Talk:Russian invasion of Ukraine

Ordering of civilian and military casualties

The following ordering of civilian and military casualties came off as bizarre and POV,

It is estimated to have caused tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilian casualties and hundreds of thousands of military casualties.

so I re-ordered it to put military casualties first. The number of military casualties is a full order of magnitude greater than the number of civilian casualties.

The edit was reverted by @TylerBurden, with the reverter claiming that my paying attention to the ordering at all is bizarre. I was told to discuss it on the talk page.

When you have two separate statistics but one overwhelmingly larger than the other, it is usually somewhat more natural to put the larger statistic first, as it represents the more significant parameter. This is especially relevant when the ordering is relevant for propaganda purposes. It is well-known that civilian casualties (in all armed conflicts) are an important propaganda weapon. I am thus afraid the original wording could be perceived as propagandistic in nature.

The convention in armed conflicts is to mention combatant casualties prior to civilian casualties, especially when the former considerably exceeds the latter as is usually true. This is evident in the infoboxes of all major wars. I do not see any compelling reason here to stray from that convention. JDiala (talk) 21:47, 24 June 2024 (UTC)

Can you provide a link to this "convention"? Because like I mentioned in my edit summary, I don't think it matters, they are both described in literally the same sentence, and both are significant parts of the article, so the placement is subjective and thus there is no reason to change it. I also don't buy the propaganda argument, you could say the same thing about the edit you made placing civilians behind military based purely on numbers being some propaganda attempt to divert focus away from civilian casualties, which would be equally unconstructive. Since it has never been an issue until now I am guessing that most people aren't interpreting it the way you are. TylerBurden (talk) 23:31, 24 June 2024 (UTC)

This is a stylistic judgement. I don't think that, for stylistic judgements such as this, we require (say) a military handbook which says "mention military casualties before civilian casualties" or something. Rather, it is reasonable to make judgements as competent English speakers as to how a sentence should be optimally arranged to come off as neutrally as possible. I am making the judgement that it is better to put combatant casualties prior to civilian casualties, because the former exceeds the latter by a full order of magnitude. You claim that this could equally be interpreted as propaganda, but this is not true, because I have a logical, non-propaganda explanation for my version (italicized in the prior sentence), whereas you do not for yours.

Imagine one of the first sentences on the 9/11 article writing something like "the attacks killed dozens of soldiers in the Pentagon, as well as around three thousand civilians". That would be a bit weird as the framing appears to emphasize the soldiers dying, despite the nature of the attack (a terror attack on civilians) and that far more civilians died. This would thus not be a natural or neutral way to word things consistent with WP:IMPARTIAL, particularly in the lead where it is especially crucial to be impartial. Likewise here, this is an armed conflict where the overwhelming majority of people dead on both sides are armed soldiers. The immediate emphasis on the comparatively low number of Ukrainian civilian casualties strikes me as strange. This is especially considering that the ratio of civilian-military casualties is not unusually high in this particular war (unlike many other armed conflicts). A reasonable reader could interpret this as having a propagandistic slant. This is not consistent with the project's goals.

I feel that this is ultimately a difference of opinion. Unlike a content dispute, it is difficult to "prove" that a particular sentence has a biased tone, and we might not be able to come to an agreement. For this reason, I welcome input from other editors.

Finally, I am not sure why the fact that the issue has not come up before is relevant. It is quite frequent (in fact, the norm) that a revert made at any given point in time was not something previous editors noticed. JDiala (talk) 04:49, 25 June 2024 (UTC)

I tend to agree. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 19:43, 2 July 2024 (UTC)

Well since you said it was convention, I was hoping you would back it up with a link. Like you said, this more comes down to stylistic judgement and personal interpretation. I don't think a single editor saying "I agree" constitutes consensus, since they also provided no link to the claimed convention. So unless that is done or it's clear that more people interpret it as POV, I think your change was premature. TylerBurden (talk) 19:53, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

@TylerBurden: You are not engaging with the points made. As I have told you, stylistic judgements can be made by native speakers of the English language without citing a formal convention. There is no expectation of this as this is not an issue of content but of writing. I have given sound rationales for the change which you have not addressed, and I already have another editor agreeing with me. Furthermore, the discussion has been stagnant for a over a week. I do not believe it is a reasonable standard to demand an even more overwhelming consensus for this, especially since this is a minor issue. JDiala (talk) 20:06, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

You're acting as if you're fixing a typo, you're not. Your argument is "there are more dead soldiers", that's true, but the number of civilian casualties is not insignificant. And please, don't act as if two editors agreeing with each other is "overwhelming consensus". TylerBurden (talk) 20:15, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

@TylerBurden: This is a bit more than a typo, but not by much. I don't think "well, yeah, but lots of civilians died too" is engaging with my point in good faith. I'd be happy to start an RfC if you'd like. JDiala (talk) 20:36, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

@TylerBurden: Instead of an RfC, c or WP:DRN are also options. Would you be willing to accept the outcome of either of those processes? JDiala (talk) 21:02, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

Sure, I already said I'd accept more people interpreting the same "POV" view as you as grounds to change the order. It should be noted that you've already recieved a topic ban in WP:PIA for POV issues. TylerBurden (talk) 00:39, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

@TylerBurden: It is inappropriate for you to refer to a sanction I have in another unrelated area as a substitute for an actual argument. Topic banned editors are allowed to edit in other areas, even contentious ones. You have provided no evidence that my conduct in this interaction is inappropriate or POV. Referring you to WP:PA, WP:GRAVEDANCING, WP:GF. JDiala (talk) 01:05, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

