Wikipedia

Arab–Israeli alliance

(Redirected from Israeli–Sunni Coalition)

The Arab–Israeli alliance,[10] sometimes referred to as the Israeli–Sunni alliance,[11][12] is an unofficial security coalition comprising Israel and various Arab countries. Originally formed in the interest of the Gulf Cooperation Council, it is primarily focused on deterring the political and military ambitions of Iran (see Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict and Iran–Israel proxy conflict),[1] and has been actively promoted by the United States since the February 2019 Warsaw conference.

Arab–Israeli alliance
TypeUnofficial coalition
PurposeRegional security
Region
Middle East
Membership
 Israel
 Bahrain
 Egypt
 Jordan
 Morocco
 Saudi Arabia[1]
 United Arab Emirates[2]
 Syria[3][4][5][6][7][8][9]

History

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The roots of the alliance started in the 2000s, due to the decreasing importance of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a wedge issue and mutual tensions with Iran.[13] By 2016, GCC states had sought strengthened economic and security cooperation with Israel, which is involved in its own proxy conflict with Iran.[14] The de facto coalition emerged by November 2017,[15] upon warming ties between Israel and the Gulf States and received broad media attention in light of the February 2019 Warsaw Conference, "This week's global summit in Warsaw will test the main pillar of the Trump administration's policy in the Middle East: The belief that Israel and key Arab states can form an alliance against Iran, even when peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians seem more distant than ever."[16]

The Trump administration tried to launch a "Middle East Strategic Alliance" (also known as the "Arab NATO") including the GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, and possibly Morocco. In April 2019 Egypt announced that it would not participate. The pact has not been announced as of 11 January 2021. "The late 2020 UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco agreements to normalize relations with Israel could have constituted an alternative, insofar as the UAE and Bahrain normalization decisions were related, at least in part, to countering Iran."[17] In 2020, as part of the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates,[13] Bahrain, Sudan,[18] and Morocco[19] signed normalization agreements with Israel. The Marshall Center analysed the Abraham Accords in October 2020, including the involvement of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, but before Sudan and Morocco took action; the Marshall Center described that the Abraham Accords "strengthens the informal anti-Iran alliance in the region".[20]

According to authors Yoel Gozansky an Iran expert at the Institute for National Security Studies, a Tel Aviv think tank, and professor Clive Jones, a Middle East security specialist: "Our approach lies in understanding Israel's ties with many of the Gulf monarchies, notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, not as some formal alliance but rather as a manifestation of a Tacit Security Regime. This regime allows for the evolution of ties between Israel and the Gulf monarchies to be explored and analyzed while allowing us to be mindful that these relations have rarely been linear, let alone underpinned by any shared normative values."[21]

In an anniversary analysis of the Abraham Accords, Haaretz said that the accords were premised on the idea of an "Israel-Sunni" anti-Iran coalition and that normalization would help but that "it's very doubtful there ever was such a coalition, and the accords did nothing to create or solidify one."[22] In March 2022, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said reconciliation talks with Iran would continue and "We look at Israel as a potential ally but before that it should solve its problems with the Palestinians."[23]

Negev Summit (2022)

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Main article: Negev Summit

A summit at Sde Boker was hosted by Israeli foreign minister Yair Lapid on 27–28 March 2022. Attending were his American, Bahraini, Egyptian, Emirati and Moroccan counterparts.

US secretary of state Antony Blinken attended the first day and released a joint statement with minister Lapid,[24] saying that "the US believes the JCPOA is the best way to put Iran back in the box." However, "when it comes to the most important element, we see eye-to-eye," Blinken said. "We are both committed, both determined that Iran will never acquire a nuclear weapon… Our commitment to the core principle that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon is unwavering. One way or another, we will continue to cooperate closely."[25] Comparing the Negev Summit to the Camp David Accords which "no one thought possible", Blinken called this the beginning of a "new dawn" for the region.

