identical in every way sense and shape. Poyani (talk) 13:56, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
  • Comment. What is this dubious argument that "Mossadegh was the only candidate", when in all democratic parliamentary electoral systems, the faction or the party in charge, picks their leader as the Prime Minster AFTER the elections, and there are essentially no other candidates for the PM position. People vote for the party, not the Prime Minster. These arguments hold no water, specially since the vast majority of the sources describe Mossadegh government as democratically-elected. This is the consensus of the academics on this issue, and that's what the Wikipedia articles should reflect. Here is not a place for WP:OR arguments . analysis, and synthesis about the technicalities of what is democratically-elected, that's the job of the academics, and their verdict is democratically-elected. 1600+ academic sources can't be wrong. Kurdo777 (talk) 22:15, 26 July 2012 (UTC)

The party actually picks the leader as the Prime Minster before the elections like in the US and the UK. In the US the nation elects the head of the party as well. Stumink (talk)

And that contradicts what I said how? Mossadegh was the founder and leader of National Front (Iran) since the 40s, long before they won a majority in the parliament. Kurdo777 (talk) 22:23, 26 July 2012 (UTC)

It contradicts what you said because you said in all democratic parliamentary electoral systems, the faction or the party in charge, picks their leader as the Prime Minster AFTER the elections. Which is wrong. That does not happen in most democracies. Certainly not in the west. Stumink (talk)

You didn't understand my point. I meant the Prime Minster's post, is not contested in the parliament, the largest party or faction's leader becomes the prime minster after the elections by default, there is no "other candidate" in the parliament contesting the post when it's clear that another party or faction has the majority. Mossadegh was the leader of the largest faction in the parliament, and he became prime minster by the vote of the majority of the elected parliamentarians. And that's why most academic sources, call him "democratically-elected". It's as simple as that. Kurdo777 (talk) 22:55, 26 July 2012 (UTC)

Regarding this part in all democratic parliamentary electoral systems, the faction or the party in charge, picks their leader as the Prime Minster AFTER the elections. You are still wrong as that is not the case. With this part of the statement you were implying in democracies parties are elected to power and then they chose the leader. As I said this is not the case. It is hard to see how this line could bre interpreted differnetly. I did understand that specific statement but I have not replied regarding the rest of your paragraph .Stumink (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 23:13, 26 July 2012 (UTC)

His statement is 100% correct. For example, in 2006, after the election the Conservative Party of Canada elected its leader as the new Prime Minister. Poyani (talk) 14:02, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
  • Democratically elected : In Wikipedia we are not going to use mathematical accuracy : such words of Democracy and election , as other terms of sociology , does not have precise meanings . We can't use sophistication in applied pages : In this page , we are going to show the coup was against a popular prime minister of Iran . Technically the US President himself is not directly elected but there is a vote (Electoral vote) by the people which still controls the outcome , so when the the following independent and published sources ([8][9][10][11][12][13]) all refer to Mossadegh as democratically elected , then why are we searching for misleading mathematical accuracy ?--Alborz Fallah (talk) 07:58, 28 July 2012 (UTC)

There are a lot of sources saying he was democratically elected, but there are a lot saying appointed or named as in the sources listed up the page. Stumink (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 09:42, 28 July 2012 (UTC)

  • Use both Appointed and Democratically elected.
    • "Appointed" because as Binksternet says there was no election he won prior to his appointment. (Let me quote another editor "Why does the introduction refer to Mossadegh as elected? He was chosen by the Shah and approved by the vote of parliament. Same holds for all other prime ministers of the Pahlavi era. The term elected creates the impression that he was actually directly chosen by people's votes, which was not the case. ... As his way of becoming prime minister was exactly the same as all other prime ministers, no special description is necessary anyhow" )
    • "Democratic" because a special description is necessary because A) so many historians and scholars say he was, and B) even if he wasn't technically democratically elected he led a sea change in Iranian politics whereby mass Iranian middle-class participation in politics began and introduced a more free political climate (at least at first before the not-so-democratic 1953 pleblicite), where (for example) opposition parties such as the communist Tudeh party could participate without being harassed.
