Draft:Issa Abdul Majid Mansour

Issa Abdul Majid Mansour
عيسى عبد المجيد منصور
Mansour in 2021
Minister of African Affairs
(Government of National Stability)
Assumed office
3 October 2023
Prime MinisterOsama Hammad
Preceded byPosition established
President of the Toubou Congress
Assumed office
18 February 2017
Preceded byPosition established
Commander of the Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya[a]
Assumed office
30 June 2007
Preceded byPosition established
Personal details
Born1970 (age 53–54)
Rebiana, Libya
Political partyToubou Congress
Signature
Military service
Allegiance Toubou militias (2007–present)
Libya National Transitional Council (2011–2012)
Libya General National Congress (2012–2014)
Libya House of Representatives (2014–2016)
Branch/service Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya (2007–present)
Libya National Liberation Army (2011–2012)
Libyan Army (2012–2014)
Libyan National Army (2014–2016)
Years of service2007–present
RankCommander
Unit
List
Battles/wars
  1. ^ Front dormant between 28 August 2011 and 27 March 2012.

Issa Abdul Majid Mansour[a][b] (born 1970) is a Toubou politician and milita leader from Libya who has served as Minister of African Affairs in the Government of National Stability since October 2023. He is the founder and commander of the Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya and has also served as the president of the Toubou Congress since 2017.

In 2007 he founded the Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya (TFSL), which he led into the 2008 Kufra conflict, a failed Toubou uprising against Gaddafi's government in Kufra.

Early life and exile edit

Issa Abdul Majid Mansour was born in Rebiana, Libya, in 1970.[13][14] He is a member of the Teda, a subgroup of the Toubou ethnic group who live in the north of Chad, the north east of Niger and the south of Libya.[15][16] He grew up in Benghazi, in the east of Libya, and in Kufra, near the Chad–Libya border.[13] He lived under the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, serving as a police officer and a worker in the Ministry of Interior.[15][16] Mansour had a brother, Juma Abdul Majid Mansour, who he claims was murdered in Tripoli during the civil war in 2011.[17]

In 1999 or 2000, Mansour fled Libya after falling out of favour with Gaddafi during a campaign of arrests against Toubou leaders by his regime.[14][18][13] He fled to Sudan and then to Niger, before moving through France to settle in exile in Norway, which housed other Toubou opposition leaders.[13][18] In exile, Mansour became an opponent of Gaddafi's regime, basing his operations from Oslo.[19][20][5] He believed his main cause was to help the Libyan people, however he became a vocal human rights advocate for the Toubou in particular; the Toubou had been marginalised under Gaddafi's regime through its policy of Arabisation.[13][14] Mansour has alleged that Gaddafi offered him $5 million in hush money during this period.[14]

2008 Kufra conflict edit

In 2007, Gaddafi's regime moved to strip the Toubou people in Kufra of their Libyan citizenship, claiming that their leaders had ties with Libya's rival Chad.[19][21] This prompted Mansour to found a new Toubou organised resistance group,[22] an armed militia called the Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya (TFSL), in June 2007.[21][23][24] Mansour appointed himself as its commander.[25] In an interview with Al-Alam TV, Mansour stressed that the group was not separatist in nature, and only wanted "the restitution of our rights".[22] Based in Oslo, the militia proved itself an annoyance to the regime, despite seemingly having little support in Libya. In 2008, the militia made empty threats to both foreign and domestic companies active in Kufra, Rebiana, Qatrun, Murzuq and Ubari, demanding that they evacuate from these locations within a fortnight. The deadline came and went with nothing occuring.[26] By 2011, Mansour had established himself as the leader of the main Toubou opposition figures.[27]

Tensions between the regime and the Toubou rose in 2008, culminating in the 2008 Kufra conflict, in which Mansour led the TFSL from his home in Norway to wage a five-day Toubou uprising in Kufra against Gaddafi's regime.[21][28][23] During the uprising, regime forces and members of the rival Arab Zuwayya tribe were killed in TFSL attacks.[29] According to one source, the Zuwayya appealed to the Libyan Army for help and informed them of an alleged plan by Mansour to establish an independent Toubou state.[14] The Libyan Army suppressed the uprising and expelled the Toubou from Kufra.[21] The TFSL would have no more fighters until 2011.[15]

