User:Gary/Drafts/Canadian Confederation/Notes

Waite

Waite, Peter B. (2001). The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864–1867. Robin Brass Studio. ISBN 9781896941233.

British North America and Great Britain

By the 1860s, the British Empire based its economy on free trade principles rather than mercantilism. As a political side-effect, the British North American colonies were given responsible government. Because of this, the British no longer sought to supply itself from its colonies; it now looked to trade with other countries all around the world. Therefore, the question arose of what use were colonies, such as the self-governing colony of Canada, when they were no longer a source nor a market for trade with the British. They were not intrinsically valuable, inconvenient to administer, and often expensive. (p. 17)

During the American Civil War, the British North American colonies were considered to be in possible danger. The territory caused for an awkward situation between the British and the United States, considering its location; it was impossible to thoroughly defend the Canadian border, for example. The Canadian government refused to spend half a million dollars to defend itself. The British nevertheless sent thousands of troops as aid. Those who criticized the British for holding on to its North American possessions pointed to Canada's refusal to spend money on defending itself and its two and a half million inhabitants as a reason for why Canada gave England nothing but "endless expense, perpetual danger". Critics also compared Canada to a child, noting that since the British were constantly providing defensive reinforcements to the colony when necessary while Canada never mounted its own form of self-defence, it would shrink away from "the dangers and burdens even of the most prosperous and heroic life" and simply continue on the path that it traveled on. Many British believed that Canada must face its own future, alone, without the help of the British. (p. 18) And that British North America should be given the responsibilities of a colony that is naturally maturing. (p. 20)

Confederation was one such solution to forming a more stronger Canada, and one that could take care of itself. Most Britons believed that, if Canada were dragged into a war with the Americans, the British should not participate. Confederation offered to make this a reality, making it popular among Britons. (p. 20) John A. Macdonald, who would later become the first Prime Minister of Canada, was a member of the Conservative Party of Canada, and believed that Canada should retain its British connection, but he was also a nationalist and believed that "a British nation under the British flag and under British institutions" should be built on the North American continent. Indeed, most other Conservatives shared his beliefs. (p. 23)

Reformers and the Bleus, which consisted largely of populations descended from the French, on the other hand, were less enthusiastic about the idea of Confederation and instead believed in creating a wholly independent Canadian nation. Most British Americans at the time were loyal to Britain, except for the French Canadians, who, at least, disliked the United States more than the English did. (p. 24) The difficulty leading up to Confederation was in converting Canadian loyalties to action. Canadians thought of defence as a final effort to repel an attack rather than a preventive measure. They also believed that if Canada entered into a war, England would provide for most of the cost of defence since entry into war would most likely be caused by either British or American aggression, not Canadian. The British, weary of Canada’s attitude towards defending itself, decided that Confederation, a cheap and simple path, was ultimately the best defensive measure for its colony. This was why the option had such strong support in London. Confederation saved the British the cost of administering several colonies and instead joined them together, therefore only requiring that Britain administer a single colony. (p. 25)

Nova Scotia was perhaps the most loyal colony and the one with the strongest connection to Britain than any other North American colony, due to its location on the most eastern point of North America, near Britain, and its swift communications with England. (p. 25) New Brunswick had possibly the strongest connection to the United States of any British North American colony. It had significant commercial and economic relations with America. It was also more difficult to access from Britain, hence its weaker relation with them. (p. 26) The relations of both Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland with Britain were strained at the time, due to recent events such as the absentee landlords of the former, and the French Shore controversy of the latter. (p. 26) Regarding defence, the four Maritime colonies were as unprepared for an attack as were the rest of British North America; however, due to their distance from the United States, they were less of a threat. (p. 26) In the western British North American colonies of Vancouver Island and British Columbia, defence was thin, with only a small group of Royal Marines in San Juan Island as the only British force in the region, making the entire area vulnerable to American invasion and annexation. (p. 27) Believing that Canada had become a major problem in British relations with the United States, London felt that they had no choice but to push the idea of Confederation forward. (p. 28)