  • Of course the devil is in the details with something so controversial. How you would use both terms to satisfy a consensus is tricky. Below is a suggestion rewriting:
Of course there would have to be a lot of changes in the body of the article too. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:13, 28 July 2012 (UTC)
I can see something like that working quite well, with the body of the article describing how Mosaddegh was appointed. Binksternet (talk) 16:31, 28 July 2012 (UTC)
Something could be worked out. But instead of wording it that way (around Mossadeq personally) why don't we just state the fact that the coup was against a democratically elected government and leave Mossadeq out of the first sentence. I am guessing no one here is actually claiming that the Majlis was not democratically elected. So instead how about this?
Further to that, wouldn't it just be incredibly silly of us to state that Mossadeq was "appointed" by a vote of 79-12. It should say that he was "elected" by a vote of 79-12. If you want to take out the word "democratically" from Mossadeq's actual premiership, maybe something of that nature can be worked out.Poyani (talk) 18:48, 30 July 2012 (UTC)
  • Comment Regardless of the decision made, the subject should be moved from the first paragraph of the article on Mosaddegh himself. It makes more sense to simply state that he was the prime minister. Mention of how he got into that position can wait until the second paragraph of the lead. -- DanielKlotz (talk · contribs) 15:06, 29 July 2012 (UTC)
Mossadegh being a democratically-elected leader is a very significant fact that cannot be overstated, given the context of the subject, like how he was the only democratically- elected leader Iran has ever had and how he was overthrown in an anti-democratic coup. That's why most of the academic articles and books on this subject, put a lot of emphasis on this fact, and also why the proponents of the coup, want to sweep it under the rug as it doesn't help their narrative. Kurdo777 (talk) 02:59, 30 July 2012 (UTC)
What the hell? Don't call me a proponent of the coup—watch your WP:NPA. The narrative I refer to is from Abbas Milani, one of the most balanced and neutral observers of the coup ever to address it. For crying out loud, the man taught Marxism in Iran for a short time before he was arrested and thrown in prison by the Pahlavi government! How can he be a neo-con Shah-lover who is a proponent of the coup? Answer: he cannot.
Mosaddegh was not then and is still not now the only democratically elected prime minister of Iran. Other prime ministers were nominated, approved and appointed the same way he was. Binksternet (talk) 16:35, 30 July 2012 (UTC)
As far as I know there have been no other Prime Ministers (other than Mossadeq) in Iranian history which (for the sake of balance let's say) "obtained" the position of Prime Minister, by being voted in by a democratically elected Majlis. Since the time of the Qajars when Majlis was created, the Shahs or Supreme Leaders have had controls over bodies which could disqualify all candidates (except their favorites) from running. Poyani (talk) 18:42, 30 July 2012 (UTC)
A little too much soapbox here. The lead paragraph should stick to uncontested facts. I see no harm in letting the first paragraph say he was the prime minister and was ousted. The second paragraph can say that he was democratically elected and quickly acknowledge that that statement is contested. -- DanielKlotz (talk · contribs) 17:26, 30 July 2012 (UTC)

The problem is your assumption that "the statement is contested", well it's not. An editor's synthesis of sources, cannot be used to dismiss a factual statement, supported by the vast majority of the academic sources. Kurdo777 (talk) 02:20, 1 August 2012 (UTC)

As much as I agree with you about there being too much soapbox here, Kurdo777 is correct. Mossadeq is more or less only notable these days for the fact that he was democratically elected and later overthrown in a coup planned and sponsored by the United States and the UK. The fact that he was personally overthrown is of little significance. There were numerous Prime Ministers in Iran which were overthrown or killed or assassinated, and most of them have no articles (or a stub) on Wikipedia, are not the subject of discussion among academics and the media, and have long been forgotten. What separates Mossadeq from the bunch is the fact that he was democratically elected. This has very serious significance and implications on the competing narratives of the Cold War and the continued western role in the Persian Gulf states. The notion that Mossadeq was democratically elected is basically unanimous. Binksternet is largely misinterpreting the work of some marginal scholars like Abbas Milani, whose work is considered historical revisionism. But from my point of view, even Milani's work is not being reflected correctly by Binksternet. Milani does not argue that Mossadeq was not democratically elected. He just dances around the issue by pointing out that Mossadeq was appointed by parliament. What he leaves out, is that being appointed by a democratically elected parliament is a form of indirect democratic election. Poyani (talk) 19:01, 30 July 2012 (UTC)
Only dissidents who write for the blog Iranian.com and the same who write for the blog mohammadmossadegh.com (the latter run by Arash Norouzi, a t-shirt graphics artist) have written about what they feel is revisionism by Abbas Milani. Milani is the director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University, and co-director of the Hoover Institution's Iran Democracy Project. The man's credentials are as high as they come. Nobody is higher. Binksternet (talk) 19:37, 30 July 2012 (UTC)
My argument was not that his work is historical revisionism. That is already very obviously true. I am actually shocked that you would even question it. I think if you actually looked up what Historical revisionism was you would very clearly agree with me that Milani's work is historical revisionism. My argument was that it is a fringe theory. That is also certainly undeniable. Scholarship on Mossadeq could be divided between Milani + a handful of others vs the other 99.99% of scholars. Milani's views maybe (perhaps not even) represent 0.01% of scholarship. It is also notable that his work which you chose to extract from, isn't actually about Mossadeq or parliamentary democracy. It is from a biography of the Shah. Mossadeq is just a side-note in his work.
