Talk:Übermensch/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Weak citation

I would point out that one of the few cited secondary sources, Pamornpol Jinatichra, is, according to his own "Online CV" (PDF). (40.9 KiB), a Ph.D. candidate in electrical engineering. All of his advanced formal education is in technical fields. Sounds like an impressive guy & all, but no more citable on this than any other bright person…like the ones contributing to this article. Which is to say, not really any more a reliable source than a Wikipedian's original research. - Jmabel | Talk 06:37, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

I saw that - I hoped that he got that somewhere else, but the author isn't named so I wouldn't know for sure. It seems to be a reference to the list of 50 'higher men' Nietzsche gave in, I think, Twilight of the Idols, so it isn't "really" necessary. It's good for an external link, though. --GoodIntentions^talk 02:30, 31 August 2006 (UTC)

Word of advice on Nietzsche battles

First of all: do not assume that anyone's interpretation is WRONG. This would be againts the fundamental spirit of Neitzcheian philosophy. Gather as many interpretatation as you can (if you go to a decent university library, you can find literally hundreds!!) without getting carried away. Noone really KNOWS what Neitzhe was trying to say: this again would violate the spirit of his philosophy. Just make sure that all interpreatations stay withing some general realm of plausibility and authorititaiveness (he WAS an atheist, for example) and document every sentence with reliable sources (even though most of them are wrong) --Francesco Franco 10:16, 2 October 2006 (UTC)

"document every sentence with reliable sources (even though most of them are wrong)" A most sensible thing to say --GoodIntentions^talk 01:26, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

The citation is indeed weak. I'll try to find a better one. VikRandell 04:02, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

Cart firmly before the horse

From the article: "In Fyodor Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, the main character, Raskolnikov, considers himself to be an Übermensch of sorts, and brazenly commits an act of murder, feeling the normal rules of morality do not apply to him."

Nietzsche was an avid reader of Dostoevsky, whom he read in French translation. Dostoevsky presumably never so much as heard of Nietzsche. - Jmabel | Talk 05:28, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Roughly 3 days, no response, removing. If someone wants to add something well-cited about Dostoevsky's influence on Nietzsche as it relates to this concept, that would be a useful addition. - Jmabel | Talk 00:42, 15 November 2006 (UTC)

Oh, I just saw this now. I'm the one who added the Crime and Punishment bit. I thought Dostoevsky was commenting on Nietzche with the book, but apparently not. A short web search turned up this, though, from Cliff's Notes: "Dostoevsky had also apparently encountered other views of the Superman or Ubermensch—views that were not yet formulated in any coherent whole but were heard wherever intellectuals gathered." [1] What do you think? Korny O'Near 16:11, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

Actually, the link I just found for Leopold and Loeb discusses Crime and Punishment too: "the idea did not actually originate with Nietzsche, as many imagine. He merely articulated something already in the air during the century in which he lived... [Dostoevsky] was responding to the intellectual idea that some people are above the social conventions of morality, grounded in the ideas about the hierarchy of masters and slaves proposed by philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel." [2] If it's true that it originated with Hegel, this seems important enough to include elsewhere in the article. Korny O'Near 16:23, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

The quotes you've given us just show a very particular understanding of Hegel, not to say a misunderstanding. To say that Hegel's dialectic of slave & master justify "the intellectual idea that some people are above the social conventions of morality" needs some sources and argumenting, as it is a most surprising reading of Hegel (who certainly didn't reinvidicate himself, as did Nietzsche, as an "immoralist"). Furthermore, although one can readily bet that Nietzsche has read Hegel (to which extent?) and has thus been "influenced" by him, this relationship is in no way a master-disciple one. Gilles Deleuze — who, you might point out, has been criticized on this point — claimed that Nietzsche's philosophy was primary an "anti-hegelianism" (see Deleuze, Nietzsche and philosophy). Kant & Schopenhauer are more obvious references for Nietzsche, but both were also strongly criticized (Kant for his conception of a "thing-in-itself" and Schopenhauer for his metaphysical conception of the will, as being single & united; whilst Nietzsche's will to power is complex, plural and not singular — and is neither a psychological faculty, nor a cosmogonic force). Lapaz 15:06, 30 November 2006 (UTC)