British North America and the United States

The British colonies were uneasy with the ongoings of the American Civil War. They saw the destruction it caused for both the Union and the Confederacy, after previously witnessing the rapid growth that the country saw in the past few decades. (p. 29) The Canadians felt that the American Civil War permanently tore apart the United States, and once it ended, the country would "emerge [...] chafed, angry, and entertaining feelings of mortal hatred and revenge". British North Americans who witnessed American expansionism, as the country first seized Florida, purchased Louisiana, and then took Texas, believed that after the Civil War, the United States would intend to acquire Canada as well. Their belief was fuelled by American newspapers such as the ‘’New York Herald’’, the ‘’New York Tribune’’, the ‘’New York Times’’, and the New York ‘’World’’, which proclaimed the acquisition of British colonies to be inevitable. (p. 30)

Liberals and Reformers generally supported the Union, while the rest of Canada supported the Confederacy, in the hopes that they would not share the same plans of assimilation that the North felt. Many Southerners found lodging in cities such as Toronto and Victoria, causing Northerners just across the border to resent the Canadians. (p. 31) A series of events raised the tension between Canada and the United States from 1862 to 1863, including the ‘’Chesapeake’’ and ‘’Philo Parsons’’ affairs. The St. Albans Raid in particular, in which bank robbers fled to Canada and were not charged with any crimes there, caused the United States State Department to require that all British North Americans traveling to the United States to have passports. (p. 32–33)

Canada believed that England would send funds for defence; when it sent only 50,000 pounds in 1865, Macdonald asked, in a serious tone, if a zero was missing from the figure. Subsequently, the idea of voluntarily capitulating to the United States was better than participating in an unsuccessful war. (p. 33–34) British North Americans were keen to learn of the successes and failures of the United States Constitution. Witnessing "the rise and fall of the Great Republic" during the American Civil War, many were quick to claim that their Constitution was severely flawed, and Halifax’s ‘’Morning Chronicle’’ called it "a constitution of elementary mistrust". However, some were more positive towards the Constitution, including the Toronto ‘’Globe’’, which wrote that it was ultimately slavery that destroyed their constitution, not federation. (p. 34)

Therefore, there were essentially three prejudices against the United States that existed in Canada. First, the Canadians deeply distrusted the North with its plans of expansion. Secondly, the Canadians strongly believed that the Civil War was caused by the United States’ federation, because it was considered to be such an ambivalent principle that it caused disruption rather than form cohesion. Finally, nearly all Canadians disliked American political practices. (p. 35) Canadians were, however, impressed with the fact that the United States was able to form a transcontinental nation, and they hoped that given enough time, energy, and ambition, that they could do the same. (p. 35)

Canadian Coalition

The Taché–Macdonald (later the Cartier–Macdonald) government had been in power from 1856 to 1862, a period of seven years. Subsequent governments would last for less than a year each, and it quickly became clear the political polarity that existed; French Canadians leaned towards the Conservatives while the English Canadians were in favour of the Reformers. (p. 36) Up to this point, the idea of Confederation had come up several times before, typically in the context of it being a solution to Canada’s growing political problems. It was mentioned in a speech by George Brown to the Canadian Assembly on February 8, 1865, in Lord Durham’s Report of 1839, in the British-American League resolutions of 1849, and in the Canadian legislature and Canadian press sporadically from 1856 to 1859. (p. 37)

It was also well known that Confederation would assimilate French Canadians by obliterating their language, discouraging their religion in favour of another one, and change their customs and institutions to integrate them into English society. This would be achieved by creating a representative government that accurately represented the country’s demographics; with more English Canadians than French Canadians, the English would have more seats in the government and therefore control over the country. The French, knowing that Confederation was inevitable, chose to support the political party that served in their best interests. The English split up into several parties because of political differences; therefore, in reality, since there was still a significant French population, whichever party they supported would be the majority party. (p. 37)

George Brown first suggested in 1853 that the government be governed with representation by population, commonly known at the time as "rep. by pop." (p. 37) By the mid-1850s, Canada West (modern-day Ontario) was growing more rapidly than Canada East (modern-day Quebec). With the growth came a change in the political landscape; the Reform party weakened, and the Conservatives formed a government with the French Canadians. (p. 37) The dominating party in Canada West, the Clear Grits, had remained the opposition party from 1854 to 1864. During this time, they demanded more members of Parliament (MP) in the government as the disparity between the population of the West and the East grew; by 1861, each MP in the East represented 17,000 people, while each MP in the West represented 21,000. In addition to this disparity, the cultural differences between the West and East—including the language, religion, and institutions—were so vast that it helped push the Province of Canada towards Confederation so as to provide both provinces with more equal representation in the government. (p. 38)