Return to Libya edit

2011 civil war edit

Return to Libya and moblilisation of forces edit

Libya was one of the countries swept by the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011.[30] Protests began on 15 February and occured mainly in Benghazi. On the "Day of Revolt" on 17 February, protests broke out in cities across the country. Gaddafi's regime responded by firing on the protesters.[31] Mansour's brother Juma Abdul Majid Mansour took part in the 17 February protests and sought to emulate the self-immolation of Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi, the event that triggered the uprisings, by setting himself on fire in Kufra. Juma was hospitalised and transfered to Tripoli, where Mansour claims he was murdered days later.[17] Speaking to The New York Times, Mansour said the protesters would not return home, adding: "If they do, [Gaddafi will] finish them off. They know the regime very well. There's no to way to go back now. Never, never".[32] The protests against the regime eventually grew into a civil war between Gaddafi's supporters and armed rebel groups.[33][30] Mansour decided to return to Libya to have his TFSL join the rebellion against Gaddafi's regime.[15][13] He accessed Libya through Egypt[34] and arrived in the rebel-held city of Behghazi in February or March 2011.[13][17]

On his arrival, Mansour met members of the National Transitional Council (NTC), a provisional government set up by the rebels, and its leader Mustafa Abdul Jalil, who invited him to take a seat on the council as its representative for Kufra.[13][14] Mansour claims that he turned down the offer.[17][13] An Amnesty International report from 2012 claims that Mansour "briefly served" as the council's representative for Kufra during the civil war but resigned from the position in October 2011 to protest what he believed was the continued marginalisation and discrimination of the Toubou community.[35] In Benghazi, Mansour announced his plan to capture the oil fields in the south from Gaddafi's forces.[13][14] He also announced that the TFSL was joining the rebels.[15] He recruited a force of 18 Toubou fighters who then joined the 17 February Brigade.[15][17]

Mansour then left Benghazi for his hometown of Rebiana, close to Kufra in the south of the country, to mobilise another force of Toubou fighters.[14] According to Mansour's estimates, his forces included up to 1,200 fighters.[13] Most of the Toubou people supported the rebellion;[10] the Toubou were one of the first groups to join the rebellion, owing to their marginalisation during Gaddafi's rule.[24] Because of the treatment of the Toubou under Gaddafi among other reasons, main Toubou opposition leaders joined the rebellion with Mansour as their leader.[27] For his part, Mansour believed the rebellion would become a turning point for Toubou rights.[14] The NTC offered Libyan citizenship to the country's Saharan communities, including the Toubou, if they joined the rebellion.[27]

Border blockade and military campaigns edit

In March, NTC leader Mustafa Abdul Jalil assigned Mansour with securing the southern borders with Sudan and Chad.[14] Mansour's Toubou forces initiated a successful blockade against Gaddafi's regime by blocking supplies and reinforcements from coming over the southern border and sub-Saharan Africa.[36][37][38] The Sudanese government, having been provoked by Gaddafi's intervention in the War in Darfur, provided military support to the Toubou forces.[27][14] It also supplied Mansour's forces with weaponry. According to some reports, Mansour was also supported by Chad.[39]

 
Aerial view of Kufra in 2007. In May 2011, the allied forces under Mansour's command captured Kufra, placing the town under his control.

In the early days of the civil war, Mansour's forces took control of Qatrun and Murzuq for a short period of time before they were recaptured by forces loyal to Gaddafi.[40] In April, Mansour's Toubou forces in the 17 February Brigade were sent to defend oil fields controlled by the Arabian Gulf Oil Company.[17] Mansour and other Toubou commanders formed an alliance with members of the Zuwayya tribe. In March and April, the allied forces captured the Maaten al-Sarra Air Base and the Sarir oil field, located south and north of Kufra respectively. In doing so, they were able to capture some vehicles.[15][41] Supported by Mansour's blockade and armed with weaponry supplied by Sudan, the allied forces under Mansour's command captured Kufra and its local oil field on 6 May, reportedly capturing weapons from the town in the process.[15][41][21] This placed the town of Kufra under Mansour's control.[21] Kufra was the first major Saharan town to fall to rebel forces in the civil war, with the last attacks on the town from Gaddafi's forces ending in May.[37]