Well, I think the quote is making a reasonable point; I think you're misunderstanding it. The point is that Hegel simply came up with the idea that humanity has both a "slave consciousness" and a "master consciousness"; he didn't try to justify it, or argue that people should live their lives differently as a result of it: that was the work of later philosophers, including Nietzsche. Essentially he created the language that others used. Korny O'Near 18:13, 1 December 2006 (UTC)

The übermensch theory is a development of the "genius worship" and great man theory which was common in the romantic movement. It is probably some kind of genius theory with roots in romanticism that Dostoyevsky refers to, rather than to Nietzsche. 217.208.31.150 12:46, 23 December 2006 (UTC)

To pretend Nietzsche made an apology of the great man is a gross misunderstanding, criticized by many philosophers, among them Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida in their respective works on Nietzsche. Maybe this extract from Thus Spoke Zarathoustra, II, "On Redemption", may shed some light on his conception of what the people calls "great men":

"I see and have seen worse things, and divers things so hideous, that I should neither like to speak of all matters, nor even keep silent about some of them: namely, men who lack everything, except that they have too much of one thing--men who are nothing more than a big eye, or a big mouth, or a big belly, or something else big,--reversed cripples, I call such men.

And when I came out of my solitude, and for the first time passed over this bridge, then I could not trust mine eyes, but looked again and again, and said at last: "That is an ear! An ear as big as a man!" I looked still more attentively--and actually there did move under the ear something that was pitiably small and poor and slim. And in truth this immense ear was perched on a small thin stalk--the stalk, however, was a man! A person putting a glass to his eyes, could even recognise further a small envious countenance, and also that a bloated soullet dangled at the stalk. The people told me, however, that the big ear was not only a man, but a great man, a genius. But I never believed in the people when they spake of great men--and I hold to my belief that it was a reversed cripple, who had too little of everything, and too much of one thing."

(bolden by me, Lapaz)

Magneto?

The Magneto reference at the end seems to based on a complete misunderstanding of Uebermensch. Superpowers have nothing to do with it. As I understand it, XMen actually intends Magneto's philosophy to resemble Malcolm X (with Dr X as MLK) and not Nietzsche. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 67.40.17.240 (talk) 05:30, 8 December 2006 (UTC).

I agree. I think that Ra's Al Gul is a better candidate.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 67.39.138.226 (talk • contribs) 23 December 2006.

I have removed this line as being unrelated to the topic. VikRandell 03:59, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

What?

I think you have to be Übermensch to understand this article. Szzuk 22:23, 13 January 2007 (UTC)

I agree...the introduction especially reminds me of something one of my first year philosophy student friends might write. I'm going to have a think about what we could replace it with, because it's really awkward to read (even more so than you could legitimately expect a philosophy article to be!) Moonpilot 19:51, 26 June 2007 (UTC)moonpilot

Manusmriti ?

Not much about influences on Nietzsche. The articles on Superman, Übermensch, and Manusmriti / Hindu ideas of 'superman'... shouldn't they link up? Hakluyt bean 18:50, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

I'm not sure what you mean. The article on Manusmriti doesn't mention anything about "Hindu ideas of 'superman'," and I don't think it had much of an influence on Nietzsche. While the superhero Superman may have originally been inspired by Nietzsche's Übermensch, this was abandoned early enough, and the two are distinct enough, that I think merging the articles would create more confusion that it would resolve. What did you have in mind? RJC ^Talk 19:29, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

You're right, the manusmriti article doesn't say much, maybe I should have posted there. Here it looks like Übermensch is a pure invention of Nietzsche, and by implication the Germans, which hindsight might persuade us is true, but as I understand it Nietzsche was steeped in Hindu philosophy and one traces the idea of overman from the caste system, the Brahmin caste, and reincarnation. Separately I didn't mean to infer merging articles, just having articles reference each other. Otherwise it looks like all these things spontaneously occurred, and in complete isolation. Hakluyt bean 15:18, 20 February 2007 (UTC)

C.S. Lewis' The Abolition of Man

The title The Abolition of Man indeed seems to suggest that Lewis is talking about the Übermensch. But I think he's not. Lewis argues against rationalism, against losing touch with human proportions and emotions. In a way that is surpassing humanity, but surpassing it by force of reason specifically, which isn't really compatible with Nietzsches view of impulsive human creativity and innovation. I'm sure Lewis doesn't support the idea of the Übermensch, but The Abolition of Man is not an attack against it. Renke 23:13, 20 February 2007 (UTC)