I think it is quite relevant when someone who is complaining about "POV" based not on policy or guidelines but on subjective personal opinion is already topic banned for the same conduct in another WP:CTOP. No one has said you are not allowed to edit, it is relevant nonetheless. You can also stop pinging me, I have the page on my watch list. Thanks. TylerBurden (talk) 01:11, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

It is disappointing that an editor with such experience lacks a basic appreciation of WP:GF. You cannot engage with my arguments and instead choose to make personal attacks. I have started a discussion on administrator SFR's page about your conduct. JDiala (talk) 01:34, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

If you view this as a personal attack, I don't think there is any point in engaging further with you. TylerBurden (talk) 01:56, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

As a WP:3O, there is no clear convention in WP or elsewhere as to how this should be ordered. It does not require an overwhelming consensus to determine the order. One of these has to come first; therefore the other is second. This rather trivial issue has already killed way too many electrons. In my opinion, an RfC on this question would be disruptive because of its trivial nature. Cinderella157 (talk) 01:48, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Thank you for your feedback. When you write "[it] does not require an overwhelming consensus", do you agree that the current 2-1 should be adequate to decide it? What is your stance on what should be done? JDiala (talk) 01:57, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

That's the point I've been trying to make since the beginning, since they both have significant coverage in the article and are mentioned right next to each other the order of it should not matter. TylerBurden (talk) 01:58, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

The order doesn't matter. Two people think it should be one way; one person thinks otherwise; and nobody else gives a brass razoo - including myself. So why the fuck are the two of you still arguing over it as if it means the end of the world?

PS I can solve this with the toss of a coin if you both agree since nobody else gives a toss and that is how much it matters. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:11, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Belarus as belligerent

The infobox lists Belarus as belligerent on the Russian side. This is sourced to a piece of information on the BBC which itself is sourced to a Facebook post by a Ukrainian adviser to the defence minister. I hope editors here agree that this is an extremely poor sourcing for Wikipedia to formally implicate a country in an international war.

To-date, the role of Belarus for Russia has been nearly identical to the role played by Poland, Romania or Germany for Ukraine: as a training and resupply ground, arms supplier, and political backer. There's no good evidence that Belarusian troops are or have been taking active part in hostilities. While bilateral relations are in a rather poor state, neither country is openly engaged in hostilities against the other.[1]

In this view, I propose removing Belarus as belligerent. — kashmīrī ^TALK 18:38, 27 June 2024 (UTC)

The role of Belarus has not been at all similar - nevermind “identical” - to that of Poland, Romania or Germany. Ukraine is not attacking Russia from the territory of Poland, Romania or Germany. Russia did attack Ukraine from the territory of Belarus. This is pretty straight forward. Volunteer Marek 05:29, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

The main reason we list Belarus as a belligerent is that Russian troops were allowed to invade from Belarus. Ukrainian troops may train in foreign countries but always return to Ukraine before entering combat. Russian air attacks were also staged from Belarus. No country has permitted Ukraine to stage air attacks from their territory. GordonGlottal (talk) 19:51, 27 June 2024 (UTC)

Please see the very complete discussion here. GordonGlottal (talk) 19:53, 27 June 2024 (UTC)

Under this reasoning it could be argued that Belarus ceased its "belligerency" sometime around 2022, as Russian troops have not moved between Belarus and Ukraine since April of that year, and it is not apparent that Russian artillery and air strikes have since taken place from Belarusian territory or airspace.

A compromise might include a qualifier something along these lines:

Russia

• Donetsk PR
• Luhansk PR

Supported by:

Belarus (2022)

SaintPaulOfTarsus (talk) 20:22, 27 June 2024 (UTC)

if there is a source which makes such an argument, let’s see it. Volunteer Marek 05:31, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Which argument, specifically? SaintPaulOfTarsus (talk) 06:22, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Is it true that nothing has been staged from Belarus since 2022? The Ukrainian army reported a launch from Belarus on 5 August 2023 (Source). GordonGlottal (talk) 00:07, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

Claim not verified independently - the source (CNN) only mentions is in passing, attributing it to an unreliable source (a different belligerent). Insufficient for an encyclopaedia IMO. Anyway, a missile launch by Russian troops stationed in Belarus does NOT make that country a belligerent. In other articles, we don't consider single instances of territory use as sufficient to consider the entire country a belligerent in a war. — kashmīrī ^TALK 01:41, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

@GordonGlottal The close of that discussion highlighted that there was no consensus to list Belarus as belligerent. That was more than 6 months ago, and a new discussion is warranted. — kashmīrī ^TALK 01:43, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

I guess it's been long enough for another RFC. But only if you think there's a real likelihood of changed consensus—be respectful of everyone's time. Note that another RFC is unlikely to be permitted for quite a while if two fail 7 months apart. GordonGlottal (talk) 02:20, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

Belarus is not listed as a belligerent. It is listed as a supporter and there was clear consensus to keep [Belarus] there. This is affirmed twice in the RfC close.

