Wikipedia

Liber Research Community

Liber Research Community is a non-governmental organization in Hong Kong that focuses on researching land and development policies.[1]

Liber Research Community
Formation2009
TypeNon-governmental organization
PurposeLand Research
Location
Methodsresearch, consultancy
Websitehttps://www.liber-research.com/
Liber Research Community
Traditional Chinese本土研究社

History edit

The group was created in 2009 by postgraduates, including Chan Kim-ching, who studied geography and planning.[1][2]

In 2017, it released a report of about 9,800 houses in the New Territories that were suspected to be involved in the illegal trading of ding rights.[1] In 2020, it found 800 more village houses that were suspected to be illegally traded within the past 2 years.[1]

In 2018, it published a research report stating that the government had underestimated the amount of brownfield sites in the New Territories, with the government estimating 1,300 hectares, and Liber Research Community finding 1,521 hectares.[3][4] Additionally in 2018, it found that around 300 hectares of government land was underutilized.[5]

In 2019, it released research where HK $9.4 billion of stamp duty was exempted in the past 10 years, when property buyers used companies to buy and sell properties via shares transfers.[6]

In 2021, it determined that nano flats, defined as units below 260 square feet, accounted for 13% of all new units in 2019, and were the result of government policies, including the reduction the amount of windows required in an apartment.[7] SCMP later released an opinion piece based on the research, stating that construction of nano flats should be curbed.[8]

In May 2021, it released a report titled Research Report on Development Potential of Vacant Small House Land, which determined that of a total of 3,380 hectares of village-type land, 1,548.8 hectares were idle and privately owned, with a separate 932.9 hectares of idle land belonging to the government. It determined that of the 1,548.8 hectares of privately owned idle land, 149.1 hectares appeared to be scheduled for illegal development of small houses, where collusion between developers and villagers was likely.[9]

In June 2021, it released Missing Brownfields- Hong Kong Brownfields Report 2021, a collaborative report with Greenpeace East Asia where together, they found a total of 1,950 hectares of brownfield sites, 379 more hectares than the government was previously able to locate.[10]

Research topics edit

According to its website, it lists 5 primary research areas:

  1. Hong Kong Land Research
  2. Housing Policy Research
  3. Open Government Research
  4. Food Safety Research
  5. Hong Kong-China Relation Research

Articles edit

Public-Private Partnerships edit

In 2018, it published an article which described various issues with land development from Public-Private Partnership (PPPs), a method promoted by the government's Task Force on Land Supply to develop land on 1,000 hectares of agricultural land, owned by four major developers.[11] The government has claimed that there were successful precedents with PPP, including at Sha Tin and Tin Shui Wai.[11] However, the article pointed out that the PPP development of Sha Tin's Area 14 (City One) was different than the PPP model promoted by the government, and that Area 14 was only a small portion of the overall Sha Tin project.[11] Additionally, the article mentioned that the PPP model for Area 14 was used due to the government having financial difficulties, and that the current government has no such financial difficulties, negating the need for further PPP developments.[11]

Tin Shui Wai also had issues with its PPP development, including a private memorandum of understanding between the developer and the government, which stipulated that commercial projects in government facilities cannot threaten the developer's commercial facilities, restricting competition and increasing prices for residents.[11] Carrie Lam stated that "another Tin Shui Wai" should not be allowed to happen again.[11]

Lands Resumption Ordinance edit

Liber Research Community published an article in 2018 where it described the government's approach to land resumption.[12] The government has stated that the Public-Private Partnership model is preferred to develop agricultural land, rather than invoking the Lands Resumption Ordinance (LRO).[12] However, the government has used the LRO to resume older properties to develop luxury housing, but has stated that using LRO to resume agricultural land is "disrespectful to private property rights" and creates "uncertainty" when it comes to property rights.[12] This has caused developers to hoard even more agricultural land, in hopes that the PPP model will help them subsidize future development of the land.[12]

Small House Policy edit

In 2018 and 2019, it published articles on the history of the small house policy, after reviewing declassified documents from the government.[13][14] It found that the policy was meant to be temporary, to help villagers establish more permanent houses; only 7% of all rural buildings in the New Territories at the time were permanent, with the rest being crude structures.[13] In 1956, the Heung Yee Kuk petitioned the government, stating that if villagers had to pay land premium to build houses, it would be equal to "forcibly taking away people's properties."[13] The government conducted research and responded, stating that the government's position of paying land premium not being inappropriate, and not infringing on any rights.[13] One argument presented by the government was that the government constructed roads and other facilities, and thus recovering some of the cost was appropriate; the Qing dynasty did not provide such facilities.[13] Additionally, the article mentioned that Cecil Clementi may have been misquoted, as he said villagers could build houses freely, but only if they reported and obtained pre-approval from him; the latter condition of pre-approval often being left out when Clementi was quoted.[13]