Needs a definition

The page is awkward because it doesn't make any statement about what the Ubermensch is. In any good encyclopedia article, you start out with "The Ubermensch is THIS"...or "The Ubermensch is a concept created by Nietzsche that is believed to represent THESE things..." Starting out with "The Ubermensch was discussed by Nietzsche blahblah" makes for a weak and awkward article. 69.224.166.32 16:01, 28 April 2007 (UTC)EGarrett

Liberal Environmentalist Obfuscation

The view of the Ubermensch presented here is quasi-Marxist and un-Nietzschean. For Nietzsche, there is no dualistic separation of the biological from the spiritual. Rudiger Safranski is honest enough to really present Nietzsche's anti-modernist, radical-conservative, eugenic-racialist doctrine:

Safranski, Rudiger (trans. Shelley Frisch). Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography. Norton, 2002:

"The Uebermensch's mastery of self-configuration is not the only issue here. There are also biologistic overtones in Zarathustra's speeches, especially when he explains that man in his current form evolved from the ape, but that there is still too much of the ape in him and too much laziness, which wants to revert to the animal kingdom. Man is a creature in transition. He is still in flux between the ape from which he originated and the Uebermensch into which he may evolve ...

Nietzsche was thoroughly familiar with his contemporaries' ideas on biological breeding and evolution. While in Sils-Maria in the summer of 1881, he had sent for literature on this subject. He would have had to be completely ignorant of the widespread trend of biological evolutionary thought spurred by Darwinism to have escaped its influence. Despite all of his criticism of the specifics of Darwinism, Nietzsche was unable to extricate himself entirely from the powerful implications of this theory...

The statements that introduce the Uebermensch in Zarathustra are inconceivable without Darwin: 'You have made your way from worm to man, and much in you is still worm' (4, 14; Z First Part, Prologue 3).

The metaphoric style of presentation in Zarathustra only hints at its biologistic contents. In his notebooks from the period of Zarathustra, Nietzsche was more forthright. He wrote that the 'goal' was the 'evolution of the entire body and not just of the brain' (10, 506). Overt references to the specifics of the physical evolution of man would have been ill-suited to the pathos of Zarathustra's speeches. Ought Zarathustra to have said something about, for instance, the quantity of hair, musculature, arm length, or head size of the Uebermensch? This would have been unintentionally comical. In matters concerning the physical appearance of the Uebermensch, Zarathustra confines himself to this advice for those contemplating marriage: 'Do not REproduce yourself, bur rather produce UPWARD! May the garden of marriage help you to do this' (4, 90; Z First Part, 'On Child and Marriage') ...

What this 'upward' means for biology remains vague, but Zarathustra leaves no doubt that the "far too many" should not be allowed to reproduce indiscriminately. 'Far too many live, and far too long they hang on their branches. If only a storm would come to shake all of this rot and worm-eaten decay from the tree!' (4, 94; Z First Part, 'On Free Death'). Rampant reproduction must be stopped. Chance and the power of the great masses must not continue to have the upper hand ... This declaration could be seen as an incitement to kill the weak and infirm before they could reproduce. Nietzsche did harbor thoughts of this kind in fits of fury and rage about what he considered a stifling air of banality. In his final writings, Nietzsche would shed his inhibitions, break out of the parable form, and draw conclusions on an open stage: 'Mankind sacrificed en masse so that one single STRONGER species of man might thrive--that WOULD be progress' (GM Second Essay 12), he wrote in On the Genealogy of Morals, and in Ecce Homo we find some notorious pronouncements on the tasks of the future 'party of life.' 'The new party of life, which takes charge of the greatest of all tasks, raising up humanity, including the relentless destruction of all that is degenerate and parasitical, will gain make possible the excess of life on earth from which the Dionysian state must reawaken' (EH 'Birth of Tragedy' 4)...

The internal logic of his thoughts built on a notion Nietzsche had already developed in The Birth of Tragedy, which held that culture is justified by great works and great individuals. If mankind does not exist 'for its own sake, if, rather, the goal lies in its peaks, in the great "individuals," the saints and the artists, it is also permissible to use mankind as material for the production of genius, masterpieces, or even the Uebermensch. And if the masses are more of a hindrance, space has to be created--by getting rid of the 'degenerates,' if necessary. Even in his fantasies of annihilation, however, Nietzsche was still a highly sensitive soul and hence more amenable to the option that the 'misfits' could offer to 'sacrifice' themselves willingly...