This is the single most discussed element of the article and has hosted near a dozen RfCs and innumerable edit-requests and proposals across the two main articles. All bar one RfC has closed with no consensus. The Belarus RfC is the exception. 'A new discussion' without clear preliminary endorsement is doomed to status quo. Mr rnddude (talk) 04:35, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

I support @Kashmiri's proposal for removal. The United States has provided far more lethal military support to Ukraine than Belarus has provided to Russia. Ukraine Armed Forces would not be able to make biweekly payroll without economic support from NATO. Russia can continue to prosecute this war even if Belarus removes itself completely from the situation. The same cannot be said for Ukraine if the United States steps away completely. Where is the neutral balance here? This particular aspect of the info box betrays a systematically biased point of view. Alternatively, simply have the info box express the fact that Ukraine is supported by the United States. Chino-Catane (talk) 18:50, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

Thanks. It's not only that. Ukraine is being actively armed by Europe and the US, it keeps receiving incredible amounts of military hardware, equipment, munitions, training, military intelligence, etc. The collective West has embarked on an economic war against Russia, seizing its assets and blocking its trade. Belarus has not done anything resembling that – generally, the West is much more engaged in the Ukrainian war than Belarus has ever been. If Belarus, by simply allowing Russian troops on its territory in line with its international obligations (CSTO), is called a "belligerent" by Wikipedia, what will be the right term for the Western countries so active in Ukraine? — kashmīrī ^TALK 20:37, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

Russia invaded Ukraine from Belarusian territory. The US (or EU or NATO or whatever) did not invade Russia from Ukrainian territory. Or at all. Simple as that. Volunteer Marek 05:27, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Nothing in the CSTO treaty required Belarus to do any of this, not that it matters. I want to modify what I said earlier slightly in response to this exchange: Your proposed understanding of the conflict is fundamentally rejected by the vast majority of English Wikipedia editors and by the sources English Wikipedia has chosen to elevate as reliable. An RFC from this perspective is guaranteed to fail. It will be an enormous waste of editors' time and effort. Wikipedia is not a place to right great wrongs. Please find a more productive use of your editorial energy. GordonGlottal (talk) 22:24, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

Why do you keep insisting that Belarus is listed as a "belligerent" when you have already been corrected above? Belarus is not listed as a belligerent, so your whole suggestion here is built on either you misreading or a misrepresentation of what the article actually says. TylerBurden (talk) 17:37, 30 June 2024 (UTC)

Thanks to Manyareasexpert for publishing an explanation offering reasons why this article labels Belarus a "co-belligerent supporter" and not the United States. Belarus permitted Russia to stage its pre-invasion force and launch missiles from its territory. Similarly, we in the United States staged our forces for the 2003 invasion of Iraq from somewhere. We also launched air support for that invasion from somewhere. Were those pre-invasion staging territories and air support launch pads labeled as "co-belligerent supporters" in the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq? Chino-Catane (talk) 16:18, 30 June 2024 (UTC)

Answer to this question seems to be that we list Turkey and Kuwait as belligerents proper (under "coalition of the willing"). The US didn't distinguish between different types of military support for the invasion and included hosts as full members of the coalition. See 2003 invasion of Iraq. GordonGlottal (talk) 04:31, 2 July 2024 (UTC)

Genocide SYNTH in lead

@TylerBurden: The Wallenberg paper with the 30 genocide scholars only concludes that there is a "serious risk" of genocide and incitement to genocide, not an actual genocide. This is WP:SYNTH. Furthermore, the child article states the far weaker conclusion that the genocide allegation has only been stated with "varying degrees of certainty" by genocide scholars, and in no place states a scholarly consensus that Russia is currently perpetrating a genocide. Per WP:SS, the parent article should summarize the child article. I object to the current sentence in the lead on these grounds. JDiala (talk) 01:31, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

"To many observers, the erasure of Ukrainian nationhood in the occupied territories and frequent denial of Ukraine’s right to exist is evidence the Russian invasion is genocidal in nature. Some 30 genocide scholars, the Genocide Watch organisation and several national parliaments have supported this assertion."

This is directly quoted from the source, and on top if it there are several others cited. TylerBurden (talk) 01:43, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Stating that something is "genocidal" is not the same as asserting that it a genocide, which the lead sentence does. It could encompass a variety of strictly weaker things, such as incitement to genocide. This is SYNTH and OR. The actual Wallenberg paper does not definitively state that it is a genocide. JDiala (talk) 01:54, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

The sources either describe it as genocide (Jade McGlynn) or various other mentions of genocide. I wouldn't be opposed to changing it to "characterised by scholars as genocidal in nature". TylerBurden (talk) 02:05, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Agree this would be a good change in wording. Moxy🍁 02:12, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

I'm fine with this. It's worth noting that Jade McGlynn, a historian and not a legal expert or genocide scholar, is a rather weak source for such a strong claim. Please note that WP:RS takes into consideration the quality of sources as well, and for such a contentious and strong claim it is best to err on the side of caution. That said, I agree with our compromise of "genocidal."

I also think the democide allegation should be removed from the lead. This does not appear to be a particularly notable allegation and there aren't nearly as many sources for it. I'm not sure it's due weight for the lead. JDiala (talk) 02:21, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

In fact, I've carefully looked at the cited sources and none of them state that the war is a "democide." I'm going to remove this myself as it's an unsourced claim. JDiala (talk) 02:35, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Jade McGlynn is most certainly NOT a “weak source”. Volunteer Marek 04:57, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I have added the qualifier "some" before "scholars", as this characterization is not a unanimous or consensus position among scholars of genocide. All of the cited sources acknowledge this in various ways: the first three are the opinions of single scholars in which they address the ongoing scholarly debate. The citations from the fourth article, the statement from the 30 genocide scholars and the Genocide Watch organization, are more significant, but I think there is a higher threshold for stating this as the scholarly opinion without qualification (our own article we wikilink to includes "allegations" in its title in reflection of this). — Goszei (talk) 06:31, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

I scrolled through the Allegations of genocide of Ukrainians in the Russo-Ukrainian War and there is no one saying there is no genocide in Ukraine. It's pretty safe to just state it as it is. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:51, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Lead changes

I have implemented a series of changes in the lead section between this and this revision which I will explain here:

• Added a mention of Russia's demands for security guarantees that Ukraine not join NATO, whose relationship with Ukraine forms the primary topic in the Background and Prelude sections. According to many analysts, this is the true underlying cause of the war (beyond Putin's Russian irredentist/neo-Nazi state/"demilitarise and denazify" pretext), and so should be mentioned in the lead.
• Trimmed the fourth paragraph, which deals with international reactions and secondary effects (I moved the mentions of ecocide and food crisis here). I think that the UN General Assembly resolution is important enough to mention here, but that the ICJ and Council of Europe should be saved for the body. The same goes for the "terrorist state" designations by the Baltic states and corporate withdrawals.
• Added a mention of the EU and the US as the primary contributors of humanitarian and military aid, which is highly significant from a geopolitcal standpoint and detailed in the body.
• Moved the genocide allegation from the first lead paragraph to the fourth, wikilinking it from the ICC investigation sentence. This better reflects its WP:DUE prominence as a matter under ongoing investigation by several bodies and interpretation and debate by scholars. If in the future the genocide becomes something closer to a consensus among scholars or widely-accepted historical fact, it should be moved to the first paragraph.

— Goszei (talk) 19:19, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

I wholeheartedly endorse these changes on the grounds you mentioned. This is an excellent step towards neutrality. Thank you for the excellent work! JDiala (talk) 19:57, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

Such drastic changes require consensus. I do not think they have have such.

• “Many analysts” is vague and unsourced. Many other - really most - analysts are clear on the fact this had nothing to do with NATO.
• No comment currently on 2 and 3.
• Strongly disagree with moving it.

Volunteer Marek 04:37, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

On the third point your text made it seem like these were the only countries which sanctioned Russia. Volunteer Marek 04:48, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

A consensus is not required to edit or make changes to the article. Whether they are substantial changes or not does not factor into bold editing. Your 04:46, 7 July 2024 edit appears to be disruptive. Mr rnddude (talk) 05:06, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

No, but if someone objects to changes to long standing text, then yeah it’s a good idea to seek consensus.

What exactly is “disruptive” about my edit? If consensus isn’t required to make changes to an article then undoing such changes is even less problematic, no? Volunteer Marek 05:10, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I mean, you yourself basically say pretty much what I just said here Volunteer Marek 05:12, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Also, I did end up moving the paragraph beginning with info on ecocide roughly to where Goszei wanted it. I do think the text itself was better previously. Volunteer Marek 05:23, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Reverting because you have a genuine objection is fine. Reverting solely because prior approval was not sought isn't.

That said, it had appeared to me that you'd removed the ecocide material rather than moving it. The highlighting in the diff tripped me up. I've struck the portion of my comment relating to the edit and apologize for my error.

I think the edit you've linked to isn't quite comparable. There was an on-going discussion of that material, which had been disputed by several editors on specific grounds including being based on actual misinformation. At that point, a consensus with adequate sourcing is required. Mr rnddude (talk) 06:15, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I do have a genuine objection. In particular I object to the removal of the info that leading up to the invasion Kremlin denied they had any intent to invade. That’s key info and should stay. I also object to over emphasizing and treating as legitimate Russian propaganda claims regarding NATO. I certainly object to using one to remove the other. Volunteer Marek 16:14, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

The NATO thing is not merely Russian propaganda claims. There are plenty of RS (both news and academic), not to mention innumerable opinion pieces by analysts, including some rather big names, discussing it extensively. While it might be better to focus on those sources rather than the blatherings of Peskov and Zakharova, that does not negate the notability or prominence of the NATO angle. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 21:17, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

(thanks for striking that part and I understand the confusion - with text being moved it’s always messy to figure out what’s going on) Volunteer Marek 16:15, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I think your revert is hard to justify. We encourage bold editing. Bold editing by definition does not require consensus on the talk page. If you object to the edit, you can revert. But you should have a reason for the revert besides “you need consensus first” which is not really a reason. Furthermore when an edit consists of multiple changes it is usually encouraged to do a partial reversion rather a wholesale reversion (WP:REVONLY). If you revert everything I’d expect a point-by-point criticism of each part of the edit on the talk page which you haven’t provided. JDiala (talk) 14:03, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I did specify my objections and my edit was indeed partial. That’s why it was done in a couple separate edits. Volunteer Marek 16:17, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Volunteer Marek, it appears you do not want discussion of NATO in the lead, since you reverted my edit. As I discussed in my edit summary, I think NATO should be discussed in the lead for a simple MOS:LEAD reason: it is discussed at length in the body in the prelude section, and the lead is supposed to summarize the body. It is also factually a correct statement that Russia demanded security guarantees that Ukraine not join NATO in the run up to the war and this was a major diplomatic issue. I want to emphasize that discussing NATO is not justifying Putin's actions. The Treaty of Versailles is frequently cited as a cause of WWII but no one suggests it justifies Hitler's wars of aggression. But we have to discuss the geopolitics honestly and a part of this includes mentioning Russia's threat perception vis-a-vis NATO. JDiala (talk) 13:44, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

First, you not only added stuff about NATO to the lede, you also removed the fact that Russia was denying it was going to invade in the build up to the invasion. Second, since most analysts and sources regard the demands regarding NATO as a pretext and red herring for invasion pushing it into the lede is WP:UNDUE and WP:FRINGE. Yes, the pretext is mentioned in the body, lots of things are, it’s a big article. Most of the text is explaining the context, which is necessary but can’t fit into the lede. Volunteer Marek 16:17, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