Andrew Galt of the Conservatives put forward a proposal of Confederation in 1858. (p. 39) The Rouges and the Reformers were suspicious to the Conservatives’ motives of suggesting Confederation, believing that the Conservatives intended on including their own pet projects into the plans. They were proved correct when Galt included an intercolonial railway along with Confederation. (p. 40) The Reformers favoured forming a loosely connected federation of Canada instead of a Confederation. Circumstances ruled in their favour, as many politicians in Canada preferred forming more regional governments than a single federal government to rule over the Canadian provinces. The four maritime provinces in particular were interested in forming a legislative union together. It was believed that if British North America could form a federation, then surely the Canadas could, too. (p. 40–43)

At the Reform convention in Toronto on November 9, 1859, the proposal for federation of the Canadas passed by a vote of 566–4, primarily due to a speech in favour of federation by Brown. Brown, however, was unwilling to co-operate with the French of Canada East, therefore gradually making federation of the Canadas an impossibility. (p. 43–44) Several coalition governments followed, but none would last for very long. It was quickly becoming clear that a simple coalition government would not be sufficient to rule both Canadian provinces in unison; the population of Canada West were unhappy with how they had been treated in past governments thus far, considering that Canada East still had more seats in Parliament than them. (p. 45)

In March 1864, Brown asked a government committee to look into the possibilities of federation as a solution to Canada’s problems. The committee voted 59–48 in favour of federation; 51 of those in favour were from Canada West, while 48 of those who opposed were from Canada East. (p. 46) The committee first met on May 20, 1864, to discuss what was needed to be done before federation was a possibility. On June 14, the committee suggested to Parliament several constitutional changes that should be made. On the same day, the existing government was defeated by two votes. In its place, a coalition was formed between Brown and the Conservatives, joining the party that was most often in power with the one that was typically the Opposition. Brown knew that a coalition was necessary for him to participate in the government, and yet he personally distrusted coalitions. He was also known to enjoy power without having responsibilities. He also had a wild temper that was well-known by the public. (p. 47)

The official announcement of the Coalition was made in the House on June 22, 1864. Brown made a rousing speech there, in which he talked about how Canada should rise above its petty political quarrels and unite together to "settle this question as a great national issue, in a manner worthy of us as a people", focusing particularly on the French Canadians. The speech was well-received by members of both Canada West and Canada East. (p. 49) The English in Canada East gave a mixed reaction to the Coalition. Some believed that a stronger government would strengthen the English in a French-dominated province, while others thought that the English would lose their religious and political identity in a separate province. (p. 50)

In Canada West, nine-tenths of the region’s newspapers supported both the Coalition and Confederation. (p. 50) The Conservatives in Canada West were staunchly against Confederation and instead believed in the existing Union, but, recognizing the popularity of Confederation, decided to support Macdonald. (p. 52) Confederation was a solution to the problems unique to Canada, including those of culture, language, and religion. It was accepted by three of the four major political parties of the Union. Canadians, especially those in Canada West, quickly warmed up to the idea of federation. The situation was quite the opposite in the Atlantic colonies, however. (p. 54)

Road to Charlottetown

In the eastern colonies, Confederation was not considered as high a priority as it was in Canada. The idea of a Maritime union had, however, come up before in the four colonies, in Nova Scotia in 1826, 1838, 1854, and in 1861; in Newfoundland in 1858; in New Brunswick; and in Prince Edward Island in 1863. The colonies felt that Confederation would not act as a solution to any of the existing problems that they had. In addition, the colonies feared the time necessary to spend to implement the many constitutional changes that Confederation would surely require. (p. 55)

Initially, Nova Scotia was interested in forming a union so that it could regain the land that it lost to other the other colonies, particularly to Prince Edward Island in 1769 and New Brunswick in 1784, when England partitioned some land for the new colonies. The people of Nova Scotia saw the division of Nova Scotia as a mistake, and they often entertained the idea of a Maritime union, while the people of New Brunswick did not like the idea of having their existence thought of as a mistake, and those of Prince Edward Island believed that a union would annihilate the island’s independence. (p. 56)