The idea that nobody's credentials are "higher" than Milani is laughable. Credentials for what? For scholarship? I am fairly sure that few would dispute, for example, that Noam Chomsky's credentials are far more notable than Milani. Chomsky is the world's most cited living author, and 8th most cited author in human history (between Freud and Hegel) and you can view his position herePoyani (talk) 21:24, 31 July 2012 (UTC)
Chomsky is no expert on Iran. You've provided no evidence for your claims about Milani, just emotional generalizations and assertions that they are "undeniable" and "can not be questioned".TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 23:48, 31 July 2012 (UTC)
Chomsky does not read Farsi. He has never studied primary source documents written by Iranians for Iranians. Binksternet (talk) 00:08, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
I'm going to say this one more time to both TheTimesAreAChanging and Binksternet. If you actually read what Historical revisionism is you would not contest that Milani is very clearly a historical revisionist. I don't think a reasonable person can dispute that. That aside, you guys seem to continuously moving the goal posts to suit your needs. First of all, I have actually seen nothing here to show that Milani actually states that Mossadeq was not democratically elected. You just seem to be pointing to the fact that he said Mossadeq was "appointed". As I described to you before, all democratically elected prime ministers are appointed. Every single last one of them. There is not a single exception to this rule in all of human history. So your argument is just your misinterpretation of Milani has said. Secondly, I was not bringing up Chomsky so we could use him as a source. I was just trying to show you how ridiculous it is to rank sources based on your personal views on who has better "credentials". Chomsky is an expert on linguistics and political science. Milani is an expert on the Shah. And Kitzner is an expert on Mossadeq and the coup. Whichever personal metrics you use to rank them, Milani is not coming up on top (which is irrelevant since I don't think his work even support your position). Poyani (talk) 22:13, 2 August 2012 (UTC)

Abbas Milani is not really regarded as a notable historian of Iran or a widely-cited expert on the coup, unlike Ervand Abrahamian and others who have written extensively on the coup for decades. Milani started to gain some fame in certain corners, very recently, after he wrote a book which was a very sympathetic biography of the Shah. Saying Milani's opinions, which are fringe claims and contradict mainstream academic accounts of the coup as well the open-source evidence that's available about the coup [14], are somehow more noteworthy, because he was once a Marxist and thought Marxism in Iran ages ago, is like saying David Horowitz is a great source on American history, because he was once a Marxist in the US. People change, sometimes dramatically as is the case here, when they get older. Another former Iranian Communist recently made a movie celebrating Shah's family.(The Queen and I (film)) Kurdo777 (talk) 02:20, 1 August 2012 (UTC)

"... Abbas Milani is not really regarded as a notable historian of Iran ... Milani's opinions, which are fringe claims and contradict mainstream academic accounts of the coup as well the open-source evidence that's available about the coup [15] ... ". Not true.
when you go to "the open-source evidence" link -- an essay subtitled: "A response to Abbas Milani's `The Great Satan Myth`" -- you find Dr. Abbas Milani, described as "a leading Iranian-American scholar, lecturer and author ...." The article goes on to accuse him of creating a "deceptive, revionist narrative" but it's not exactly verifying your statement that Milani is "not really regarded as a notable historian of Iran". --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:33, 25 September 2012 (UTC)
There is no need to debate that essay; it is not a reliable source because it is a blog published by a non-notable t-shirt artist. Instead, we ignore that essay. Binksternet (talk) 19:13, 25 September 2012 (UTC)
Wow, did you really cut down Milani and boost up mohammadmossadegh.com in the same sentence? Absolutely amazing. The website mohammadmossadegh.com is a blog run by a graphic artist who makes t-shirts! Abbas Milani is a highly respected scholar at one of the USA's top universities! If this is your rebuttal of Milani then your argument has gone off the rails.