In the rest of the south, Toubou forces led a campaign to capture towns from the regime. Toubou forces were moblilised in the towns of Sabha and Ubari under the command of Cherfeddin Barkay and Barka Wardougou (fr) respectively. Toubou forces captured the al-Wigh military base, the Umm Aranib desert plateau and the village of Zweila. They also recaptured the towns of Qatrun and Murzuq, taking control of their military councils.[21][41] By the end of the civil war on October 23, a few days after the death of Gaddafi, the Toubou had de facto control over much of Libya's souther frontier, including the border crossings there.[21] Gaddafi's regime had collapsed a month earlier with the fall of Tripoli to rebel forces.[42] With Gaddafi's regime toppled and the civil war in its final stages, Mansour announced the dissolution of the TFSL in August 2011.[16][43] He continued to command his own militia and brigade in the Kufra District after the civil war.[15][44]

Transitional period edit

In the aftermath of the civil war, the different Toubou forces, while cooperating to some extent, had become disunited. Soon after the collapse of Gaddafi's regime, the Chadian president Idriss Déby reportedly invited Mansour, Wardougou and Allatchi Mahadi, another Libyan Toubou commander, to N'Djamena. Déby allegedly gave the commanders money and offered to supply them with vehicles if they formed a united militia.[41] After the civil war, the Toubou militias reorganised themselves into seven brigades which operated under a system of collective leadership similar to Shura. Mansour took charge of the Toubou's anti-illegal immigration brigade alongside Toubou commander Issa May; the brigade was officially named the Katiba Shahid Juma’ Abdelmajid (Anti-Illegal Immigration Battalion of the Martyr Juma Abdul Majid).[41][45] The Toubou's brigades operated throughout the south of Libya, working together to maintain a satisfactory level of security in the region.[45] Déby went on to supply financial support to Mansour and several other Toubou leaders, including Mahadi and Wardougou's successor Abay Wardougou.[41]

In October 2011, Mansour met Mustafa Abdul Jalil in Benghazi with other Toubou leaders from Kufra. According to Mansour, Jalil promised them that the Toubou people would be represented in the new Libyan government. Jalil is also claimed to have promised the creation of a committee which would recognise the Toubou's rights as well as their identity.[14] By November, Mansour had joined the new government as the head of the Department for Combatting Illegal Migration, where he was responsible for tackling illegal immigration.[46][47] According to his estimates, the number of Africans migrating illegally through Libya into European countries had risen from around 3,000 a year under Gaddafi to as much as 3,000 migrants each day after the fall of his regime.[48] From May 2012 to April 2013, the Department deported almost 25,000 foreign nationals, most of them for having irregular documentation. Of the 40,000 irregular migrants arrested by the government in 2013, the Department deported over 30,000 of them.[49] Mansour left the Department for Combatting Illegal Migration in 2013.[47]

Kufra and Sabha conflicts edit

After taking control of the town of Kufra during the civil war, Mansour was given control over the Kufra District by the NTC. His control of the region extended down to the borders with Chad and Sudan in the south east.[21] The NTC, weary of the Zuwayya's reputation as former long-time supporters of Gaddafi, gave Mansour and his militia responsibility for monitoring and securing the south eastern borders.[50][15][51] He was also given control over the smuggling routes and desert crossings on the border.[36][9] Afterwards, Mansour reportedly formed a border guard of 100 Toubou soldiers in late 2011. This border guard was tasked with levying taxes for the NTC on routes located to the south of Kufra.[15] By late 2012, the border guard had extended its influence to the border with Niger in addition to the borders with Chad and Sudan.[36][52] The border guard based their operations from Kufra.[36]

By giving Mansour responsibility for monitoring and securing these areas, the NTC effectively gave him a near monopoly over the region's illicit economy, which included both the legal and illegal trade of drugs, weapons, fuel, food and migrants over the border.[50][38] The Toubou used these economic resources for their own enrichment; Mansour was accussed of profiting off smugglers and traficking to the detriment of the Zuwayya.

During the rule of Gaddafi, the smuggling routes on the border where controlled by members of the Zuwayya.[9] The Zuwayya ran safehouses in the region and raised tariffs on smuggled goods.[21] After falling under Mansour's control, the smuggling routes provided a source of conflict between the Toubou and the Arab tribes local to the area.[9] Mansour's border guard were seen as unfairly taxing members of the Zuwayya. The Toubou's alliance with the Zuwayya, whose members accounted for the majority of Kufra's population, broke down.[53][37] As early as November 2011, forces from the Zuwayya attacked Mansour's forces and tried to occupy a checkpoint. Afterwards, the NTC distanced itself from Mansour. Mansour's forces nonetheless maintained control of the routes south of Kufra.[15]