Nietzsche, the critic of ressentiment, was himself full of vengeance toward the common man of ressentiment, wishing to make room for his Uebermensch in Zarathustra by attacking the 'far too many.' He felt surrounded by those 'last people' who have their 'little pleasures' for the day and the night who 'blinkingly' contrive the joy of work. To such people, the lofty and sublime are just plain boring: 'What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star? Thus asks the last man and blinks' (Z First Part Prologue 5). This is a burden that prevents man from soaring upward. Nietzsche responded with fantasies of annihilation. He, the Uebermensch, with whom they will all come face to face. Woe unto them...

-- 63.3.10.2 (talk) 07:25, 27 May 2007 (signed by RJC ^Talk)

The reasoning behind this comment seems more a violation of NPOV than a reason to tag the article for such a violation. I will remove the tag from the article until a better justification for it is offered. RJC ^Talk 17:15, 27 May 2007 (UTC)

Eugenics?! Wow. Rudiger Safranski reminds me of that creature they referred to as "Zarathustra's Ape", in On Passing By. More like Rudiger Foster-Safranski, as there was clearly no place for such bitterness and hostility in the higher man. Rather than despising the man of ressentiment, the higher man "despise(s) your despising".

They call you my ape, you foaming fool. But I call you my grunting swine: with your grunting you spoil for me my praise of folly. What was it that first made you grunt? That nobody flattered you sufficiently; you sat down to this filth so as to have reason to grunt much--to have reason for much revenge. For all your foaming is revenge, you vain fool; I guessed it well. And even if Zarathustra's words were a thousand times right, still you would do wrong with my words.

Oh Safranski, where one can no longer love, there one should pass by (rather than kill).DBaba 04:04, 11 September 2007 (UTC)

"According to Nietzsche, nature produces the weak and the strong, the advantaged and disadvantaged. There is no benevolent providence and no equitable distribution of chances to get ahead in life. Before this backdrop, morality can be defined as an attempt to even out the 'injustice' of nature and create counterbalances. The power of natural destinies needs to be broken. In Nietzsche's view, Christianity represented an absolutely brilliant attempt to accomplish this aim ... Nietzsche greatly admired the power of Christianity to set values, but he was not grateful to it, because its consideration for the weak and the morality of evening things out impeded the progress and development of a higher stage of mankind.

Nietzsche could envision this higher stage of mankind only as a culmination of culture in its 'peaks of rapture,' which is to say in successful individuals and achievements. The will to power unleashes the dynamics of culmination, but it is also the will to power that forms a moral alliance on the side of the weak. This alliance works at cross-purposes with the goal of culmination and ultimately, in Nietzsche's view, leads to widespread equalization and degeneration. As a modern version of the 'Christian theory of morality,' this alliance forms the backbone of democracy and socialism. Nietzsche adamantly opposed all such movements. For him, the meaning of world history was not happiness and prosperity of the greatest possible number but individual manifestations of success in life. The culture of political and social democracy was a concern of the 'last people,' whom he disparaged. He threw overboard the state-sponsored ethics of the common welfare because he regarded such ethics as an impediment to the self-configuration of great individuals. If, however, the great personalities were to vanish, the only remaining significance of history would be lost in the process. By defending the residual significance of history, Nietzsche assailed democracy and declared what mattered was 'delaying the complete appeasement of the democratic herd-animal'(11,587; WP 125) ... Nietzsche opted against democratic life organized according to the principle of welfare. For him, a world of that sort would signal the triumph of the human herd animal...

If we are content to regard this highly personal philosophy and these maneuvers of self-configuration with fascination and perhaps even admiration, but are not willing to abandon the idea of democracy and justice, it is likely that Nietzsche would have accused us of feeble compromise, indecisiveness, and epitomizing the ominous 'blinking' of the 'last men.'" Safranski, Rudiger (trans. Shelley Frisch), Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography, Norton, 2002, pp. 296-298. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.3.10.2 (talk) 13:41, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

As per your recent Safranski addition, the entry already suggests in its opening "that one man is above another at any given point in time, that equality among humans is myth and the product of a depraved Christian slave morality." You seem to have quoted Safranski articulating precisely the same thing. Is Safranski also "quasi-Marxist"?

the 'goal' was the 'evolution of the entire body and not just of the brain' (10, 506). Overt references to the specifics of the physical evolution of man would have been ill-suited to the pathos of Zarathustra's speeches. Ought Zarathustra to have said something about, for instance, the quantity of hair, musculature, arm length, or head size of the Uebermensch? This would have been unintentionally comical.