The appeal of a Maritime union was particularly strong after the failure of the Intercolonial Railway. At the Quebec Conference in September 1862, the governments of Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia agreed to share the costs of the railway in the proportion of 5 : 3.5 : 3.5. When the ministers of each colony went to England to negotiate funding the project, the British offered a sinking fund; New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were prepared to agree to it, but Canada did not, and so the ministers returned to North America without any funding. (p. 58)

In July 1863, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick agreed to a comprehensive survey proposed by Canada that would take place before construction began. (p. 58) Canadians began feeling uneasy about the project, and believed that it would end up as a financial disaster similar to the Grand Trunk Railway. Opposition to the Intercolonial Railway was very strong. The Canadian government, which could not risk a single vote, therefore scrapped the project. Without the support of the Canadians, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had no choice but to also halt construction for the project. (p. 59)

Following these events, anti-Canadian sentiment quickly grew in the Maritime provinces, and the idea of a Maritime union was brought forward once again. The belief was that a union would politically strengthen the provinces, and give them more of a say in negotiations with Canada. The idea was met with much enthusiasm from many of the three provinces’ leading newspapers that represented views across the political spectrum. In Canada, some Reform newspapers, perhaps some of which were glad to get rid of the Intercolonial Railway, also supported the cause. In the spring of 1864, all three Maritime legislatures proposed resolutions that authorized the appointment of delegates to a conference. (p. 61)

However, the idea of a union began to fade as hopes for the Intercolonial Railway were revived. The Canadian government had decided to continue the survey for the railway. (p. 61) Charles Tupper, Premier of Nova Scotia, formally introduced his proposal for a Maritime union in the legislature on March 28, 1864. He believed that union of all of British North America would be impractical for many years, but that a Maritime union was immediately both desirable and practicable. Tupper’s resolutions, which called for the appointment of delegates, passed without opposition. (p. 62)

In New Brunswick, Premier Samuel Leonard Tilley introduced the resolution for the appointment of delegates on April 9, 1864, and passed without opposition as well. (p. 63) In Prince Edward Island, the legislature felt there was no need to join the proposed union. However, they decided to send five delegates to the conference, anyway, just in case questions arose that were of importance to the colony. (p. 64) The general sentiment among Canadians and Islanders was that Maritime union was never a serious possibility. Indeed, by the summer of 1864, no Maritime union conference was arranged, nor was a date or place set. (p. 65)

One useful result that came from the debates about Maritime union was that there was strong support for Confederation of all of British North America. Suddenly, a conference became necessary to discuss these newly discovered feelings, and Canada, which asked to participate in the conference, was invited to do so. On July 24, 1864, Charlottetown was chosen to host the conference on September 1, 1864. Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia hastily appointed delegates to send to the conference. (p. 65–66) Thus, there were two proposals that would be presented at the conference: a union of all British North America, and a Maritime Union. The Maritime colonies preferred a Maritime Union as they felt that a federal system as large as one that would be created in British North America would be difficult to run if such a system were created. (p. 66)

In Nova Scotia, many newspapers objected to the very principle of federation. They did not want to see the Maritimes and Canada mix in each other’s political affairs. Newspapers in New Brunswick were more receptive to Confederation, believing that it was an inevitable result among British North American colonies. As for the Islanders, they were quite indifferent to the idea of Confederation, until Charlottetown was chosen as the site of the conference. Afterward, newspapers there wrote furiously about the possible creation of "a great nation in this western hemisphere". (p. 67–69) Newfoundland, which was not invited to the conference, was the only British North American colony to not send any delegates. (p. 71)

Maritimers were untrustworthy of Canadians, due to its history that included events such as the Rebellions of 1837, the pelting of the Governor-General with rotten eggs in 1849, the Grand Trunk scandals, and the actions following planning of the Intercolonial Railway. Fortunately, Canada sent several hundred Canadians to the Maritimes, a trip which was planned after the plans for the Intercolonial Railway fell through, to improve relations between the colonies. The party included representatives of prominent Canadian newspapers and important politicians. This visit helped to relieve much of the tenseness between the colonies due to the Canadians’ goodwill combined with the warm reception in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. The visit also allowed Canadians to promote the advantages of Confederation to otherwise uncertain Maritimers. (p. 71–73) While the visit did not have an immediate impact, it did begin to stir a national spirit among the Maritime provinces, which would lead up to the Charlottetown Conference on September 1 of that year. (p. 78)

