Draft:Maritime Arms Trade in Singapore in the 19th century

In the 19th century, economic activity along traditional arms trade routes in South East Asia were expanded significantly with the arrival of western colonial powers. During this period, the British not only consolidated their influence in the region but also looked to regulate the arms trades.

Colonial Singapore’s strategic location and status as free port made it a popular destination for trades of all kinds, ranging from raw materials to arms and ammunition[1]. Although the production and exchange of firearms existed in South East Asia before the colonialization of Singapore in 1819, western colonial powers supplied the region with weaponry of an unprecedented level of quality and quantity[2][3]. Demand for European products came from various parties, from local elites to Chinese insurgents[4]. In response, both the legitimate and illegitimate trade of munitions boomed in the colony[5]. The flourishing arms trade was lucrative for Britain but also armed other anti-colonial elements which became significant threats to their colonial authority[3]. As a result, the local colonial government imposed regulations in an attempt to control the arms trade . However, the clash between profit and security against global and regional instability meant that regulations were enforced to varying degrees. The colonial government was also met with resistance from merchants who benefitted from the arms trade .

History

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By the 19th century, colonial powers such as the Dutch and Spanish had settled in South East Asia and were looking to expand their influence though a tight control over trade[6]. On the other hand, Thomas Stamford Raffles was a strong believer in Adam Smith's concept of free trade and Laissez-faire method of governance[7]. With these principles in mind, Raffles established Singapore as a colony and hoped to counter the Dutch's monopolistic approach to governance through establishing a free port in Singapore to promote British values of free trade[6]. Raffles' successor, John Crawfurd, was also a believer in the idea of free trade[7]. Both men had a Laissez-faire approach towards the governance of colonial Singapore, allowing merchants from various background to trade freely, producing a conducive environment for the rise of arms trade in the colony.

Securing passage through South East Asia was also crucial to the British due to their highly profitable opium trade with China[8]. While British ships were well-equipped to deal with attacks, Britain had no stations between India and China[8]. This made their cargo vulnerable to the influence of other colonial powers in the region. For example, in 1782, French and Dutch forces stationed in Riau intercepted an East India Company (EIC) ship and confiscated almost 1500 chests of opium and other wares[8]. Thus, the colonization of Singapore was pivotal in ensuring that Britain had a stake in South East Asia and unhindered access to the Asian market.

Pre-colonial Singapore

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In A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands & Adjacent Countries, the second and last Resident of Singapore, John Crawfurd provides a detailed account of the weapons being used in the region. Crawfurd notes the usage of canons and firearms in Malacca’s resistance against the Portuguese conquest, meaning that artillery and gunpower technology had been in the region since the early 16th century[2]. Among the arms seized from Malacca, the Portuguese documented a cannon that had been gifted by the King of Calicut[2]. Similarly, cannons and firearms were also present in Borneo and certain parts of the Philippines[2]. In Java, the Portuguese found skilled locals making various weapons from iron[2]. While information on gunpowder could come from China, Crawfurd stated with certainty that firearm technology was brought by Islamic traders[2].

John Crawfurd

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In 1824, Crawfurd petitioned the Bengal government to allow for the tax-free importation of arms and ammunitions into Singapore[9]. Amid Britain’s rising concerns of the security risks from unregulated arms trade in Singapore, Crawfurd justified his support for the continuation of the arms trade by arguing that bans would not take away the demand and that other colonial powers would take Britain’s place in supplying munitions to Singapore[10]. An enthusiastic advocate of free trade, Crawfurd felt that the British government did not have the authority to restrict the sale of arms to non-British states[10][11]. Additionally, he felt that the prices of firearms would prevent pirates from being able to access advanced weaponry, making them less of a threat[10]. Crawfurd also saw the usage of firearms as a way to carry out Britain’s civilizing mission in South East Asia[10].

Colonial Singapore in the 19th century

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At the start of British colonial rule, the import of arms and gunpowder was tax-free which contributed to the rapid acceleration of the arms trade[11]. Firearms could be exchanged for a variety of goods ranging from money to native products from North Borneo and the Sulu Archipelago[12]. Gunpower, muskets and canons would be shipped from London and exported to places such as Malacca, Penang and Indonesia[13][14].

However, the flourishing arms trade also sparked fears that European weaponry was enabling anti-colonial groups. In 1828, it became illegal to import munitions into Singapore and a license system was introduced in 1829 to keep check of the transshipment of firearms and gunpowder[5]. These regulations were not strictly enforced. In 1830 a Singapore trader failed to obtain a permit for the import of bayonets and gunpowder[5]. In response, he appealed to the Board of Commissioners who then approved of the open trade of ammunitions and arms in Singapore on the basis that existing regulations had little effect on limiting the supply of firearms[5]. This continued until the Indian Mutiny in 1857 which led to a new law, restricting the importation, production, and exchange of munitions[5][15]. While the governor of the Straits Settlement, Edmund Blundell, acknowledged the need for regulation of the arms trade, he also warned that it would not be easily accepted as “there is scarce a mercantile firm in the place, English or foreign, that does not import largely gun, small arm, military stores and ammunition”[1]. Blundell warned that it would not be feasible to enforce the new law and in reality, it had little effect on controlling the arms trade.

