Talk:2020–2021 China–India skirmishes
Nuduram Soren was nominated for deletion. The discussion was closed on 24 February 2022 with a consensus to merge. Its contents were merged into 2020–2021 China–India skirmishes. The original page is now a redirect to this page. For the contribution history and old versions of the redirected article, please see its history; for its talk page, see here. |
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Some sources
editThis section is pinned and will not be automatically archived. |
- Fisher, Margaret W.; Rose, Leo E.; Huttenback, Robert A. (1963), Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, Praeger – via Questia
- Garver, John W. (2006), "China's Decision for War with India in 1962", in Robert S. Ross (ed.), New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy, Stanford University Press, ISBN 978-0-8047-5363-0, archived from the original (PDF) on 28 August 2017
- Hoffmann, Steven A. (1990), India and the China Crisis, University of California Press, ISBN 978-0-520-06537-6
- Lamb, Alastair (1964), The China-India border, Oxford University Press
- Lintner, Bertil (2018), China’s India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-909163-8
- Maxwell, Neville (1970), India's China War, Pantheon Books, ISBN 978-0-394-47051-1
- Raghavan, Srinath (2010), War and Peace in Modern India, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7
- Woodman, Dorothy (1969), Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries, Praeger – via archive.org
Territorial changes source
editThis article reports that "A summer of fighting saw India lose control over about 300 square kilometers of land along the disputed mountainous terrain". It has amazing 3D maps of the territorial changes.
India claim of LAC contradict what can be seen on google earth timeline feature.
editit seem the Indian narrative that "the buffer zone is in Indian side" does not appear to be accurate. even if we ignore the lines draw by google(google drawn line do not seem to reflect the map in this article, sometime the line follow disputed territory, sometime it follow LAC, sometime google just do their own thing). what I want to look at isn't the line google drew, but the visible road that exist, those road can show us who is in control. I am not going to go into argument over where the LAC should be, wiki is not a place for original research. rather this is just to remind and point out while editing this article, that alot of it is just narrative and not factual. and should be present as such.
why there is this confusion may come from the fact that both side actually allow the other side to patrol their side of the LAC, and that the ability to patrol does not mean it is in their side of the LAC. i suspect that alot of these inaccuries comes from the media not understanding and realising the arrangement of the LAC. but this is just speculation. again this is written only to make people aware that there maybe issues. 2406:3003:2060:3135:ED23:A7EE:6BBE:3C1C (talk) 22:33, 28 October 2024 (UTC)
Status quo ante bellum
edit
Oficcial report says that the situation before the 2020 skirmishes happened has been restored so I request to change the status and keep it at status quo ante bellum N0riooo (talk) 11:20, 31 October 2024 (UTC)
Disengaged complete
edithttps://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-complete-border-disengagement-depsang-demchok-ladakh-9646221/ N0riooo (talk) 11:24, 31 October 2024 (UTC)
https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/India/patrolling-starts-at-indo-china-border-as-disengagement-complete-sources/ar-AA1tfLdF — Preceding unsigned comment added by N0riooo (talk • contribs) 11:28, 31 October 2024 (UTC)
Effect of the October 2024 agreement on territorial changes
editUnder the October 2024 agreement between India and China, disengagement has been agreed only in Depsang and Demchok, Ladakh.
This is only with respect to the last two remaining friction points — Depsang and Demchok — and there is no change in status at the other friction points where buffer zones were set up since the disengagement from 2020-2022.
Former diplomats and military officers also advised caution on the continued presence of buffer zones which are in the Indian territory.
The buffer zones set up in Indian territory after the skirmishes of 2020 still remain inaccessible for India.
The two armies had established no-patrol buffer zones ranging from 3 km to 10 km, primarily on the Indian side of the LAC.
While there is now an agreement on patrolling rights in the Depsang Plains and Demchok, sources indicate that the situation at other friction points—such as those in the Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso, where troop disengagement occurred two years ago alongside the establishment of buffer zones – will remain unchanged.
While there was agreement on patrolling rights in Depsang Plains and Demchok, sources said the situation at the other friction points — in Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso — where disengagement of troops was achieved two years ago with creation of buffer zones would remain the same.
Those buffer zones at Galwan, north bank of Pangong Tso, the Kailash Range and the larger Gogra-Hot Springs area, varying from 3-km to 10-km, are largely on what India considers to be its own territory.
The frictions between the two sides in the Depsang Plains and Demchok region have long been regarded as "legacy issues" predating the Chinese incursions of 2020.
The assertion that the pre-2020 status has been reached along the entire border is false.
The pact does not include the buffer zones that were earlier created by altering the status quo at multiple transgression points, including the Galwan Valley where Chinese troops had killed 20 Indian soldiers in 2020.
It is very clear that the minister and the government are trying to keep the domestic audience in good humour by making such unsubstantiated claims. India had ceded further territory to the Chinese under the earlier agreements by creating buffer zones within India-claimed lines instead of insisting on a return to the pre-transgression status quo of April 2020.
Based on the above, the description in the infobox that speaks about the the territorial changes that have happened since 2020 should not be reomved from the article. The Discoverer (talk) 08:05, 10 November 2024 (UTC)