On the first point, you are correct I did remove the invasion-denial part. I stand corrected on that point and I apologize for the oversight. I do not really have an objection to the inclusion of that. On NATO, it seems that you are confusing two separate things. You seem to think the previous version of the lead claimed that NATO expansion was the actual reason Russia invaded. This is indeed a contentious claim, although I would not describe it as "fringe" and Goszei has convincingly argued below that there are legitimate reasons to believe it is more than a pretext. The key thing to note, however, is that, this was not what the previous version said. The previous version said that Russia "demanded security guarantees that Ukraine not join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)". In other words, this was merely a description of what Russia said publicly in the diplomatic crisis preceding the invasion, without any prejudice towards its actual intentions. That NATO expansion was what Russia claimed to have been a threat is not really disputed. JDiala (talk) 17:11, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Ok, we can work this out. The part that I have a problem with - and this issue arises frequently when dealing with situations like this - is that presenting one side’s claims can make it seem as if those claims are legitimate. In this particular context the problem is that Russia made several demands prior to invasion, all of them highly unrealistic (withdrawal of NATO forces from Poland, “denazification” of Ukraine, etc). Why mention this particular one? As Gordon’s edit summary said, Putin was throwing out all kinds of claims and demands, while whole time denying he was planning to invade. And this is how it generally works with invasions - make impossible demands, then claim that since these weren’t met, you aren’t really the aggressor, but a victim. So again, why this particular one? I wouldn’t be completely opposed to mentioning NATO issues in the lede but we do need to be careful with the wording. At the time Putin invaded, Ukraine wasn’t slated to join NATO. Volunteer Marek 17:45, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

There are two responses to your question "Why mention this particular one?" First, it's not just "this particular one." The paragraph in question discusses a variety of Russian reasons to invade, including "demilitarization", "denazification", supporting the pro-Russian forces in the Donbas conflict, and also unstated Russian intentions which analysts ascertained like a denial of Ukraine's right to exist and irredentism. Second, the NATO stuff is particularly important because it was the principal point of contention in the diplomatic crisis preceding the war. It was a direct Russian ultimatum: guarantee you don't join NATO, or else.

With respect to your other point, "presenting one side’s claims can make it seem as if those claims are legitimate", this is just not something I agree with. We have to respect our readers' intelligence. If a claim is not stated in wikivoice and is directly attributed to a third party, then the educated reader should clearly understand that we are not endorsing the factuality or legitimacy of said claim.

Here is a thought for a compromise. Mention the Russian demand that NATO not expand eastward. However, also state the Ukrainian counterargument: that sovereign states have a right to join whichever alliances they please. JDiala (talk) 18:32, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Here's a fair solution. The revision in question should have read,"In late 2021, Russia massed troops near Ukraine's borders, having demanded security guarantees that Ukraine not join NATO while denying any plan to attack." This proposition appears to be factually unassailable with no bias whatsoever. Chino-Catane (talk) 22:10, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Russia massed troops near Ukraine's borders, having demanded
Russian demands have been evaluated by academic sources, and that evaluation should be in the article body. If it's not there then it should be added. After that we may think why russian demands, without academic comments, should be presented in the lead. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 23:00, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

VM, what makes you say that it is a red herring[…] and WP:FRINGE? Apart from the source pool, common sense seems to come into it. Sure, invading a country is an unlawful escalation, but that doesn’t negate that there was a bona fide diplomatic crisis. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 21:31, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

---

I believe this discussion has got off onto the wrong foot. All versions of the article text (both existing and proposed) require consensus, and both I and Marek thus far have followed standard practice through the WP:BRD cycle. The purpose of this discussion is to build a consensus, as we are doing.

I disagree with Marek's argument that "analysts are clear on the fact this had nothing to do with NATO" and that "NATO stuff was obvious red herring". NATO is currently mentioned 36 times in the article text. We link to Enlargement of NATO, and describe Ukraine's 2008 bid, Russia's opposition on security grounds then, and NATO's declaration that Ukraine would eventually join. If anything, it fails to mentions NATO enough. Our article at Ukraine–NATO relations describes how Yanukovych's government officially abandoned the goal of joining NATO in 2010 before it was ousted by the pro-EU revolution in 2014, resulting in a political turnaround. Our article at Russo-Ukrainian War describes how NATO and the U.S. began training and arming the Ukrainian military in 2014; both are still deeply involved in these capacities. At a very minimum, it is clear that Ukraine's complex relationship with NATO forms part of the broader geopolitical story of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet conflicts (see our article on the Russo-Georgian War, which mentions the diplomatic crisis over NATO in its lead), and Ukraine's internal divisions, which all can agree at least contributed to the war.

A backgrounder by the Council on Foreign Relations think tank, published in 2023, summarizes the analyst positions on the war's causes as such:

Some Western analysts see Russia’s 2022 invasion as the culmination of the Kremlin’s growing resentment toward NATO’s post–Cold War expansion into the former Soviet sphere of influence. Russian leaders, including Putin, have alleged that the United States and NATO repeatedly violated pledges they made in the early 1990s to not expand the alliance into the former Soviet bloc. They view NATO’s enlargement during this tumultuous period for Russia as a humiliating imposition about which they could do little but watch. [...]

In the weeks leading up to its invasion, Russia made several major security demands of the United States and NATO, including that they cease expanding the alliance, seek Russian consent for certain NATO deployments, and remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. Alliance leaders responded that they were open to new diplomacy but were unwilling to discuss shutting NATO’s doors to new members. [...]

