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Draft:Spa Conference (13-15 August 1918)

The Spa conference of 13-15 August 1918 constitutes the last official meeting between the German and Austro-Hungarian monarchs during the First World War. During this conference, the third since the beginning of 1918 held in Spa, then headquarters of the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL),[T 1][N 1] the civil officials participating in the conference then became aware of the impossibility, for the central powers, to achieve victory. Indeed, the Imperial Reich[N 2] and its allies were exhausted and their latest offensives ended in failures on the Marne as well as on the Piave in Italy. Considering for the first time a compromise peace with the Entente forces reinforced by the massive arrival of American soldiers, the political and military leaders of the Reich and the dual monarchy are thinking for the first time about a scenario for exiting the conflict.[1]

Participants edit

 
Hindenburg, Wilhelm II and Ludendorff (left to right), in Spa in 1918.
Main articles: Wilhelm II, Erich Ludendorff, Paul von Hindenburg, and Charles I of Austria

This conference can be broken down into two separate meetings. The first, held on the 13th and August 14, 1918, brings together a council of the German crown, around the main political and military leaders of the Reich, under the presidency of Emperor Wilhelm; the second, a German-Austro-Hungarian conference, meets the next day, on August 15, 1918.[2]

Crown Council: 13 and 14 August edit

Main article: German Empire

Summoned following the defeat of August 8, 1918,[N 3] it brings together the August 13, under the presidency of Wilhelm II, dejected by the defeats of his armies, the military Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff, then first quartermaster,[N 4] general Chancellor Georg von Hertling, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Reich Paul von Hintze, as well as Imperial Crown Prince Wilhelm of Prussia.[2][3][4][5][6]

German-Austro-Hungarian Conference:August 15th edit

 
Arthur Arz von Straußenburg, Chief of Staff of the Army of the Dual Monarchy.

The second conference, German-Austro-Hungarian, met the next day, August 15, 1918, after the arrival in Spa of Emperor-King Charles, accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stephan Burián von Rajecz, and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Army, Arthur Arz von Straußenburg; upon the arrival of the Austro-Hungarian monarch and his retinue, Wilhelm II wore an Austro-Hungarian uniform, while Charles wore a German uniform. This meeting constitutes the first between the two monarchs since the conference in the month of may and their final meeting: despite the hugs and familiarity, the atmosphere remains cold between the German representatives on the one hand, and the Austro-Hungarian delegation on the other.[7][8][9][3]

The participants in the imperial council the day before take part in the exchanges between the two main actors of the Quadruplice.[8][N 5]


Context edit

Military failures of the Central Powers edit

Main article: Second Battle of the Piave River

During this phase of the war, in the spring and early summer of 1918, the Central Powers experienced numerous failures, in Italy in June, in France in July, while the other fronts weakened over the months.[10]

Furthermore, on the French front, the German units engaged against the victorious Allied troops no longer showed the bite necessary for prolonged resistance, while the number of soldiers not joining their unit increased significantly.[N 6] Finally, the hungry army easily disbanded to plunder the food stocks discovered during the spring offensive, while the soldiers were dressed in threadbare military effects or taken from Allied prisoners.[11][12]

In addition, the German and Austro-Hungarian troops were devastated by losses, the call to the 1920 class and to the suspended workers not succeeding in making up for the losses of the imperial army, which were increasingly numerous: in fact, between March and July 1918, the German army recorded the loss of 226,000 dead and nearly 750,000 wounded, these losses being made up by men too young or too old to be sent to the front. Every month, since the spring, the German Imperial Army has deplored the definitive loss of 80,000 soldiers, once the number of wounded, killed and sick has been subtracted from those of the newly mobilized.[13][12]

Faced with the Allied offensives which shook the entire front, the German command made a strategic change in the conduct of operations, wishing to reconnect with the defensive strategy which had prevailed until the beginning of 1918.[14]