Welcome to the new mainstream. Milani's scholarly writings have reshuffled the deck, especially when taken in concert with previous research by George Lenczowski and the recent book by Darioush Bayandor. Those who accept the CIA's "leaked" documents as truth are out of date, or they are scrambling to explain disjointed and contrary facts. Those like Milani who dismiss the CIA's own "official" version and instead work from immediate reports and diary entries are having more success in explaining the confusing nature of the coup. Binksternet (talk) 03:51, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
Who said anything about mohammadmossadegh.com, let alone "boost it up"? I'm not using that site as a source on the article. I linked it in the discussion here for the sources cited there, the site and who runs it, is irrelevant when there are secondary academic sources cited there. As for Bayandor, he was a diplomat of the Shah's regime, Lenczowski was an associate/friend of Shah too, they're not independent academics, both were involved with Shah and his regime. Welcome to new mainstream? Milani's writings have reshuffled the deck? All because you say so? I'm sorry but this not how Wikpedia works. You are not the one who determines what is the "new mainstream" unless you have proof that the scholarly community, as a whole, has reviewed these new fringe ideas and theories, and has determined them to be the new mainstream, which is not the case here. The credentials of Milani or Bayandor though is beside the point of our present discussion as neither of them explicitly says "Mossadegh was not democratically elected", and you're making a synthesis of their various arguments, to make a point that they do not actually make. Saying Mossadegh was "named Prime Minster" or "appointed Prime Minster" does not, in any way, contradict the fact that he was democratically-elected. That assertion, that he wasn't democratically-elected, is your own WP:OR. Kurdo777 (talk) 05:13, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
You have not been able to explain so far the exact process by which Mosaddegh was democratically elected. This is because there is no such description. No sources describe how Mosaddegh might have been one of several candidates among which the Majlis selected Mosaddegh as the best. This is because it did not happen that way. All of the sources which use the phrase "democratically elected" use it without describing the process. The ones that mention Jamal Emami as the nominator are the ones that have enough useful detail to describe the actual process. Once the process is described it is very clear that Mosaddegh was nominated by Jamal Emami, approved by the parliament on the same day, then appointed by the Shah the next day by signature. This was a return to a style of naming a prime minister that had not been used for 2.5 years. It was not a completely new method or a unique one. Binksternet (talk) 13:30, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
Regarding your link to an article published on mohammadmossadegh.com, I have completely ignored it as a valid argument and I recommend others do as well. The article is by Arash Norouzi who sells t-shirt art, not by a scholar who studies 1950s Iran. At the bottom of your linked article it even says "Arash Norouzi is an artist and co-founder of The Mossadegh Project." What is this project? A self-published blog! Not a scholarly effort by any stretch. There is no comparison at all to someone of Milani's stature and accomplishments. Binksternet (talk) 13:37, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
Milani references Darioush Bayandor's book, Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited, on page 459 of his own "finely wrought" scholarly biography, The Shah. Bayandor's publisher, Palgrave Macmillan, is a well-known imprint for scholarly works. Bayandor is not the pariah you try to make of him. Binksternet (talk) 16:29, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
There is a lot of discussion about whether prime ministers in parliamentary democracies can be considered to have been "democratically elected". Binksternet argues that they cannot, because technically they are appointed by the head of state. The fact that they usually lead the party that has a majority of democratically elected deputies is irrelevant. Could Binksternet please provide a source about Mossadegh that makes this interesting argument. TFD (talk) 15:31, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
Let's look at your premise that Iran's prime ministers were majority party leaders. What political party was being led by Hossein Ala', the guy preceding Mosaddegh? None... he had been Iran's Ambassador to the USA. How about the guy before that—Haj Ali Razmara? No party affiliation. Going back further, there's Ali Mansur, a member of the minority Revival Party (not the majority party). Before him was Mohammad Sa'ed of the Democratic Party of Iran (HDI), not the majority party. See how this is going? Before Sa'ed was Abdolhossein Hazhir of the Liberal Party. I don't know whether this party was the majority in 1948. Before that was Ebrahim Hakimi of the Party for Progress; again I don't know who was in the majority at that time but this party was often in power. Binksternet (talk) 16:05, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
As far as I can make out the case against calling Mosaddegh "democratically elected" is not that "prime ministers in parliamentary democracies can [not] be considered to have been `democratically elected`", it's that there was no national parliamentary election that brought him to power. He was voted prime minister by parliament April 29 1951, following the assassination (in March) of the previous prime minister (General Haj Ali Razmara), not any popular election. There was an election 8 or 9 months later in early 1952 and it did not take away Mosaddegh's majority. But (AFAICT) it was not noted for some new expanded franchise or impartial counting that would have made Mosaddegh the first "truly democratically elected" PM, but for controversy over the cutting short of vote count so that reactionary provincial MPs did not get a seat in the majlis.