Other experts have said that perhaps the most important motivating factor for Putin was his fear that Ukraine would continue to develop into a modern, Western-style democracy that would inevitably undermine his autocratic regime in Russia and dash his hopes of rebuilding a Russia-led sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. “[Putin] wants to destabilize Ukraine, frighten Ukraine,” writes historian Anne Applebaum in the Atlantic. “He wants Ukrainian democracy to fail. He wants the Ukrainian economy to collapse. He wants foreign investors to flee. He wants his neighbors—in Belarus, Kazakhstan, even Poland and Hungary—to doubt whether democracy will ever be viable, in the longer term, in their countries too.

I believe this demonstrates the topic is more than just a "red herring", and that it is consistent with mentioning both Russia's NATO-related security demands in late 2021 as well as Putin's irredentist statements in this article's lead, as my version proposes. — Goszei (talk) 16:12, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

wrt to NATO We are talking about this specific text by which was reverted by GordonGlotall and then readded by JDiala. I still agree with Gordon here. First issue is that it removes the denials. Volunteer Marek 16:44, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

And his edit summary is correct - Putin also demanded NATO’s withdrawal from Poland and Baltic, recognition of occupation of Crimea, a change in Ukrainian government, etc. Why focus on this particular pretext?

In regard to the CoFR - again, you have these “some scholars”. Anyone who’s been following this conflict knows who these “some scholars” are and the fact that you can count them on fingers of one hand. The same source you quote gives the actual reason for invasion in the last paragraph you quote. Volunteer Marek 16:50, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I believe you are mistaken, I (not JDiala) made the change to that sentence in this revision, and I stand by it. It's obvious that Russia would deny plans to invade Ukraine (as opposed to openly announcing its intention), so it isn't worth stating. We should instead state what Russia did openly announce, which were its demands, no matter how disingenuous or non-viable they were. Our GA on the Prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine devotes a large part of its lead to describing the demands, and this lead should devote one sentence to doing so. Regarding the CoFR, it does not present the second viewpoint as the "actual reason for the invasion", but presents both as factors in Putin's decision to go to war.

If you need further evidence, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg himself said this to the EU Parliament in 2023:

The background was that President Putin declared in the autumn of 2021, and actually sent a draft treaty that they wanted NATO to sign, to promise no more NATO enlargement. That was what he sent us. And was a pre-condition for not invade Ukraine. Of course we didn't sign that. The opposite happened. He wanted us to sign that promise, never to enlarge NATO. He wanted us to remove our military infrastructure in all Allies that have joined NATO since 1997, meaning half of NATO, all the Central and Eastern Europe, we should remove NATO from that part of our Alliance, introducing some kind of B, or second class membership. We rejected that. So he went to war to prevent NATO, more NATO, close to his borders. [emphasis added] He has got the exact opposite.

— Goszei (talk) 17:25, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Yes, but JDalaia was the one who restored it after it was reverted.

And I think the denial is important. He wasn’t saying “if NATO agrees to my demands I won’t invade”, he was saying “oh, we’re just doing training exercises, we’re not planning an invasion”.

Also I do think the last paragraph lays out the real reason for invasion. Volunteer Marek 17:50, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Anyone who’s been following this conflict knows who these “some scholars” are and the fact that you can count them on fingers of one hand. [emphasis added] Really? Quite a lot of scholars outside agenda-pushing think tanks have taken this view. The basic principles of intl rel and poli sci naturally lead to such conclusions. It is pretty mainstream in the relevant fields, even if non-academics want to cancel it for their own reasons. It’s hard to see a fundamental difference between people employed by the Atlantic Council or the American Enterprise Institute, who happen to have degrees, promoting narratives consistent with their employer’s overall goals, and similar phenomena in the hard sciences in which people with degrees are paid to write about the purported safety of their employer’s products (plastics, greenhouse emissions, prescription drugs, etc.) in situations where independent research shows otherwise.

Do you seriously doubt that the Russians have a monopoly on propaganda/info ops? Or is it that you don’t believe there’s anything threatening about a giant permanent alliance of the world’s most developed powers with an integrated command structure sitting on one’s border? Or is it that hybrid regimes aren’t allowed to feel security threats? Get real(ist). It may be easy for Europeans to gloss over inconvenient bits, but if my country spent only as much on defense as our average ally, we could afford decent social programs and pay off our debt.

Of course none of this excuses going and invading a sovereign country from a legal or ethical perspective.

RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 22:00, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Please see comments below by Manyareasexpert and GordonGlottal. Also see WP:NOTAFORUM. Also, no spending as much on defense as “average ally” would not enable the US to “pay off its debt” (whatever that means) or even “afford decent social programs”, nevermind that these are just more red herrings here. Volunteer Marek 05:01, 8 July 2024 (UTC)

This is not only cringeworthy, but violates WP:NOTFORUM. TylerBurden (talk) 21:07, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Wow, so much discussion that I had to have a look. Why would not we edit the article body first and then the lead. I remember reading reliable sources both saying NATO expansion was an excuse for Russia to invade, and assessing Russia was feeling threatened by it. Let's talk sources. The burden is on those who request the change. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 21:26, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

+1. This discussion has wandered very far from valid methods. Anyone who is here to build an encyclopedia should please state their case strictly in terms of reliable secondary sources. This talk page is not a forum for lay political argument. GordonGlottal (talk) 22:56, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Mentioning NATO in lead

Continuing from the discussion above: (1) Should we mention NATO in the lead section? (2) If so, how should this be done (should it be presented in the context of the security guarantees demanded by Russia in December 2021, or in some other way)?