Foreign minister Nasser Bourita of Morocco relayed a message from King Mohammed VI to Blinken, saying that "when we reestablished the relations [with Israel], this is not an opportunistic move, it is a move of conviction," and promised more formal visits between the two countries’ officials, which will advance cooperation and ties further. Bourita said, "We are here today because we genuinely, sincerely, and deeply believe in peace."[26] Royal Air Morocco had opened direct flights to Tel Aviv earlier in the month.[27]

In response to the recent ISIL shooting in Hadera that killed two Israelis at a bus stop,[28] all participants condemned it.[citation needed] They decided to make the Negev summit a regular annual conference, and invite other regional partners, including the Palestinians, with Lapid saying, "We are today opening a door before all the peoples of the region, including the Palestinians, and offering them to replace the path of terror and destruction with a shared future of progress and success." And further, "What we are doing here is making history, building a new regional architecture based on progress, technology, religious tolerance, security and intelligence cooperation."[29] During the summit, the Bahraini foreign minister openly suggested discussing the establishment of a security-intelligence alliance, which he called a "mini-NATO", among all members of the summit countries.[citation needed]

Saudi rapprochement with Iran and Israel–Hamas war (2023)

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In 10 March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced the resumption of relations, following a deal brokered by China.[30] Under the agreement both countries agreed to respect the other's sovereignty and not interfere in the internal affairs of the other.[31] This triggered a chain reaction in which several Arab nations that had previously established diplomatic ties with Israel began to work towards establishing diplomatic relations with Iran, such as Bahrain and Sudan.[32][33]

After the Israel–Hamas war began in October 2023, Saudi Arabia decided to halt normalization talks with Israel.[34] In January 2024, Prince Khalid bin Bandar Al Saud, the Saudi ambassador to the United Kingdom, said in a BBC interview that Saudi Arabia was still interested in peace and normalized relations with Israel following the war, on the condition of the creation of a Palestinian state.[35]