"Realizing that the opposition would take the vast majority of the provincial seats, Mosaddeq stopped the voting as soon as 79 deputies - just enough to form a parliamentary quorum - had been elected." [Abrahamian, 1982, p.268-9] Mosaddeq asserts that `foreign agents` have been exploiting the election campaign with bribes to destabilize Iran, and thus `the supreme national interests of the country necessitate the suspension of elections." [Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003) p.137]
What was new and notable about Mosaddegh's entry into power (and arguably made him the first democratic-era Prime Minister, if not the first "democratically elected" PM) was the mass participation on behalf of him and his issue -- oil nationalization. There were big strikes, riots, and demonstrations in favor of nationalization and against the British.
So please, let's try to stick to facts from WP:RS and not proclaim that this source has "fringe ideas and theories" and that source is the "mainstream academic account" without backing claims up with evidence. --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:55, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
Binksternet, are you now claiming that the prime ministers of the UK, Canada, and Australia, who are appointed by an hereditary monarch, are democratically elected, but that Mossadeqh, who was also appointed by an hereditary monarch, was not? do you have any sources explaining the difference? TFD (talk) 00:03, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
No, I am not. Appointed PMs are not democratically elected. Binksternet (talk) 00:31, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
All Prime Ministers are appointed. There are no Prime Ministers on earth who are not appointed by their parliaments. Poyani (talk) 21:56, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
It seems that I was wrong. Apparently, Japan is the one rare country which actually elects its Prime Minister from popular vote. I guess that is the only parliamentary democracy you recognize in the world. All the parliamentary nations of Europe must be dictatorships according to you since they all appoint their Prime Ministers. Poyani (talk) 22:22, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
Look at the article on Margaret Thatcher: "She became prime minister after winning the 1979 general election.... re-election in 1983. Thatcher was re-elected for a third term in 1987...." It seems standard usage in Wikipedia and if you want to change it, I suggest a policy change, rather than your arguing your interesting point of constitutional law in thousands of articles. Or do you only care about this specific PM? TFD (talk) 01:20, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
The difference is that Thatcher came to power in 1979 along with a new Conservative majority in the UK Parliament, the change coming as the result of a general election. Iran had no general election to bring in Mosaddegh. There was no change in the makeup of the parliament, no change of party balance, no seats won or lost. Iran did not have the tradition of the British, that the PM was always from the majority party, and must change when the majority changed. Binksternet (talk) 05:10, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
First of all, this rule about how long a person can wait after an election to be elected by a parliament to be considered "democratically elected", is just your original research. You will simply not see it anywhere else because it does not exist. Many democratically elected Prime Ministers are elected by parliament much after an election.
For example, there also no "change in the makeup of the parliament, no change of party balance, no seats won or lost" when Gordon Brown and John Major became British Prime Ministers. They were elected using the 'exact same' mechanism as Mossadeq. Through an Indirect election in a democratically elected parliament.