My favored wording is In late 2021, Russia massed troops along Ukraine's borders and issued demands including a ban on future expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), especially to Ukraine. The demands were broader, including the withdrawal of NATO troops and weapons from all of Eastern Europe (presumably in an attempt to extract maximum concessions), but the reason this particular demand should be highlighted is because it was the most immediate point of negotiation, given the circumstances of the crisis. I don't think that a clause like denied any plan to attack or similar should be included, because (1) it is obvious Russia would do this deny this, and (2) the denials became moot after December 17, as massing troops around a country and then issuing a list of demands of that country clearly constitutes a tacit threat of invasion. To be clear, simply mentioning Russia's demands does not present them to readers as legitimate, though I will note that if Russia didn't intend to negotiate at all, it wouldn't have issued any ultimatum. Indeed, documents recently published by the New York Times have revealed that in the spring 2022 talks, shortly after the invasion started, Ukraine agreed to Russia's demand that it become a permanently neutral state and never join NATO. The situation has now changed, but this demonstrates that this particular point of negotiation was and continues to be real, and should thus be presented to our readers. — Goszei (talk) 07:15, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

@JDiala, Volunteer Marek, Mr rnddude, RadioactiveBoulevardier, Chino-Catane, Manyareasexpert, and GordonGlottal: Pinging all those who have participated in this discussion so far. — Goszei (talk) 07:18, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

the reason this particular demand should be highlighted is because it was the most immediate point of negotiation
Again those are personal opinions. Another question is why should the lead provide Russian demands but not their assessment by RSs, which assessments are already in the article.

I don't think that a clause like denied any plan to attack or similar should be included, because (1) it is obvious Russia would do this, and (2) the denials became moot after December 17
Again those are personal opinions. And no, it wasn't obvious, and as far as on February 23 everybody in Russia were laughing and making fun of Ukrainians for them to get concerned with possible invasion rumors. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:31, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Agree. In the run up to the invasion the question of “will they invade or won’t they?” was a huge deal and many commentators were assuring us that Russia wouldn’t invade based on Russian denials. It is also not obvious. Ultimatum in such situations aren’t necessarily rare. In 1991 US pretty much said “leave Kuwait or we’ll invade” - there were no denials. In this case the denials themselves were a propaganda campaign and Kremlin disinformation so yes, they’re important. Volunteer Marek 16:45, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

• Here's how the Council on Foreign Relations summarized Russia's demands:

  Russian draft treaties on security guarantees released in the run-up to the invasion focused on NATO, not Ukraine. The three key demands in these treaties were an end to NATO expansion, a prohibition on the deployment of offensive weapons along Russia’s borders, and the withdrawal of NATO infrastructure back to the lines of 1997, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed two years before the first post-Cold War wave of expansion.

What Does Putin Really Want in Ukraine? Chino-Catane (talk) 10:16, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

I support your NATO background addition [2] but please don't base it on outdated sources, as, after the start of the invasion, every pre-2022 source is outdated, and will be deleted. Use, for example, Putin's Wars and NATO's Flaws - Google Books and Evaluating NATO Enlargement - Google Books . ManyAreasExpert (talk) 11:15, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Putin's Wars and NATO's Flaws isn't scholarly, it's a book by a journalist without significant academic credentials or significant background in Russia/Ukraine. It's a low quality source. JDiala (talk) 00:06, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

This is better then pre-2022 sources and existing NATO-related text could be enhanced. There are more in-depth assessments however. For example, There is no question that Russia—its leaders, expert analysts, and public— reacted negatively to NATO enlargement right from the start. Despite some contrary statements, Russia’s opposition was fairly consistent over time. But there is little evidence that NATO’s enlargement per se was the primary cause of Russia’s concerns or fears about the West. There is little evidence of any direct Russian military reaction to enlargement, and Russian experts knew that enlargement actually made NATO harder to defend. Evaluating NATO Enlargement - Google Books ManyAreasExpert (talk) 16:16, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

I can only reiterate what I said above: editor discretion is strictly limited by policy, which requires us to follow reliable secondary sources. Valid wiki arguments take the form "RS1, RS2, and RS3 all say X" never "X must be true according to the following evidence and logic". Please state your argument exclusively in terms of secondary sources if you're here to build an encyclopedia. Then others can reply with alternate sources, critiques of your sources, critiques of your summary, etc. This is the only way it can work. GordonGlottal (talk) 20:40, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

To editor Manyareasexpert:What's the policy justification for this pre-2022 source ban? Only 2 / 9 citations in the International treaties subsection were published after January 1, 2022. How can this ban be justified for a Background section where history must be discussed? For example, the WP:GA assessed article Russo-Georgian War does not adhere to this condition. Chino-Catane (talk) 17:51, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

No ban but the source should be related to article topic and those pre-event are just don't. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 19:38, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

The cited sources generate information describing "Russian threat perceptions". Which particular sentence(s) and source(s) do you believe are unrelated to the background of the historic episode we are labeling "Russian invasion of Ukraine"? Chino-Catane (talk) 21:19, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

There was serious reassessment after the actual event did happened. Why should we use pre-invasion sources to describe the invasion, given there are plenty post-invasion assessments. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 21:45, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

It's not at all unusual to use sources about the background context of an event published prior to that event. If you're claiming that there was a "serious reassessment" sufficiently serious to deprecate older sources, you need a source for that. JDiala (talk) 23:40, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

The source should be on topic. You seem to question the validity of the sentence There was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened. I think we should stop here. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 23:42, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

All of the sources in question are on topic. You are also misquoting your own sentence. You originally said "there was serious reassessment after the actual event did happened" and now you are saying "there was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened". It's hard to glean the point you're trying to make. As you've been told, you need an evidence-based, WP:RS backed reason to discard pre-2022 sources. This is not normally done. JDiala (talk) 23:57, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

All of the sources in question are on topic.
Let's have a look at the first source CIAO: Strategic Analysis: NATO Eastward Expansion and Russian Security (archive.org) of contested edit [3]. Nowhere it mentions the Russian invasion of 2022. No surprise here, since the source dated November 1998. So no, your statement is wrong.