Discrepancy between politics and military edit

Following the day of August 8, 1918, the military leaders of the Reich, Erich Ludendorff first, admitted that the Central Powers failed to win the decision against the Allies, considerably reinforced by the massive addition of American units. However, Hindenburg concealed this failure from Emperor.[N 7] However, Wilhelm II was not fooled by the seriousness of the situation, even if he was unaware of its extent before the conference with the Dioscuri on August 10: from that moment on, he continued to demand an end to hostilities and the opening of negotiations with the Allies.[15][16][17][5]

Presenting this failure in such a way as not to alarm civilians about the reality of the Reich 's military situation, Ludendorff evokes a simple change in strategy, the move to the defensive, intended to "gradually paralyze the enemy's will to fight". This failure is also materialized by his change of attitude towards the members of the government, whom the first quartermaster general previously considered with haughtiness, pride and disdain.[2][6]

Despite the declarations of the military, some proactive, others pessimistic, civilian officials, notably Vice-Chancellor Hintze, lucid about the reality of the internal situation of the Reich in mid-summer 1918,[N 8] could only admit the state of disrepair of the Reich's allies, as well as the progressive exhaustion of the Reich and its economy, while Hintze's colleagues in the government are dismayed by the seriousness of the military situation.[18][6][N 9]

The voluntary declarations fail to mention the resignation of the first quartermaster general.[2] Thus, August 13, having lost his splendor, Ludendorff, commander of an army defeated by the Allies, officially announced to the political leaders of the Reich , including Wilhelm II, that the Reich no longer had the military capabilities to enable it to achieve victory over the allied armies.[19]

However, faced with civilians shocked by the news, the military softened the seriousness of the situation, while recognizing the need to reach an agreement with the Allies.[5]

Internal situation edit

Within the central powers, the internal situation is becoming more and more worrying every day. However, it remains contrasting: catastrophic among the allies of the Reich , the political and economic situation only allows the effects of the defeat for the German population to be limited.

In the Reich, civilian populations suffered from increasingly severe rationing: food rations were reduced to a minimum. The ration of “war bread” is reduced to 160 grams per day in June 1918, while ersatz, of mediocre quality at best, reign supreme, both in food and in the economy of the Reich.[13]

The dual monarchy is in a contrasting situation. Many food products are subject to rationing, but good society is spared, mainly thanks to the existence of a flourishing black market; at the same time, the war economy was heavily affected by shortages of raw materials. The army is undermined by hunger and desertions,[N 10] while the Austrian imperial government only exercises its authority in the German regions, Bohemia and Galicia rejecting the alliance between the Reich and the dynasty a little more every day of the Habsburgs, symbols of this alliance.[20][21][22][23][3]

Negotiations in progress edit

Main articles: Salzburg negotiations and Treaty of Berlin (August 27, 1918)

At the beginning of the month August 1918, the Reich is an actor in negotiations, both with its allies, but also with Bolshevik Russia.

Thus, in accordance with the Spa agreements of the previous May, Austro-German negotiations have been taking place since July 9, 1918, in Salzburg, in order to clarify the modalities of implementation of the political and economic agreements of spring.[24] Quickly, the Austro-Hungarians managed to empty the economic provisions of the May agreements of their content, while the financial administrations of the Reich showed reservations about the economic implications of these provisions.[25]

In addition, since March , negotiations have been held between representatives of Russian power and representatives of the central powers, mainly German, in order to clarify the economic provisions of the German-Russian peace treaty. At the beginning of August, the negotiations entered their final phase, with the additional treaties being signed on August 27, 1918.[26]

If the Central Powers did not remain inactive, the Allies led, during the Austro-German exchanges, an active policy towards the Slavs of the dual monarchy. Indeed, it was during this conference that the Allies made public their recognition of the national committees, notably the Czechoslovak committee.[27]

The last major Austro-German conference edit

 
Stephan Burián von Rajecz, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Dual Monarchy, assisted the Emperor-King Charles I to bring their country out of the conflict as quickly as possible.