Did Safranski really write this? What weirdness. Nietzsche didn't say anything about ideal arm length or head size, because he didn't want to sound "unintentionally comical"? So if he could have said it in a way that wasn't laughably stupid, he would have. That he hasn't ever said such a thing, that is where we as scholars come into the picture! DBaba 15:21, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

The anonymous user who posted the comment you're responding to posted an identical comment on several other Nietzsche-related talk pages. I suspect that s/he's trolling. RJC ^Talk 04:07, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

Mencken and Leftist Distortion

As regards super-trendy left-wing corruption and whitewashing of Nietzsche,see H.L. Mencken's The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (1908) for a fearless, harshly honest portrayal before the egalitarian demagogues and the "post-modern industry" appropriated Nietzsche for their own "civil rights" and anarchistic purposes:

"Nietzsche opposed squarely both the demand for peace and the demand for equality...he believed that war was not only necessary, but also beneficial, and that the natural system of castes was not only beneficent, but also inevitable. In the demand for universal peace he saw only the yearning of the weak and useless for protections against the righteous exploitation of the useful and strong. In the demand for equality he saw only the same thing. ... [Nietzsche's] ideal was an aristocracy which regarded the proletariat merely as a conglomeration of draft animals made to be driven, enslaved and exploited" (Mencken, 162-63).

It seems a gross abuse of scholarly equity that interpreters like Safranski, Mencken, etc. are not given fair recognition in the articles and fringe-left activists arbitrarily decide their own weird, neutralizing interpretation as the only acceptable one. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.3.10.2 (talk) 08:50, 16 September 2007 (UTC)

Falsity of Leftwing Democratic Nietzsche

http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/archives/vol6no2/NietzschereviewTOQV6N2.pdf

[...]

Nonetheless, some in today’s left-dominated “post-modernist” academia have a more open-ended view. Homosexual Marxist philosopher and famed sadomasochist Michel Foucault, for example, insisted there was no single Nietzschean philosophy. He suggested the right question to ask was, “What serious use can we make of Nietzsche?”3 Taking Foucault’s apparently political invitation to heart, some Nietzsche scholars have decided to paint their left wing politics with a Nietzschean brush, claiming his pedigree for a variety of left-wing causes on behalf of the “oppressed,” even Communism.

In the 1970s, Tracy Strong, now professor of political science at the University of California in San Diego, suggested that Communist China and Cuba represent the “the very Nietzschean proposition of creating ‘new men.’”4 Referring to any Communist society as Nietzschean flies in the face of Nietzsche’s frequent denunciations of egalitarianism and socialism as manifestations of what he regarded as slave morality. Unfortunately, that sort of misinterpretation and mischaracterization appears throughout Nietzsche scholarship today, and seems to go unchallenged. While not every philosophy scholar is willing to go so far as to describe Communists as Nietzschean social experimenters, some deliberately attempt to minimize or camouflage those parts of Nietzsche’s writings that contradict or undermine the egalitarian and left-wing ideologies that pervade America’s university system.

Strong himself nearly admitted as much elsewhere: [T]hose on the democratic left who have been attracted to Nietzsche and have wanted to enlist his thought in their projects have done so by arguing that, while Nietzsche’s thought is not (really) political, his thought provides material for developing a new progressive politics. Such interpretations thus conclude that it is necessary to set aside Nietzsche’s particular political judgments.5 But even Strong’s candid assessment of his colleagues is accompanied by a bit of camouflage of his own. “It is hard, on the face of it,” he writes, “to find in Nietzsche support for liberal egalitarian democracy in any of its modern incarnations.”6 As an understatement, the remark is breathtaking. It is akin to suggesting that it is hard to find in Martin Luther King’s works any support for Southern slavery. The phrase “it is hard to find” implies that it might be found if one only looks hard enough. In truth, however, it is hard to find because it isn’t there.