You are also misquoting your own sentence. You originally said "there was serious reassessment after the actual event did happened" and now you are saying "there was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened"
So do you agree that There was a serious reassessment of the event after the actual event did happened is valid? ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:17, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Sources from prior to the invasion by definition do not take into account the invasion in their assessment. That does not mean that they are irrelevant for discussion on the background context of the invasion. JDiala (talk) 09:16, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

discussion on the background context of the invasion
That should be source's conclusion, not yours. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:27, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

This isn't the standard used for sourcing. Editors are allowed to adjudicate whether a given source is relevant to a given article. As you've been told, it's routine practice for older sources to be used for for the background sections of a given article. JDiala (talk) 09:33, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

To editor Manyareasexpert: Since you did not respond to the question, "Which particular sentence(s) and source(s) do you believe are unrelated...", I take this to mean that every sentence in my reverted edit is related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

• "Why should we use pre-invasion sources..."
  

Every sentence in my reverted edit was factually correct, generated from sources that no one has flagged as poor work or discredited. I have no issues with using newer sources to improve the entry, but this is no reason for my entry to not appear in the article as it was presented.

• "...describe the invasion..."
  

My Background subsection titled "Russian threat perceptions" does not describe the invasion itself. As Russia built up its invasion forces, it publicly stated demands concerning NATO 1 2 3. My entry presented historical facts concerning Russia's perceptions of NATO. Those facts have not changed, nor have they been disputed. Chino-Catane (talk) 03:48, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

No point arguing for the usage of pre-2022 sources, given there are plenty of sources which actually mention the article subject. You can even use the one given above. I even quoted some of its conclusions above. Here's more:

Some Western observers, even after February 2022, recognise the role of agency and contingency in a backhanded way, when they wonder why Russia’s vast bureaucracies, and the majority of people did not recoil in horror when their leader launched his war. Unfortunately, historic inves tigations into the impact of NATO enlargement on the Russian elites have become side-lined by current security and geopolitical concerns in the West. Still, as this essay suggests, it would have been much better for Western leaders to acknowledge what happened in 1991–1999 and in Ukraine between 2004 and 2008 without prevarications. A candid effort to get the story of NATO expansion straight and why Ukraine was left exposed to Putin’s fury would not affect any policies and attitudes that Putin’s brutal attack generated. Nor it would lessen the support for Ukraine’s cause. But it would have settled the issue once and for all, and thus denied Putin’s machine of propaganda lies, as well as his sympathisers in the West, any real grounds for credibility. (the chapter end paragraph) ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:51, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

• Here are two WP:GA-assessed articles about armed conflicts that cite sources in their background sections published before the episode itself: Battle of Kilinochchi (2008–2009) and 2008 Mumbai attacks. Chino-Catane (talk) 03:59, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

  another up-to-date source: NATO and the Russian War in Ukraine - Google Books
  A third option was put forward by Russia in December 2021 as an alternative to a full-scale invasion and was then ignored by the West that remained and remains wedded to the principle of self- determination: to force Ukraine to abjure any application to join the EU or NATO and to guarantee its neutrality by a great-power congress, involving Russia itself and America, of course, and NATO collectively (Bismarck must be laughing and weeping in his grave). Such a proposal not only flies in the face of the principle of self-determination but has also been deprived of any credibility by the behaviour of Russia itself as it had entered into just such a great-power agreement with the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. In this, the US and Britain stepped in as guarantors of an agreement between Russia on the one hand and Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on the other that if the latter surrendered to Russia the nuclear weapons stationed on their territory at the time the USSR was dissolved, Russia in turn would promise not to touch their frontiers. Which Russia, in the case of Ukraine, has blatantly ignored since 2014. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:55, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

You really do need to engage with the arguments others are making to defend your position. Chino-Catane's point is that non-up-to-date sources are routinely used for the background sections of major events (including wars). You should address this. JDiala (talk) 09:19, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

That could not be used as a justification to violate the argument that sources should be on topic of article subject. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:24, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Please engage with the argument. We've cited numerous examples of GA-tier articles which source in a given way. Clearly, your views are not congruent with what the WP community considers correct sourcing. JDiala (talk) 09:33, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Wrong. See WP:OR : To demonstrate that you are not adding original research, you must be able to cite reliable, published sources that are directly related to the topic of the article. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:43, 10 July 2024 (UTC)

Russian threat perceptions

To editor Asarlaí: With regards to your reversion, which sentence(s) and source(s) in particular are you accusing of being instances of Russian propaganda? Chino-Catane (talk) 17:57, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

The lengthy section you added was one-sided and gave undue weight to the Kremlin's claims of the "threat from NATO expansion". This is one of the excuses Putin gave for invading. The only sources used were those that support the Kremlin's narrative. It gave no opposing views or counter-arguments, and it took the Kremlin's claims at face value - even tho' most Western analysts believe they're only a pretext.

We could write an equally-lengthy section about the Kremlin's other claims: its denial of Ukrainian nationhood and statehood, "Ukrainian Nazis", "genocide in Donbas", etc. But, like the "NATO expansion" claim, they're already mentioned in the article, and writing a whole section for any of them would likewise be giving them undue weight.

As I said in my edit summary, if your content belongs anywhere, it would be Russia–NATO relations. But it would need to be re-written to include opposing views. – Asarlaí ^(talk) 10:34, 10 July 2024 (UTC)