Battle of Nuštar

The Battle of Nuštar was a major battle during the Croatian War of Independence. Fought between the 2nd of November to the 5th of November, 1991. It was fought between Croatia, and SAO Krajina which was supported by the Yugoslav People’s Army, between the dates of 2-5 November, 1991. Nuštar was situated near Vukovar and Vinkovci, it was a major necessity to the Croatian defenders at Vukovar and Vinkovci, due it’s road that led to nearby villages and towns, which had supplied the Croats in Vukovar. Nuštar saw major artillery shelling from the Yugoslav People’s Army, along with air strikes conducted by the Yugoslav Air Force. Despite the major bombing and shelling from the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Yugoslav Air Force, The Croatian garrison in Nuštar never fell, but it suffered massive infrastructural damage.

Battle of Nuštar
Part of the Croatian War of Independence
Location Nuštar, Croatia 45°20′N 18°50′E Result Croatian victory
Belligerents
Croatia	Yugoslavia SAO Krajina
Units involved
Croatian National Guard Croatian Defence Forces Croatian Army Croatian Police	Yugoslav People's Army Yugoslav Air Force SAO Krajina TO Serb Volunteer Guard
Casualties and losses
Unknown	10 T-55’s destoryed, 17 tanks in total, 9 Armored Personnel Carriers destoryed, c. 100-200 killed

Background

In 1990, ethnic tensions between Serbs and Croats worsened after the electoral defeat of the government of the Socialist Republic of Croatia by the Croatian Democratic Union (Croatian: Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – HDZ). The Yugoslav People's Army (Serbian: Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA) confiscated Croatia's Territorial Defence (Croatian: Teritorijalna obrana – TO) weapons to minimize resistance. On 17 August, the tensions escalated into an open revolt of the Croatian Serbs, centred on the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around Knin (approximately 60 kilometres (37 miles) north-east of Split), parts of the Lika, Kordun, Banovina and eastern Croatia. In January 1991, Serbia, supported by Montenegro and Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, unsuccessfully tried to obtain the Yugoslav Presidency's approval for a JNA operation to disarm Croatian security forces. The request was denied and a bloodless skirmish between Serb insurgents and Croatian special police in March prompted the JNA itself to ask the Federal Presidency to give it wartime authority and declare a state of emergency. Even though the request was backed by Serbia and its allies, the JNA request was refused on 15 March. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, preferring a campaign to expand Serbia rather than to preserve Yugoslavia with Croatia as a federal unit, publicly threatened to replace the JNA with a Serbian army and declared that he no longer recognized the authority of the federal Presidency. The threat caused the JNA to abandon plans to preserve Yugoslavia in favour of expansion of Serbia as the JNA came under Milošević's control. By the end of March, the conflict had escalated with the first fatalities. In early April, leaders of the Serb revolt in Croatia declared their intention to amalgamate the areas under their control with Serbia. These were viewed by the Government of Croatia as breakaway regions.

At the beginning of 1991, Croatia had no regular army. To bolster its defence, Croatia doubled its police numbers to about 20,000. The most effective part of the Croatian police force was 3,000-strong special police comprising twelve battalions organised along military lines. There were also 9,000–10,000 regionally organised reserve police in 16 battalions and 10 companies, but they lacked weapons. In response to the deteriorating situation, the Croatian government established the Croatian National Guard (Croatian: Zbor narodne garde – ZNG) in May by expanding the special police battalions into four all-professional guards brigades. Under Ministry of Defence control and commanded by retired JNA General Martin Špegelj, the four guards brigades comprised approximately 8,000 troops. The reserve police, also expanded to 40,000, was attached to the ZNG and reorganised into 19 brigades and 14 independent battalions. The guards brigades were the only units of the ZNG that were fully equipped with small arms; throughout the ZNG there was a lack of heavier weapons and there was poor command and control structure above the brigade level. The shortage of heavy weapons was so severe that the ZNG resorted to using World War II weapons taken from museums and film studios. At the time, the Croatian weapon stockpile consisted of 30,000 small arms purchased abroad and 15,000 previously owned by the police. To replace the personnel lost to the guards brigades, a new 10,000-strong special police was established.

Prelude

Croatian Forces supplied Weapons, ammunition, and food to the soldiers fighting in Vukovar via roads near Vinkovci and Nuštar, this prompted Serbian forces to attack Nuštar as it was the main base for the rearming of the Croatian Soldiers at Vukovar. This prompted the Yugoslav People’s Army to launch a series of attacks in the area.

Timeline

In Noon, the Joint JNA-Chetnik force would attack Nuštar, before that, the Yugoslav People’s Army would shell Nuštar with over 3,000 artillery shells, including the use of aerosol. Despite the devastation, the Croatian forces quickly reorganized and replenished their ammunition supplies, preparing for the impending attack. They would rely on hand weapons, including assault rifles, grenades, and anti-tank rocket launchers to repel the second wave of assault. The second attack, launched just after 9:00 am, was a combined effort by tanks and infantry forces from Marinci and the Henrikovci Estate. Approximately 50 tanks and armored personnel carriers formed a moving shield for an infantry force of 500-1,000 JNA and Serbian Četnik troops. As the JNA/Serbian forces entered the village, they were met with a ZNG canon at the entrance. However, it was soon overwhelmed, and the combined forces began to split at the local cemetery, launching a two-pronged attack. One group of enemy combatants entered the main street, while another followed the path along the cemetery's side, heading towards Ban Jelačić Street. The goal was to form a pincer movement with Četnik forces that were leaving recently occupied Cerić. Meanwhile, a third group of Serbian troops entered Marin Držić Street, adding to the enemy's numbers. The objective was to capture the village center and attack the castle, where the Croatian command had set up its field HQ. If successful, this would sever all roadways connecting Vinkovci to Vukovar. The JNA/Četnik forces' attempted push into the village center was met with intense resistance from the HOS defenders, leading to a critical breakdown in their advance. The once-coordinated forces splintered into three separate groups, as the Marin Držić Street became a flashpoint of intense street fighting. Despite their initial momentum, the JNA/Četnik forces were unable to breach the village center, as they were repeatedly repelled by the HOS defenders' steadfast determination. Throughout the day, the HOS defenders employed a combination of light infantry weaponry and anti-tank hand-fired mortars to hold their ground, utilizing every available advantage to stave off the enemy's relentless assault. As the JNA/Četnik forces continued to push forward, the HOS defenders remained resolute, bolstered by the arrival of fresh supplies and reinforcements from Vinkovci, the closest major Croatian city still under Croatian control. The local defenders were equipped with shoulder-fired anti-tank rounds and rockets, providing them with a critical edge in the battle. Meanwhile, reserve troops from the 109th Brigade of the ZNG in Vinkovci began to deploy along the shifting front lines, only to fall victim to Serbian snipers, further exacerbating the already dire situation. Despite this, the Serbs failed to meet their goals.

Aftermath

The City of Nuštar had been completely destroyed during the battle, with approximately 5,000 + bombs and shells hitting the town, including the killing of Croatians by the White Eagles and the Serb Volunteer Guard

Sources

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