The Battle of Paštrik (Serbian Cyrillic: Битка на Паштрику, romanizedBitka na Paštriku, Albanian: Beteja e Pashtrikut) was a two-week confrontation between the KLA with NATO's support against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, during the Kosovo War. The official goal of the KLA was to seize the border between Albania and Kosovo, and eliminate the Yugoslav units there. The offensive was codenamed Operation Arrow (Albanian: Operacionit Shigjeta) by the KLA.[11]

Battle of Paštrik
Part of the Kosovo War

Mount Paštrik view from Prizren
Date26 May–10 June 1999
Location42°12′38″N 20°31′24″E / 42.21056°N 20.52333°E / 42.21056; 20.52333
Result
Belligerents

KLA
NATO NATO
Artillery support:
 Albania

Medical support:
 Norway
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Yugoslav Army
Commanders and leaders
Agim Çeku
Bilall Syla
Ekrem Rexha
Sadik Halitjaha
Tahir Sinani
Beqir Sadiku
Albania Kudusi Lama
NATO Wesley Clark
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Nebojša Pavković
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Vladimir Lazarević
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Božidar Delić
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Stojan Konjikovac
Units involved
121st Brigade "Ismet Jashari"
123rd Brigade
Kukës Division[5]
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Priština Corps Units 549th Motorized Brigade
72nd Brigade for Special operations 72nd special Airborne Brigade
Russian volunteers[citation needed]
Strength
2,000
United States B-52, A-10 and Lockheed AC-130 units
Artillery support
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia three infantry battalions
one artillery battalion
one armored battalion
air defense companies (reinforcements added during the battle)[6]
Casualties and losses
16 killed, 40 wounded[7][8]

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 25 killed, 126 wounded[9]


Per NATO:
32 artillery pieces, 9 armored personnel carriers, 6 armored vehicles, 4 other military vehicles, 8 mortar positions and one SA6 surface to air missile[10]
Paštrik is located in Kosovo
Paštrik
Paštrik

KLA fighters managed to seize Mount Paštrik, its northern slopes and the village of Milaj, on the northern bank of the White Drin by the end of May.[12] In spite of heavy NATO air support, which included the use of USAF B-52 bombers, the Yugoslav Army held the line on the White Drin, where they build temporary bridges to maintain their supply lines open, supported by heavy mortars and artillery. The KLA took over the villages of Planeja, Bucare and Ljumbarda and a stretch of the border area northwest of Prizren,[13][7] but was unable to make further gains by the time of the Kumanovo Agreement on 9 June,[14] which resulted in Yugoslav troops withdrawing from Kosovo.

Background

In April 1999 a month prior to the battle, Albanian refugees from the villages of Gorozhup, Milaj, Gjonaj and Planeja at the slopes of Mount Pashtrik reported that they had been beaten, killed and forcefully driven out of their villages by Yugoslav army, police and paramilitaries.[15] The terrain between Kosovo and Albania which is mountainous only allows a few passages, the Yugoslav army sought to create defensive chain which they believed would repel a ground attack by the KLA. The Pashtrik area was particularly vulnerable if attacked by light infantry; the Yugoslav army was aware of this and established a series of watchtowers and observation posts at strategic points near the Albanian border.[citation needed]

The KLA had received training and arms from the Albanian army and western agencies, during this period the KLA also focused on recruiting ethnic Albanian veterans from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. Agim Çeku, the most prominent commander during the battle, was an officer in the Croatian army during Operation Medak Pocket and Operation Storm.[16] The KLA high command was vague in their statements about the operation. Their official goal was to capture Mount Pashtrik and the forward operation bases there. Western media reported that the KLA's goal was the capture the highway linking Peja and Prizren several kilometers north of Pashtrik and some even more ambitious reports placed the capture of Prizren as a goal. These scenarios and media reports have been assessed as unrealistic as the KLA could have captured Prizren only under prolonged ground attacks and air strikes.[17] The political goals of the KLA were not to secure a military victory but to put the 549th under fire and send a message that this was a prelude to a much larger NATO ground invasion. The KLA's force was reported to be as high as 4000 men by some western sources. Albanian TV only stated the units involved being the 121st 'Ismet Jashari' Brigade and the 123rd Brigade, both were a part of the Operational Zone Pashtrik. Wesley Clark put the number of KLA insurgents at between 1800-2000. The KLA was supported by tank and artillery fire from the Albanian army and close air support from NATO.[17]