Charlottetown Conference

Only by Canadian initiative did the Charlottetown Conference take place at all, although some contemporaries felt that this was not the case, instead believing that the Canadians used their skill of persuasion to convince the delegates to participate in something that they were not interested in. (p. 79) Canada’s party, consisting of eight of the twelve members of Cabinet, left Quebec for Charlottetown on August 29, 1864. They traveled down the St. Lawrence River on the Queen Victoria. When they arrived in Charlottetown on September 1, they learned that most of the twenty hotels in the town had no vacancies since most of them were there to see Slaymaker and Nichols’ Olympic Circus, which was in town from August 30 to September 2. (p. 80)

The delegates from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick arrived on August 31. They were not met by a group of members of the Prince Edward Island government as was expected. Instead, W. H. Pope, the Provincial Secretary, was given the task of meeting them and escort them to their lodging in the Mansion House since most of the members of government were at the circus. (p. 81) When the Canadians arrived in Charlottetown, Pope rowed out in an oyster boat to meet the Canadians, who had anchored the Queen Victoria in the harbour. (p. 81)

The following day, at the Charlottetown Conference, Premier of the Island Col. J. H. Gray was made Chairman. The Conference decided to allow the Canadians to make their case for Confederation over the next four days, after which the question of Maritime union would begin. The Conference was then adjourned until 10 am the next day. (p. 83) Over the next two days, Cartier, Macdonald, and Galt argued in favour of Confederation, beginning with the basis of the financial settlement. The plan was that the new federal government would assume all debts, and it would then provide revenue to the provinces, apportioned on the basis of population. (p. 84)

At 3 pm of each day, the Conference adjourned. The delegation of the Island hosted a buffet luncheon on September 2, at Pope’s home. (p. 86) The Canadians hosted lunch the next day on the Queen Victoria. The Canadians were aware that they had to win over the other delegates so that Confederation could become a reality, so they provided a particularly large amount of wine and spirits to loosen them up, spending a few thousand dollars on them. This gathering could be considered the true beginning of Confederation, when many of the 23 delegates talked out their differences and realized that Confederation could become a reality. (p. 86)

On September 5, Brown addressed the Conference on the constitutional aspects of Confederation, particularly the matters relating to the governance of the general and local governments. (p. 87) General details about Confederation were discussed the next day, on the same day that the Canadians left the Conference and let the remaining delegates decide on the fate of Confederation. The day after, the Conference decided unanimously that Maritime union was hopeless, and that Confederation was highly desirable. The Conference then began making its rounds to each Maritimes province, first heading to Halifax, but not before spending a few days relaxing in Charlottetown. (p. 87)

Prince Edward Island hosted a grand ball at Province House for all the delegates. Dinner was provided, and afterward, some of the guests made speeches that lasted for nearly three hours in total. (p. 88) All the delegates crowded on the Canadians’ Queen Victoria to travel to Halifax, Nova Scotia. The Conference met in the Legislature of Halifax on September 10, where it was decided that another Conference was to be held in Quebec, Canada, on October 10. The Conference was then adjourned, pro forma, to Saint John. (p. 89)

While still in Halifax, the city hosted a dinner for the delegates at the Halifax Hotel, the city’s best. Once again, speeches were made after the meal, this time by Brown and Macdonald, among others. (p. 89) The Charlottetown Conference arrived in Saint John on September 14. The delegates attended a banquet held at Stubbs’ Hotel, where the toast of the evening was given by the New Brunswickers to their fellow delegates. The following morning, the Conference set off for Fredericton, New Brunswick, by steamer. (p. 90)

This Conference was ultimately only used to prepare for the upcoming Quebec Conference. Although most of the points of Confederation were discussed, and some were already decided upon, during the Charlottetown Conference, there were no fixed plans for Confederation set in place yet by the time the Conference ended. For instance, the method of selection and the basis of composition of the Legislative Council was decided. The appointment of judges was also discussed, but they did not yet come to an agreement on this. The divisions of power was discussed, and many delegates wished to reduce the power of local legislatures to a minimum. The Conference also decided to help resolve the Island’s unique absentee landlord problem by giving it 200,000 pound sterling to buy out the land proprietors, pleasing many Islanders; however, this particular decision was never solidified. (p. 91)