The Kuk began a "public relations war," and when describing small house rights, replaced "reasonable rights" of villagers with "traditional rights" in Article 40 of the Basic Law.[14] It also began to label the small house policy, created in 1972, as a "custom" that originated from the Qing dynasty.[14] Thus, the policy was meant to be temporary, but in the 1980s, was morphed by the Heung Yee Kuk to have been a perpetual right.[13][14]

Land allocation edit

In 2017, it released an article that studied effective land allocation.[15] The government's Development Bureau created the 2017-18 Land Sale Programme, which reserved 28 sites for residential development, providing about 18,810 units.[15] The government claimed that there were already too many public housing units at some of the sites, and therefore said that the developments should be for private units, causing a further exacerbation of unavailable public housing.[15] The article also noted that some sites were unzoned, and without rezoning, housing could not be built- meaning those sites reflected a false supply of housing.[15] Furthermore, CY Leung changed procedures such that important decisions on housing development could be adjusted by the financial secretary and other officials behind confidential and closed meetings, bypassing established rules, and creating potential loopholes in planning.[15]

MTR and property analysis edit

In July 2021, it published 7 separate articles analyzing property development and the MTR.[16][17][18][19][20][21][22]

1. MTR revenue model edit

In the first article, Liber detailed the history of MTR's revenue model.[16] It discovered that the "Rail + Property" development model was originally formed to offset unexpected financial difficulties with creating the original MTR lines, with original estimates that MTR's property would account for approximately 20% of its total revenue.[16]

The Executive Council also determined that since MTR had to apply for land grants from the government, it was the government's decision on how land above MTR stations should be allocated, stating "the grant of comprehensive development rights on land affected by railway installations will be discretionary".[16] Land above stations would not necessarily be used to build private housing to maximize MTR's revenue, but could be used to solve issues of housing in Hong Kong, such as by developing public housing instead.[16] The Executive Council also noted that "revenue from property development was not originally envisaged as being used as a means of financing the capital cost of the railway itself" and that revenue from property development was to be used for a "contingency reserve", such as for offsetting excessive construction costs.[16]

The report noted that 40% of MTR's revenue is currently from property, and that the original intent of using property revenue for contingency purposes had shifted into a different, unsustainable model where property is used to subsidize operations and construction of new stations.[16]

2. Land hoarding along MTR lines edit

In the second article, Liber found that property developers have bought and hoarded land along newly announced MTR lines.[17] It found that large developers had already hoarded at least 80 hectares of land along the Northern Link MTR line.[17] After doing so, developers started to lobby for the government to relax Comprehensive Development Areas (CDA) planning rules, rules meant to build new areas in an organized and fully utilized fashion.[17] If CDA planning rules are to be relaxed along the new MTR lines, developers will be able to profit from their hoarding of land, while the general public will bear the cost of having underutilized land.[17]

3. MTR as a property manager edit

Liber also found that MTR has shifted from developing properties to a strategy of renting out and managing properties.[18] It found that MTR manages 112,759 flats, housing around 300,000 people.[18] Analyzing Deeds of Mutual Covenant (DMCs), it found that DMCs were often assigned MTR as its manager, even if the property was built by other developers.[18] Additionally, MTR also outsources management of some properties to other developers, sharing management fees and business with them.[18] As MTR develops more stations and controls management of above-station property, Liber forecasts that MTR's property management business will keep growing larger.[18]

It also found that some owners of MTR-managed apartments have been unhappy with MTR as the manager of their properties, but MTR employs multiple strategies to make it difficult for apartment owners to form an owner's corporation and switch management companies.[18] With no competition, it found that MTR had raised management fees by as much as 19% in one year for apartment owners, poorly maintained common areas of apartments, and hid management budgets from homeowners.[18]

7. MTR and overseas projects edit

In Liber's 7th article, it found that MTR has been expanding overseas, using profits from its Hong Kong operations to subsidize overseas operations in lower-margin markets, such as in Australia, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.[22]