On August 14, 1918, Emperor-King Charles I of Austria arrives in Spa, accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stephan Burián von Rajecz.[8]

This second moment in the conference was prepared by the exchanges which took place the same day during the crown council, bringing together the main German and Prussian ministers, under the presidency of Wilhelm II.[18]

Austro-Hungarian positions edit

From the outset, the Emperor-King of Austria and Hungary, supported by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced the impossibility for the dual monarchy, exhausted by four years of conflict, to face a fifth winter of war.[8]

Due to this exhaustion, and faced with the blindness of those responsible for the Reich, Charles I wanted peace negotiations to open as soon as possible, at the first opportunity, thus announcing his wish to get his empire out of the conflict.[28][29][17]

War aims during the summer of 1918 edit

During the crown council of August 13 and 14 , the war aims were reaffirmed by the participants, Paul von Hindenburg even asserting that he could continue to occupy large portions of French territory.[9]

Thus, the Chancellor and his State Secretaries intend to negotiate with the Allies a white peace in the West and the maintenance of the status quo in the East, negotiated from a victorious position and defined by the peace treaties at the beginning of the year. 1918, with Russia, Ukraine and Romania. During the crown council, the Polish question was studied again.[9][14]

The fate of the territories under the control of the Quadruple troops is also studied on August 14: Paul von Hintze wishes to maintain German troops in Belgium, in order to constitute a pledge, evacuated in exchange for the restitution of its colonies to the Reich upon the signing of the peace treaty. In this context, war damages would also be paid to the Kingdom of Belgium. The fate of Poland was also mentioned in the German-Austro-Hungarian talks: the devolution of the Polish crown and the sharing of the kingdom's industries constituted the sticking points between the two allies.[30][8]

Negotiations edit

In a context of economic exhaustion of the central powers, the Reich and the dual monarchy consult together and attempt to plan their mutual, common or separate initiatives that these two States intend to implement in the following weeks, both their military projects and their vision of ending the conflict.

Quickly, during exchanges between soldiers, the German and Austro-Hungarian generals presented their respective operational projects, these being fiercely negotiated, the Austro-Hungarians wishing to launch a new offensive of which Genoa would constitute the final objective. Faced with these unrealistic offensive plans at this stage of the war, the German soldiers announced to their Austro-Hungarian colleagues that their priority objective was to support the French front.[27]

In addition, to these operational projects are added diplomatic initiatives intended to put an end to the conflict. In this area, the differences between the Reich and the dual monarchy become gaping as the days go by. Thus, the Germans were in favor of waiting for the opportune moment, materialized by a victory, or, failing that, a halt imposed on the Allied advance, while the Austro-Hungarians, whose country was then completely exhausted, aspire to the rapid opening of negotiations with a view to putting an end to hostilities. The two partners being not equal, the policy implemented in the days that followed consisted of waiting for a defensive success before proposing the opening of these peace negotiations.[31][32]

Issue edit

German optimism, Austro-Hungarian pessimism edit

German political leaders demonstrate, both after the crown council of August 13 and 14, and after the conference, the August 15th, a largely unjustified optimism; this feeling, prevalent among the Germans participating in the conference, was not shared by the Austro-Hungarian officials, thus materializing the distance between the two delegations, and the gap which then existed between the aspirations of the leaders of the two empires.[7][14]

To instill this optimism in the German population, the imperial government is considering, to influence the course of events, a large-scale propaganda action, along two lines, one aimed at the population of the Reich, the other aimed at the neutral and allied public opinions. These propaganda actions are intended to be coordinated by a “propaganda committee”, made up of recognized personalities. The speech broadcast by this committee must highlight the will of the Reich to fight until victory, in a context marked by a disintegration of the morale of the population, undermined by deprivations[N 11] and worked on by Allied propaganda.[N 12] One of the first events of this committee took place on August 21, 1918: Paul von Hintze then tried to calm the apprehensions of the leaders of the political parties represented in the Reichstag regarding the military and economic situation of the Reich. However, the efforts of the imperial ministers were not supported by the action of Wilhelm II, whose nervous exhaustion encouraged him to surrender, as soon as August 16 at Wilhelmshöhe Palace, near Kassel to rest.[33][34][35][N 13][14][18]