Battle

26–29 May: Initial KLA attack

The offensive began at 4 am, when KLA troops attacked across a ten mile front from their operating areas, supported by barrages from the Albanian army and NATO air support. They quickly overran Yugoslav observation points and watchtowers.[18][19] Once past the border, some units appear to have gone to the northern side of the mountain from which they could observe armored units in Gjakova.[20] Other units went over the mountain or to the forests south of it. When Colonel Delić realized an offensive was underway, he ordered his troops to entrench and responded to the attack with howitzer and mortars. He ordered his artillery to target the avenues leading to the mountain.[21] These barrages compromised the KLA's offensive capabilities for the next two days. Despite extensive use of NATO air strikes, they did little to stop Yugoslav artillery from attacking KLA supply lines within Albania. As combat continued in the border settlements, KLA sources reported that they had overrun Planeja and were moving towards Gjonaj.[22]

1 June: Increased NATO air strikes

On 1 June, NATO aircraft launched around 150 sorties on VJ targets. NATO claimed to have hit 32 artillery pieces, 9 personnel carriers, 6 armored vehicles, 4 other military vehicles, 8 mortar positions and one SA6 surface to air missile. NATO throughout the campaign kept the KLA at an arms length. The KLA offensive had reached a stalemate, and the Yugoslav army appeared to be organizing a counter offensive. NATO fearing Milošević would get a better position at the negotiating table if they recaptured the gains made by the KLA stepped up their bombing campaign. According to Dana Priest, Wesley Clark told his officers, "That mountain is not going to get lost. I'm not going to have Serbs on that mountain. We'll pay for that hill with American blood if we don't help [the KLA] hold it."[10] Some NATO air strikes hit KLA positions, however the KLA did not suffer any casualties from NATO friendly fire at that time. These air strikes gave the KLA opportunities to attack. The Yugoslav army responded to this by shelling settlements at the border with Albania including the settlements of Pergolaj, Golaj and Krumë. These strikes didn't hit any civilian targets, but increased the refugee flows in Kukës and put pressure on the administration.[23] Albania responded to this by mobilizing its army to the border and conducting a high profile live fire exercise.[22]

6–9 June: Stalemate

On 6 June, the Yugoslav Army launched a counter offensive near Planeja. As the Yugoslav soldiers advanced towards Planeja, they were hit by 82 unguided Mark 82 bombs from two B-52s and a B-1B.[24] There are conflicting accounts about the casualties suffered by the Yugoslav troops. The Washington Post Foreign Service, which also claim that the strike involved the use of cluster munition, put the toll in "several hundreds".[25] According to some testimonies from KLA fighters, they suffered serious casualties but according to other KLA reports most were able to get into safety before the impact. A ground inspection by German KFOR troops following the end of hostilities found no wreckages of any vehicles or tanks.[7][24] On June 7, bombing and ground fighting continued around Paštrik. On June 9, the Yugoslav army retreated and the Military Technical Agreement was signed for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo.[26]

Aftermath

Despite the failure of the KLA to reach its operational objective, it has been regarded as one of the most important factors in Slobodan Milošević's decision to sign the Kumanovo Treaty. According to US army general Theodore G. Stroup, "'Milosevic lost his nerve when ground power, in the form of the Kosovar offensive and the capability of Task Force Hawk to take advantage of the offensive to illuminate the battlefield with its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, first unlocked the full capability of airpower."[27]