Illegal arms trade to China

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During the Taiping Rebellion and the Second Opium War, Blundell alerted Calcutta multiple times of large shipments of munitions being transported to China[16]. Despite Blundell’s warnings, the exchange with Chinese insurgents mostly went unnoticed and there was minimal effort to stop the trade of weapons during the battles[16]. As the hostilities were coming to an end, it was revealed that weapons that were flagged to be disposed or transported elsewhere, were sold a second time by British traders to China[16]. From mid-1856 to mid-1857, more than 26,000 firearm parts and weapons were transported from London to Shanghai through Singapore, not including the undocumented transactions[16]. The majority of arms and ammunitions sold to China also went towards equipping anti-British groups[16].

There was an attempt in 1863 to direct the supply of arms towards the Chinese Imperial Government and prevent resources from falling into the hands of pirates and insurgents from Taiping[16]. Under the new restriction, arms and ammunition in Singapore could only be transported to China which quickly attracted a negative reaction from different groups ranging from the British organizations to Singapore merchants[1]. Eventually, concessions were made to allow the trade of arms “for use within the Straits Settlement” meaning that weapons could be shipped to other parts of South East Asia[1]. The ban on arms trade was removed a year later and instead, the Governor was tasked with ensuring that Chinese insurgents did not have access to weaponry from Europe and “Singapore’s arms trade remained unchallenged thereafter”[1].

Late 19th century

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By the late 19th century, regulation of arms had become more structured and effective. While individuals were still able to buy firearms for personal use, a permit was necessary for the trade or production of munitions and there was limit on the amount of gunpowder an individual could possess[17].

The Aceh War in 1873 provided an environment that was conducive to enforcing limits on the arms trade. The British quickly followed the Dutch in banning the transport of munitions to North Sumatra[18]. This was further facilitated by the eighth governor of Singapore, Harry Ord, who had been aggressively pushing for arms control[18]. The impacts of the ban could be felt immediately as there was a sharp decrease in the records of Singapore’s arms exports and its profits from ammunition[19]. In 1876, the Dutch hoped to outlaw the transportation of weaponry into South East Asia and requested that Singapore follow suit. However, the new governor was not as cooperative with the Dutch as Ord. It took another three years for colonial authorities in the metropole and the colony to come to a decision to impose an export ban throughout the Dutch Indies[19].

References

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  1. ^ a b c d e Turnbull, Constance M. (1972). The Straits Settlements, 1826-67: Indian Presidency to Crown Colony. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. pp. 178–179.
  2. ^ a b c d e f Crawfurd, John (1856). A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands & Adjacent Countries. London: Bradbury & Evans. p. 22.
  3. ^ a b Chew, Emrys (2012). Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 163.
  4. ^ Chew, Emrys (2012). Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 162, 175-176.
  5. ^ a b c d e Chew, Emrys (2012). Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 174.
  6. ^ a b Trocki, Carl A (2006). Singapore: Wealth, power and the culture of control. London: Routledge. p. 8.
  7. ^ a b Trocki, Carl A. Singapore: Wealth, power and the culture of control. London: Routledge, 2006. 13-14.
  8. ^ a b c Trocki, Carl A. (2006). Singapore: Wealth, power and the culture of control. London: Routledge. p. 11.
  9. ^ Singapore Chronicle and Commercial Register (September 23, 1830). "THE IMPORTATION of WARLIKE STORES".
  10. ^ a b c d Trocki, Carl A. (2006). Singapore: Wealth, power and the culture of control. London: Routledge. pp. 12–13.
  11. ^ a b Wee, Michele (September 30, 2024). ""John Crawfurd."".
  12. ^ Chew, Emrys (2012). Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 161–162.
  13. ^ The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser. (November 26, 1835). "Imports".
  14. ^ The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser. (November 5, 1835). ""PRINCIPAL EXPORTS."".
  15. ^ National Archives of Singapore. "S26: Vol. I/II: Governor's Letters from Bengal Page 58 of 844", 1857. https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/private_records/record-details/2cd49f41-1108-11ea-b18a-001a4a5ba61b
  16. ^ a b c d e f Chew, Emrys (2012). Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 175–176.
  17. ^ Chew, Emrys (2012). Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 178.
  18. ^ a b Tagliacozzo, Eric (2005). Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier. Yale University Press. pp. 261–262.
  19. ^ a b Tagliacozzo, Eric (2005). Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier. Yale University Press. p. 263.

Bibliography

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Emrys Chew, Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

John Crawfurd, A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands & Adjacent Countries (London: Bradbury & Evans, 1856), 22

National Archives of Singapore. "S26: Vol. I/II: Governor's Letters from Bengal Page 58 of 844", 1857. https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/private_records/record-details/2cd49f41-1108-11ea-b18a-001a4a5ba61b

Turnbull, Constance M. The Straits Settlements, 1826-67: Indian Presidency to Crown Colony. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press), 1972.

Singapore Chronicle and Commercial Register. “THE IMPORTATION of WARLIKE STORES.” Nlb.gov.sg. NewspaperSG, September 23, 1830. https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/article/singchronicle18300923-1.2.6.

Trocki, Carl A. Singapore: Wealth, power and the culture of control. (London: Routledge), 2006.

Tagliacozzo, Eric. Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865–1915. (Yale University Press), 2005.

The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser. “Imports.” Nlb.gov.sg. NewspaperSG, November 26, 1835. https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singfreepressa18351126-1.2.10.

The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser. “PRINCIPAL EXPORTS.” Nlb.gov.sg. NewspaperSG, November 5, 1835. https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singfreepressa18351105-1.2.11.

Wee, Michele. “John Crawfurd.” www.nlb.gov.sg. Accessed September 30, 2024. https://www.nlb.gov.sg/main/article-detail?cmsuuid=be179e6e-f78b-45c0-9aab-78ccbcf12259.