Undermining Nietzsche’s antiegalitarian views by trying to diminish or minimize their significance appears to be common. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, authors of numerous books and essays on Nietzsche, have tried, for example, to dismiss a central tenet of Nietzsche’s antiegalitarianism by asserting “Nietzsche clearly intended the Übermensch as a fiction…”7 Walter Kaufmann, evidently embarrassed by Nietzsche’s seeming Aryan racialism in his explicit glorification of “the magnificent blond beast” described as mastering Europe, tried to explain away the reference by claiming that the blondness refers symbolically to the tawny lion, a metaphor used in Thus Spake Zarathustra to signify creative destruction.8 Kaufmann also dismissed Nietzsche’s decidedly politically incorrect views of women as “philosophically irrelevant.”9

Close examination of Nietzsche’s texts reveals the weaknesses in these claims. Solomon and Higgins argue that since Nietzsche was not a Darwinian, the Übermensch must not be a biological notion, and that Thus Spake Zarathustra (a fictionalized presentation of Nietzsche’s ideas) is the only text in which the idea is seriously addressed.

While it is true that he did not accept all of Darwin’s theory of evolution, Nietzsche’s concern with a higher type of man, and the idea of breeding the higher type in both a eugenic and psychological/cultural sense, emerged early in his writing career and remained an important part of his philosophy.

The Übermensch is indeed a “fiction” in the sense that such a being does not yet exist, but Nietzsche repeatedly urged its pursuit as a goal. As early as “Schopenhauer As Educator,” which appears in Untimely Meditations, his second book, Nietzsche calls for the creation of conditions under which “the individual higher exemplar, the more uncommon, more powerful, more complex, more fruitful” man can emerge.10 This was not yet the Übermensch of Zarathustra, but its beginnings are there, and Nietzsche remained committed to the concept throughout his life. In a notebook of 1885, the year he completed part 4 of Zarathustra, he wrote of the need to create a new morality “whose intention is to breed a ruling caste – the future masters of the earth” who are described as “a new species and caste of masters” who are the logical result of efforts by “a newer kind of ‘free spirits’” driven by their “dissatisfaction with present-day man.”11 In 1887, long after publication of Zarathustra, he wrote, “The progressive diminishment of man is what drives one to think about the breeding of a stronger race.... Not merely a master race, whose task would be limited to governing; but a race with its own sphere of life, with a surplus of force for beauty, valor, culture, manners, right up to the highest intellectual realm...”12 He did not use the word Ubermensch, but the concept is identical. In part two of Zarathustra itself, Nietzsche makes it rather clear that he regards the Ubermensch as a very real possible creation of will, in contrast to God, which was a fictional creation.

Once you said God when you looked out onto distant seas; now, however, I have taught you to say: Ubermensch. God is a conjecture, but I do not want your conjectures to reach beyond your creative will. Could you create a God? Then do not talk to me about any gods! But you could certainly create the Ubermensch. 1

As for Kaufmann’s attempt to deny that the “blond beast” refers to any racial or ethnic group, the context disproves him. The phrase appears in a passage recounting an historical epoch. In one of those contexts where the phrase appears, Nietzsche explicitly refers to “the blond Germanic beast.”14 Nietzsche was no racialist, but the weakness in Kaufmann’s argument betrays a certain anxiety, urgency, and even desperation to prove it. Kaufmann makes it hard to avoid suspecting him of a political motive. That is especially true with regard to his dismissal of Nietzsche’s comments about women being irrelevant to his philosophy. The assertion is simply untenable, because Nietzsche’s views of women are intimately bound up with his understanding of history and society, and his belief that social progress in which women play a role is the decadence of modernity. In section 239 of Beyond Good and Evil he wrote:

Wherever the industrial spirit has triumphed over the military and aristocratic spirit, woman strives for the economic and legal independence of a clerk: “woman as clerkess” is inscribed on the portal of the modern society which is in course of formation. While she thus appropriates new rights, aspires to be “master,” and inscribes “progress” of woman on her flags and banners, the very opposite realizes itself with terrible obviousness: woman retrogrades. Since the French Revolution the influence of woman in Europe has declined in proportion as she has increased her rights and claims; and the “emancipation of woman”…thus proves to be a remarkable symptom of the increased weakening and deadening of the most womanly instincts.15 [Emphasis in the original]

The decline of culture through this sort of progress/decadence, of which feminism is an integral part, sets the stage for the nihilism from which Nietzsche sought to provide the West an escape with his philosophy.

One egregious example of minimizing Nietzsche’s antidemocratic views deserves special mention. In a book purporting to explain what Nietzsche “really” meant, Solomon and Higgins admit that Nietzsche had “harsh words” for democracy, but reassure their readers that his criticism was merely “routine.”