Mansour claims that, near the end of the civil war, Jalil promised him and other Toubou leaders from Kufra that the Toubou would be represented in the new government with a committee formed to recognise their rights and identity.[14]

On 24 April 2012, a warrant was issued for Mansour's arrest.[54]

Post–Gaddafi Libya edit

 
Mansour with the United States ambassador to Libya Richard B. Norland in November 2022

In March 2012 Mansour, by this point the main leader of the Toubou in Libya, threatened to create a breakaway state for the Toubou if the NTC failed to solve the 2012 Kufra conflict.[55]

On 19 September 2014 Mansour was appointed Advisor to the Speaker of the House of Representatives for African Affairs.[56] He announced his resignation from this role on 15 August 2016.[57][58]

On 18 February 2017, Toubou activist Salem Othman announced the establishment of the Toubou Congress, a political party which claims to represent the Toubou in Libya and aims to defend their rights. Othman also announced that Mansour had been elected unopposed as the party president. In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat in 2017, Mansour said he was not involved in the creation of the party.[58] However, in an interview with Al-Arab in 2019, Mansour said that he was the founder of the party.[59]

On 3 October 2023, Prime Minister Osama Hammad of the eastern-based Government of National Stability appointed Mansour as Minister of African Affairs in his government; this was his second cabinet appointment since taking over from Fathi Bashagha in May.[60][61][62] As Minister of African Affairs, Mansour is responsible for the government's relations with other African nation states and organisations as well as discussing ways to address the Libyan Crisis.[63] Mansour's stated policy objective, as set out in accordance with Hammad's wishes, is to strengthen relations between Hammad's government and Libya's African allies in a way which serves the interests of the Libyan people and helps create an atmosphere of security, stability, well-being and prosperity in Libya.[64][65]

Political views edit

Mansour has stated his support for national reconciliation across Libya, including between Gaddafi loyalists and supporters of the old monarchy of Libya.[66] He has stated that reconciliation between Libya's tribes is necessary to make the country safe.[67] He has also said the reconciliation process should involve the formation of a single, unified government to prevent further divisions in the country and the continuation of the Libyan Crisis. Mansour has stated that the constitution of Libya should be fair and representative of all aspects of the nation, and that there should be parliamentary and presidential elections held in the country.[68] In 2021, Mansour raised the issue of fair electoral representation for Libya's minority groups with Richard B. Norland, the United States ambassador to Libya.[69][70] Mansour has been a minority rights advocate for the Toubou since before the 2011 civil war, and has continued his advocacy following the end of the conflict.[37] In 2017, he called on the Arab League to support equal rights between Libya's minority groups, including the Toubou, and the rest of the country.[67] In the event that Libya becomes divided between small factions, Mansour has suggested the creation of separate breakaway microstates, including one for the Toubou.[71]

Mansour has encouraged foreign intervention in Libya. He has suggested that the Toubou could work with foreign powers in campaigns against smuggling and international terrorism.[72] Internationally, Mansour has presented the Toubou as a secular force who can resist terrorism and provide border security in Libya's south.[73] In 2017, Mansour proposed plans to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to curb illegal immigration, terrorism and smuggling in Libya, as well as plans to complete the reconciliation process between the tribes of southern Libya. He has praised Italy for its role in curbing terrorism in Libya, particularly in Sirte, and for helping the country to become more safe and stable.[47] He has also called on the Arab League to help stabilise Libya.[67] Mansour has discussed what he considers the "marginalisation" of essential day-to-day services in the south of Libya, as well as its economic, security and stability issues, with foreign leaders and representatives.[66][67][74]

References edit

  1. ^ Arabic: عيسى عبد المجيد منصور;[1] Arabic pronunciation: [ʕiː.saː ʕæbdelˈmaʤiːd manˈsˤuːr]; English pronunciation: /ˈsə ˌɑːbdʊl məˈd mænˈsʊər/. Also referred to as Issa Abdul Majid,[2][3][4] Abdul Majid Mansour,[5][6] Abdul Majid Issa,[7][8][9] or simply Abdul Majid.[10]
  2. ^ There is no standardised system of romanisation for Arabic names, and it can produce several results.[11][12] Other romanisations of Mansour's name include Issa Abd al-Majid Mansour, Issa Abdel Majid Mansour, Issa Abdelmajid Mansour, Issa Abdul Majeed Mansour and Essa Abdul Majid Mansour, among others.
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