Military reapproachment

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In June 2024, IDF Chief Herzi Halevi as well as CENTCOM chief and generals from Bahrain, Egypt the UAE, Jordan and Saudi Arabia met in secret in Bahrain in order to discuss regional security cooperation according to Axios.[36][37]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b The solidifying Arab-Israeli Alliance Archived 24 June 2022 at the Wayback Machine "Relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia continue in the shadows, with reports of senior Israeli officials regularly visiting the Gulf States. Israeli cabinet ministers have openly visited the UAE and Oman, with more set to take place in the future."
  2. ^ "Arab-Israeli Progress Seemed Impossible. That's Because of Old Assumptions". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 23 September 2020. Archived from the original on 24 June 2022. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
  3. ^ https://www.memri.org/reports/arab-reports-cooling-relations-between-syrias-assad-regime-and-iran
  4. ^ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrias-muslim-brotherhood-is-gaining-influence-over-anti-assad-revolt/2012/05/12/gIQAtIoJLU_story.html
  5. ^ https://strafasia.com/iran-and-muslim-brotherhood-a-bizarre-alliance-of-two-rival-ideologies/
  6. ^ https://www.arabnews.com/node/2390246/middle-east
  7. ^ https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2023/05/19/Saudi-Arabia-s-Crown-Prince-meets-Syria-s-al-Assad-in-Jeddah
  8. ^ https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/then-now-how-arab-states-changed-course-syria-2023-05-19/
  9. ^ https://www.newarab.com/analysis/gulf-islands-dispute-why-syria-supporting-uae-over-iran
  10. ^ Totten, Michael James (2016). "The New Arab–Israeli Alliance". World Affairs. 179 (2): 28–36. doi:10.1177/0043820016673779. JSTOR 26369507. S2CID 151328992.
  11. ^ Lappin, Yaakov (4 February 2021). "Biden decision on weapons sales to Gulf states 'important test' for Israeli-Sunni alliance". JNS.org. Archived from the original on 3 May 2022. Retrieved 19 March 2021.
  12. ^ Olson, Robert (13 June 2016). "Renewal of Turkey-Israel Relations Imminent". LobeLog. Archived from the original on 13 January 2022. Retrieved 19 March 2021.
  13. ^ a b Entous, Adam (18 June 2018). "Donald Trump's New World Order". The New Yorker. Archived from the original on 17 September 2018. Retrieved 26 January 2021.
  14. ^ Ramani, Samuel (12 September 2016). "Israel Is Strengthening Its Ties With The Gulf Monarchies". HuffPost. Archived from the original on 15 February 2018. Retrieved 14 September 2016.
  15. ^ Marcus, Jonathan (24 November 2017). "What's shaping the Israel-Saudi 'alliance'". BBC News. Archived from the original on 24 June 2022. Retrieved 20 January 2020.
  16. ^ . 13 February 2019 https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-warsaw-summit-will-test-u-s-gamble-on-israeli-arab-pact-against-irantz. Retrieved 4 February 2021. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  17. ^ "Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. 11 January 2021. p. 24. Archived (PDF) from the original on 8 March 2017. Retrieved 13 March 2021.
  18. ^ Ravid, Barak (7 September 2016). "Israel Urges U.S., Europe to Bolster Ties With Sudan, Citing Apparent Split With Iran". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 13 October 2020. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
  19. ^ Nahmias, Omri; Harkov, Lahav; Cashman, Greer Fay (11 December 2020). "Morocco, Israel normalize ties as US recognizes Western Sahara". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 16 March 2021. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
  20. ^ Norlen, Tova; Sinai, Tamir (October 2020). "The Abraham Accords – Paradigm Shift or Realpolitik?". Marshall Center. Archived from the original on 27 May 2022. Retrieved 23 March 2021.
  21. ^ Jones, Clive; Gozansky, Yoel (April 2020). Fraternal Enemies: Israel and the Gulf Monarchies. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-752187-8.
  22. ^ Pinkas, Alon (13 August 2021). "Abraham Accords a year on: Israel's biggest challenges remain". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 15 May 2022. Retrieved 13 August 2021.
  23. ^ Alashray, Enas; Chmaytelli, Maher (3 March 2022). Boyle, Jon (ed.). "Israel can become a "potential ally" if Palestinian conflict resolved - Saudi crown prince". Reuters. Archived from the original on 30 October 2022. Retrieved 2 August 2023.
  24. ^ Israel's FM Lapid welcomes US Secretary of State Blinken ahead of Negev Summit, i24NEWS, archived from the original on 27 March 2022, retrieved 28 March 2022 – via YouTube
  25. ^ Harkov, Lahav (27 March 2022). "Negev Summit: Israel, Arab states discuss regional defense alliance". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 21 July 2022. Retrieved 28 March 2022.
  26. ^ Kasraoui, Safaa. "Negev Summit: Moroccan FM Vows Strengthened Cooperation with Israel". Morocco World News. Archived from the original on 3 May 2022. Retrieved 28 March 2022.
  27. ^ Aamari, Oussama. "Moroccan FM Arrives in Israel for 'Historic' Negev Summit". Morocco World News. Archived from the original on 24 June 2022. Retrieved 28 March 2022.
  28. ^ "At least 2 Israelis killed by terrorists in Hadera shooting spree". Ynetnews. 27 March 2022. Archived from the original on 3 May 2022. Retrieved 28 March 2022.
  29. ^ "Israel's Negev Summit wraps in unanimous condemnation of terror attack". Ynetnews. 28 March 2022. Archived from the original on 14 July 2022. Retrieved 28 March 2022.
  30. ^ Gans, Jared (11 March 2023). "Five things to know about the Iran-Saudi deal brokered by China". The Hill. Archived from the original on 21 May 2023. Retrieved 27 October 2023.
  31. ^ Wintour, Patrick; editor, Patrick Wintour Diplomatic (10 March 2023). "Iran and Saudi Arabia agree to restore ties after China-brokered talks". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 14 March 2023. Retrieved 27 October 2023. {{cite news}}: |last2= has generic name (help)
  32. ^ "Iran and Sudan look to restore diplomatic ties". Reuters. 6 July 2023. Retrieved 27 October 2023.
  33. ^ "Bahrain, Iran likely to restore diplomatic ties soon, US diplomat says". Reuters. 13 June 2023. Archived from the original on 27 October 2023. Retrieved 27 October 2023.
  34. ^ "Saudi Arabia wanted to 'de-risk' the Middle East. Instead it has to hit pause on normalization with Israel". Fortune. Archived from the original on 24 November 2023. Retrieved 27 October 2023.
  35. ^ "Saudi Arabia wants peace with Israel after Gaza war, envoy tells BBC". The Jerusalem Post. 9 January 2024. Retrieved 10 January 2024.
  36. ^ Ravid, Barak. "Scoop: U.S. holds meeting with Israeli and Arab generals amid Gaza war". Axios. Archived from the original on 19 August 2024. Retrieved 13 June 2024.
  37. ^ "Under the radar: IDF chief meets with CENTCOM, Arab generals in Bahrain - report". The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. 12 June 2024. Archived from the original on 13 June 2024. Retrieved 13 June 2024.
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