His comments are not very different in tone or temper from the routine complaints we hear today (from democrats) about uneducated and ignorant voters who are easily led astray by demagogues, about the irrationality of making delicate and important strategic decisions by majority vote, about the need for leadership and wisdom at the top rather than simply a popular mandate through polls.16

That characterization of his views is easily refuted by any of a number of passages in Nietzsche’s writings that refer to democracy, of which the following is typical:

I believe that the great, advancing and unstoppable democratic movement of Europe, that which calls itself ‘progress’ – and equally its preparation and moral augury, Christianity – fundamentally signifies only the tremendous, instinctive conspiracy of the whole herd against everything that is shepherd, beast of prey, hermit and Caesar, to preserve and elevate all the weak, the oppressed, the mediocre, the hard-done-by, the halffailed; as a long-drawn-out slave revolt...17

Those comments reveal a profound and radical critique, and do not sound at all like “routine complaints” about democracy. The contrast between Nietzsche’s actual comments and the characterization of them by Solomon and Higgins is quite noticeable, and forces any educated reader to question the interpretative skills of these two scholars.

It would be tiresome to continue to produce examples from democratic egalitarian works on Nietzsche simply to refute them with quotations from Nietzsche’s texts. Suffice it to say that the Nietzsche most nonspecialists are familiar with today is largely a mass-market product of the left-wing university system, and should be regarded with healthy skepticism... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.3.10.129 (talk) 19:21, 2 October 2007 (UTC)

Nietzsche's AntiBlack White Racism

On the Genealogy of Morals. Trans. Douglas Smith. Oxford University Press, 1998. , p. 49:

"By way of consolation to the more delicate, perhaps in those does pain did not hurt as much as it does today. At least, that might be the conclusion of a physician who has treated Negroes* (these taken as representatives of prehistoric man--) for serious cases of internal inflammation; such inflammation would bring even the best-organized European to the brink of despair--but this is not the case with Negroes. (The curve of human capacity for pain seems in fact to fall off extraordinarily abruptly, once past the upper ten thousand or ten million of the higher culture; and I personally have no doubt that in comparison with a single painful night undergone by one hysterical little bluestocking, the total suffering of all the animals put to the knife in the interests of scientific research simply does not enter into consideration.)"

Note 49 by Douglas Smith, p. 147: "Nietzsche's terminology and views here are clearly racist, assuming an evolutionary difference between white European and black African."

James Winchester, "Nietzsche's Racial Profiling" in Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy. Ed. Walls, Andrew. Cornell University Press, 2005. 255:

"At one point Nietzsche suggests that black skin may be a sign of lesser intelligence as well as a sign that one is closer to the apes (Dawn/Daybreak 241). Nietzsche clearly shares some of the basic tenets of nineteenth-century race theory ... In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche writes that Negroes are representatives of prehistoric men (vorgeschlictlichen Menschen) who are capable of enduring pain that would drive the best-organized European to despair (Genealogy 2.7). Today most would see this claim about Africans as a prejudice. Who today would defend the claim that blacks feel pain less acutely than whites, particularly given that such a characterization could be used to justify the enslavement and maltreatment of blacks? ... William Preston uses this passage to make the claim that Nietzsche is a cruel racist, and there are in fact many places that support this claim (William A. Preston, "Nietzsche on Blacks" in Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy. Gordon, Lewis. Routledge, 1997, 169). Preston also argues that Nietzsche is equating Negroes to lab animals and that Nietzsche feels that blacks are worth so little that men of distinction will not derive much pleasure in oppressing them. As we have already seen, Nietzsche states unambiguously that cruelty is essential to every 'higher' culture..."

"In On the Genealogy of Morals, we find a discussion of the Aryan race, which is, Nietzsche proclaims, white. Against Rudolf Virchow, whom Nietzsche credits with having created a careful ethnographic map of Germany, Nietzsche argues that dark-haired peoples of Germany cannot be Celtic. Germany's dark-haired people are essentially pre-Aryan. Nietzsche further argues that suppressed races are coming to the fore again in Europe, and one can see this on the basis of the emergence of darker coloring and shorter skulls. He says it is even possible that modern democracy, or even more likely modern anarchism and the inclination for the commune, 'the most primitive form of society which is now shared by all socialists in Europe', is a sign of the counter-attack of the pre-Aryan races. The Aryan race may very well be in a state of physiological decline..."