John Major's article specifically states "He was named Leader of the Conservative Party on 27 November 1990, and was summoned to Buckingham Palace and appointed Prime Minister the following day." Should we change the history books to say the UK was not a democracy during his rule? Poyani (talk) 21:54, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
That's ridiculous. Nobody here is saying the UK was not democratic under some PM. By bringing in comparisons to other countries you have muddied the waters and added to the inordinate length of the RfC. Too many good contributors will look at all of this and dismiss it thinking "too long for me". Binksternet (talk) 00:44, 3 August 2012 (UTC)
Let's return to discussing Iran and only Iran. Nobody doubts that the government of Iran under Mosaddegh was a democratic one. Nobody doubts that the members of parliament (the Majlis and the Senate) were not duly elected by general election in most cases and by indirect election in the case of half the Senate. This was how the parliament operated before Mosaddegh, and how it operated after Mosaddegh, except that he got rid of the Senate while he was in office. He was, however, appointed to office, and his Cabinet was appointed to office. He was in charge of a democratic government, most of whom were democratically elected. The final twist to the story is that Mosaddegh resigned from office on July 16, 1952, following which the Shah filled the empty position by appointing Ahmad Ghavam to the premiership. The Tudeh Party and the National Front called for demonstrations to be held July 21, and the Iranian people rallied massively in support that day. Ghavam resigned around 4pm and thousands marched to Mosaddegh's house around 7pm. The Shah re-appointed Mosaddegh as PM. Dartmouth Sociologist Misagh Parsa writes that "Stiff opposition from the royal court and in the Majles continued to plague Mosaddegh" during the next year he was in office. Abolghasem Khan Bakhtiari started a rebellion "to give the impression of instability", according to Parsa. In late April 1953, Mosaddegh's enemies killed and mutilated the Tehran chief of police who Mosaddegh had appointed. Formerly friendly members of the Majlis abandoned Mosaddegh regarding the issue of nationalization, and also because of his stated intent to print money to prop up the government. Mosaddegh's reduced band of supporters resigned the Majlis. Mosaddegh called for a general election in early August 1953 to dissolve the Majlis, and he won the issue by an amazing margin with 99.9 to 1 voting results, though election fraud was claimed by opponents. (This was not an election to settle whether he was PM or not.) The Shah therefore dissolved the Majlis and set new elections for August 15, 1953. The day after the elections, a military coup by royalist officers was attempted against Mosaddegh, but it failed, according to Misagh Parsa. This is the active beginning of the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. Mosaddegh ordered the army into the streets to restore order, a mistake because his own Tudeh supporters were pushed off the street where they could not help stop what happened next. Parsa says, "once the military was in control it promptly carried out another coup d'état, which was successful. The overthrow of the government was engineered in part by Kermit Roosevelt, a CIA officer who later became the vice-president of Gulf Oil. Mosaddegh was removed from office through the joint efforts of high-ranking Iranian officers and a fraction of the clergy, along with well-paid thugs, all of whom were financed, equipped, and supported by the United States government." Parsa writes: "Thus, the forces supporting the status quo were triumphant, and Iran's 'democratic' experiment, which had been accompanied by great popular mobilization and struggle, came to an abrupt end." In this sentence, Parsa acknowledges that there was a democratic feeling to the things Mosaddegh was doing, however the specific description of elections, votes and appointments shows that Mosaddegh was an appointed PM at every step of his premiership including at the end when he was ousted by coup. Binksternet (talk) 00:44, 3 August 2012 (UTC)
Would you be okay with this wording?
The 1953 Iranian coup d'état (known in Iran as the 28 Mordad coup) was the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Iran, lead by Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh on 19 August 1953 ...