Parallel to this propaganda campaign, German statesmen did not take into account the Austro-Hungarian declarations: “for us, it is absolutely finished”, declared the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs to his German colleagues on August 15th; Burián indeed wants a rapid initiative, “sofort und direkt”[T 2] with a view to facilitating the restoration of peace. This Austro-Hungarian pessimism was attenuated by the results of the conference, but these were called into question by Austro-Hungarian diplomats: Burián returned to Vienna aware of German policy, which then aimed to gain time both in the face of to the Allies and to the members of the Quadruple.[8][14][27]

 
Paul von Hintze (photograph, 1915), then Reich State Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Sending a request for negotiations edit

Main article: Peace efforts during World War I

Despite this gap between the Reich and its ally, German representatives tried to influence Austro-Hungarian policy, without success. Since August 15th, the vice-chancellor and state secretary, Paul von Hintze, prepares and then sends, in accordance with the instructions received at the crown council the day before, separate peace offers to the United States. However, according to Hintze these separate peace offers must be made at the "opportune time", after the stabilization of the front; this stabilization is perceived by German officials as the consequence of an important future defensive success won on the Western Front.[9][14][30]

Additionally, the 21st of August, supported by Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, Burián sent to Berlin the text of the note he intended to send to the Allies; the leaders of the Reich then tried to stop this approach, but could not respond precisely to the questions formulated by the Emperor-King Charles I in person. Thus, on September 14, at the end of a month of exchanges between the two main partners of the Quadruple, Burián published a note calling for the opening of negotiations, without interruption of the fighting; the Allies refused the terms, thus signifying their desire to defeat the central powers on the battlefield, then deprived of any effective offensive capacity. At the same time, the Austro-Hungarian steps did not prevent the Allies from continuing their operations, increasing offensives on all fronts, irremediably calling into question the military and political position of the central powers at this stage of the conflict.[36][37][38]

German diplomacy tried, for its part, to set up indirect circuits to exchange with the Allies on the subject of the cessation of hostilities, but the Netherlands quickly shied away from Allied pressure, forcing the Reich to open negotiations direct with the Allies with a view to the cessation of hostilities. Alongside these demands, the Reich government attempted to prevent Austro-Hungarian officials, distraught by the foreseeable defeat and dissolution of the dual monarchy, from sending the Allies a request for negotiations.[39][28]

Notes and references edit

Translations edit

  1. ^ Supreme Command of the Army.
  2. ^ "Immediately and directly"

Notes edit

  1. ^ Two other conferences had already been held in Spa in 1918: the first conference, in May 1918, had led to the vassalisation of Austria-Hungary by the Reich; the second conference (the first according to Fischer), on 2 July, was held at a time when the German general staff was experiencing a wave of optimism linked to preparations for the offensive of 15 July.
  2. ^ Between 1871 and 1945 the official name of the German national state was Deutsches Reich, subsequently simply referred to as Reich.
  3. ^ For Erich Ludendorff, it is a “day of mourning for the German army”.
  4. ^ The position of first quartermaster general was created especially for Erich Ludendorff on August 28, 1916.
  5. ^ The Quadruple brings together the Reich and its allies, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria.
  6. ^ Erich Ludendorff issues July 20 a directive aimed at prohibiting the vagrancy of soldiers breaking their ban behind the front lines.
  7. ^ This policy of concealing the extent of the defeat resulted in a growing gap over the days between the military and civilians.
  8. ^ The vice-chancellor is informed through multiple channels of the existence of multiple factors of internal disorganization, threatening the existing social order.
  9. ^ Initially, however, Vice-Chancellor Paul Von Hintze saw the shift from offensive to defensive as a simple change in strategy.
  10. ^ In the countryside, deserters quickly organized themselves into armed bands, living off the inhabitants, calling into question security in the Hungarian countryside.
  11. ^ This observation did not go unnoticed by the leaders of the Reich.
  12. ^ Between March 31 and November 11, 1918, the British alone launched more than sixteen million leaflets on the Reich and the occupied territories, a significant number of which reached the population of the Reich.
  13. ^ This stay in Hesse was not unanimous among his close advisors, who suggested that he show up in Berlin.