Gooding-Williams, Robert, "SUPPOSING NIETZSCHE TO BE BLACK--WHAT THEN?" in (same author) Look, a Negro!: Philosophical Essays on Race, Culture and Politics. Routledge, 2005.

"While new and still newer Nietzsches continue to thrive...older Nietzsches remain-one of which is Nietzsche, the philosopher of aristocratic radicalism, but likewise the brutally scathing critic of socialism, feminism, and liberalism-indeed, of all forms of modern egalitarianism. This, for example, is the figure Georg Lukacs describes in writing that Nietzsche's 'whole life's work was a continuous polemic against Marxism and socialism' (The Destruction of Reason). Similarly, it is the figure William Preston evokes when...he insists that 'Nietzsche's whole philosophy-and not just his view of blacks-is racist.' In an essay meant for an anthology devoted to black existentialism ('Nietzsche on Blacks' in Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy. Gordon, Lewis. Routledge, 1997, 169), Preston asks, 'Can Nietzsche help black existentialists find answers to their own questions?' 'No' is Preston's clear response to this question, but a careful reading of his argument urges a still stronger conclusion-namely, that progressive philosophers given to a serious engagement with issues like white supremacy, colonialism, black politics, and black identity-whether or not they are existentialists, and whether or not they are black-have no use for Nietzsche. Preston tends toward this conclusion when he claims that Nietzsche saw suffering black people as laboratory animals that he wanted 'to make ... suffer more.' In effect, Preston argues that black and other progressives have no use for Nietzsche, because Nietzsche was a 'cruel racist' and a forwardlooking, trans-European 'man of the Right.'

...In his excellent essay on Nietzsche and colonialism, Robert Holub remarks that events heralding Germany's emergence as a colonial power (Germany began to acquire colonies in Africa and the Pacific in 1884) 'reached their height during the years that Nietzsche was composing his major works' ('Nietzsche's Colonialist Imagination: Nueva Germania, Good Europeanism, and Great Politics' in The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and its Legacy, ed. Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox). Holub also reminds his readers that Nietzsche became personally involved with colonialism through the adventures of his sister and brother-in-law, Elisabeth and Bernhard Forster, founders of the Paraguayan colony of Nueva Germania. Finally, and most important for my purposes, Holub recognizes that this personal involvement has 'a philosophical counterpart in [Nietzsche's] writings.' More exactly, he acknowledges that Nietzsche's philosophical imagination becomes a colonialist imagination when it conjures the images of the 'good European' and a 'great politics' to envision a caste of 'new philosophers' that would rule Europe and subjugate the entire earth. A critic of the sort of nationalism the Forsters embraced,

Nietzsche endorsed a supranationalist imperialism, and his 'untimeliness ... involves his unusual way of approaching the problems posed by foreign affairs and world politics. Eschewing the nationalist, mercantile, and utopian/idealist approach to colonization, he developed ... a conceptual framework that entailed a geopolitical perspective. In the 'good European' he found a term for a future elite that could overcome the nation-state, create a superior cultural life, and achieve domination of the world. With 'great politics' he offered an alternative to parliamentary life and actual colonial fantasies, as well as a vague blueprint for global conquest on a grand scale.'

Holub's description of Nietzsche's geopolitics helps put Preston's remarks into perspective. Thus, when Preston describes Nietzsche as a forward-looking, trans-European 'man of the Right,' he alludes to Nietzsche's colonialist fantasy of a future, European elite that would dominate the world beyond Europe. When he describes Nietzsche as a racist, he reminds us that this fantasy is, in part, the fantasy of a black Africa subjected to European rule, and that Nietzsche's antiblack racism (evident, for example, in his suggestion that the black race is less intelligent than the white races; see Daybreak, aphorism 241; On the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, aphorism 7, where Nietzsche takes blacks as representatives of prehistoric man) in tandem with his enthusiasm for breeding higher human beings, suggests that he imagined an 'imperialism of the future' as involving the domination of racially inferior black Africans by racially superior white Europeans. In short, Preston exposes the white supremacist connotations of Nietzsche's colonialist imagination."

Cf. Abir Taha, Nietzsche, Prophet of Nazism: The Cult of the Superman: Unveiling the Nazi Secret Doctrine —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.131.55.73 (talk) 03:50, 6 October 2007 (UTC)