Significant omissions from the constitution drafted at the Charlottetown Conference includes the power of disallowance, and the manner of appointing the lieutenant governors. More importantly, there was no mention of Maritime union in it, which by then had been nearly forgotten in favour of Confederation. (p. 91–92) Public reaction to Confederation among the Maritime provinces were extremely positive, which surprised the Canadian delegates who expected to require more effort to extoll to the populace the advantages of Confederation. Many of the general population, along with the delegates, felt swept away by the idea of building a new nation, in addition to the exciting new identity that it would bring. (p. 92)

Many of the major points of Confederation were already agreed upon by the time the Charlottetown Confederation ended. The Quebec Conference that followed merely refined and systemized what was already agreed upon. This was because much of the work had already been done beforehand, and simply presented to the Maritime delegations by the Canadians, which was enthusiastically accepted at the Conference. At the Conference was where it was first realized that Confederation was a political reality, and where new personal and political relationships were formed. This was where an authentic national spirit first appeared. (p. 93–94)

Quebec, 1864

On October 10, 1864, the Quebec Conference met in Quebec, the capital of Canada in 1864, in the reading room of the Parliament buildings, located in the city’s Upper Town. (p. 97) It was here that many of the finer details of Confederation were discussed, and where the Quebec Resolutions were written. Topics included political union, defence, railways, the Northwest, and relations with Great Britain and the United States. Both the Canadians and the Maritimers worked together to forge a new nation that would unite all peoples of British North America. (p. 97) At the same time, the Canadians and the Maritimers had different reasons for Confederation. The Canadians were aware that Confederation was always an essential solution to its continuous governing problems that stemmed from cultural tensions. (p. 98)

On the other hand, the Maritimers gained little from Confederation and yet took great political risks to achieve it. Even though many of them would suffer politically if they continued with Confederation, what they saw in Confederation that made them push forward with it was "broader fields of enterprise, more spacious meadows of reward, an end to the littleness of provincial pastures". They felt that each Maritime province was a separate nation, and wanted to create an identity that joined them all together. (p. 99) The Quebec Conference required much more time and hard work than the Charlottetown Conference did, which surprised many of the delegates. The unanimity at Charlottetown did not carry over to here, where systems were formally arranged, compared to the more informal conversions at Charlottetown. (p. 100)

The first major disagreement was related to the Senate, a vital component of determining power in the federal government. Macdonald wanted the three sections of British North America—Canada West, Canada East, and the four Atlantic provinces—should each have an equal representation of 24 members in the upper house. The Maritimers instead wanted Canada West and Canada East to have 24 members each and the four Atlantic provinces 32 combined. The reason for the increase in seats by the Atlantic provinces was due to Newfoundland’s relatively late entry into the plans for Confederation at the Charlottetown Conference. This issue led to such significant disagreements that the Conference was threatened to end early. (p. 100)

The Canadian government held a ball that night, which came as a welcome relief. Several Canadian ministers danced at the ball, intent on impressing the wives and daughters of the Maritime delegation in order to win over the men as well. (p. 101) On October 15, the Quebec Board of Trade hosted a dinner at Russell’s Hotel in Palace Street, where many Maritimes delegates spoke to the over 150 guests. (p. 101) Later on October 17, during the Conference, three main points came up that related to Prince Edward Island: the Senate, the House of Commons, and the financial settlement for absentee landlords. (p. 103) On the issue of the Senate, Macdonald agreed to Nova Scotia Premier Tupper’s motion of adhering to the original Charlottetown arrangement of 24 members for each of the three groups, excluding Newfoundland; Newfoundland was to be given four Senators. Other points of debate included the qualifications for senators and the method of their selection. On October 19, the Senate issues were put aside until the London Conference in 1866. (p. 103)

Next came the issue of representation in the House of Commons. As Prince Edward Island's delegate, Edward Palmer stated on October 19 that the Island would only support Confederation if given a satisfactory number of representatives in the lower house. Although Palmer wanted six seats, the Conference only offered five to the Island, which Palmer reluctantly accepted. (p. 104) By October 21, the discussion had moved on to the powers of the central legislature, with particular focus on the concurrent jurisdiction in agriculture. The Conference then moved on to criminal law, which brought forward strong opinions, with a significant amount in favour of one uniform system. (p. 105) On October 24, when the powers of the local legislatures were being discussed, the delegates of New Brunswick objected to the proposed system suggested by the Canadians, in which local legislatures would have their powers specified. They believed instead that local legislatures should not have their powers specified. However, Tupper retorted, stating that undefined powers must be specified somewhere, and that it was previously discussed at Charlottetown that all powers not given to the local governments would be reserved to the federal government. (p. 105)

