First Panjshir Offensive

The first Panjshir Offensive, Also known as Panjshir I, which took place in April 1980, four months after the arrival of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.[1] Was a battle between the Afghan Mujahideen under Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Soviet army, and the Socialist Afghan Armed Forces

First Panjshir offensive
Part of the Soviet–Afghan War

Map of the Panjshir Valley
Date9 April 1980 - 12 April
Location35°21′N 69°35′E / 35.350°N 69.583°E / 35.350; 69.583
Result Both sides claim victory
Belligerents
 Soviet Union
Afghanistan Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
Commanders and leaders
Soviet Union Captain Leonid Khabarov Ahmad Shah Massoud
Strength
  • 6,000 Soldiers Soviet Union
1,000 Soldiers and Security Police Afghanistan DRA
  • 200 or 1,000 men
  • Poorly equiped with outdated rifles
  • 3 rocket launchers
Casualties and losses
  • 100 casualties
  • ten guns captured
  • eight tanks and other vehicles damaged (Mujahideen claim)
  • High Casualties (Soviet Claim)
  • 4 killed (Mujahideen Claim)
  • The Battle

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    Three Soviet battalions participated in this battle including the 4th Battalion of the 56th Guards Independent Airborne Assault Brigade under the command of Captain Leonid Khabarov.[2] This Soviet force numbered 6,000 men[3], while around 1,000 Afghan soldiers and security police also participated.[2] The number of Ahmad Shah Massoud's fighters are disputed, some claim it was around 200 men[4][5][3] However others, including the Soviet intelligence claim the Mujahideen numbered slightly more than 1,000 armed rebels from among local residents. The Afghan Mujahideen was poorly armed with antiquated rifles and had not constructed any defensive works, but laid mines on the only road.[6][7][3] According to an Afghan historian the only mujahideen anti-tank weapons were 3 rocket launchers.[5]

    Initially The Operation went smooth for the soviets, they had cleared mines, rebuilt destroyed bridges, and advanced within the Panjshir. The Soviets quickly reached Massouds headquarters at the kishlak of Pasishah-Mardan. It had been abandoned in a hurry, The Soviets found files of documents, lists and identity documents lay scattered all around. Sergei Morozov, a sergeant in the 56th Guards Independent Airborne Assault Brigade, said his battalion was ambushed which resulted in thirteen deaths. Khabarov was injured in the fighting, taking a bullet to the forearm. The rebels deliberately let the Soviet/DRA force into the valley and ambushed them as they withdrew. During the four-day operation, the Soviets claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties on the rebels, The Mujahideen claimed Soviets & Afghan armed forces suffered 100 deaths, with an additional ten guns captured, eight tanks and other vehicles damaged aswell as 10 helicopters shot down whilst only suffering 4 deaths.[8][9]

    Results

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    Both The Mujahideen and the communists claimed Victory, The Soviets had achieved its goal of capturing Massouds headquarters, However Massouds forces had inflicted high casualties among the Soviets and only intended to withdraw in good order and regroup afterwards.[10]

    References

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    1. ^ Rodric Braithwaite (2013). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89. Internet Archive. Oxford University Press. p. 217. ISBN 978-0-19-932248-0.
    2. ^ a b Rodric Braithwaite (2013). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89 [Three Soviet battalions participated, including the 4th Battalion of the 56th Guards Independent Airborne Assault Brigade under the command of Captain Leonid Khabarov. About a thousand Afghan soldiers and security police went with them.]. Internet Archive. Oxford University Press. pp. 217–218. ISBN 978-0-19-932248-0.
    3. ^ a b c Grover, Verinder (2000). Afghanistan: Government and Politics [The first Panjshir offensive mobilised two columns of tanks and 7.000 men. Resisting the attack were scattered groups of poorly armed Panjshiris, a motley force of farmers, herdsmen and villagers few of whom had any real combat training.]. Deep & Deep Publications Pvt. Limited. p. 101. ISBN 978-81-7100-927-5.
    4. ^ Anas, ʻAbd Allāh; Anas, Abdullah; Hussein, Tam (2019). To the Mountains: My Life in Jihad, from Algeria to Afghanistan [Massoud had 200 fighting men. Alongside his local commander Abdel Hayy Haqq Jue, he divided up the arena of battle into various zones. Under Commander Muslim, Abu Ubaidah and Abu Dujanah moved closer to the front line to attack.]. Oxford University Press. p. 89. ISBN 978-1-78738-011-0.
    5. ^ a b Rodric Braithwaite (2013). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89 [An Afghan historian has claimed that there were only two hundred armed rebels in the valley at the time, and their only anti-tank weapons were three rocket launchers.]. Internet Archive. Oxford University Press. p. 219. ISBN 978-0-19-932248-0.
    6. ^ "ArtOfWar. Ляховский Александр Антонович. Ахмад-Шах". artofwar.ru. Retrieved 2024-08-14.
    7. ^ Rodric Braithwaite (2013). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89 [To oppose this force Masud had little more than a thousand men. They were armed mainly with old-fashioned rifles and they had not yet constructed much in the way of defensive works. They mined the only road in the valley, destroyed the bridges, and planned to ambush the invaders.]. Internet Archive. Oxford University Press. p. 218. ISBN 978-0-19-932248-0.
    8. ^ Rodric Braithwaite (2013). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89. Internet Archive. Oxford University Press. pp. 218–219. ISBN 978-0-19-932248-0.
    9. ^ Urban, Mark (2016-07-27). War in Afghanistan. Springer. p. 70. ISBN 978-1-349-20761-9.
    10. ^ Galeotti, Mark (2021-10-28). The Panjshir Valley 1980–86: The Lion Tames the Bear in Afghanistan [Both sides claimed victory. The Soviets pointed to the fulfilment of their operational goals, and claimed that Massoud had been wounded in the attack, his force dispersed. The rebels likewise claimed to have inflicted severe casualties on the attackers, downing no fewer than ten helicopters, and losing just four men. These last claims are highly dubious, but the point is that the rebels did not seek to confront the attackers on their own terms, rather to withdraw in good order and then regroup afterwards.]. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 40. ISBN 978-1-4728-4467-5.