References edit

  1. ^ JSTOR (1920)
  2. ^ a b c d Renouvin (1934, p. 598)
  3. ^ a b c Bled (2014, p. 399)
  4. ^ Fischer (1970, p. 13)
  5. ^ a b c Renouvin (1934, p. 601)
  6. ^ a b c Fischer (1970, p. 625)
  7. ^ a b Laparra (2011, p. 70)
  8. ^ a b c d e f Renouvin (1934, p. 602)
  9. ^ a b c d Fischer (1970, p. 626)
  10. ^ Fischer (1970, p. 622)
  11. ^ Garden (2008, p. 3)
  12. ^ a b Le Naour (2016, p. 286)
  13. ^ a b Le Naour (2016, p. 285)
  14. ^ a b c d e f Fischer (1970, p. 627)
  15. ^ Tulard (1997, p. 441)
  16. ^ Le Naour (2016, p. 290)
  17. ^ a b Bogdan (2014, p. 228)
  18. ^ a b c Jardin (2008, p. 4)
  19. ^ Schiavon (2011, p. 224)
  20. ^ Bled (2014, p. 292)
  21. ^ Bled (2014, p. 378)
  22. ^ Bled (2014, p. 379)
  23. ^ Bled (2014, p. 393)
  24. ^ Soutou (1989, p. 718)
  25. ^ Soutou (1989, p. 720)
  26. ^ Soutou (1989, p. 697)
  27. ^ a b c Schiavon (2011, p. 226)
  28. ^ a b Bled (2014, p. 400)
  29. ^ Schiavon (2011, p. 225)
  30. ^ a b Le Naour (2016, p. 292)
  31. ^ Le Naour (2016, p. 297)
  32. ^ Le Naour (2016, p. 298)
  33. ^ Le Naour (2016, p. 288)
  34. ^ Le Naour (2016, p. 300)
  35. ^ Bogdan (2014, p. 229)
  36. ^ Le Naour (2016, p. 299)
  37. ^ Renouvin (1934, p. 603)
  38. ^ Renouvin (1934, p. 604)
  39. ^ Le Naour (2016, p. 303)

Bibliography edit

  • JSTOR (1920). "The Spa Conference: Results of the First Direct Verbal Negotiations Between the Allies and Germany". Current History (1916-1940). 12 (5): 765–772. ISSN 2641-080X. JSTOR 45328978.
  • Renouvin, Pierre (1934). "La Crise européenne et la Première Guerre mondiale". Presses Universitaires de France, Coll. Peuples et Civilisations. 19: 500–502.
  • Bled, Jean-Paul (2014). L'Agonie d'une monarchie: Autriche-Hongrie, 1914-1920. Paris: Tallandier. ISBN 979-10-210-0440-5.
  • Bogdan, Henry (2014). Le Kaiser Guillaume II: dernier empereur d'Allemagne: 1859-1941. Paris: Tallandier. ISBN 979-10-210-0517-4.
  • Fischer, Fritz (1970). The War Aims of Imperial Germany (1914-1918) [Griff nach der Weltmacht]. Translated by Migeon, Geneviève; Thiès, Henri. Paris: Éditions de Trévise.
  • Jardin, Pierre (2008-06-15). "La fin de la guerre en Allemagne". Revue historique des armées (in French) (251): 35–46. doi:10.3917/rha.251.0035. ISSN 0035-3299.
  • Laparra, Jean-Claude (2011). "The other side of the parades: The command of the German army: realities and intersecting destinies 1914-1918". 14-18 Editions. ISBN 978-2-916385-77-8.
  • Schiavon, Max (2011). L'Autriche-Hongrie dans la Première Guerre mondiale: la fin d'un empire. Collection "Les nations dans la Grande Guerre". Paris: Éditions SOTECA 14-18. ISBN 978-2-916385-59-4. OCLC 770601364.
  • Soutou, Georges-Henri; Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1989). L'Or et le sang: les buts de guerre économiques de la Première guerre mondiale. Paris: Fayard. ISBN 978-2-213-02215-4.
  • Tulard, Jean (1997). Bérenger, Pierre (ed.). Les Empires occidentaux de Rome à Berlin. Histoire générale des systèmes politiques (1. éd ed.). Paris: Presses universitaires de France. ISBN 978-2-13-047852-2.

See also edit

Related articles edit

External links edit

The First World War in Spa

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