On the last day of the Quebec Conference, October 26, the issue of Charlottetown's absentee landlords was once again brought up, continuing the discussion that began at the Charlottetown Conference, in which it was verbally agreed upon that the Island would be given 200,000 British pounds to buy out the land proprietors. The Island's delegates were surprised to learn that this deal was omitted from the Resolutions, and that they would not be receiving the money; none of the Maritime provinces rose to its defence because they would be receiving more money because of this omission, while Prince Edward Island received none of it. The Island's delegates were furious, but ultimately unable to do much about it. (p. 107) The delegates then met in the nearby city of Montreal, on October 28, where they revised the Resolutions and Minutes that they had produced at the Quebec Conference. (p. 109)

After revising the Resolutions, the delegates traveled by steamer up the Ottawa River and then by train to Toronto in Canada West (modern day Ontario), stopping at Kingston and Belleville to greet the crowds that gathered. Once arriving in Toronto, the delegates went to the Queen's Hotel, where the Canadian delegates spoke from a balcony to the massive crowd below. (p. 110–111) Back in his own province, Reform politician George Brown summed up many of the sentiments of Canada West's citizens when he noted that Confederation was not only a triumph for all of Canada, but also a triumph of Canada West over the French Canadians. As the Montreal Gazette wrote following the Conference, "Will the people follow the example, and rise to the level of the occasion—to settle now the destiny of this northern cuntry and the people that dwell here...?" (p. 113)

Confederation and the Federal Principle

In 1865, it was certain that Confederation was to be a reality. The British government enthusiastically supported Confederation, and offered the full power of the Colonial Office towards the project. In fact, they were willing to legislate the provinces into union by the summer of 1865. Indeed, the British North American delegates wanted to delay Confederation as little as possible, intending for the process of joining the colonies together to be "short, swift, and sure". (p. 114–115)
The Quebec Resolutions, which lists the 72 resolutions produced at the Quebec Conference by the delegates, were first published in Le Journal de Québec, on November 8, 1864, less than a week after the conference concluded. They quickly appeared in nearly every newspaper throughout British North America. The resolutions caused much excitement among the population, as little official information was published during the Charlottetown and Quebec Conferences. (p. 115)
Although the Quebec Resolutions were published for all to read, it was necessary to explain its meaning to the citizens. Therefore, Tilley and Gray began this process, beginning in New Brunswick shortly after the resolutions' publication. The first meeting, held in Saint John on November 17, was not a success; neither Tilley or Gray had a broad grasp of the subject to give it coherence. (p. 116)
Galt also undertook this task, giving his first speech in Sherbrooke, Canada East, and was more successful than Tilley, being able to give a thoroughly comprehensive analysis of the financial and legal basis for Confederation. His speech was so well-received by the audience of 300 that it was transcribed and widely circulated across British North America, especially in the Maritime provinces where the people were more skeptical of Confederation. (p. 116)
Regarding the legal and constitutional aspects of Confederation, all that was required at this point was to address the Queen from each of the colonial legislatures, requesting that an act be passed to unite them. Although some British North Americans feared that Britain's imperial sovereignty could allow it to arbitrarily introduce new changes to Canadian Confederation, most people instead felt that the new federal government of the Dominion of Canada was simply an extension of the existing government of the Province of Canada. The understanding was that the new central government in Ottawa, Canada West, would relieve the old colonial governments of most of their existing functions, so much so that they could be considered local governments, rather than provincial ones. (p. 118–119)
Opinions on the type of government that would the new union of British North America differed greatly. While some, including Macdonald, wanted a legislative union, which provides the central government with complete control over its provinces, similar to how the Parliament legislates the British Isles, most people, especially most of the delegates that helped draft the Quebec Resolutions, believed that the federal government should be formed as a federal union, which is a system that clearly separates the powers of the provinces and the central government. Cartier and Taché preferred the latter option, believing that it would help French Canadian ministers better defend French Canadian privileges. (p. 120)