Publications edit

Research Reports[23]
# Year Name
1 2013 Myth and Reality: Land Problem in Hong Kong
2 2014 Tyranny of the land leasing: Case Study on the Short-Term Lease Arrangement in Mashipo, Hong Kong
3 2015 No Place for Home: New Perspectives For The Long Term Housing Strategy in Hong Kong
4 2015 Hydroponics in Focus: A Study on Hong Kong’s Emerging Hydroponics Industry
5 2016 Brownfield Sites in Hong Kong 2015: tracing causes, distributions and possible policy framework
6 2017 Leasing for the Few: Exploring Short Term Tenancy Sites by Tycoons in Hong Kong
7 2018 Research report on abuse of small house policy by selling Ding Rights
8 2018 A Study on the Development Potential of Brownfield in the New Territories
9 2018 Your Real Choice: Honest Consultation on Land Supply
10 2018 Tracking the tax dodgers:  a study on avoidance of residential property tax by share transfer in Hong Kong
11 2018 Missing Option: Research on Temporary Use and Vacant Government Land in Hong Kong
12 2018 Study on the Ownership of Fish Ponds in North West New Territories
13 2018 Brownfields in Time: Tracing the course of Brownfields expansion in the New Territories
14 2020 Abuse of the Small House Policy: Revisited 2020
15 2021 A decade of compression- Hong Kong nano-flat study 2010-2019
16 2021 Research Report on Development Potential of Vacant Small House Land
17 2021 Missing Brownfields- Hong Kong Brownfields Report 2021
Books
# Year Name ISBN
1 2013 不是土地供應 - 香港土地問題的迷思與真象 978-988-12005-0-1
2 2016 棕跡 978-988-14095-2-2

See also edit

References edit

  1. ^ a b c d "Hong Kong: new 'rural villas' smack of illegal deals with developers, group says". South China Morning Post. 26 October 2020. Retrieved 26 April 2021.
  2. ^ "Housing plan for brownfield sites not bold enough, think tank says". South China Morning Post. 31 August 2020. Retrieved 26 April 2021.
  3. ^ "Government 'exaggerated constraints' in freeing up brownfield sites". South China Morning Post. 20 December 2018. Retrieved 26 April 2021.
  4. ^ "Has an area the size of 38 Victoria Parks been excluded from land planning?". South China Morning Post. 15 March 2018. Retrieved 26 April 2021.
  5. ^ "300 hectares of government land 'underutilised or vacant'". South China Morning Post. 18 September 2018. Retrieved 26 April 2021.
  6. ^ "HK$9.4bn tax revenue lost as residential property buyers dodge stamp duty via 'share transfer' - study". Hong Kong Free Press HKFP. 12 July 2018. Retrieved 26 April 2021.
  7. ^ "Open plan, 'dark toilets': how nano flats have lowered Hong Kong living standards". South China Morning Post. 4 January 2021. Retrieved 26 April 2021.
  8. ^ "The time to consider curbs on the building of nano flats is now". South China Morning Post. 31 January 2021. Retrieved 26 April 2021.
  9. ^ "Is there more land in Hong Kong for housing than perceived?". South China Morning Post. 3 May 2021. Retrieved 3 May 2021.
  10. ^ "Hong Kong NGOs find enough unidentified brownfield sites to build 95,000 homes". South China Morning Post. 10 June 2021. Retrieved 23 June 2021.
  11. ^ a b c d e f lrcresearcher. "楊夏至／陳劍青：香港公私合營的歷史真相". Liber Research Community (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Retrieved 20 October 2021.
  12. ^ a b c d Community, 本土研究社 Liber Research (25 September 2018). "改土歸流：下落不明的《收回土地條例》". Medium. Retrieved 20 October 2021.
  13. ^ a b c d e f g "Key to note in the Hong Kong Small House Rights Case: Where Did the "Traditional Rights" Discourse Come From?".
  14. ^ a b c d "毋忘初衷：重返丁屋政策的歷史脈絡（文：黃肇鴻） (09:00) - 20181217 - 文摘". 明報新聞網 - 即時新聞 instant news (in Traditional Chinese). Retrieved 20 October 2021.
  15. ^ a b c d e "KC Chan: Land allocation is the key to housing problems in Hong Kong".
  16. ^ a b c d e f g lrcresearcher. "還原「物業帶動鐵路」的歷史時空". Liber Research Community (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Retrieved 11 August 2021.
  17. ^ a b c d e lrcresearcher. "【解剖「囤地線」】以鐵路為骨幹 撐起了誰的未來? #永續港鐵霸權 #7月專研". Liber Research Community (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Retrieved 11 August 2021.
  18. ^ a b c d e f g h lrcresearcher. "【十二萬物管王國】全面剖析港鐵物業管治術 #永續港鐵霸權 #7月專研". Liber Research Community. Retrieved 11 August 2021.
  19. ^ "【香港鐵路大縮水秘史】#永續港鐵霸權 #7月專研". Liber Research Community (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Retrieved 8 September 2021.
  20. ^ lrcresearcher. "【數據分析：港鐵各站住宅物業版圖 2021】 #永續港鐵霸權 #7月專研". Liber Research Community (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Retrieved 8 September 2021.
  21. ^ "【港鐵物業俾佢賺盡50年？】#永續港鐵霸權 #7月專研". Liber Research Community (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Retrieved 8 September 2021.
  22. ^ a b "【國際滑「鐵」盧】港鐵海外投資連番觸礁實錄 #永續港鐵霸權 #7月專研". Liber Research Community (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Retrieved 8 September 2021.
  23. ^ "Liber Research - Report Archive".

External links edit

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