References

  1. ^ Grant, Rebecca (1 June 2000). "Nine Myths About Kosovo" (PDF). Air Force Magazine. Vol. 83, no. 6. pp. 50–55. Retrieved 26 June 2020. Operation Arrow was limited to one sector, and even so, it was not a success... The KLA forces came under heavy Serb artillery fire, and while some areas changed hands, no major gains were claimed by the KLA.
  2. ^ Barić, Robert (2002). "Operacija Allied Force i ograničenja zračne moći" [Operation Allied Force and limitations of air power]. Polemos: Journal of Interdisciplinary Research on War and Peace (in Croatian). 5 (9–10): 177–214 – via HRČAK.
  3. ^ H. Perritt, Henry (2010). Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. p. 199. ISBN 978-0252092138.
  4. ^ T. Hosmer, Stephen (2001). The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. p. 89. ISBN 978-0833032386.
  5. ^ Hajra, Hajro (8 March 2017). "Agim Sylejmani: Operativa e Shtabit të operacionit "SHIGJETA" Maj -Qershor 1999" [Agim Sylejmani: person in charge of the staff of Operation Arrow, May-June 1999]. Prointegra.ch (in Albanian). Retrieved 21 February 2022. Divizioni i Kukësit dhe gjeneral Kudusi Lama ishin bartësit kryesor të luftës që zhvillohej në gjithë atë front të gjerë, aq sa ishte edhe vija kufitare Shqipëri-Kosovë. [The Kukës Division and General Kudusi Lama were the main bearers of the war that took place throughout that wide front, as much as the Albania-Kosovo border line.]
  6. ^ Forage 2001, p. 61.
  7. ^ a b c Steele, Jonathan (17 July 1999). "Ghost village marks the battle that ended the war". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 24 August 2013. Retrieved 20 September 2020.
  8. ^ Saramati, Ruzhdi (6 May 2014). "Jehona e operacionit "SHIGJETA" ne Pashtrik" [The echo of Operation Arrow in Pashtrik]. Epopeja e Pashtriku (in Albanian). Retrieved 31 March 2022. Po afrohet dita e 31 Majit, për ti përkujtuar 15 dëshmorët e kombit shqiptar, që ranë heroikisht në betejat luftarake kundër pushtuesit jugosllavo – serb, gjatë Operacionit luftarak të UÇK-së "SHIGJETA". [The day of May 31 is approaching, to commemorate the 15 martyrs of the Albanian nation, who fell heroically in the battles against the Yugoslav-Serbian invaders during Operation Arrow.]
  9. ^ "Promocija knjige "Bitka za Paštrik – sećanja učesnika 1999" na Sajmu knjiga" [Promotion of the book "Battle for Pastrik - Memories of the Participants in 1999" at the Book Fair]. Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia (in Serbian). 26 October 2018. Retrieved 26 March 2023. U operaciji „Strela" brigada je imala 25 poginulih i 126 ranjenih, a neprijatelj daleko više. [In Operation Arrow, the brigade had 25 dead and 126 wounded, and the enemy far more.]
  10. ^ a b Priest, Dana (19 September 1999). "Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won War". The Washington Post. p. A1. Archived from the original on 24 August 2000. Retrieved 21 June 2021.
  11. ^ Forage 2001, p. 57.
  12. ^ Western European Union (1999). Proceedings - Assembly of Western European Union: Actes Officiels - Assemblée de L'Union de L'europe Occidentale. W.E.U. p. 313.
  13. ^ "Operation Arrow, Task Force Hawk and Air Power: KLA Ground Offensive and U.S. Army Targeting and Intelligence Point to Synergy of Joint Approach" (PDF). National Security Watch. 8 June 1999.
  14. ^ Priest, Dana; Finn, Peter (2 June 1999). "NATO Gives Air Support to KLA Forces". The Washington Post. p. A1. Archived from the original on 9 October 2000. Retrieved 14 May 2020.
  15. ^ "Killings and beatings on the journey to Albania" (PDF). Amnesty International. 20 April 1999. Archived (PDF) from the original on 24 June 2021. Retrieved 19 June 2021.
  16. ^ Steele, Jonathan (12 May 1999). "New commander for KLA". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 5 September 2024. Retrieved 5 September 2024.
  17. ^ a b Forage 2001, p. 62.
  18. ^ Wertheimer, Linda; Chayes, Sarah (28 May 1999). "KLA Push". All Things Considered. NPR. Archived from the original on 5 September 2024. Retrieved 5 September 2024.
  19. ^ Came, Barry (7 June 1999). "At the Front with the KLA". Maclean's. Vol. 112, no. 23. pp. 44–47. Retrieved 5 September 2024 – via Internet Archive.
  20. ^ Williams, Daniel (29 May 1999). "Yugoslav General Says Rebels Repelled". The Washington Post. p. A1. Retrieved 5 September 2024.
  21. ^ Shea, Jamie; Jertz, Walter (7 June 1999). Military Strikes on Yugoslavia (Videotape). Retrieved 5 September 2024 – via C-SPAN Video Library. The artillery firing into Albania continues in the Mount Pastrik area and from positions near Junik, in fact just a little over along the Kosovo–Albanian border...
  22. ^ a b Forage 2001, p. 65
  23. ^ Forage 2001, p. 66
  24. ^ a b Forage 2001, p. 67
  25. ^ Drozdiak, William (9 June 1999). "Yugoslav Troops Devastated by Attack". The Washington Post. p. A19. Archived from the original on 9 October 2000. Retrieved 29 April 2024.
  26. ^ Forage 2001, p. 68
  27. ^ Forage 2001, p. 69

Bibliography