If so then let's just reach consensus and move on. FYI - After Mossadeq the ministers were never elected in quite the same way. A large number of political parties were banned by the Shah from participating in elections. Poyani (talk) 20:16, 3 August 2012 (UTC)
Well, it doesn't match what happened historically. The Iranian Senate was established in 1950 as composed half of general election senators and the other half as indirectly elected senators. Mosaddegh dissolved the Senate in late 1952, the beginning of the end of Iran's democratic government. He then threw out the democratically elected Majlis in late July 1953, causing the Shah to declare a new general election. Whoever was elected on 15 August 1953 did not get a chance to rule because on 16 August the coup started against Mosaddegh. The coup did not target the Majlis, just Mosaddegh, and in later repercussions, his closest supporters. What I'm demonstrating is that Mosaddegh had already contributed his share to the downfall of democracy in Iran. The coup did not target democracy, just Mosaddegh. Binksternet (talk) 21:18, 3 August 2012 (UTC)
Is that your synthesis or is that based on RS? The causes of the coup are discussed at length in the article and nowhere does it say that the the coup was specifically targeting democracy (whatever that means). However, I will mention again that what makes this coup notable is that it is cited specifically by an enormous body of research in the available RS for overturning a democratic government. I am aware that there is a fringe theory among mostly former members of the regime and a tiny sliver of scholars that there was no coup, or that Mossadeq was not democratically elected, and that all the declassified CIA and US government documents and US government official admissions of the coup are a conspiracy, but that should not be the lead for the article. Poyani (talk) 20:23, 7 August 2012 (UTC)
It should also be noted that Mossadeq conspiracies are a-dime-a-dozen. I noted before, if you want to start a section for the conspiracies and fringe theories, that is another idea which could be discussed. Milani's theories are just one set of conspiracies. The official Royalist position to this day is that there was no coup. The Iranian government's position (often disingenuously misrepresented by Milani) was that Mossadeq was a British agent which lead the coup against Ayatollah Kashani. The reverse has to be Ray Takeyh, another person equal in Milani in credentials, who claims that coup was not carried out by the CIA at all, but rather by the clerics. And lets not forget the Shah's own conspiracy theory (published in his memoirs) that Mossadeq was actually an agent of "foreign governments". The vast majority mainstream scholarship on the coup considers it a notable event because it was a coup by the CIA against a democratically elected government, implemented to reverse the nationalization of Iranian oil, a position which was democratically supported by the Iranian population. Poyani (talk) 20:46, 7 August 2012 (UTC)
You are arguing against nobody here. I am not putting forward any sort of theory that Mosaddegh was a paid agent. Instead, I am demonstrating that an unconnected group of scholars and diplomats have independently written about the coup and that they all disagree with the old mainstream narrative. The new narrative as championed by Abbas Milani (who you will not be able to dismiss or sideline) is a more complex story, harder to tell than good vs evil, black and white absolutes. There were shifting alliances and double dealings. There were people with very complex motivations. There were divisions within parties, divisions among clerics. The end result is a more encompassing story of the coup, one that does not support a simplistic statement such as "democratically elected" as applied to the prime minister. One that does not support the notion that Mosaddegh was entirely noble and good; a martyred hero of democracy. Mosaddegh was inconsistent with the idea of constitutional law and he was grasping for greater power. He made smart decisions and stupid mistakes. Near the end, he was losing his support in parliament, and his base of popular support was fickle—the members of the National Front and the Tudeh did not agree with each other. There were strong internal factors that had a bearing on the coup, but this article does not give them proper weight. Binksternet (talk) 21:41, 7 August 2012 (UTC)
♦ Democratically Elected: Documents, both official and secret, from the U.S. State Department Background Notes, MidEast and TPAJAX consider Mossadegh as democratically elected.
That said, I think Poyani's suggestion is also workable: "The 1953 Iranian coup d'état (known in Iran as the 28 Mordad coup) was the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Iran, lead (sic) by Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh on 19 August 1953 ..." --Misha Atreides (talk) 13:30, 13 August 2012 (UTC)
I pointed out the US State Department's background notes of 2011 in my above list of sources. Why focus on just one of those, when there are many saying the opposite? Regarding the TPAJAX notes, what I saw in them was a concern that "the Mossadeq government... was disregarding the Iranian constitution in prolonging Premier Mohammed Mossadeq's tenure of office... It was the aim of the TPAJAX project to cause the fall of the Mossadeq government..." I did not see where "democratically elected" shows up. Even if it is in there, these notes have been called into question by Abbas Milani who doubts many of the facts found in the CIA's self-serving history. Binksternet (talk) 14:35, 13 August 2012 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ The date of the coup in the Persian calendar.
  2. ^ CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORY: OVERTHROW OF PREMIER MOSSADEQ OF IRAN, Mar. 1954: p iii.
  3. ^ U.S. foreign policy in perspective: clients, enemies and empire. David Sylvan, Stephen Majeski, p.121.
  4. ^ The date of the coup in the Persian calendar.
  5. ^ CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORY: OVERTHROW OF PREMIER MOSSADEQ OF IRAN, Mar. 1954: p iii.
  6. ^ U.S. foreign policy in perspective: clients, enemies and empire. David Sylvan, Stephen Majeski, p.121.
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.